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GNOMOLOGIUM VATOPEDIANUM: THE EURIPIDEAN SECTION¹

SPRANGER's *Preliminary Skeleton List of the Manuscripts of Euripides* (C.Q. xxxiii [1939], 98-107) mentions four gnomological manuscripts:

<i>Spranger's No.</i>	<i>Library</i>	<i>Library Cat. No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
30	Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Florence	pl. 7. 15	saec. xi
61	Biblioteca di San Marco, Venice	507	xii
217	Landesbibliothek, Darmstadt	2773	xiv-xv
235	Vatopedi Library, Mt. Athos	36/7	xii

The first² and the third³ of these manuscripts contain miscellaneous excerpts of many classical and scriptural authors, arranged under various subject-headings; though some of the excerpts are Euripidean, these manuscripts have no more right to be classified as Euripidean than have the manuscripts of Orion or Stobaeus. They are, therefore, wrongly included in Spranger's list.⁴

The second⁵ and the fourth⁶ of these manuscripts are those with which this paper⁷ is mainly concerned. Both contain,⁸ amidst much gnomological and other material, a specifically Euripidean gnomology, consisting of lines, and adaptations of lines, excerpted, in their original order, from a manuscript of the Selection of Euripidean plays. Such gnomologies⁹ are totally different

¹ This article was submitted for publication before the appearance, in September 1957, of Professor A. Turyn's *The Byzantine Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Euripides* (Illinois Studies of Language and Literature, Vol. 43). References to that book have been added in the footnotes.

² See Bandini, *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum bibliothecae Mediceae Laurentianae*, pp. 252-5. Cf. Turyn, op. cit., p. 93 n. 151.

³ See L. Voltz and W. Crönert, *Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen*, xiv. 537-71.

⁴ Mr. Spranger's list was, as he himself has made clear, only intended to be provisional. Incidentally, manuscript no. 237 on that list (Vatopedi 738/25) is not a text of *Medea*, but a paraphrase of that play written in 'modern' Greek. For some omissions in the list, see n. 9 (on this page). [The list is now superseded, except for *manuscripti recentissimi*, by Turyn, op. cit., pp. 3-9.]

⁵ See Zanetti, *Graeca D. Marci Bibliotheca codicum manuscriptorum per titulos digesta*, p. 272. See also Turyn, op. cit., p. 93.

⁶ See Sophronios Eustratiades and Arcadios, 'Catalogue of the Greek Manuscripts in the Library of the Monastery of Vatopedi on Mt. Athos' (*Harvard Theological Studies*, xi, 1924), p. 13. See also Turyn, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

⁷ I am deeply indebted to the Oxford Craven Committee for financial support in this investigation, to Mr. W. S. Barrett of Keble College for much assistance and advice, to Mr. T. C. Skeat of the British Museum, to Dr. Paul Maas, and to Mr. J. A. Spranger, for giving expert opinions on a number of points. My thanks are also due to the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes, Paris, and to the librarians of all the libraries mentioned above.

⁸ i.e. each codex—Marcianus 507 and Vatopedianus 36. The Vatopedi reference '36/7' refers to the specifically Euripidean section of that manuscript.

⁹ Others, doubtless, exist. Turyn, op. cit., pp. 93-94 n. 151, describes two such manuscripts: Vatican Barberini gr. 4 and Escorial X.I. 13. One may add that R. Devreesse, *Codices Vaticani Graeci*, iii. 196 ff., lists, under the number 711, a manuscript 'saec. xiv ex.' containing 'tragicorum sententiae selectae, nempe (ff. 121-123) Euripidis, (ff. 123v-125) Sophoclis, (ff. 125-126) Aeschyli.' Also, Papadoulos-Kerameus, 'Ιεροσολυμιτική Βιβλιοθήκη', ii. 572, lists, under the number 507, a manuscript "γραφέν περί τῶ μέσον τῆς ἡ' ἐκστ." containing "ἐΓνωμικά ἐκ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου".

in origin from more generalized anthologies, since they are part of the direct Euripidean tradition.¹

Marcianus 507 is known as the *Gnomologium Venetum*²: Vatopedianus 36 may reasonably be called the *Gnomologium Vatopedianum*.

PREVIOUS WORK. The *Gnomologium Venetum* is described by Zanetti³ as 'in 4. membranaceus, foliorum 208. saeculi circiter XII'. He mentions that it contains, *inter alia*, 'SENTENTIAE plures excerptae ex Iliade et Odyssea Homeri, et Euripidis Hecuba, Oreste, Phoenissis, Hippolyto, Medea, Andromache, Alceste, Rhese, et ex Sophoclis Ajace, Electra, et Oedipo'. The Euripidean section was further described, in 1876, by Otto Hense,⁴ who quoted a few readings from it. A collation was published by Schenkl,⁵ in 1889, but this collation is not detailed, and is, in some places, inaccurate.⁶

The *Gnomologium Vatopedianum* is described by Eustratiades and Arcadios⁷ as Μεμβρ. 23X16 αἰών. ιβ. φ. 209 κολοβ. Their description of its contents is, in its entirety, similar to Zanetti's description of the other manuscript's contents. The sections corresponding to the quotation from Zanetti (above) are (including misprints): 6. φ. 110^a 'Ἐκ τῆς Ἰλιάδος ῥαψωδία. 7. φ. 120^b Γνώμαι Εὐριπίδου ('Ἐκάβης, Ὀρέστου, Ἰππολύτου, Μηδείας, Ἀνδρομάχης, Ῥήσου). 8. φ. 130^a παρεκβολαὶ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους (Αἴαντος, Ἠλέκτρας, Τυράννου Οἰδίποδος).

¹ Cf. K. Horna, *Gnome, Gnomendichtung, Gnomologien* (P.-W. Suppl. vi), p. 84, and Wilamowitz, *Einführung*, p. 171 n. 101.

² Murray, O.C.T. Eur. I, *praef.* vii-viii, terms it '*Gnomologia Veneta*' (feminine), but elsewhere, in his *apparatus criticus*, he uses the more normal neuter form of the word.

³ Loc. cit.

⁴ *Acta Societatis Philologiae Lipsiensis*, vi. 333-5.

⁵ *Wiener Studien*, xi. 309-14.

⁶ Schenkl's collation is by Kirchhoff's text (though he uses Prinz's sigla in references to other manuscripts). The following inaccuracies are noteworthy (Murray's numeration: readings inferred *ex silentio* are in square brackets: readings derived from my own collation are in heavy type): *Hec.* 864 [θητηών] for θνητός — 956 [ἔστι πιστὸν οὐδὲν] for ἔστιν οὐδὲν πιστὸν — 1189 χρῆσθ' ἔχειν for χρῆσθ' ἐχρήν — *Phoen.* 462 ξυνελθόντ' for ξυνελθών — 495 ἀφῆσας for ἀφύσας — 538 [ἀνθρώποις] for ἐν ἀνθρώποις — 539 [πλέονι] for πλείονι — *Hipp.* 96 [κέρδος γε] for κέρδος — 240 [παρεπλάγχθη] for γὰρ ἐπλάγχθη — 252 [βίος] for βίος — 612 [φρήν] for φρήν ἐστ' — 927 [ὅς τε] for δευτε — 1295 βίον (error typographic) for βίον — *Medea* 215 μέμφοιθε' for μέμφοιθε — 217 [ἀφ' ἡσύχου] for ἀμφοῦχου — 219 ἔνεστιν for ἐνέστιν — 290 [γυναι] for πλέον — 320 [ράων] for ῥάων — 472 μολών for μολάν — 808 ἡσυχάζουσιν for ἡσυχάζουσιν — *Andr.* 185 καὶ τὸ δίκαιον for καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον — 332 [τι] for τοι — 552 ἀνηβητηρίων for ἀναμητηρίων — 597 [ξὺν νέουσιν] for ξυνέουσιν — 642

[εμικράς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς] for μακράς ἀπαρχῆς — 693 [Οἴμοι] for Ὀμοι — 700 [οὐδένεα] for οὐδέν — 1282 [φερνὰς] for φερνὰς — *Alc.* 353 [μέν, οἶμαι] for μέν οὖν οἶμαι — 680 εἶπων for ῥίπτων (see below) — 703 εὔπω (?) for Cίγα (see below) — 882 [ἀτέκνους τε] for ἀτέκνους — 1157 μεθρημόμεθα for μεθρημόμεθα — *Rhes.* 106 [ωῦτός] for αὐτός — 160 [ἔθηκας] for ἔθηκεν — 161 [μὲν] for με — 206 [παρ'] for πρὸς — 412 [ὑστερον] for ὑστερος. Schenkl omits to mention that the gnomology contains *Hipp.* 1441 (with a variant) and *Andr.* 644; he includes, on the other hand, *Hipp.* 1023, which the gnomology does not contain. In addition, his ascriptions of initial capitals, when he quotes the first word of a passage, are incorrect more often than not (cf. *Medea* 964, *Alc.* 195, 548-9, 679, 960, *Rhes.* 159, 394). [The above list contains all but the most minor explicit inaccuracies: of implicit inaccuracies only some of the most important are mentioned, since that collation makes no claim to be exhaustive.] Schenkl's εἶπων for ῥίπτων, at *Alc.* 680, is odd: the ρ and the rough breathing are clear (for the ρ cf. βαρύ and ὑβρίεις in the line above), and the πτ compendium, though somewhat cramped, is quite distinct from π (for a similarly cramped πτ compendium, cf. πίπτουσι at *Orest.* 603). Odd, too, is his εὔπω for Cίγα at *Alc.* 703: the ι and γ are perfectly normal, though the α, which is open at the top and with a long final stroke, might be confused with an open ω.

⁷ Loc. cit.

9. φ. 133⁸ Ἀρχὴ τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας· ῥαψωδία. No description other than this and Turyn's (see my nn. 1 and 6 on p. 129) has been published.¹

CONTENTS. An examination of the manuscript reveals that the Vatopedi catalogue contains a serious mistake: the *Gnom. Vatop.* contains excerpts not only from the six Euripidean plays mentioned, but also, like the *Gnom. Ven.*, from *Phoenissae* and *Alcestis*. Indeed, *Gnom. Vatop.* and *Gnom. Ven.* present almost identical texts of a Euripidean gnomology.

RELATIONSHIP OF *GNOM. VATOP.* AND *GNOM. VEN.* It seems almost certain that the Euripidean section of *Gnom. Ven.* (g) is a direct copy of the Euripidean section of *Gnom. Vatop.* (G), and was copied from it after some corrections had been added by a second hand (G₂). Subsequently, further alterations and interpolations (G₃ and G₄) were made on the first page of the original, and these, of course, do not appear in the copy. A second hand in the copy (g₂) has made a few trivial alterations, and retouched a number of letters.

The evidence is as follows:

(a) That G and g are very closely related:

(1) They give an identical selection of excerpted lines, and identical gnomological adaptations. They have the same rubricated title-headings, and the same disposition of rubricated capitals (often incorrectly placed). Even variations in the shape of some letters² and in the employment of contractions³ correspond to a great extent. [The first page of *Gnom. Vatop.* contains 8 verses in addition to those contained by *Gnom. Ven.*, but these were obviously interpolated by a fourteenth-century hand (G₃: see 'HANDS', below). To accommodate some of these interpolated verses, other verses and parts of verses were

¹ E. Miller, *Archives des missions scientifiques et littéraires*, II^e série, 2 (1865), p. 506, mentioned seeing, on Athos, a 'chrestomathie' containing separate sections of excerpts from Homer, Euripides, and Sophocles, but he gave no further description, nor any precise details as to its location. Krumbacher, *Hist. der Byz. Lit.*², p. 602 n. 5, points to the similarity in contents between the manuscript seen by Miller and the Venice one. S. Y. Rudberg, *Eranos*, liv (1956), 177, describes the manuscript as 'un recueil gnomologique qu'il vaudrait la peine d'étudier de plus près', but his mention of its contents evidently derives from the Vatopedi catalogue, since it reveals the same serious mistake (see below).

² Thus, for instance, amongst the rubricated capitals, the capital M is formed in two ways. Sometimes it is written with straight lines, like the modern printed form, and sometimes it is written with curved lines, like a minuscule μ written larger. In the six places where G has the square form (*Hipp.* 93, 328, 1083, *Andr.* 229, *Rhes.* 333, 482), g also has the square form: in three other places where G has the curved form (*Orest.* 450, *Hipp.* 1441, *Medea* 807), g also has the curved form. In two other places (*Hipp.* 1257, *Medea* 598), however, the curved form is used in G and the square

form in g.

³ Compendia are used far less frequently by g than by G; this is because G uses them constantly throughout the manuscript, while g, with a few exceptions (cf. p. 132 § c), uses them only at the end of a line, in order to preserve the right-hand margin. On the other hand, G and g agree in their use of certain of the more common contractions, such as *άνος* (= *άνθρωπος*), *μήρ* (= *μήτηρ*), *μέρ* (= *μήτερ*), *πέρ* (= *πάτερ*), *πός* (= *πατρός*), *πρίδος* (= *πατρίδος*). They also agree in the few cases where such contractions are not used: *μητρός* η *πατρός*, written out in full, at *Hipp.* 425, *πατρίς* at *Phoen.* 406, *μητέρων* at *Andr.* 230. Similarly, both manuscripts abbreviate *εύρωτιδου* in the first title-heading (*Hecuba*) by writing the δ above the preceding ι and omitting ου, but in the other title-headings both manuscripts write out the word in full. At *Alc.* 722 both manuscripts contract *θεοῦ* to *θεῖ*, though *θεός* and its derivatives are not elsewhere contracted. At *Hipp.* 1295, again, both manuscripts agree in an abbreviation of *μέρος* to *με* with an oblique line, an abbreviation more drastic than any other found in these manuscripts, and in an abbreviation of *έcriv*, a word which is only abbreviated elsewhere, in both manuscripts, at *Hipp.* 694.

erased, and rewritten within a smaller compass. In these places, however, traces of rubric (see the collations, below, at *Hec.* 293 and 332) reveal that G's original disposition of verses and rubricated capitals was the same as that found in g.]

(2) They share some major errors¹ not found in other Euripidean manuscripts, and many minor errors;² even vagaries of accentuation, punctuation, and orthography are often found to agree (cf. p. 134, n. 2).

(b) That g is descended from G, and not G from g:

(1) Palaeographic considerations³ suggest that g was written later than G.

(2) There are in G no 'trennfehler' with regard to g, except in places where G is corrected by another hand. Of these corrections, one is certainly twelfth-thirteenth century, and there is no reason to consider that the rest are not written by the same hand (G2: see 'HANDS', below).

(3) There are in g, by contrast, a number of cases of 'progressive error' with regard to G: the most notable are:

Correct text	G	g	
ἀνθρώποις	ἀνανθρώποις ⁴	ἐν ἀνθρώποις ⁴	(<i>Phoen.</i> 583)
ἡκυαίαν	ἡκυχάν ⁵	ἡκυχάζουσαν	(<i>Medea</i> 808)
οἱ	αἱ	ἱ	(<i>Andr.</i> 643)

(c) That g is directly descended from G (without intermediate manuscripts):

The most compelling evidence for this is that g, at *Andr.* 697-8, has omitted from the middle of a manuscript line, and added at the foot of the page,

τ' ἄλλων μυρίων πάλλων δόρυ· οὐδὲν πλέον δρῶν

and this section of the text corresponds exactly to one complete manuscript line in G.

Further evidence is provided by the occurrence in g of ambiguous compendia⁶ which appear to be deliberate reproductions of similarly ambiguous compendia found in G. The scribe of g, when he would normally have written out a compendium in full (see p. 131, n. 3), seems in these places to have preferred to leave scope for alternative interpretations.

The above evidence does not *completely* rule out the possibility that g is directly descended not from G but from G's exemplar.⁷ However, that hypothesis seems most improbable, and such conclusions as could be drawn from

¹ Cf., for example, the collations at *Orest.* 543, *Phoen.* 501, *Hipp.* 612, 986, *Andr.* 190, 419, 552, *Alc.* 179, 351.

² Cf., for example, the collations at *Hec.* 816, *Orest.* 3, *Hipp.* 472, 643, *Medea* 543, *Alc.* 376, 788.

³ See 'HANDS', below, and p. 134 n. 1.

⁴ Written ἀνανοίς, ἐνανοίς: see p. 131, n. 3.

⁵ A simple error, since the compendium used by G for αἱ is similar in shape to ζ: for the possibility of confusion, cf., from the same manuscript, ζ and αἱ in *καρπιζέται* at *Hipp.* 432.

⁶ E.g. T with a sign which, from its size and position, might represent either an apostrophe or the compendium for ΕΣ. In the collations I give what seems the more probable alternative.

⁷ This hypothesis would depend upon the assumption, necessary to explain the omitted line, that G has preserved, in that place, at any rate, the lineation of his exemplar. Such correspondence of lineation does occur: we find, for example, in g, manuscript lines which correspond exactly with those of G, not only in places where both manuscripts have begun an excerpt with a new line (e.g. *Orest.* 1-2: Οὐκ ἔστιν . . . οὐδὲ πάθος οὐδέ), but also in places where the manuscript line begins with half a word (e.g. *Orest.* 450-1: ξίας καὶ μὴ . . . ἔχει, and *Orest.* 1156-7: παννὶς ἀλόγιτον . . . ἀντάλλαγμα). But that g should happen to omit a line in just one such place where G and its exemplar correspond would be a remarkable coincidence.

adopting it are, in any case, nugatory. Hence, that possibility¹ is ignored in the latter part of this paper.

It seems almost certain, then, that *g* is an apograph of *G* (+ *G*₂). From this it follows that *g* is only of interest on three counts: (1) as helping to restore the original reading where subsequent interpolations have obliterated *G*'s text, (2) as helping to distinguish between *G*'s corrector (*G*₂) and *G*'s interpolators (*G*₃, *G*₄), and (3) as providing data for the study of the merits and demerits of twelfth- to thirteenth-century copyists.

The above conclusions refer only to the Euripidean sections of these two manuscripts. But both of them in their entirety contain the same works; hence it is highly probable that throughout their length the same relationship obtains.²

SYSTEM OF COLLATION. It has been necessary to discuss the relationship of the two manuscripts at such length since the collations depend, to a certain extent, upon the conclusions adopted. In the identification of *G*'s subsequent hands, while some textual alterations can be dated, and related to each other, on palaeographic grounds alone, others, consisting of one or two letters added, modified, or rewritten, cannot be so identified.³ In such cases, the textual alterations have, for the sake of economy of hypotheses, been assigned to one or other of the identified hands, according to (1) whether the ink is brown or black (see 'HANDS', below), and (2) whether or not the alteration appears in the text of what we have, on sufficient evidence, already concluded to be an apograph (*g*). It will be seen that, on this system, one cannot appeal to all the hand identifications which the collations contain when asserting the dependence of *g* on *G*, since this would involve *petitio principii*: these collations do, however, serve to demonstrate that there is nothing in the manuscripts inconsistent with this dependence.

¹ As Dr. Maas has pointed out to me, should any one wish to assert that *g* is a witness independent of *G*, when *G* is, apparently, the older manuscript, the onus of proof lies with the person who makes that assertion, not with the person who denies it. [Turyn, *op. cit.*, p. 92, has not led me to alter my opinion that *g* is directly descended from *G*. He gives it as his surmise that the two manuscripts are *gemelli*, but makes no claim to have examined the matter in detail. He quotes (p. 93 n. 149) the heading of *Phoenissae* in *g* as *ἐν τῷ δῶδου ἐκ τῶν φωνισσῶν*, and infers that *g*'s source read *φωνισσῶν* (the reading found in *G*). This fits my theory, though it is not inconsistent with his. Turyn suggests that the Venice scribe 'wrote the title correctly, but then erased *ι* to conform with his source'. My own observations do not lead me to believe that *ι*, or any other letter, has been erased: perhaps the scribe, seeing that his exemplar was incorrect, simply left a space for subsequent correction—he appears to have done the same thing at *Rhesus* 759 (see collations).]

² The cover of the Venice manuscript is marked 'Provenienza Bessarione', and the manuscript was evidently part of Cardinal

Bessarion's library, donated to the Biblioteca di San Marco in 1468. For the formation of Bessarion's library, see Vast, *Le Cardinal Bessarion*, pp. 364–78; for its contents, see Omont, *Revue des Bibliothèques*, iv. 129–87, and, for its transference to Venice, see Morelli, *Della Publica Libreria di San Marco in Venezia Dissertazione Storica*, Capo II. Bessarion would have had ample opportunity to acquire manuscripts derived from Mt. Athos [see S. Y. Rudberg, *Eranos*, liv (1956), 174].

³ A number of collators have, in my opinion, made extravagant claims in their identification of manuscript hands: a noteworthy instance from the Euripidean collations is the distinction drawn between *L*² and *L*, where one is often at a loss to discover the collator's criteria. (Mr. Barrett confirms this point from his experience of the *Hippolytus* collations.) Since a single letter added to a text must, of necessity, be shaped in accordance with the available space, and may well be adapted to conform with the writing into which it is interpolated, the colour of the ink must often be the only available palaeographic criterion. Other criteria, of a logical type, are, however, permissible: cf. Spranger, *C.Q.* xxxiii. 186.

HANDS. G is a twelfth-century hand,¹ written in brown ink. A number of corrections have been assigned to G1 (*prima manus se ipsa corrigens*).

G2 is a twelfth- to thirteenth-century hand,¹ written in black ink. It is responsible for adding τ' ἀπόλλυε at *Hipp.* 487, and to it have been assigned a number of other corrections.

G3 is a fourteenth-century hand,¹ written in brown ink. It is responsible for three lengthy interpolations on the first page of the manuscript, and to it has been assigned another alteration, also on the first page.

G4 is a hand contemporary with or later than G3, written in black ink, which has retouched many of the letters in the first two lengthy interpolations made by G3. Hence the symbols 'G3(4)' have been used to designate the joint efforts of these two hands. To G4 has been assigned another alteration, also on the first page.

g is a thirteenth- to fourteenth-century hand,¹ written in brown ink. A number of corrections have been assigned to g1 (*prima manus se ipsa corrigens*).

g2 is a hand contemporary with or later than g, written in black ink. It is responsible for retouching a number of letters written by g, and for making a few minor alterations.

MINUTIAE. The collations of both G and g, which are by Murray's text, are given in great detail.² In the case of G, the purpose is to contribute, in response to Mr. Spranger's plea,³ to the collection of full⁴ and

¹ Maas and Skeat confirm these datings.

In the case of G, they agree with the catalogue, regarding the hand as 'typically' twelfth-century. Skeat points out that the square breathings, used throughout the manuscript, suggest a date *early* in the twelfth century. In the case of G2, only the supplement which I have mentioned (τ' ἀπόλλυε) is long enough to be dated. The writing is not dissimilar to that of g. In the case of G3, the writing of the third major interpolation (*Hec.* 328-31) is clearly fourteenth-century, and the writing of the other two interpolations (*Hec.* 291-3; 317-20 and 332), though somewhat cramped through lack of space, is clearly by the same hand. In the case of g, Maas and Skeat agree with Schenkl, who writes (op. cit., p. 309): 'codex ille scriptus est si quid video aut saeculo XII exeunte aut ineunte XIII.'

² I have included many minor orthographic oddities which, though equally prevalent in the other Euripidean manuscripts, are only sporadically reported from them. Amongst these are:

(i) the marking of crases as if they were elisions — contrast, in Gg, κ' ἀγγέε at *Hipp.* 1001 with κωλίγους at *Hipp.* 987 — cf. Spranger, *C.Q.* xxxiii (1939), 185 n. 3;

(ii) vagaries of word-division:

(a) μη δέ for μηδὲ, οὐδ' ἐν for οὐδέν, ὄτ' ἀν for ὅταν;

(b) ἐξότου, παροῖεν (cf. Gardthausen, *Gr. Palaeographie*², ii. 399);

(iii) accentual vagaries:

(a) in adverbs, such as νῦν for νυν, οὐκοῦν for οὐκουν;

(b) in nouns, such as μῦθος, γῦναι, ἀνδράειν, and the accusative plurals τιμάς, κυφοράς, ἀφορμάς;

(c) in verbs, such as ὀνομαῖαι, δράσαι, and the participles μολῶν, θανῶν, εὐτυχῶν;

(d) in enclitics: cf. ἔχει τίν', ἐμὸν πότ', λύπη τὲ, μὲν εἰμὶ, γυναικες ἐμὲν.

I have also included examples of 'diacritic' apostrophe (οὐκ' and οὐχ': cf. Gardthausen, op. cit., p. 398), and of 'inter-aspirates' (καθίσταται, ἀνθύπουργεῖν, ἐξάμαρτάνειν, ἐνέε-τω, ὑπεράλγειν: cf. *ibid.*, pp. 385-6). These I have not observed in the other Euripidean manuscripts, though they may occur.

³ *C.Q.* xxxii. 200. Cf. Page, *Medea*, p. iii.

⁴ It is not, of course, suggested that *apparatus critici* should contain all such details as are included in the present collation. The full collations should be published separately, *editorum in usum*. The aim of such full collations is not solely the detection of *leifehler*. They also enable us to gain a deeper understanding of the manuscript through acquaintance with its characteristic faults. Thus, for instance, in Gg, γυναικες ἐμὲν (for γυναικίς ἐμὲν) at *Medea* 231, together with many similar examples of wrongly accented enclitics (see n. 2 (iii, d.) on this page) shows that at *Medea* 408 γυναικες ἐμὲν is, on the scribal evidence, no less likely than γυναικες ἐ μὲν. So, too, a com-

accurate¹ collations of Euripidean manuscripts. In the case of g, the purpose is firstly to present in full the data on the basis of which the dependence of g on G has been asserted, secondly to give the evidence by which alone the original G+G₂ text can be distinguished from the subsequent G₃+G₄ interpolations, and thirdly to provide information which may be useful for a study of twelfth- to thirteenth-century scribal practice.²

While *minutiae* have been recorded, *minutissima* have, in the interests of brevity, been neglected: thus, for instance, vagaries of punctuation have been ignored, as have the many instances of final grave accents preceding marks of punctuation.

The collations have been made by inspection both of the originals³ and of photographic facsimiles. While inspection of the originals was, of course, essential, in order to distinguish the various hands, nevertheless the photographs, particularly in the case of erasures, were sometimes clearer than the manuscripts themselves. The photographs are now in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

For the convenience of those who may wish to check doubtful points, a list of pages and their contents is given:

G	Selections from	g	Selections from
120b	<i>Hec.</i> 227 to <i>Hec.</i> 588	123a	<i>Hec.</i> 227 to <i>Hec.</i> 592
121a	<i>Hec.</i> 588 to <i>Hec.</i> 957	123b	<i>Hec.</i> 593 to <i>Hec.</i> 1193
121b	<i>Hec.</i> 1187 to <i>Orest.</i> 455	124a	<i>Hec.</i> 1193 to <i>Orest.</i> 605
122a	<i>Orest.</i> 542 to <i>Phoen.</i> 201	124b	<i>Orest.</i> 605 to <i>Phoen.</i> 360

parison of the readings at *Hipp.* 614, *Medea* 195, *Andr.* 230 and 697 suggests that οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἀμαρτάνω at *Hipp.* 323, though it may be a simple miswriting of οὐ γὰρ εἰς ε' ἀμαρτάνω, might well be regarded as virtually equivalent to οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἀμαρτάνω, and this, perhaps, is how the gnomologist understood the line. Finally, ἔχθος (for ἀχθος) at *Orest.* 3 and ἔχος (for ἀχος) at *Hipp.* 1462, both deriving from confusion of two very similar compendia, show that at *Hipp.* 1260 ἐπέχθομαι, though seeming to be midway between the variants ἐπάχθομαι and ἀπέχθομαι, is nevertheless the virtual equivalent of ἐπάχθομαι. [Turyn, op. cit., p. 327, perhaps through inadvertence (but cf. *ibid.*, p. 11 *ad fin.*), cites Gg as reading ἐπάχθομαι here.]

¹ In spite of the pleas for re-collation (see p. 134, n. 3), the number of gross inaccuracies in the collations of Kirchhoff, Prinz, and Wecklein is not generally realized. I append a miscellaneous selection of manuscript readings noted in the course of this and other investigations: *Hec.* 282 κρατεῖν] πράττειν O — 585 κακῶν compendio ὄν suprascripto V — 866 πόλεως sine dubio O (not, as Kirchhoff, πόλεος, *not*, as Murray, πόλεος ut videtur) — 1191 τὰ δίκαι' in τὰδικ' mutatum O — 1194 ἀπώλοντ' οὐτις O — 1226 καφέστεροι O = *Orest.* 51 θήξαντ' A — 63 οἶκον P — 119 πνευμένη P — 143

ἀποπρό μοι] ἀποπρόβι L — 150 λόγον δ' A — 153 λόγον μετάδος A = *Phoen.* 486 οἶκον] δόμον P — 487 τὸν ἱεὸν αὐτῆς χρόνον V — 1622 οὐ μὴν γ' ἐλίξας ἀμφὶ VO = *Hipp.* 187 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν D = *Medea* 179 omisum in B = *Andr.* 185 καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον B — 597 ξυννέουσιν, ut videtur, V = *Alc.* 600-2 εὐγενὲς ἐκφέρεται] εὐγενὲς εὐγενὲς αἰδεῖται] ἐκφέρεται B, sed verba εὐγενὲς αἰδεῖται lineola delevit nescioquis: εὐγενὲς (? = εὐγενὲς) εὐγενὲς αἰδεῖται] ἐκφέρεται O — 868 χαίρων προσορῶ B — 882 τε omisum in BDO — 1085 ε' νῦν D = *Rhes.* 107 πρόσκειται καλὸν γέρας sine dubio O (not, as Wecklein, ut videtur) — 665 μέλλειν V. Other quite important manuscript variants are mentioned by Kirchhoff but not by Wecklein or Murray. Innumerable minor variants have been neglected by all previous collators (see p. 134, n. 2).

² Mr. Skeat informs me that amongst extant Greek manuscripts there are few such pairs of exemplar and apograph deriving from so early a date. For this reason the writer intends to publish elsewhere a survey of some interesting features of scribal practice revealed by these collations.

³ The collations made at Vatopedi were completed in circumstances not dissimilar to those described, in picturesque detail, by Miller, op. cit., pp. 501-2.

122b	<i>Phoen.</i> 201 to <i>Phoen.</i> 472	125a	<i>Phoen.</i> 374 to <i>Phoen.</i> 526
123a	<i>Phoen.</i> 472 to <i>Phoen.</i> 1596	125b	<i>Phoen.</i> 526 to <i>Hipp.</i> 96
123b	<i>Phoen.</i> 1622 to <i>Hipp.</i> 346	126a	<i>Hipp.</i> 96 to <i>Hipp.</i> 403
124a	<i>Hipp.</i> 358 to <i>Hipp.</i> 610	126b	<i>Hipp.</i> 403 to <i>Hipp.</i> 667
124b	<i>Hipp.</i> 612 to <i>Hipp.</i> 930	127a	<i>Hipp.</i> 668 to <i>Hipp.</i> 997
125a	* <i>Hipp.</i> 930 to <i>Hipp.</i> 1339	127b	<i>Hipp.</i> 997 to <i>Medea</i> 119
125b	* <i>Hipp.</i> 1340 to <i>Medea</i> 215	128a	<i>Medea</i> 120 to <i>Medea</i> 299
126a	<i>Medea</i> 215 to <i>Medea</i> 470	128b	<i>Medea</i> 299 to <i>Medea</i> 808
126b	<i>Medea</i> 470 to <i>Medea</i> 1080	129a	<i>Medea</i> 808 to <i>Andr.</i> 365
127a	<i>Medea</i> 1080 to <i>Andr.</i> 404	129b	<i>Andr.</i> 365 to <i>Andr.</i> 700
127b	<i>Andr.</i> 404 to <i>Andr.</i> 765	130a	<i>Andr.</i> 700 to <i>Alc.</i> 211
128a	<i>Andr.</i> 818 to <i>Alc.</i> 354	130b	<i>Alc.</i> 301 to <i>Alc.</i> 705
128b	<i>Alc.</i> 355 to <i>Alc.</i> 727	131a	<i>Alc.</i> 705 to <i>Alc.</i> 960
129a	<i>Alc.</i> 773 to <i>Alc.</i> 1010	131b	<i>Alc.</i> 960 to <i>Rhes.</i> 412
129b	<i>Alc.</i> 1011 to <i>Rhes.</i> 509	132a	<i>Rhes.</i> 412 to <i>Rhes.</i> 961
130a	<i>Rhes.</i> 509 to <i>Rhes.</i> 961		

*125b also contains *Hipp.* 1078-9.

SIGLA. The *sigla* referring to manuscript hands are as above. Where a variant quoted is that of the first hand in both manuscripts, the *sigla* are normally omitted.

Every line contained in the gnomology is mentioned. Where the line contains no variants from Murray's text, the line number is followed only by a comma or a full stop.

No contractions are noted, and variants written in contracted form are printed in full. Both manuscripts everywhere omit the iota, and instances of this are not noted. Neither manuscript employs consistent word-division: half-spacing is used in the collations where the implied word-division is doubtful.

In addition the following signs are used:

† indicates that the line begins with a rubricated capital.

‡ indicates that the line has been, or *may have been*, deliberately curtailed or adapted to suit the gnomologist's purpose.¹

• signifies the erasure or deletion of a letter, breathing, or accent.

COLLATIONS

Hecuba: *Inscriptio γινώμαι τοῦ εὐριπίδου· ἐκάβης*

227† *Γίνωσκε* 228 τοι] τι Gg, sed o inter τ et ι addidit G4 253†, 254 ἡμῶν g: ἡμῶν G: ὑμῶν G3 — πέρμα ὅσοι 255 τιμᾶς μὴ δὲ γινώσκουσιν 256, 257, 282†, 283 habet g: habuit G, sed hoc versu eraso in eodem spatio vv. 283, 291 scripsit G3(4) — εὐ δοκεῖν g: εὐ δοκεῖν G3(4) [291 solus habet G3(4) — Νόμος littera N non rubricata — ἡμῖν — ἱκος 292 solus habet G3(4) — τοῖς δούλοις] 293† habet g: habuit G, sed verbis τὸ . . . λέγει erasis in eodem spatio v. 292 et verba τὸ . . . λέγει scripsit G3(4): sub verbis ἱκος (291) et καὶ (292) a G3(4) scriptis rubricationis erasae vestigia manent 294 πείθει 295 κ' ακ' G: κακ' g — δοκοῦντων mutavit in δοκοῦντων G1 — αὐτὸς — ταυτὸν

306†, 307 ὅτ' ἂν G: ὅτ' ἂν g 308, 311† Οὐκοῦν — βλέποντα 312 χρωμες' θ' (primum verbum) G 317† et 318 habet g: habuit G, sed litteris τι (verbi ζῶντι) et verbis μὲν . . . ἔχοι deletis in eodem spatio litteras τι et verba μὲν . . . ἔχοι et v. 319 et verba ex v. 320 τὸν . . . μακροῦ scripsit G3(4) — ἐμοὶ Gg — κ' εἰ g G3(4) [319 solus habet G3(4) 320 solus habet G3(4)] [328-31

¹ Cf. Schenkl, op. cit., p. 310: 'Non pauca ut loci communes efficerentur immutata omissa addita esse invenies.'

quattuor puncta (··) in margine posita significant G3 huc velle referri hos vv. in ima pagina scriptos et eodem signo signatos: tum punctis erasis alterum signum paulo inferius posuit, ut hi vv. post 371 legerentur: hos versus solus habet G3 — Oi littera O non rubricata — θαυμάζεις — ὁμοία 332† habet g: habuit G, sed verbis Aí aí (?) τὸ δοῦλον erasis in eodem spatio finem v. 320 (γὰρ ἢ χάρις) et Aíai (littera A non rubricata) τὸ δοῦλον scripsit G3(4): sub verbo γὰρ (320) rubricationis erasae vestigia manent — Aí aí g — πεφυκέναι Gg 333, 370† του omittitur 371 ὡς πότε εὐ πράξει με χρή 375†, 376 ἐντιτιθείς G 377, 378, 379† κ' ἀπίσθημος G: κ' ἀπίσθημος g 380 ἐσθλῶν] ἐσθλῶν — καπιπλεῖον 381.

497† μὲν εἰμὶ 498, 585† θυγατερ G — οὐκ οἶδ' — κακῶν compendio ὄν supra ὦν scripto 586 ᾄψωμαι τινός 587 τὸ δ' — δὲ κείθεν 588 διαδοχος G 589 μη 590 φρενῶν 591, 592 οὐκ οὖν 593 θεόθεν ***** εὐσταχυν G: θεόμεν εὐσταχυν g 594 ἀμαρτοῦσα ὦν g 595, 596, 597, 598 χρητὸς ἔστ' — αἰεὶ mutavit in αἰεὶ g 599 ἄρ οἱ 600 γέ g, sed accentus erasus 601, 602 οἶδε 622† εἰς 623, 624 ὁ μὲν 625, 626 τάδ' 627 τέ 628 κατ' ἡμαρ — τυγχάνει G

814† τάλλα 815 μαστεύομεν 816 μονὴν 817 εἰς 818 ἴν' εἴ ποτε 819 βούλητο τυγχάνη θ' 864† Οὐκ' ἔστι θνητός 865 δοῦλος ἔστιν 866 πόλεως ἢ δήμου γραφαὶ 867, 898† et 902† ἔσται τάδ' οὕτω πᾶσι γὰρ κοινὸν τόδε 903† Ἰδία θ' ἐκάστω G: Ἰδία θ' ἐκάστω g 904, 956 φεῦ omittitur — οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν πιστὸν 957 οὗτ' αὖ G — πράττειν

1187† ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐχρῆν ποτὲ 1188, 1189 χρῆστ' ἔδρασε χρῆστ' ἐχρῆν (ἐχρῆν g) λέγειν 1190, 1191 τὰ δίκαι' εὐ περιτέλειν 1192 εἰς' οἱ G: εἰς οἱ g 1193 δια g 1194, 1226† οἱ ἀγαθοὶ σαφέστεροι 1227 αὐθ' 1238†, 1239 ἐνδίδωκ

Orestes: *Inscriptio* ἐκ τοῦ ὀρέστων εὐριπίδου

1†, 2 συμφορὰ 3 ἔχθος 70†† σωθῶμεν omittitur 100† δέ μοι 108† Εἰς 126† φύςκ G 127† καλῶς litteris αλωα a rubricatore rescriptis g 213, 214, 232†, 236†, 251 cὺ νῦν 252, 300† αἰδὲ 340†, 388† 'Ουχ' G: 'Οὐκ' g — πρόσωψις G: πρόσωψις littera ι a rubricatore rescripta g — μ' omittitur — τάργ' 390† τὸ δ' ὄνομ' οὐ G

413† εἰσγασμένους G 424† εἰς φίλους ἔφυς κακός 450† της 451, 454† οὐκ' g 455 μὴ πὶ 542† εἰς 543 μὴ παισίμους συμφορᾶς 602† καθεστᾶσι 603 μὴ G — πίπτοντες 604, 605†, 606, 638†, 639, 640†, 641, 666†, 667 ὅτ' ἄν G: ὅτ' ἄν g — τί χρή φίλων 668, 670 κ' οὐχ' G: κ' οὐχ g 737† γίνεσθαι 772† ὅτ' ἄν 792†† οὐκ ἔμοιγε σοῦ omittitur 794†† οὐκ ἄρ' ὀκνήσεις omittitur — φίλοις

823† Τὸ γὰρ κακοῦργεῖν ἀσέβεια μεγάλη 824 τ' omittitur 1034† Πᾶσι 1082† Ἀλλ' ὦ — ὄνομ' 1083 ἔστιν 1155, 1156, 1157 ἀντάλλαγμα g, sed primus accentus deletur 1161† Οὐκ' — ἐκποδῶν mutavit in ἐκποδῶν G1 — ε αἰνῶν 1162 βάρος τί — ἔστιν 1175† δια 1176, 1182† μέλλειν] λέγειν — ἔχει τίν' 1523† τίς — ὁρᾶν

Phoenissae: *Inscriptio* εὐριπίδου ἐκ τῶν φωνισσῶν (sic G: φωνισσῶν g spatio unius litterae inter ν et ε relicto)

198† Φιλόφρογόν τι χρήμα 199 συμκράς δ' ἀφορμᾶς ἦν 200 ἐπεισφέρουσι 201 ἀλλήλαις 270†, 271 ὅτ' ἄν G — πους — χρονιός 355†, 356, 358†† Ἀναγκαίως ἔχει solum 359 ἀπαντας g, sed τας in rasura scripsit g 360, 374† μήτηρ 375, 386† βούλει — ταῦτ' 388 ἢ 389, 392† τόδ' τὸ γ' — α τίς 393 χρεῶν φέρειν 394, 395 εἰς — παρα — δουλευταῖον 396 βόσκουσι 397 καλοῖς δὲ βλέπουσι ὅμμασι

403 πράττειν — ἦν τις δυστυχῇ 406† εἴοικε 407 ὀνονομάσαι G, sed alterum νο delevit G1: ὀνομάσαι g — δύναμι' ὡς ἔστι 438†, 439, 440 δυναμὶν τε G: δύναμις

τε g 452† 'Επις G: 'Επίς g, sed compendium ec addidit rubricator 453
μύθοι — πλείον ἀνύουσι — [post 453 et ante 454 χάσας δὲ μύθοι πλείον ἀνύουσι
σοφόν G, sed deletit G2] 454, 461† *Οἶαν G — θυμωθῆς 462 εἰς ἐν ξυνελθὼν —
ὀμμασι 463 ἐφοίσει ἡκει — χρεῖ G: χρή G2 — σκοπεῖν μόνον 464, 469† μύθος 470
κ' οὐ — δεῖ τ' ἂν δίχ' 471, 472 νοσῶν ἑαυτῷ 494† Ταῦτ' οὖν ἕκαστα 495 ἀθροΐας]
ἀφύσας 496, 499† ταυτὸ — σοφόν θ'

500 ἀναμφίλεκτος 501† Νῦν θ' ὅμοιον οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἔιν 502 ὀνομαῖα 507†, 508
παρεῖναι G 509, 510 τοῦλασσαν 526 μὴ πὶ 527, 528† οὐχ' g 529 ἡμπερία 530 τί
531, 532† φιλοτιμίας παῖ solum 538† συνδεῖ omittitur — νόμιμον — ἀνανθρώποις
G: ἐν ἀνθρώποις g 539 πλείονι — καθίσταται 540 τοῦλασσαν — θ'] δ' 555†
χρηματ' G 556 δ' ἔχοντες] δέχοντες 557 ὅτ' ἂν G — χρήζωσιν g 558 ὄλβος g 597†
είσορῶ omittitur — Δεινὸν

721†, 731†, 772†, 917†, 965† Πᾶσι — ἀνθρώποις 1214†, 1215 κοῦκ] οὐκ
1216, 1446†, 1595† *Ω G: *Ω g — ἀπαρχῆς ὡς ἐμ' ἔμφυκας 1596 πλήμον g
1622† Οὐκοῦν ἔλεξας ἀμφί 1623 ἐμὸν πότ' 1624 οὐδ' εἴπερ 1680, 1762† ἀλλὰ
γάρ omittitur 1763 ἐκ θεῶν omittitur.

Hippolytus: Inscriptio εὐριπίδου ἐκ τοῦ ἱπολύτου

93† Mice — πᾶσι 94, 95 ἐν δ' ἐνπροηγόροιςιν — τίς — χάρις omissum in
margine addidit g1 96 κέρδος γε] κέρδος 102†, 105†, 117† χρή σε 118 εἴ τις
ὕφ' — σπλάχνον 119 τούτου 183† κ' οὐδενὶ 184 οὐδὲν c' 185, 186, 187 τὸ μὲν
γάρ ἐστιν 188 λύπη τέ — χερσι τε 189, 190 κ' οὐκ 240† Ποῖ γάρ ἐπλάγχθη 245
κατ' ὅσων δάκρυά μοι 246, 247, 248, 249 γινώσκοντες 252† βίος] βίος 253,
254 ἀνακρίνασθαι

319† ἀπόλλυειν οὐχ' — ἐκοῦσαν G — οὐχ' 323† εἰς ἀμαρτάνω 328†, 331†
ἐσθλὼν αἰσχροῖ 345† Φεῦ πῶς κτλ — ἄ μ' ἐχρῆν 346 οὐ μ' ἂν τις G — τ' ἀφανῇ
358† οἶ g — οὐχ' — ἐκόντες G 359† ἐρώων solum 377† Ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν — κατα
378 εὐφροεῖν 379 τάδε 380 χρηστ' ἐπιστάμεθα — γινώσκωμεν 381 οἱ μὲν 382, 383
ἄλλην τίνες 395† ἦ] ἦ 396, 397 αὐτῆς

403†, 404† δρώει] δρώντι 424† Δουλοὶ — θρασύπλαχνός τις G: θρασύ-
πλαχνος τις g 425 ὅτ' ἂν G 426 τοῦτο φᾶς ἀμυλᾶσθαι 427 κ' ἀγαθὴν g: κ' ἀθὴν G,
sed γα suprascriptis G1 428 ἐξέφθην 429, 430 παροῖςιν 431, 432, 435†, 436,
465† συνεκκομίζωιν Κύπριν omittitur 466 ἐστι G: ἐστι g 471†, 472 πράξεας
486† Τοῦτ' ἐσθ' 487 δόμους' G — τ' ἀπόλλυε g, quae verba omisit G, supra-
scripsit G2 — verbo οἱ alterum spiritum addidit G2 488 οὐ γάρ τι — ὥσιν
489 ἐξότον τίς 498† λέξας — συγκλείσεις 499.

604† Οὐκ ἔστ G: Οὐκ ἔστ g — δευ' 609† μύθος 610, 612 γλώσς' G: γλωσσ' g —
φρὴν ἔστ' ἀνώμοτος 614† Ἀπέπτυσ οὐδ' εἰς (εἰς g) — ἄδικος ἔστι 615 εὐγνῶθ' G
616 ὦ g 617 εἰς κατώκησας 640† ἐν γ' 641 πλείον 642, 643 τοῖς σοφέσιν 644 βρα-
χεῖα 663† γευμένος G, sed mutavit in γεγευμένος G2 664 οὐποτ' 665 εἰ φησί τις μ'
666 πῶς εἶναι κακεῖνα 667 ἦ νῦν τίς 668 ἦ κάμ' ἑάτω 693† *Ολοοῖ καὶ ἐν χ'
ὅστις 694 πόθυμός G, sed mutavit in πρόθυμός G2 701†, 785† οὐκ' 881† Αἰ αἰ

911† Σιγὰς G — δ' omittitur 912, 913 κᾶν — ἀλίσκεται 914 κᾶτι 915, 916,
917, 919 οὐδὲ θηράσασθ' g 920 οἷσιν οὐκ' 921† Δεινον G 922 δυνατός omittitur —
ἔστ' 925, 926, 927 ὅς τε] ὅστις 928, 929, 930 τ' ἀδικ' 931 κ' οὐκ 936, 937, 938,
939 ὁ δυστερος G 940, 941 γαίαν 942 955† ἐπεὶ γ'] κακός γ' 956, 957 αἰσχροῖ 981
οὐκ' g — τινὰ 982 τὰ] τὸ — παλιν g 986† Ἐγὼ γ' ἀψιγωγος Gg, sed pars litterae
w in G erasa ut ἀψιγωγος efficeretur — ὄχλον g — λογους G: λόγους g 987
εἰς ἡλικας G: εἰς ἡλικας g, et accentum supra η addidit rubricator 988, 989
ὄχλου g 996† γὰρ] γοῦν 997 φίλοις τὲ G 998 μὴτ' ἀπαγγέλλειν G: μὴτ' ἀπαγγέλλειν

g, sed apostrophus et spiritus erasus 999 ἀνθύπουργεῖν 1000 οὐκ' ἐργελαστής — ὁμιλοῦντων G 1001 αὐτός — κ' ἀγγύς — φίλος 1022† γὰρ omissum suprascripsit g1 — οἷος εἴμ' ἐγὼ 1024, 1070† Αἰ αἰ' — δακρύν τ' ἐγγύς Gg, sed apostrophum in rasura scripsit g1 1071, 1078-9 vide post v. 1466 1083†.

1257† verbi Μίσει in G priorem ι scripsit rubricator 1258 ἦσθην 1260 οὐτ' ε' πέχθομαι 1290† οὐχ' 1291, 1292, 1294† 'Ως ἐν ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν 1295 βίοντος] βίου 1339† λύπη δὲ κάμοι' λυπεῖ θανῶν με 1340 χαίρουσιν — δὲ μὴν 1341 τέκνησι 1389† 'Ω G — οἷαις κυφοραῖς συνεζύγης 1390, 1433† ἀνθρώποις solum 1434 ἐξάμαρτάνειν 1441† Μακράν γε 1462† τὸ δ' ἔχος 1463, 1464, 1465, 1466.

Hic sequuntur 1078-9 — φεῦ εἰθ'

Medea: Inscriptio ἐκ τῆς μηδείας εὐριπίδου (μηδίας G, sed correxit G2)

54† δούλοισι G, littera o, ut videtur erasa: δούλοισι g — κυφορὰ 55 κακῶς omittitur 76†, 85† ἄρτι G littera o, ut videtur, erasa — γινώσκει 86 αὐτὸν — μᾶλλον φιλεῖ] φιλεῖ πλέον 87 οἱ μὲν 119†, 120, 121, 122, ἐπ' ἴσοις G: ἐπ' ἴσοις g 123 ἔμοι γοῶν εἰ μὴ μεγάλως 124 γ' τ' 125, 126 τοῖνομα — χρήσθαι τε 127 ὑπερβάλλοντα 128 θνητοῖς] βροτοῖς 129, 130 ἀπέδωκε 190† κ' οὐδέν 191 οὐκ' g 192 ἐπι μεν G 193 παρα g 194 εὐροτο 195 οὐδεῖς] οὐδ' εἰς 196 εὐρετο 197 θάνατος 198.

214† δόμον g 215 μή μοι τί — μεμφοῖσθε G: μέμφοισθε g 216 ὁμμάτων 217 θυραῖους — οἱ δ' ἀμφυχού 218, 219 οὐκ' ἐνέστιν ὀφθαλμοῖς 220 σπλάγχχνον G 221, 230† ὅς] ὅς 231 γυναῖκες ἐμὲν 263†† κυᾶν omittitur — τάλλα G: ταλλα g 264 κακὴ δ' — εἰσὶν 265 ὅταν G — κύρη 266 οὐκ' — φρῆν 278†, 279 κ' οὐκ' G: κ' οὐκ' g 290† ἀπέχεσθαι — γύναι] πλέον 291 μαλθακισθένθ' 294†, 295, 296, 297, 298 προσφέρειω σοφᾷ 299 κ' οὐ 300 εἰδέναι τί 301 λυπρὸς ἐν πόλει 316† μαλθακ' — εἴσω 317, 318 τοῶ δὲ δ' G: τὸ ῶ δὲ δ' g — πέποιθα σοι 319 ὀξύθυμος g 320 ῥᾶον 330† βροτοῖςιν

408 ἀμχανάσται G, sed τα suprascripsit G2 409, 446†, 447, 469† θρασος G — τὸδ' ἔστιν 470 δράσαντ' — δράσαντες 471, 472 ἀναίδει· εὐ — μολᾶν 516† δῆ] δεῖ 517 ἀνθρώποις 518 δεικνύειν G, littera ε, ut videtur, erasa 519, 520†, 521 φίλοι omittitur — κυμβάλως 522† εἰοικεν — φύναι 523, 524 ὑπ' ἐκδραμεῖν G: ὑπέκδραμεῖν g 525 γύναι 542† δέ μοι γε 543 κάλιον 544 πίσημος 561† ἐκποδῶν 573†† τίθεσθε omittitur 574 οὐκ' G 575 χ' οὕτως — οὐκ' 598†, 599 μηδ' μὴ δ'

618†, 659†, 660 μη G — καθαρὰν 661 κληῖδα 662, 797†† ἐξεχθρῶν g — φίλοι 807† κ' ἀσθενῇ 808 μηδ' ἡσυχάζαν G: μηδ' ἡσυχάζουσιν g 809 κ' οὐ φιλοῖσι δυσμενῇ 810, 890†† γυναῖκες] 'Ω φίλτατ' 891 ἀντιτίθεν νῆπι ἀντι 964† μὴ μοι σύ omittitur 965, 1078† καὶ] Νῦν — τολμήσω 1079, 1080, 1224†, 1228†, 1229 ἐπιρυνέτος 1230, 1346† Ἔρρ 1360.

Andromache: Inscriptio εὐριπίδου ἀνδρομάχῃ

100† οὐδέν 101 τελευταῖαν 102, 181† τοι] τι — θηλειῶν ἔφν 182 γυγάμοις G, sed ξ addidit G2 184†, 185 καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον 189†, 190 τῶν] ταῖς 229† γύναι 230, 231 τέκνα οἷς — ἐνέστι G 237† γύναι] ποτέ 238, 239 γε] μὲν 240 αὖ] ἀν 319†, 320 οὐδέν] οὐδ' ἐν — μέγα 321 εὐκλοία — μὲν ἔστιν — ὑπο G 322, 323 οὐκ' — δοκεῖν φρονεῖν 330, 331, 332 τε] τοι 352† χρή πὶ 364† Ἄγαν γ' 365 καὶ G, sed mutavit in καὶ G1 — ἐξετόξευσε 368† Εὐ δ' ἰσθι ὅτου τίς 369 τοῦτ' ἔσθ' G — τροῖαν 376†, 377 πέφυκας 404 δῆτ' — δῆτ' 405, 418†† λέγ' οἱ ἐπραξα. πᾶσι δ'] "Οὕτως μάλιστα πᾶσιν — ἄρ] ἄρ 419 δ αὖ ἀπειρος 420, 421 ὥκτειρ G: ὥκτειρ' g — ἀκούσας 422 κύρη 445†, 446, 447 μηχανοράφοι 448 ἐλικτὰ — κ' οὐδέν G: καὶ οὐδέν g, ut videtur, sed mutavit in κ' οὐδέν rubricator 449 εὐνυχεῖτ' altero e a rubricatore rescripto — ἀν ἐλάδα

551† εοικέ 552 τοδ' — ἀναμητηρίων 553 μ' omittitur 590† κακ κακῶν 591 κοί που — ἀνδράσι G: ἀνδράσι g 595†† πασῶν κακίστην] Ἄλλ' ὦ κακίετε — οὐδ' ἂν G 596, 597 ξὺν νέοισιν] ξυνέουσιν 598, 599 τ' οὐκ] οὐκ G: οὐκ' g — ἀνασχετὰς 600 κῆτα] κᾶτα 639 ἐκομίζου — κύδιστον 640 καὶ omittitur 641, 642 μακρὰς ἀπαρχῆς 643 γλώσσα — οἱ] ἡ G: ἡ g 644, 693† *Ωμοι 694 τρώπαια — πομίων G, sed *le* suprascripsit G2 695, 696, 697-8 εἰς] εἰς — τ' ἄλλων μυρίων πάλλων δόρυν· οὐδέν πλεον δρῶν in textu omissum in ima pagina restituit g 699 ἐναρχαῖς g — κατα g 700 οὐδέν 701 οἱ δ' 702 βούλησις θ' 764†, 765 δεῖ δειλόν g: δειλόν G, sed mutavit in δεῖ δειλόν G2

818† θανάτου νιν ἐκλύσασθε omittitur — ἡβάδων 819 μολόντ' 930†, 936 καγῶ — σειρήνους g 937, 938 με χρῆν mutavit in μ' ἐχρῆν, ut videtur, g1 943† οὐποτοπουτ' G: οὐποτοπουτ' g — εἰςᾶπαξ 944 ἔστι G: ἔστι g 945 ἄλοχον G: ἄλοχον g — εἰσφοιτᾶν 946, 952†, 953 δρώσι — πόλλ' ἄγαν κακά 957†, 958, 985† ἐν δέ 986 οὐκ'

1007†, 1008 κ' οὐκ' G: κ' οὐκ' g 1050†† et 1051† *Ηκω μαθὼν νῦν· τῶν γὰρ ἐκ δόμιον φίλων 1052 κατοίκον 1279† Ἄλλ' εἰ γαμεῖν δεῖ τ' ἔκ τε γενναίων χρεῶν 1280 δοῦναι τ' ἐσθλοὺς 1281 μὴ πύθυμίαν 1282 μὴ δ' εἰ (εἰς g, sed c erasum) — φρενὰς g 1283.

Alcestis: Inscriptio ἐκ τῆς ἀλκήστιδος εὐριπίδου

42†, 109†, 110, 111 ἀπαρχῆς G: ἀπαρχῆς g, sed alter spiritus erasum 179† cε] της — δέ με 195†† Πάντας προσεῖπε — προσερίθη 210, 211, 301†, 309 ἡπιούσι G: ἡπιούσι g, ut videtur, sed mutavit in ἡπιούσι g1 — μητρυάτέκνοις G: μητρνα τέκνοις g 310 ἡπιωτέρα 336† οὐκ' 337† οὐμός — γύναι] φίλος 350†† Κοὶ προσπεσοῦμαι — περιπτύσσω 351 ἀγκάλας] ἀνάγκαις 352 οὐκ' 353 μὲν οὖν οἶμαι 354 ἅπαν τλοίην ἂν — ὀνειράσιν 355 φίλω 356 κᾶν — λεύσεν G, sed mutavit in λεύσειν G1: λεύσειν g — ὄντων' 376† γε omittitur — φύλης χειρός 380† δρασσω 381 οὐδέν ἔσθ'

527† κ' οὐκέτ' ἐσθ' G: κ' οὐκέτ' ἐσθ' g 528, 540†, 542 παρα — φίλοις 548†-9† εἴτων παρεῖναι πληθὸς omittitur — θύρας δέ κλεισόν· οὐ πρόπει κτλ 550 στεναγμόν 557† προς 558 κακοξένους 600-3 τὸ γὰρ εὐγενὲς εὐγενὲς αἰδεῖται· ἐκφέρεται πρὸς αἰδῶ· ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς δὲ πάντ' ἔνεστι σοφίας — cetera omittuntur 616†† Φίλου μὲν ἡμάρτηκας 617 δυσμενῇ 669 ἄρ'] ἂν 670, 671, 672 θανεῖν 679† *Ἀγαν γ' 680, 685, 686, 692† *Ην μὴν 693 *cm*κρόν

703†, 704, 705 κ' οὐ 712, 719† Φεῦ εἰθ' — τοῦδ' εἰς 722†, 723 λῆμμα — κ', οὐκ' — ἀνδράσι — τοσόν G: τὸ σόν g, ut videtur, sed mutavit in τοσόν g1 726 θανόντ' μοι 727 γῆρας g, sed a in rasura scripsit g2 773†, 774 ξένους g litteris οἱ a g2 rescriptis 775, 776† ἐταῖρον g litteris ρο a g2 rescriptis — ὄρας Gg, littera o a g2 rescripta 777 συνωφρυνώμενω g littera ρ a g2 rescripta 782†, 783 κ' οὐκ' 784 μέλλουσαν g litteris αν a g2 rescriptis 785 τύχης G, quod mutavit in ψύχης G2: ψυχῆς g 786 κᾶστ οὐ 787, 788 εὐφρενε — πίνε 789 τύχης] τέχνης 797† νοῦν g, sed o erasum — φρενῶν] κακοῦ 798, 799, 800 συνωφρυνώμενοις G, sed ρ addidit G2: συνωφρυνώμενοις g littera ε a g2 rescripta 801 ἅπασιν ἔστιν 802, 814† *Ο δ' οὐ 837† καὶ χεῖρ] ψυχῇ τ' 865† μῆτερ μ' ἔτεκε 866, 867, 868 χαίρων προσορῶ 869, 882† τε omittitur 883 τῆς δ' ὑπεράλγειν 884, 885, 886 θανάτους g, sed parte litterae v erasa in θανάτοις mutatum 887, 888 εἶναι G — δια

942† προσήθεις 943 εἰκόδοι 960† ἔξω] οὐκοῦν — κύδιον 961, 1008†, 1009 υπο 1010, 1011, 1078†, 1081 ἄγει g littera α a g2 rescripta 1085 μαλάζει c' νῦν δ' ἐθ' (δ' ἐθ' aut δ' ἐθ' g) ἡβάσι κακόν 1086, 1101 πειθου — τ' ἄχ ἂν — εἰς 1157† μεθρημόμεθα G: μεθρημόμερθα g 1158 εὐτυχῶν

Rhesus: *Inscriptio* εὐριπίδου ἐκ τοῦ ῥήκου

84† μῦθος 105† δράσαι 106 αὐτὸς 107, 122 ἀνὴρ — χειρ[ι] θράσει 159† Δόλων οἷσθ' οὖν — εὐκλεὰ 160 ἔθηκεν 161† Οὐκ οὖν G — μὲν] με — πονοῦντ' ἄξιον 162† 163 πρὸς g littera o a g2 rescripta — διπλὴν g 176† χεῖρ' g, sed mutavit in χεῖρες g2 206† παρ'] πρὸς 266† *HG: H g — ἀγρώτες

317† *Οταν g littera a a g2 rescripta — εὐσταθῶων 318 συμφορὰ Gg, litt era p a g2 rescripta — τ' ἀγαθὰ 327† ἀτίσεις] ἔλεξας — καπίμομος 328 πόλιν] φίλους 332†, 333†, 394† φιλῶ λέγειν solum 395 τ' ἀληθὲς αἰεὶ κ' οὐ — διπλοῦς G 4 111†† παρέσχον ὦν cū] *Εσθλῶν (*Εσθλῶν g) φίλων δὲ 412† φίλων] ἡμῶν 422† κ' αὐτὸς — εὐθείαν 423 κ' οὐ 424†, 425 ἦπαρ — ἐπειρόμην 443 ὕστερον 482† τάγγυθεν

509†† θάσσω] *Οσθ' ὥς G, sed ι addidit G2: Οἷσθ' ὥς g — μερμέρω 510†, 511, 583†, 584 βιάσσειον G 625†, 626 οὐ] οὐ Gg, sed mutavit in οὐ g1 634†, 639† λόγοις 665† μέλλειν — παντ' — δοκεῖ 666 συμμάχους] ἐς φίλους 667 γνῶσει G: γνῶς** g: γνῶση g2 756† κ**απὶ G: καπὶ g — κακοῖσιν πρὸς 757 αἰσχυρὰ — καίτοι] καὶ τοὶ 758 εἰ omittitur 759 θανότι G: θανότι g spatio uni us litterae inter o et τ relicto 760, 961†.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GNOMOLOGY. The *Gnomologium Vatopedianum* is, with the exception of the Jerusalem palimpsest, probably the oldest Euripidean manuscript which we possess. Its readings should be quoted at all relevant places alongside those of MABVHLP, and its testimony must be taken into account in any attempt at elucidating the mutual relationship of those manuscripts—cf. Turyn, op. cit., p. 92. Some tentative conclusions concerning the manuscript's place in the Euripidean textual transmission have already been published—*Proceedings of the London Classical Society*, contained in *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (University of London)*, No. 4 (1957), pp. 60–61.

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HERODOTUS AND HISTIAEUS¹

'He who tries to play a double part, and fails in the attempt, as Histiaeus did, is not likely to occupy an honourable place in history. He seems to have been of great and selfish ambition, without the capacity to form a judgement as to the means requisite to carry it out, and without any scruple as to the means he did adopt.'² Grundy's judgement has proved widely influential among modern scholars. It has been seriously questioned only by Heinlein,³ who, in making Histiaeus the loyal confidant of Darius, offered a radically different interpretation of his political career. But the wild and undisciplined nature of many of Heinlein's conjectures prevented his hypothesis from winning acceptance. In this paper I venture to suggest that the accepted view of Histiaeus as a private adventurer might be false, and that a revaluation of his career along the lines proposed by Heinlein might be profitable.

In the history of the Scytho-Thracian campaigns undertaken by Persia in the penultimate decade of the sixth century the name of Histiaeus is mentioned by Herodotus in three connexions. First, he is singled out as the opponent of the proposal made by Miltiades the Philaid that the Danube bridge be destroyed, and Darius and his army left stranded on the Scythian side of the river (4.137-8).⁴ Second, invited by Darius to name his reward for this service, he chose the district of Myrcinus in Thrace (5. 11). Finally, he had Myrcinus taken from him, allegedly at the instigation of Megabazus, and, after being recalled by Darius to Sardes, he travelled with the royal entourage across Asia Minor to Sousa (5. 23).

Herodotus' story (4.98 and 136) that Darius ordered the bridge to be dismantled if he and his army had not returned within sixty days, condemns itself through lack of motive, and may be ascribed to a tradition designed to blacken the characters of the Ionian tyrants. The part which Herodotus assigns to Miltiades has also been seriously questioned by modern historians.⁵ Yet there is nevertheless no real reason to disbelieve Herodotus' assertion that the destruction of the bridge was in fact mooted. The outbreak of revolt in certain cities of the Hellespont (5. 1 and 26) suggests that Darius had suffered a heavy reverse north of the Danube, and for the confederate forces at the river to contemplate the destruction of the bridge would be the natural consequence of the receipt of such news. Histiaeus' opposition to the proposal, whoever its author, seems confirmed by the actual award of Myrcinus, and Herodotus will be correct in ascribing to him the argument that, if Darius fell, the Persian-supported system of tyranny in Asia Minor would collapse (4. 137). In his initial appearance in

¹ This paper is a revised version of the essay which was successfully submitted for the Oxford University Ancient History Prize in 1955. My thanks are due to Mr. C. Hignett, who first taught me to question the fashionable view of Histiaeus, to Mr. P. A. Brunt, and to Dr. G. E. F. Chilver, for much advice on both bibliographical and historical points.

² G. B. Grundy, *The Great Persian War and*

its Preliminaries (London, 1901), p. 141.

³ *Klio*, ix (1909), 341-51.

⁴ All references are to Herodotus, except where otherwise indicated.

⁵ The earlier reconstructions are summarized in How and Wells's note on 4. 137. Recent papers, with references to the later literature, have been contributed by Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* lxxi (1951), 212-21, and by Hammond, *C.Q.*, n.s. vi (1956), 113-29.

Greek history Histiaeus thus emerges as pro-Persian in sympathy. Significant from this standpoint is Herodotus' story of the Egyptian crier (4. 141). This indeed is far less likely to be genuine tradition than a piece of dramatic fiction, but at the same time its inventor clearly presupposes that some sort of intimacy between Darius and Histiaeus was commonly known. It is more than probable that Histiaeus had been entrusted with the command of the fleet during the King's absence in Scythia.¹

In return for this act of allegiance Histiaeus was invited to name his reward. His choice fell upon the district of Myrcinus in Thrace. Modern scholars have seen in this the ambition to establish himself in an independent stronghold and cast off allegiance to Persia. This view does not indeed lack the personal support of Herodotus, whose language about Myrcinus is quite unambiguous. He comments (5. 11): αἰτέει δὲ Μύρκινον τὴν Ἡδωνῶν, βουλόμενος ἐν αὐτῇ πόλει κτίσασθαι. And later, at the time of Aristagoras' flight in late 497, he speaks of Μύρκινον τὴν Ἡδωνῶν, τὴν Ἰστιαίος ἐτείχεε παρὰ Δαρείου δωρεὴν λαβὼν (5. 124). Herodotus further describes (5. 23) how the grant was revoked on the advice of Megabazus, who drew Darius' attention to the wealth of natural resources in the region, and to the revolutionary designs which Histiaeus might be entertaining. But these passages are far from decisive. All clearly derive from the same source. Herodotus' belief in the sinister motivation behind the choice of Myrcinus rests only upon the reported speech of Megabazus which he subsequently gives, and Megabazus' behaviour in turn is fully explicable in terms of personal jealousy. Heinlein² demonstrates the impossibility of taking Megabazus' accusation seriously. If Darius had entertained suspicions of the type accepted by modern scholars, he should at least have demanded of Histiaeus a defence of his conduct at Myrcinus, and should still more have shrunk from the the prospect of giving a suspected traitor the opportunity to promote intrigue in his own court. On the other hand, I see no reason to doubt that Megabazus did actually make the accusation, nor any reason to follow Heinlein³ in making it originate in groundless boasts made by Megabazus' descendants.

Three distinct questions are raised by this Myrcinus episode. (1) Why was the grant made? (2) Why did Megabazus oppose it? (3) Why was it revoked?

It is obvious without examination that Darius would not bestow favours which it was not in his political interest to bestow. It must have been convenient for him that Histiaeus should opt for Myrcinus, just as it must have been convenient for him that Coes, whom he rewarded at the same time, should choose the tyranny of Mytilene (5. 11). Both doubtless chose as they were instructed to choose. The award of Myrcinus must therefore be considered in the wider context of Persian policy in Europe.

One of Persia's strategic objects at this time, as Grundy⁴ rightly emphasizes, was the control of the Hellespont-Macedon coastal road. Herodotus nowhere states this categorically, but it is clearly implied by parts of his narrative. Thus, after insisting (5. 2) that the conquest of Thrace was undertaken on Darius' express orders, he defines the area of Megabazus' conquests as τὰ παραθαλάσσια (5. 10), and appears (5. 21) to record a dynastic marriage with the court of Macedon.⁵ The vital sector of this coastal road was its point of contact with

¹ As suggested by Duncker, cited and followed by Swoboda, *P.W.*, s.v. Histiaeos, cols. 2047-8.

² Op. cit., p. 344. ³ Op. cit., p. 346.

⁴ Op. cit., pp. 70-75.

⁵ Grundy, op. cit., pp. 65-66, 70-71, needlessly magnifies the apparent contradiction between the expression τὰ παραθαλάσσια

the valley of the Strymon, the line taken by the great northern trade-route from central Europe, and the hub of the network of roads radiating from the Thracian goldfields. A measure of its importance to Persia is afforded by the military decision to expatriate the Paeonians. Since Myrcinus was adjacent to Paonia, and part of this same critical region, it is impossible to accept Herodotus' implication that Darius was totally ignorant of its strategic and economic assets. On the contrary, the expatriation of the Paeonians and the grant of Myrcinus are clearly designed to serve the common purpose of strengthening Persian control of this part of Thrace. Since Histiaeus was the intimate friend of the King, Darius had no more hesitation in making over Myrcinus to him than he would have had to a regular Persian governor, from whom indeed he might well have had more to fear.

Heinlein¹ offers a different reconstruction of the Myrcinus episode. Megabazus' campaign in Thrace he proposes to make contemporaneous with the Scythian campaign of Darius, and the foundation of Myrcinus by Histiaeus he dates before either. For the first part of his hypothesis he relies on the consideration that led Macan² to suggest that the campaigns of Megabazus and Otanes might be contemporaneous, namely that Megabazus could scarcely have launched a major campaign to the west with the Bosphorus still in revolt. He appeals also to Herodotus' implication (7. 59) that it was as early as the Scythian campaign that Persia garrisoned Doriscus in Thrace. But how, after such a remark as 'Die Chronologie ist die schwächste Seite Herodots',³ can Heinlein safely employ any chronological datum which the historian supplies, especially one so vague as this? In support of his latter claim Heinlein argues the necessity of a considerable time-gap for Histiaeus' venture to have become sufficiently developed to attract Persian attention. The tradition that Histiaeus received Myrcinus in return for his service at the bridge he dismisses as the kind of anecdote that Darius' notorious generosity would easily attract to itself. He does not indeed deny Histiaeus a part in the Scythian campaign, employing it to explain the lack of completion of his project at Myrcinus, but he refuses to commit himself as to the nature of that part. Heinlein's theory rests on the assumption that Myrcinus was an independent venture. If, as I claim, it had Persian sanction from the beginning, his arguments cease to be relevant.

After his recall to Sardes Histiaeus found himself in the position of *Βασιλέως σύμβουλος*, 'Royal Adviser on Greek Affairs' (5. 24: Herodotus twice uses the

and what Herodotus elsewhere (5. 2 and 16) says about the range of Megabazus' conquests. In the former passage he writes: *ἤλαινε τὸν στρατὸν ὁ Μεγάβαζος διὰ τῆς Θρηκίης πᾶσαν πόλιν καὶ πᾶν ἔθνος τῶν ταύτῃ οἰκημένων ἡμερούμενος βασιλεῖ.* Here the direction implicit in the preposition *διὰ* is fixed by the narrative which follows, i.e. east to west from the Hellespont towards Macedon. Herodotus means only that Megabazus reduced every city and tribe encountered along this route, not every city and tribe anywhere in Thrace. In the latter passage the words of *δὲ περὶ τὸ Πάγγαιον ἔρος . . . οὐκ ἐχειρώθησαν ἀρχὴν* are only a qualification of Herodotus' earlier assertion, not a flat contradiction of it. It is clear in general that the oral traditions upon which Herodotus drew for this part of

his work, uncritical as they were and tainted with local prejudice, prevented him from forming any coherent picture of Persian strategy. He was for example led to believe that the expatriation of the Paeonians had no deeper motive than Darius' admiration of the domestic efficiency of their native women (5. 12-15), while his Macedonian informants concealed their court's reception of Persian overtures in the attractive legend that the Persian ambassadors were secretly done away with as they wine and whored (5. 17-21).

¹ Op. cit., pp. 341-3.

² Herodotus IV-VI (London, 1895), ii. 59-60.

³ Op. cit., p. 342.

expression). His high standing in royal favour made him, inevitably, an object of immoderate suspicion and hatred to permanent Persian ministers, Megabazus now and Artaphrenes later. They in turn did their utmost to achieve his downfall, and, where Megabazus failed, Artaphrenes in the end succeeded. Their accusations against Histiaeus are of great historical significance in the assessment of relations between Greek and Persian at the royal court, but they cannot be employed at their face value for the reconstruction of the political aims of Histiaeus. Herodotus was quite aware of the jealousy of Histiaeus' Persian enemies. When Artaphrenes and Harpagus had Histiaeus put to death, they did so, in the historian's opinion, *ἵνα μὴ διαφυγὼν αὐτῷ μέγας παρὰ βασιλεῖ γένηται* (6. 30). It is to be regretted that Herodotus did not bear in mind the strength of their emotions when he reported the earlier aspersions of Megabazus and Artaphrenes as literally true.

It therefore follows that we are not obliged to accept the tradition that Histiaeus was recalled from Myrcinus solely at Megabazus' instigation. Herodotus himself gives the true explanation in making Darius stress to Histiaeus that his prolonged absence would create an irreparable gap in the royal advisory council on foreign affairs (5. 24-25). We may conclude that, when the King contemplated returning home, he was left with no option but to cancel his grant, and take Histiaeus with him. Another governor for Myrcinus would readily be available if required, but there was no other Greek upon whom Darius could equally depend for his foreign ministry.

What happened to Myrcinus after the recall of Histiaeus is left obscure. Darius appears to have taken no further steps to secure the district for Persia, and it is not heard of again until the later months of 497, when it became the goal of Aristagoras' ill-fated exodus from Miletus (5. 125-6; Thuc. 4. 102). This seeming negligence is perhaps symptomatic of a general failure to consolidate the achievements of Megabazus in Thrace. While Darius' return to Persia need not in itself indicate the abandonment of plans for western expansion, it is significant that Megabazus had already been recalled before the King's departure from Sardes (5. 23), and there is no evidence that his successor, Otanes, continued his campaigns on the south coast of Thrace. Herodotus records him only as campaigning with success against the insurgent states of the Hellespont (5. 26), and thereafter passes him over in silence, apart from an allusion to his continued presence in Asia Minor during the period of the Ionian revolt (5. 116). Failure to consolidate seems true also of the hard-won territory of Paeonia. For the expatriated Paeonians, accepting an offer of assistance made by Aristagoras after his return from Athens in the winter of 499/8, were able to return to Thrace without encountering serious Persian opposition (5. 98). It must be concluded that most of the Persian garrisons left in Thrace had been drawn off by the time of the Ionian revolt. Herodotus does not invalidate this conclusion when, in his account of Xerxes' advance on Greece, he says of Doriscus in Thrace *Περσέων φρουρὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κατεστήκει ὑπὸ Δαρείου ἐξ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ Σκύθας ἐστρατεύετο* (7. 59). That the preposition *ἐξ* cannot here be interpreted as connoting uninterrupted Persian possession is proved by the itinerary of the returning Paeonians, who were transported by the Chians as far as Lesbos, and by the Lesbians as far as Doriscus (5. 98).

Some years after the disappearance of Histiaeus from the Aegean coast the Ionian revolt broke out. However defective the aetiology supplied by Herodotus, there is no obvious reason to reject his statement that its immediate

cause lay in the difficult personal circumstances in which Aristagoras found himself placed after the failure of the Naxian expedition (5. 35). Grundy,¹ however, suggests a different explanation. According to him Aristagoras was already in conspiracy before the expedition took place, and 'in urging it upon Artaphrenes he simply aimed at bringing about the mobilization and concentration of the Ionian fleet—to provide, in other words, the only possible means for that combination between Greek cities which was absolutely necessary for the success of the revolt'. Moreover, Grundy claims that these pre-Naxian intrigues were aided by the receipt of secret information which Histiaeus was able to obtain at Sousa.

It must be said at once that Grundy's thesis is not very realistic. The part played by Aristagoras in the actual preparation and mobilization of the Naxian expedition would in fact be a very small one. It was clearly not within his province to determine what contingents should be called upon to serve in it. De Sanctis² has demonstrated the degree to which Aristagoras' part in the Naxian affair has been magnified by the hostile tradition upon which Herodotus drew, and he cogently argues the impossibility of his having entertained any grandiose personal ambitions in passing on to Artaphrenes the request of the Naxian oligarchs.

What evidence does Grundy adduce in support of his contention that the idea of rebellion was conceived before the Naxian expedition took place? His initial appeal is to the sudden appearance of a body of enthusiastic 'fellow-conspirators' immediately Aristagoras first voiced the suggestion of revolt in the autumn of 499: ἐβουλεύετο ὡν μετὰ τῶν στασιωτῶν (5. 36). But is Grundy correct in assuming that the word must necessarily bear the interpretation which he gives it? Syme has said that every monarchy is a concealed oligarchy, and the tyranny of Aristagoras constituted no exception to this rule (5. 124: πρὸς ταῦτα δὴ ὡν συγκαλέσας τοὺς συστασιώτας ἐβουλεύετο [Ἀρισταγόρης]). It is therefore permissible to interpret the word simply as 'the members of Aristagoras' party'. Grundy appeals further to the federal character rapidly acquired by the revolt, both in nomenclature, where the insurgents styled themselves τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰόνων (5. 109), and in the issue of a uniform coinage.³ But the explanation of this phenomenon does not necessitate the adoption of Grundy's hypothesis. All that it demonstrates is the existence in Ionia of widespread discontent with Persian rule, upon which Aristagoras knew that he could rely in making the decision to break with Persia.

Among the grievances of the Ionians Cary⁴ has stressed economic pressure, but this suggestion is hard to reconcile with Herodotus' assertion (5. 28) that Miletus was at the height of her prosperity shortly before the outbreak of the revolt. Archaeological evidence is of course entirely absent, since the trade of Miletus lay mainly in woollens. The principal resentment of the Ionians, as Histiaeus had warned his fellow tyrants at the bridge (4. 137), was Persia's retention of the outmoded system of tyranny. It was consciousness of this that prompted Aristagoras to the successful device of overthrowing the Ionian tyrannies in late 499 (5. 38), and the Persians to the introduction of democratic reform as soon as the revolt had been suppressed (6. 43). Herodotus himself dates the inception of the revolt by the overthrow of the tyrants,⁵ and it may be

¹ Op. cit., pp. 84 ff.

² Riv. Fil., N.S. ix (1931), 49-54.

³ See Gardner, *A History of Ancient Coinage*

(Oxford, 1918), pp. 91-103.

⁴ C.A.H. iv. 218-19.

⁵ Miletus, he says, fell in the sixth year

inferred from this that he believed their deposition to be a true and sufficient explanation of the revolt's initial success. A second grievance lay in the changed status in which the Ionians found themselves after the Lydian supremacy gave way to that of Persia in 541. Immediately after the fall of Sardes they had offered to submit to Persia on the same terms as the Lydian monarchs had granted them, but, Miletus excepted, the offer had been rejected (1. 141). Under the philhellene Croesus they had paid tribute only as Lydian subjects (1. 6), and had been exempted from military service.¹ But now payment of tribute was supplemented by the demand for ships and men. Ionians were forthwith drafted into Harpagus' expedition against Caria and Lycia (1. 171), and into that of Cambyses against Egypt (2. 1). Indeed, even when Persia attempted to alleviate conditions after the revolt by fiscal and constitutional reorganization (6. 42-43), nothing was done about military service, and the Ionians were instructed to supply warships and horse-transports for the Persian expedition against Athens and Eretria (6. 48).

Grundy's claim that the revolt was already conceived before the Naxian expedition must therefore be rejected. But there remains his further claim that Histiaeus was party to the revolt. For this Grundy offers the following evidence: (i) The message of the tattooed slave allegedly sent by Histiaeus to Aristagoras (5. 35). (ii) Herodotus' insistence that by 500 Histiaeus was affected by nostalgia at Sousa, and was prepared to employ any means to secure his return to the coast (5. 35 and 107). (iii) Histiaeus' flight from Sardes in 496 after the accusations levelled at him by Artaphrenes (6. 1-4).

It is not enough to dismiss the story of the tattooed slave as mere legend.² Legend it clearly is; but to deny the possibility that Histiaeus and Aristagoras communicated by means of a tattooed slave is not to deny the possibility that they may have communicated by a more orthodox coding system, and over a longer period of time. Such a possibility will no doubt appeal to historians of Grundy's line of thought, but its very nature prevents it from being the sort of possibility that could be confirmed or rebutted by direct historical evidence. If the possibility that Histiaeus and Aristagoras were secret correspondents is to be taken seriously, it will have to be shown that the circumstances of the time were such as to render any alternative hypothesis untenable, and no apologist of the tradition associating Histiaeus with the responsibility for the revolt has yet succeeded in showing this.

The nostalgia of Histiaeus is employed by Herodotus to explain both his eagerness for the revolt to be staged (5. 35) and his subsequent promise to Darius to end it by negotiation (5. 106-7). Clearly it applies to the latter consideration only. Apart from the intrinsic improbability that Histiaeus should have chosen, to satisfy a personal desire, a course which, whatever its outcome, must involve widespread death and destruction in his native Ionia,³ it is not even clear how Histiaeus could hope that the staging of the revolt would secure his return to the coast. Plainly he could not know in 499 that Darius would two years later be reduced to straits of absolute dependence upon negotiation by one of his ministers. Disunity among the Ionians was too

after the apostasis, and the apostasis he has already identified with the deposition (6. 18 with 5. 37).

¹ See How and Wells on 1. 141.

² As is done by Heinlein, *op. cit.*, p. 346,

Swoboda, *op. cit.*, col. 2048, and De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

³ See the observations of De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

notorious. Thus, in their war against Alyattes of Lydia, the Milesians had found only Chios willing to lend them aid (1. 18), and again, at about the time of the collapse of the Lydian empire, the philosopher Thales had vainly urged upon the Ionians the advisability of founding at Teos a stronghold for purposes of common deliberation and defence (1. 170). Still less can Histiaeus have entertained the hope that a revolt against Persia would be successful enough to secure his direct liberation. Unlike most of his compatriots, he had been given the opportunity to view something of the real power and magnitude of the Persian empire. It was indeed on precisely this ground that the geographer Hecataeus, the best-informed of Aristagoras' advisers, had initially opposed the idea of revolt (5. 36).¹ Histiaeus, then, cannot have believed that the Ionians could withstand the might of Persia. In fact his behaviour at Sardes strongly suggests that he had underestimated the strength of the rebellion, as it was natural that he should. But Herodotus is right to emphasize Histiaeus' nostalgia. His decision to abandon the security of the Persian court for the uncertainties of diplomatic intrigue with the Greeks proved a fatal one, and can be explained only by a persistent yearning to see the Aegean once more.

It is perhaps characteristic of modern scholarship that it should refuse to allow so human an emotion as nostalgia to dictate a person's behaviour. Scholars have accordingly assumed that Histiaeus had political reasons for undertaking his pacifist mission, and even that his promise to Darius was merely a pretext to conceal his real ambitions. Swoboda² typifies this view in suggesting that Histiaeus aimed through a settlement to obtain a position of personal supremacy in Ionia. Heinlein³ would go much further. Histiaeus' aim, he argues, was the combination of the Greek cities of Ionia and the Aegean into a political unit subject to Persia, with the creation of himself as its satrap. Such schemes were not entirely new. Both Thales and Bias had made suggestions for Ionian unification (1. 170), but Histiaeus extended their application by proposing that the new Ionia should be shaped into a Persian province. Heinlein optimistically supposes that Histiaeus' alleged promise to obtain Sardinia for Darius (5. 106) reflects informed contemporary opinion on his policy, and therefore commands respect. Heinlein's and kindred views are probably right to the extent that Histiaeus would naturally expect some form of reward for his diplomacy, and that a position of influence among his fellow Greeks would attract him particularly. But, in the total absence of evidence on the subject of Histiaeus' political aspirations, detailed speculation of the kind offered by Heinlein seems neither legitimate nor useful.

The satrap Artaphrenes, like Megabazus earlier, did not let slip the opportunity to unleash his hatred of the interfering Greek upon whom Darius had lavished favours. 'Histiaeus', he said, 'had stitched the shoe for Aristagoras to put on' (6. 1-2). And this time the hope of bringing Histiaeus low was a real one, for his patron and protector lay three months' journey away, at Sousa. Histiaeus, by coming to Sardes, had played straight into his enemy's hands. If we reject, as we must, the reality of the guilt alleged by Artaphrenes,⁴ we are

¹ I am not convinced by the suggestion of De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61, that the cautiousness of Hecataeus represents a tradition which he himself circulated *post eventum* to dissociate himself from what transpired to be the ill-judgement of Aristagoras and the rest of his council.

² *Op. cit.*, cols. 2048-9.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 349-51.

⁴ The personal hatred underlying his accusation is admirably analysed by Heinlein, *op. cit.*, pp. 345-6, who reconstructs the stages by which the tradition that Histiaeus was party to the revolt developed from it.

left to explain Histiaeus' flight from Sardes. It is possible, since it was Artaphrenes who, aided by the general Harpagus, ultimately had him put to death (6. 30), that Histiaeus felt his life in danger if he should protract his stay at Sardes, but, on the whole, it seems unlikely that the satrap at this stage felt himself sufficiently secure to murder the King's favourite. The most probable explanation is that Histiaeus, on his arrival at the scene of the revolt, realized that he had underestimated its strength and that his rash promise to end it by negotiation could not now be fulfilled.

Once Histiaeus had implicitly broken with Persia by yielding ground before Artaphrenes, his career reached its peripeteia. The circumstances of his flight from Sardes left him with no option but to throw in his lot with the insurgents. At the same time he struck back at Artaphrenes by sending from Chios inflammatory messages to a Persian group in Sardes hostile to the satrap, with which, Herodotus suggests, he had been in previous communication (6. 4). The main facts of this rather mysterious incident cannot be doubted. The ruthless action taken by Artaphrenes against the detected conspirators testifies to the reality of their guilt. If Herodotus is correct in his implication of previous communication, and is not simply reproducing what Artaphrenes may have given out in public to justify his action, then one of two conclusions must follow. Either Histiaeus was involved with the conspirators before his arrival at Sardes, or he must have been approached by them immediately they heard of his clash with Artaphrenes, for he escaped on the first night after his arrival (6. 2). The latter conclusion would make a very crowded picture of Histiaeus' visit to Sardes, but it is for all that a perfectly feasible one. Heinlein,¹ on the other hand, bases his reconstruction on the former alternative. He would maintain that Histiaeus' object in leaving Sousa was in the first instance the consummation of a deeply laid plot against Artaphrenes, and that negotiation with the Ionians was secondary to this. Hence he attaches great significance to Herodotus' assertion that it was precisely when he heard of the burning of Sardes that Histiaeus asked to leave Sousa (5. 106). Such a reconstruction certainly deserves consideration, but it is faced with the obvious difficulty that we are entirely ignorant of both the aims and numbers of the Persian conspirators. Commentators have been reduced to guesswork.² Heinlein himself makes the subsequent suggestion that Artaphrenes' open ambition to enlarge his own satrapy may have made enemies for him among his fellow-countrymen.³

While the flight of Aristagoras and his party certainly points to some loss of enthusiasm for the revolt,⁴ the temper of the insurgents as a whole was still defiant. It therefore follows that, if it were true that Histiaeus had been in conspiracy against Darius, his flight from Sardes should have meant an escape to friends and freedom. But in fact his reception by the Ionians could not have been more hostile. He was first imprisoned at Chios as a proved associate of Darius (6. 2), and shortly afterwards handled violently at Miletus itself (6. 5). His position now was desperate in the extreme. The hostility of Artaphrenes, the conspiracy at Sardes, and the failure of the diplomatic mission made it impossible for him to return to Darius, while the Ionians utterly rejected his overtures. His only means of escape was to resort to piracy in the waters of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 345.

² See, e.g., How and Wells on 6. 4.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 349.

⁴ See the discussion of De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

Byzantium (6. 5). So long as the war continued and neither side possessed the leisure to devote itself to his extermination, his position was both safe and profitable for himself, and to the Ionian confederacy, dependent as it was on corn-supplies from the Euxine (6. 26), damaging in the extreme. But with the collapse of Ionian resistance the security of his position vanished. The quest for a further sphere of influence, in which Thasos in particular interested him, led him through a dramatic series of adventures in the Aegean, until finally captured by his Persian enemies (6. 26-30).

Conversely, Heinlein¹ categorically denies that Histiaeus ever contemplated joining the insurgents, and argues that he took steps, as soon as he arrived in Chios, to advance his original plan of bringing about a settlement. In company with modern historians generally Heinlein assumes that Histiaeus' initial aim was to reinstate himself in the tyranny of Miletus. Such an assumption scarcely does justice to Histiaeus' political sagacity. He if anyone knew the strength of anti-tyrannical sentiment in Ionia, and, whether he aimed at prolonging the revolt or bringing it to an end, his purpose was not likely to be advanced by a resurrection of the tyranny. Heinlein relies on the explanatory gloss provided by Herodotus in his description of Histiaeus' rejection at Miletus—οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ἄσμενοι ἀπαλλάχθέντες καὶ Ἀρισταγόρῳ οὐδαμῶς πρόθυμοι ἦσαν ἄλλον τύραννον δέκεσθαι ἐς τὴν χώραν, οἳ αὖτε ἐλευθερίας γενοσάμενοι (6. 5). But the fact that the Milesians expelled Histiaeus because they had had enough of tyranny plainly does not prove that his intention was to establish one. He was given no opportunity to explain, much less actualize, his plans. His expulsion is simply a commentary on the reputation with which he came, the reputation of an ex-tyrant and an agent of Darius.

Heinlein's view that Histiaeus still aimed at a settlement rests upon the premiss that pro-Persian sympathy existed in some strength in the larger insurgent states. This premiss he establishes by appeal to the desertion of the Samian and Lesbian contingents at the battle of Lade (6. 14). This is probably safe, though the strength of the pro-Persian groups would begin to mount only with the renewal of the Persian offensive, which was by no means immediate. But Heinlein's attempt to show that Histiaeus actually entered into negotiation with such groups I find unconvincing.

At Chios, for example, the ability of Histiaeus to communicate with the Persian conspirators at Sardes and his ability to obtain aid for his return to Miletus can be explained without postulating the support of a pro-Persian party. Histiaeus required a messenger willing to go to Sardes, and a crew willing to ship him to Miletus, both of which needs he could easily and conveniently satisfy by means of a full purse. Neither was he necessarily supported by a pro-Persian group when he was successful in obtaining from Lesbos eight triremes to accompany him to Byzantium (6. 5). Herodotus cannot tell us the actual means of persuasion which he employed, but it is most unlikely that he divulged his real purpose in Mytilene. Once at sea he could of course rely on the support of the common seamen for the prospect of booty which he offered. Heinlein's suggestion² that Histiaeus deliberately aimed at the reduction of Ionia by starvation verges on the fantastic, since he himself is compelled to admit, in accounting for Histiaeus' absence from Lade, that his position was safe only so long as the revolt continued. A Persian victory, which on Heinlein's theory he was helping to precipitate, could result only in his own

¹ Op. cit., pp. 346-7.

² Op. cit., p. 347.

proscription. It was not in fact in Histiaeus' own interest permanently to withhold from Ionia the grain he had captured, but rather, by forcing up its price, to dispose at great profit of the stores which he had accumulated. Heinlein fails to notice that in 493, when driven by the capitulation of the Ionians to seek out for himself a new sphere of influence, Histiaeus did not totally abandon Byzantium, but left his affairs there in charge of Bisaltes (6. 26). This shows that his motives were self-interested, and not of the type suggested by Heinlein. The goad of famine was superfluous after the fall of Miletus.

Since Histiaeus' behaviour in 493 bears every appearance of indecision and desperation, the attempts of some modern scholars to interpret it in terms of a consistent programme may be illegitimate. Thasos was doubtless his principal goal. Not only was it close to the Thracian goldfields, but it alone of the places which he visited had the remotest chance of resisting the tide of Persian conquest. His descents on Chios and Lesbos (6. 26-28) remain obscure, but Grundy¹ is perhaps right to see in them an attempt to swell his forces with fugitives from Persia. The examples of Dionysius of Phocaea (6. 17) and of the Samian aristocrats (6. 22) show that there were many who were not prepared to accept a renewal of Persian rule. German scholars have attributed to Histiaeus a more ambitious programme, the foundation in the Aegean of an 'Inselreich'. Meyer boldly asserts: 'Noch nach der Schlacht bei Lade plante er die Gründung eines Inselreichs.'² Similar views are held by Swoboda,³ who indeed is prepared to date the inception of the plan to the time of Histiaeus' original voyage to Byzantium, claiming that the closure of the straits constituted the first step in its execution. These theories must be dismissed. It is idle to pretend that, at the moment of Persia's victory over the Ionians, a single Greek with a handful of ships and a motley collection of followers could hope to establish in the Aegean a power independent of Persia. Even Polycrates, with the greatest naval force of the age at his disposal, had not achieved this. Heinlein's view⁴ is still more elaborate. While he agrees that Histiaeus' aim was the foundation of an 'Inselreich', he insists, in consequence of his belief that Histiaeus had remained loyal to Darius, that this 'Inselreich' was intended to be subject to Persia. In other words, Heinlein invites us to believe that Histiaeus' programme was in essence unchanged from the programme with which he had left Sousa, and that all that had taken place in the last four years had taught him nothing. The foundation-stone of Histiaeus' 'Inselreich' was to be Lesbos. The supremacy there of the pro-Persian party, guaranteed by the desertion of the Lesbian contingent at Lade, Heinlein interprets as a personal victory for Histiaeus, whom he supposes to have communicated with the party-leaders in Mytilene throughout his period at Byzantium. But, even if this supposition were correct, what enticement could Histiaeus now offer them for their continued support? The revolt was now over, and to befriend Histiaeus could only end in provoking the wrath of his implacable enemy Artaphrenes. The second stage in the formation of the 'Inselreich' Heinlein discovers in Chios, where, followed by Swoboda,³ he is sufficiently bold to interpret the successful skirmishes described by Herodotus as tantamount to the conquest of the island. Thasos was intended to be the third and most spectacular member, but defeat brought the programme to an end. Such an elaborate

¹ Op. cit., pp. 136-40.

³ Op. cit., col. 2049.

² *Gesch. des Altert.*, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart,

⁴ Op. cit., p. 348.

1939), iv. 287.

mechanism of conjecture is best described by an expression of Heinlein's own, 'bare Erfindung'. For it lacks even a shred of supporting evidence. Yet Heinlein himself insists that Greek 'Volksmeinung' was hostile to the tyrants. If it had been Histiaeus' plan in 493 to assist in the subjugation of Greek to Persian, this would inevitably have been reflected in the 'Volksmeinung' and have found clear expression in Herodotus.

Despite the deviations of the latter part of Histiaeus' career, Darius remembered his old loyalty and his valuable diplomatic service, and could not regard him as a traitor. Instead, he gave orders for his head to be embalmed and solemnly interred, eulogizing him as a doer of great good to the King and people of Persia (6. 30). Scholars have, on the whole, expressed contempt for this tradition. Grundy¹ and Heinlein² dismiss it completely, while Swoboda³ is prepared to admit only the interment. They give no reasons for this cavalier behaviour, and one is left to conclude that they have assumed that Herodotus cannot have had access to such intimate information about the royal court. Yet Herodotus records a considerable quantity of comparable information about the inner circle at Sousa, accepted by these scholars when it is convenient for them to do so, and the sources of his information may have been quite reputable.⁴

The opposite view of Histiaeus⁵ has proved so persistent that it might perhaps be worth while drawing attention to the faults in method which it involves. Grundy's and kindred conclusions depend heavily on the behaviour of Histiaeus' personal enemies. But it is not in their truth value that the significance of the accusations of Megabazus and Artaphrenes lies, but rather in their capacity for giving expression to the contra-attitudes of the speakers. It is likewise improper to stress the behaviour in which Histiaeus was driven to indulge after his rejection by both sides.⁶ No event subsequent to his clash with Artaphrenes in 496 can be used to shed light on the earlier part of Histiaeus' career.

Insufficient attention has been paid to the relationship between permanent Persian officials and the casual Greeks whom the King periodically took into his service. Scholars sometimes forget that the King habitually mistrusted his satraps, and that he favoured any device to limit their power. Persia possessed in the 'Eye and Ears of the King' (Xen. Cyr. 8. 2. 10) an organized ministry of security. Information could be centralized by establishing in positions of authority individuals who owed their elevation solely to royal dispensation, and who might be expected to safeguard it by keeping watch for any movement of disloyalty among the generals and satraps proper. Among their number the Ionian tyrants ranked high in importance, and the award of such a tyranny was a favourite method of discharging a royal debt. Thus, after Darius' return from Scythia, Coes was granted the tyranny of Mytilene. Herodotus (5. 11) represents the choice as Coes' own, but it must also have been what Darius wanted. The occasion for the award, enjoyed till the general deposition of 499

¹ Op. cit., pp. 140-1.

² Op. cit., p. 351.

³ Op. cit., col. 2050.

⁴ Herodotus' Persian sources are investigated by Wells, *Studies in Herodotus* (Oxford, 1923), pp. 95-111. He argues that much material was derived from Zopyrus, son of Megabazus, who deserted Persia for Athens

(3. 160).

⁵ Repeated recently by Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London, 1956), pp. 124-7.

⁶ Thus Grundy, op. cit., pp. 135-40, passes straight from a detailed analysis of his final adventures to an overall estimate of his career—a procedure which predisposes the reader to accept an unfavourable verdict.

(5.37-38), was Coes' opposition to Darius' original intention of dismantling the Danube bridge on his advance into Scythia (4.97-98). Grundy,¹ with general approval, rejects the story as part of the hostile tradition that the Ionian tyrants left in their wake, on the ground that Darius could not have been sufficiently foolish to sever his lines of communication at the very outset of the campaign. But Coes must have done something to earn his reward. Perhaps it was from him that Darius took the idea of separating his army and fleet. This decision is untypical of orthodox Persian strategy,² and it therefore looks as if he acted on special advice. Similarly, for distinguished service at Salamis, Theomestor of Samos was elevated by Xerxes to the tyranny of the island (8.85), though the rebellion of 479 quickly nullified the award (9.90).

One indication of the suspicion entertained by the King against his satraps is his policy of undermanning their provinces. This is clearly shown by the success of the Ionian offensive against Sardes in 498 (5.102). Since Darius had allowed him only a minimal permanent garrison, Artaphrenes was helpless against the insurgents until reinforcements arrived.³ Although Herodotus says (5.100) that Artaphrenes manned the acropolis of Sardes 'with no small body of men', the force cannot have been a large one, since it is admitted in the same chapter that the Ionians captured the rest of Sardes 'with none to offer resistance'. The tradition of Lysanias of Mallus, drawn upon by Plutarch (*De Malignitate Herodoti* 24), that the Ionian offensive was intended as a counter to a Persian attack on Miletus is an attempt to explain away an unreal difficulty, and is perhaps of late-fourth-century origin, since the strategy is palpably post-Alexandrian.⁴ Similar considerations of security led to the refusal of *prorogatio imperii* even to successful generals. Despite the apparent success of his Thracian campaign, Megabazus was recalled in favour of Otanes (5.25-26), and in 492/1 Mardonius lost his command in similar circumstances. Herodotus (6.94) explains this as the consequence of incompetence in the recent campaign in Thrace, but he afterwards contradicts this allegation by twice allowing Mardonius full credit for the reconquest of Thrace (7.9 and 108).

It seems clear in general that the Greek *ingenium* attracted the kings of Persia, and that they found it profitable to employ in both the military and the diplomatic fields. The significance of Histiaeus' career thus lies in the possibilities which it explored for those Greek statesmen who found reason to withdraw their allegiance from their native cities, and to look for other fields in which to exercise their talents. Demaratus and Themistocles were among his earliest and most celebrated successors. The former was welcomed by Darius with great joy (6.70), and given lands and cities which his descendants continued to enjoy even in the fourth century (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.6.). Themistocles was received by Artaxerxes with greater honour than any other Greek, and granted the revenues of Magnesia, Lampsacus, and Myus (Thuc. 1.138).⁵ The case of Alcibiades, though of great historical interest, stands on a rather different level, since his dealings were with individual satraps rather than with the King. Such outsiders did not escape the hatred and envy which had contributed to the downfall of Histiaeus. Thus, personal jealousy and unfounded suspicion

¹ Op. cit., pp. 51-52.

² Compare 6.6 (Lade) and 7.236 (Salamis).

³ My attention was drawn to this point by Mr. C. Hignett.

⁴ See Tarn, *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments* (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 43 ff.

⁵ The passage, however, contains well-known historical difficulties. See, e.g., Gomme, ad loc.

prompted the admiral Achaemenes to veto the proposal of Demaratus to detach, after Thermopylae, a squadron of 300 sail and create a naval diversion in the waters of the Peloponnese (7. 235-6).

If the above reconstruction is acceptable, Herodotus in turn will be convicted of uncritical handling of his oral sources. Such a conclusion need not cause anxiety, for Histiaeus is not the only individual to suffer in Herodotus through the persuasiveness of a hostile tradition. Without indulging in the offensive and useless practice of dictating the way in which Herodotus ought to have written his history, we can point out that a historian is generally called upon to ask himself whether his informant at any stage, or his informant's informant, had any obvious motive for lying or otherwise distorting the truth. Histiaeus' personal enemies did have such motives, but the question is simply not one that Herodotus always troubles to ask.

A. BLAMIRE

SOME USES OF *GRATUS* AND *GRATIA* IN PLAUTUS: EVIDENCE FOR INDO-EUROPEAN?

THE form of this paper, which has more than one purpose, needs a word of explanation and perhaps of excuse. I had had it in mind to bring together and discuss a number of passages of Plautus in which *gratus* or *gratia* occurred. Then I came across an interesting paper by Professor L. R. Palmer in *Hommages à Max Niedermann* (Collection Latomus vol. xxiii), Bruxelles, 1956, pp. 258-69, entitled 'The Concept of Social Obligation in Indo-European: A Study in Structural Semantics'. There Palmer dealt, among other things, with *gratus* and related words; he seemed to me, however, to treat the Latin evidence, the greater part of it from Plautus, in a way which I felt to be mistaken. In addition it seemed that a preconceived theory, derived from a special interpretation of the Mycenaean tablets, was being read into Roman thought and institutions against the evidence. I have therefore taken the opportunity to discuss the passages of Plautus¹ in which I was first interested within a general examination of Palmer's treatment of the Latin evidence for his theory.

The title of his paper indicates, and Palmer makes it clear (pp. 259-60), that he believes in an Indo-European society² and considers that a certain degree of agreement in the descended languages, when related words cluster round similar ideas, allows inference of a common Indo-European concept or institution. He then refers to his identification of *te-re-ta* on the tablet PY Er OI as *τελεστικός*,³ 'a man of the burden (*τέλος*)' which he compares with **baro* and illustrates by Hittite, Tacitean German, and feudal analogies.⁴ The 'burden' is the feudal bond, whereby a man receives a portion of land in fief and in return binds himself to render military service. Palmer then continues:⁵ 'This firmly established,⁶ we may return to the notion of "man of the burden" and seek further evidence for this peculiar concept. The present occasion must focus attention on Latin.'

The transition to Latin is made by the concept of gift-exchange, of which the Homeric poems give evidence though it has little immediate connexion with the Mycenaean tablet. The word *munus* is taken, as usual, to be the Latin for an exchange-gift and the importance of the metaphor of binding in relation to the word is emphasized.⁷ This leads to the assertion that a *munus* was also regarded

¹ *Amph.* 39 ff.; *Most.* 220 f.; and *Pseud.* 709 ff.

² On this see the remarks of M. I. Finley in *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser. x. i (1957), 140.

³ *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1954, p. 39.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 40 and esp. n. 2.

⁵ *Hommages Niedermann*, p. 261. References to this article will hereafter be given just by page-number.

⁶ It may be remarked in passing that the present writer, far from seeing this as firmly established, can only regard it as an hypothesis

on which, in the absence of more direct evidence, the only possible judgement is: 'Not proven'. There is a dangerous circularity in the argument, which is not unduly exaggerated by saying that the Hittite evidence (itself very uncertain and obscure) is used to interpret the tablet and then the similarity of the two is claimed as a reason for finding a common Indo-European institution as ancestor.

⁷ Palmer (p. 262) claims that *fungor* should be connected with the root of Iranian *baag* ('loosen') rather than Vedic *bhuñkte*, and that its basic meaning therefore is 'to loose one-

as an *onus*, and the jurist Paulus (third century A.D.) is quoted, followed by examples of Ciceronian *imponere*.¹ Palmer now quotes Plautus *Merc.* 105 *dico eius pro meritis gratum me et munem fore*, as a fossilized phrase, and so arrives at *gratus*. He connects *gratus* and *grates* with the same root as *gravis* (so introducing his 'man of the burden' concept), and asserts "That the *grates* were not "songs of praise"² but technically "return gifts"³ is evident from many passages: *quom bene nos, Iuppiter, iuvisti, dique alii omnes caelipotentes, | eas vobis gratis habeo atque ago* Plaut. *Persa* 755 f.' No further evidence on the point is offered. Now the etymology here put forward of *gratus*, etc., is quite unconvincing⁴ (it will be dealt with in detail below); that being so, there is no help in *Pers.* 755 f.—a perfectly normal example of the idiom needing no new explanation. When Palmer continues "The underlying notions of requital and releasing are clearly brought out by Virgil's use of the verbs *referre* (*Aen.* 11. 509) and *persolvere* (*Aen.* 1. 600)", it appears that linguistic evidence is being doubtfully applied.

Palmer is trying to find evidence in Latin of word-clusters which, when set beside related words in other Indo-European languages, will enable him to postulate a common Indo-European concept as the ancestor. Now the Romans possessed in an unusually explicit form a system of clientship and other obligation-relations which find expression in words like *munus* and *gratia*; Palmer wants to connect *gratia* with the root meaning 'to bear a burden, etc.' and so claim this system as a development of Indo-European concepts and institutions. The difficulty with any such attempt is that Latin literature only begins after Roman society has become completely self-conscious and sophisticated. So when Plautus uses words like *gravis*, *gravida*, *grandis* with *gratia* he does so rather for the alliteration and assonance—it adds to the rhetoric—than because a long-inherited way of thinking compels him. Plautus, linguistically at any rate, is in no sense a primitive: his language, far from being colloquial, draws on all possible resources—poetry, *carmina*, Greek imitation, law, the language of Roman institutions, etc. One would need to demonstrate that the relevant passages were echoes of institutional language and then that these were ancient,

self from'. He says (p. 263): 'It remains to add that this hypothesis illuminates the syntax of the verb: *munere fungor* may be interpreted quite literally "I release myself from the obligation".' But one would think that the basic meaning and consequently this syntax of the verb would be clearer the earlier one could trace it. The simple fact is that *fungi* is invariably constructed with the *accusative* in early Latin. For an account of the verb see Wackernagel, *Vorles.* *ū. Syntax*, i. 68; Schmalz-Hofmann, p. 435.

¹ Little can be made of the use by Cicero of such an obvious metaphor (examples are fairly common, though Palmer quotes only two: one of these as *cum aratori munus aliquid, ius aliquid onus aliquid imponitur*, *Cic. Verr.* 3. 199; but one manuscript reads just *cum aratori aliquid imponitur*, another just *cum aratori ius aliquid imponitur*, the others just *cum aratori onus aliquid imponitur*, while *cum aratori munus aliquid imponitur* is due to a conjecture by R. Klotz. More strange is Palmer's next statement (p. 263): 'Most

striking is Plautus' combination of *moenia* with *tolerare* (*Trin.* 687) for *tolero* is a denominative formed from **tolus*, the Latin equivalent of the Greek *τέλος*, which provided the starting point for this investigation. This observation may encourage us to look more closely into the contexts of *munus* and *munis*. The etymology of *tolerare* could be significant only if the phrase *moenia tolerare* was extremely frequent and could be shown to be a technical, institutional phrase. As it is, Palmer does not give a single further instance of its occurrence.

² The usual etymology connects *grates* with Sanskrit *gir* ('songs of praise'): on this see further, p. 162 below.

³ i.e., presumably, things which constitute a weight or burden on the recipient.

⁴ M. Leumann, *Glotta*, xxxvi (1957), 147, says of this etymological connexion: 'was angesichts der verbalen Bedeutung der Wurzel *g^hers* 'preisen' eine ziemlich gezwungene Kombination darstellt'.

even primitive, institutions. This is nowhere possible with Palmer's examples. When Palmer claims (p. 265 f.) 'On the other hand Plautus' idiom provides conclusive evidence that Roman *Sprachgefühl* was clearly conscious of the concrete image of "burdening" . . .', he disregards Plautus' idiosyncratic use of language and the logic of his own position.¹ It is worse to appeal to Virgil's use of *referre* and *persolvere*, as if in so sophisticated a poet it were possible, without more direct evidence, to trace primitive traditional concepts when he uses so natural and poetically apt an expression. In fact, when evidence from more obvious sources is examined, it becomes clear that *persolvere grates*, *gratiam* is very rare, late, and poetical, while *referre grates*, *gratiam* is common at all periods in most authors (it recalls, for example, *χαρίν ἀποδιδόναι*). Consequently the use of *referre* may be evidence, to some extent, for 'underlying notions' (if the evidence is taken as a whole), but *persolvere* is not. When examined, most of the passages adduced by Palmer show no more than that, at a developed stage of Rome's economy, some of her most ingenious and fecund writers (and perhaps, to some extent, her ordinary citizens) found it natural to use a variety of metaphors, some of them commercial. Palmer tends to quote Latin of different periods as if, during the course of many hundreds of years, Rome had not undergone a swift and extremely complex development. Certain essentially Roman concepts can be found and traced, but it needs a very cautious investigation of minute pieces of evidence drawn from many sources.

A key for Palmer's interpretation of *gratia* is *Amph.* 39-49:

debetis velle quae velimus: meruimus
et ego et pater de vobis et re publica;
nam quid ego memorem (ut alios in tragoediis
vidi, Neptunum, Virtutem, Victoriam,
Martem, Bellonam commemorare quae bona
vobis fecissent) quis benefactis meus pater,
deorum regnator, architectust omnibus?
sed mos numquam ille illi fuit patri meo
ut exprobraret quod bonis faceret boni;
gratum arbitratum esse id a vobis sibi
meritoque vobis bona se facere quae facit.

So Lindsay prints the passage, and, since only the last few lines are in question now, other textual difficulties may be ignored. Palmer comments (p. 269): 'Here we have a highly technical use of *gratus*: "he considers that is an obligation

¹ There are two ideas here which have become confused. The passages quoted by Palmer illustrate two things: (1) That words meaning 'heavy' are used with *gratia* by Plautus. This is largely due to Plautine word-play—*grave et gratum*, *gratia gravis*, *levior pluma est gratia* . . . *plumbeas iras gerunt, solidam et grandem gratiam*. This point is clinched when it is noticed that other writers scarcely ever use these words with *gratia*. So these passages tell us nothing in particular about 'Roman *Sprachgefühl*'. (2) That Romans, like Greeks (and presumably many other peoples), sometimes think of important people as 'weighty' and unimportant as

'lightweights' (e.g. *Trin.* 1170). Now in gift-exchange, on Palmer's theory, the person who receives a gift becomes 'burdened' (*gratus*), not the person who confers the favour and who thereby becomes influential with the other. So the second set of ideas (which is of importance for 'Roman *Sprachgefühl*', e.g. in the concept of *gravitas*) has nothing to do with Palmer's point. It might be answered that the greater one's obligations, the greater one's importance; but this lacks evidence in Roman thought and affairs. A man is weighty because he exerts influence, not because he contracts obligations.

imposed on himself by you". On this phrase Plautus himself provides the commentary: "the benefactions he confers on you arise out of your *merito*".¹ His preoccupation with the concept of burden has here led Palmer to attribute to this line the opposite to its true meaning. For, as both Ussing and Arthur Palmer (edition of 1890) saw, it means: 'he realizes that you feel gratitude to him for it' and the next line adds 'and that you deserve the kindness he shows you'. Unfortunately neither Ussing nor Arthur Palmer elucidated the syntactical difficulties of the sentence and both appear (in spite of the latter's suggested translation 'on your part') to treat a *vobis* as ablative of the agent. In Latin *gratum alicui* can have two meanings, depending on the context: either it can mean 'something for which one feels gratitude', or 'something by which one wins gratitude'.² In the former sense, which is far the easier, *gratum* is sometimes linked with *acceptum*: e.g. *Stich.* 50 *mihi grata acceptaque eius est benignitas*. The second sense is more difficult: cf. *Ter. Heaut.* 262 *quod tamen nunc faciam: tum quom gratum mi esse potuit nolui*. A young man quarrelled with his father and went into exile; he now laments his conduct and says he will obey his father, although the action can no longer (as it once would have done) win

¹ Palmer makes much of the word *merito* in religious contexts. He says (p. 265): 'If the god fulfils his part, he acquires a credit balance (*mereor, meritum*) which had to be faithfully and accurately discharged or paid off (e.g. *CIL* I² 632: *perficias decumam ut faciat verae rationis*).' But the matter has only to be so expressed to reveal itself as an inadequate account of this aspect of Roman religious feeling (that there was such a crude element in Roman, as in other religions, at low levels is undeniable but here irrelevant). *merito* is no more than another expression of the worshipper's gratitude and joy: it stands beside words like *laetus, lubens, lubenter* etc., and explicit enumeration of a god's services (frequent in Greek and Roman prayers). One must not assume that the word was borrowed from book-keeping and inserted in prayers. Palmer illustrates the 'accurate payment of the god' concept by quoting only a fraction of an extraordinary dedication in which (if the whole is read) a merchant, in rudimentary hexameters, offers Hercules a tithe (as was usual with Hercules), claims that it is truly reckoned (always a special point with tithe-offerings), and asks Hercules to help him collect his debts. This should not be taken to reveal the inner content of Roman religion (the publicity value of such a dedication should not be ignored). In general Palmer makes too much of commercial ideas and language in Roman religion; most of the evidence comes from the comic writer Plautus, who is not above a joke (cf., e.g., *Most.* 241 ff.). Of other evidence who can say that certain terms were first developed in commerce and then were transferred to religion? A specially unfortunate result of this treatment is that a distorted and

exaggerated picture is given of one of the most interesting characteristics of Roman religion. It is hard to believe that any religion, positing active divine control of the world, did not conceive of man's relationship with the gods as being in the nature of a contract (so there is nothing surprising in the use of a word like *merito*). What is peculiar in Roman religion is that the cast of mind which produced Roman law (no soulless system) also took a special interest in religious forms and ritual. The result was that, presumably over a long development, a much greater precision of definition was attained as to the conditions of relationship between human and divine in all its aspects than we find in other religions.

² The very existence as well as the nature of these two constructions is by itself sufficient to rule out the possibility of Palmer's equation of **gratus* with **gravis*. For in the relationship of giver and receiver, the latter's pleasure is obvious, while the giver may take pleasure in the other's gratitude whether expressed in deeds or in words. The gift brings pleasure to the recipient, and to the giver also when return, of whatever sort, is made. The point of view is clear in Accius *trag.* 114 *R. alui educavi: id facite gratum ut sit seni*; Cepheus has spent much trouble: if the girl goes off, he will lose the return he might expect for his kindness. Palmer's equation can give no plausible account of these two constructions. These constructions of *gratus* are not discussed in the most recent treatments of the word: M. Leumann in *Gnomon*, xiii (1937), 36; H. Frisk, *Eranos*, xxxviii (1940), 26-30; E. Wistrand, *Eranos*, xxxix (1941), 17-26.

him *gratia*. So the boastful soldier in the *Eunuchus* says (395 f.) *est istuc datum / profecto ut grata mihi sint quae facio omnia*: 'I have the gift of winning *gratia* with everything I do'. So also *Rud.* 1221 *atque ut gratum mi beneficium factis experiar*: 'I want also to find a material return for my services'—cf. also Accius *trag.* 114.¹ These passages make it clear that *gratum sibi* means not, as Palmer says 'an obligation imposed on himself', but 'an action which wins gratitude for him'. There remains *a vobis*: Palmer, like Ussing and Arthur Palmer, takes it as agent—'by you'. This is not possible, for it requires that *gratum* be treated as a passive² which the construction of *gratum sibi* shows that it is not felt to be. Compare rather the frequent phrase *inire gratiam ab aliquo*: e.g. *Asin.* 59 *bene hercle facitis et a me initis gratiam*; cf. also *Cist.* 7. 629. 736; *Curc.* 405; *Epid.* 441; *Stich.* 514; *Trin.* 376, and *Thes. l. L.* 6. 2. 2218. 69 ff. So *Amph.* 48 can be translated: 'he realizes that his action wins gratitude for him from you'.

In the context of this passage from *Amph.* should be examined a passage from *Most.* The girl Philematium, urged by the old woman Scapha not to reserve her favours for Philolaches alone (a young man who is in love with her and has bought her freedom), replies (220-1):

eundem animum oportet nunc mihi esse gratum, ut impetravi,
atque olim, prius quam id extudi, quom illi subblandiebar.

So Lindsay prints the passage, but notes in his apparatus to 220: 'vel sic distingue *esse, gr. ut im.*', and this punctuation had been suggested by Ritschl. This latter is the punctuation accepted by Ussing and by Sonnenschein (edition of 1907). But Niedermann in his recent text of *Most.*³ returned to the vulgate punctuation, which had been printed also by Leo. In his critical note, Leo says: '*gratum* interpolatoris videtur' (referring to the theory first promulgated by Ladewig that 208-23 are not Plautine⁴) and honours Arthur Palmer's *oratum* with a mention.⁵ Ussing comments ad loc.: 'sed oratio dura minimeque Plautina, sive cum superioribus iungas "*animum gratum*", sive cum Ritsch. "*gratum impetravi*" ut "*gratum elocuta*" Hor. *Od.* III, 3, 17'. This helps little since the passage of Horace is no real parallel. Sonnenschein quotes the same and similar parallels simply to show that *gratum* can be used substantivally, and adds: 'It is tempting to take *animum gratum* together in the present passage; but *animus gratus* and *animus ingratus* . . . are not Plautine phrases.' This latter point is not strong since (a) the passage may well be—I should claim certainly is—post-Plautine, and (b) Terence can use *gratus* to mean 'grateful', of a person. The real case against linking *animum* and *gratum* rests on grounds of meaning and has never been stated. The girl says that she ought to have the same feelings towards Philolaches now that she has got what she wanted as when she was still playing up to him; but 'the same feelings' does not mean gratitude, for there was no relevant reason for her feeling that; she means by *eundem animum* 'love and affection'. Consequently *animum* and *gratum* must not be joined. The only alternative is to take *gratum ut impetravi* together in the

¹ These passages are collected by *Thes. l. L.* 6. 2. 2261. 9 ff.

² As it is also taken by Lodge, *Lexicon Plautinum*, i. 8, sectio A. 1. 5.

³ Plautus, *Aulularia*, *Menaechmi*, *Mostellaria*, ed. Max. Niedermann (Editiones Helveticae, ser. Lat. 14), Frauenfeldae, 1955.

⁴ I have examined this hypothesis in

detail and tried to support it with further arguments in *J.R.S.* xlviii (1958), 22 ff.

⁵ I find noted in the margin of the copy used by Paul Jacobsthal at Leo's seminar in 1900-1 on *Most.* the suggestion *optatum*, which was presumably made *viva voce* by Leo at the time.

sense of *cum id impetravi quod mihi gratum est*. The meaning of *gratum* here, as is made clear by *impetravi*, is the first of the two mentioned above 'something for which one feels gratitude'—and the dative is omitted as unnecessary. Phrases may be compared such as *Merc.* 527 *honoris causa quicquid est quod dabitur gratum habeo* or *Truc.* 582 *iussit orare ut haec grata haberes tibi*. The lines should consequently be punctuated as Ritschl suggested:

eundem animum oportet nunc mihi esse, gratum ut impetravi,
atque olim, prius quam id extudi, quom illi subblandiebar.

The result is to produce a slightly clumsy piece of writing, where *gratum* is used substantivally (to which there can be little objection in itself—see Sonnenschein, *ad loc.*) and forms the antecedent to *id* in the next line.

Finally the passage *Pseud.* 709–15:

CAL. dic utrum Spemne an Salutem te salutem, Pseudole?

Ps. immo utrumque. CH. Utrumque, salve. sed quid actumst? Ps. quid times?

CAL. attuli hunc. Ps. quid, attulisti? CAL. 'adduxi' volui dicere.

Ps. quis istic est? CAL. Charinus. Ps. eugae! iam χάριν τούτῳ ποιῶ.

CH. quin tu si quid opust, mi audacter imperas? Ps. tam gratiast. bene sit tibi, Charine. nolo tibi molestos esse nos.

CH. vos molestos mihi? molestum mi id quidem. Ps. tum igitur mane.

712 euge iam charytoi io πολῶ P: eug—tutopoio A: corr. Scaliger.

The great difficulty is the reading in 712. Pseudolus' answer in 713 *tam gratiast* is a polite refusal, cf. *Men.* 387 and *Stich.* 472. So Charinus says (impatiently): 'Why do you not ask what you want of me?' and Pseudolus answers: 'It's so kind of you: but no. The best of luck to you. We mustn't trouble you.' Why should Pseudolus say this to the man whom he has specifically asked to be summoned? The only possible answer is that it is part of a joke, the clue to which lies in 712. This seems to be made certain by the form of Charinus' remark in 713: *quin* so used is impatient, a call to get down to business—so, explicitly, in *Most.* 572 *quin tu istas mittis tricas?* and, as here, *Pseud.* 1183 *quin tu mulierem mi emittis?* The tone of Charinus' remark would therefore be perfectly represented by supposing that he impatiently brushes aside an irrelevant joke by Pseudolus in 712. The manuscripts make it clear that the words were Greek, also that χάριν was here and a part of ποιεῖν, probably ποιῶ. Now χάριν ποιεῖν seems not to be a Greek idiom: the nearest idiom I can find is χάριν πράσσειν in Eur. *Ion* 36. 896; *El.* 1133; *Hec.* 1211 in the sense of 'do a favour to'. But the idiom is too remote in form and, in any case, would not fit here, where some formula of refusal is needed to motivate *tam gratiast* in 713. This latter point is crucial to the interpretation and needs some explanation. Pseudolus could in 712 conceivably say something like, for instance, 'I favour Charinus' or some such phrase which had no relevance to the context except that it made a pun on Charinus. But, in that case, his next words in 713 would be completely unmotivated and rather absurd, and, secondly, since in 712 χάριν seems identifiable, it is rather a strange coincidence that Pseudolus' next reply contains the Latin word for this (*gratia*), unless both replies have something of the same content. If 712 is a polite refusal of Charinus' help, then Pseudolus' remarks in 712–14 have a reasonable coherence: 712 refusal, 713 *tam gratiast* (a similar

refusal using now the Latin equivalent to what he has just said in Greek), 714 *bene sit tibi*—a polite formula of dismissal (cf., e.g., χαίρειν), and *nolo tibi molestos esse nos*—another polite formula of refusal which has many analogies in both Greek and Latin. Then Pseudolus would refuse Charinus' help by using a whole series of conventional polite refusals. This must be the general trend of this section of the dialogue. The Greek in 712, however, may not represent a Greek but a Latin idiom—*gratiam alicui facere alicuius rei, de aliqua re*, etc., as was suggested, for instance, by Gronovius. This is a very distinctive Latin idiom and, since χάριν and ποιῶ seem to be identifiable with fair certainty in the manuscripts and since a formula of refusal is needed, there seems little serious room for doubt. Plautus elsewhere translates a Latin idiom into Greek; cf., for example, *Casina* 729: OL. *enim vero πράγματά / μοι παρέχεις. / Lys. dabo tibi μέγα κακόν / ut ego opinor, nisi resistis*. Here μέγα κακόν represents the slave slang *magnum malum* 'a good beating'. In *Pseudolus*, with a different motive, he uses the Greek translation for the sake of the pun with Charinus: cf., for example, *Bacch.* 240 *haud dormitandumst: opus est chryso Chrysalo*. The whole thing is simply a Plautine joke, parallel to the joke allowed to Charinus in 710: *Utrumque, salve*; it is quite irrelevant and means that, once made, the farce must be kept up that Pseudolus, who himself asked for Charinus and needs him (as will appear), has to say that he can now do without him, till the idea is moulded back into the flow of the Greek dialogue in 715 f. Humour is won from it by making Pseudolus, the slave, speak in a tone of exaggerated and solicitous politeness.

But what is the actual reading? Scaliger proposed χάριν τούτῳ ποιῶ and this is read by most editors except Leo.¹ But it is hard to see what it means. The construction *gratiam facere* requires a dative of the person excused and a genitive of that which he is excused (or ablative with *de*, etc.). Perhaps then χάριν τούτῳ ποιῶ means 'I excuse Charinus' and one is to supply, for example, *nobis operam dandi*. But it is not easy to supply this, and, moreover, Pseudolus is talking to Calidorus (he has not yet addressed Charinus) who is responsible for Charinus and makes the joke about carrying him along (711). It would seem more natural that Pseudolus should in this joke decline Calidorus' offer of Charinus rather than Charinus' unmade and implicit offer of help. It would also make the syntax of this Latin joke in Greek dress clearer. So perhaps we should read χάριν τούτου ποιῶ: the genitive of the thing which one is excused is normal (see *Thes. l. L.* 6. 2. 2217. 57 ff.) and the persons excused may be omitted from the construction when they are directly addressed: cf., for example, *Most.* 1130. 1168; *Rud.* 1415. Then Charinus breaks in impatiently at 713, brushing the irrelevant joke aside, and Pseudolus turns to address him in terms of elaborate, incongruous politeness, declining the offer of help which he has now just made.

If the argument above is right that a Latin *gratia*-idiom is to be seen here, then, not only does Palmer's connexion of *gratus* and *gravis* give no plausible account of the idioms *gratum alicui* and *alicui gratiam facere alicuius rei*, but *Pseud.*

¹ Leo reads ποιοῦ, hesitantly; but it seems unlikely that Plautus made the magnificent and condescending Pseudolus leave the dismissal of Charinus to Calidorus, rather than, as in 713, discharge the matter himself. Leo says in his critical note: 'quod posui non satis facit, placuerit Χαρίνος χαίρειν' and

Ussing had suggested χαίρειν τούτου λέγω. Either of these would be unexceptionable on grounds of sense and meaning; but the manuscripts seem to give, with an unusual degree of agreement, χάριν and some form of ποιεῖν. An editor's first obligation lies here.

712 shows positively that Plautus, at any rate, connected *gratia*, not with words that mean weight and obligation, but, since he translates it by $\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma$, with words that mean joy and pleasure. The curious idioms *gratiam facere* and *tam gratias* are examples of the linguistic phenomenon whereby a phrase, though it has no inherent suitability for the purpose, becomes by usage reserved for one special purpose—here of polite refusal (so *benigne* by convention generally implies refusal). But there are also other usages of *gratia et sim.* which Palmer's theory will not explain: *gratias* and *gratis*, for instance; these are readily explained on the traditional etymology. Added to this is the inescapable fact that, while *gratia et sim.* appear in many contexts where pleasure and approval are expressed and in none is this meaning excluded, there are none where the idea of weight or burden is imperative and many where it is excluded.

Finally a word about Palmer's etymology. He connects *gratus* and *grates* with the root of Sanskrit *gurūh*, *βαρύς*, and *gravis*. The connotations of joy and approval which *gratus et sim.* display must therefore be regarded as a secondary development special to Latin. This puts the cart before the horse: rather, the widespread connotations of joy and approval which attach to Latin *gratus et sim.* should force us to the conclusion that the root of *gratus*, though similar in form perhaps to the root of *gravis*, must be distinguished from it. The whole question of the etymology of *gratus et sim.* can be greatly simplified if note is taken of a recent investigation of corresponding Sanskrit words by Professor T. Burrow.¹ He is mainly concerned with Sanskrit evidence, but the appropriate conclusions can easily be drawn for Latin. Burrow points out that two very different sets of meanings are claimed for the Sanskrit root *gṛ-/gar-*: (1) 'speak aloud, sing, proclaim, etc.', and (2) 'welcome, approve, show appreciation, etc.' He then makes out a very convincing case that in fact there is not just one root here but two: (1) *gṛ-/gir-* 'to praise, sing, etc.', and (2) *gṛ-/gur-* 'to welcome, appreciate, etc.' He illustrates the division of the various forms and meanings with many passages. In Latin a certain difficulty must be felt in the fact that, for example, *grates* is normally equated with Sanskrit *gīr* 'songs of praise'; for it is not easy to imagine the precise line of development which connected them. But now, on Burrow's demonstration, we can refer Sanskrit *gīr* to the root *gṛ-/gir-* ('sing, etc.'): whereas Latin *grates*, *gratus*, *gratia*, etc., Oscan *brateis* can be connected with the root *gṛ-/gur-* whose basic connotation is 'to show appreciation'. This gives in itself a precise account of the origin and development of the Latin words and their relation to the corresponding Sanskrit words; it is also made clear that ideas of obligation and recompense which sometimes attach to the words are a secondary development—such as could happen naturally and independently in different languages.

The result of the inquiry into the basis for Palmer's theory that the concept of 'man of the burden' can be widely traced in Roman language and ideas I would suggest is this. If doubts about the evidential value to be attached to Palmer's combination of the Mycenaean tablet with Hittite evidence (together with doubts about the propriety of using the feudal analogy at all) are ignored, there is still no evidence whatever for linking the root of *gratus et sim.* with that of *gravis*, while there is positive evidence against it, and a much readier and more obvious etymological account can be given of *gratus et sim.* On the more

¹ *Bulletin of the Society for Oriental and African Studies*, xx (1957), 133-44.

general question whether Latin provides evidence for the 'man of the burden' concept, there is no evidence which allows the inference that the concept of burdening in relation to ideas of exchange and obligation is in any way basic or inherent in the language in the sense of being an inheritance from a remote Indo-European past rather than the contingent and independent product of a growing society. Nor has Palmer brought any evidence which allows, let alone compels, us to regard the characteristic Roman institutions of clientship and all the cognate less sharply defined relationships which create mutual obligation (in a non-legal sense) as developments of social forms traceable to a remote Indo-European ancestor.¹

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¹ I am grateful to Professor T. Burrow and Mr. R. G. M. Nisbet for their help in this paper.

LUCRETIUS 5. 979

a parvis quod enim consuerant cernere semper
 alterno tenebras et lucem tempore gigni,
 non erat ut fieri posset mirarier umquam
 nec diffidere ne terras aeterna teneret
 nox in perpetuum detracto lumine solis.

979

'lit. "it was not possible that it should come to pass that they should wonder"' (Bailey, note ad loc.)

As generally interpreted this line leaves much to be desired because of its unwieldy construction. It is true that *est ut* plus a form of *possum* is a common periphrasis in Lucretius (for examples v. Munro, 4th edition, note on l. 620). Quite common also is Lucretius' use of the infinitive as a nominative substantive (examples cited by Munro, note on l. 331). But the combination of *fieri mirarier* with the already periphrastic *erat ut posset* results in 'a very clumsy phrase. . . . The line should be regarded as one which Lucretius might have improved on revision' (Bailey).

Madvig proposed *possent*, which Bailey (note ad loc.) translates: 'it was not possible that they should be able to wonder that it happened'. This reading does away with the 'double periphrasis' of *erat ut posset* and *fieri mirarier*, and defines *mirarier* (which otherwise is apparently absolute). Its disadvantages are that it involves alteration of the text, admittedly slight, and that an accusative, such as *id*, might be expected as the subject of *fieri*.

I suggest that *ut fieri posset* should be regarded as an indirect question depending on *mirarier*, i.e. 'to wonder how it could come to pass'. The use of *ut* plus subjunctive in an indirect question is a common construction, found several times in Lucretius (e.g. 2. 1170-1; 5. 617). The order of interrogative clause followed by the governing verb is in keeping with Lucretius' practice (e.g. 2. 979). The clumsy phrasing is thus removed, and *mirarier* is defined, without alteration of the text. The subject of *fieri posset* is more easily supplied in a finite clause than with a solitary infinitive.

There remains the question of the meaning of *non erat mirarier*. *Non erat* might be taken to mean 'it was not possible'; but *est* in this sense is of doubtful authenticity as a Lucretian usage. The phrase *est videre* is attributed to Lucretius by Draeger (vol. ii, p. 294) and by Schmalz-Hofmann (p. 583). But Munro (v. Critical Notes 2. 16, 5. 533), following Lachmann, rejects the construction as non-Lucretian, and at 2. 16 *nonne videre* is now generally read (so Bailey).

Better established is the use of the infinitive as a nominative substantive, and some examples of this construction suggest another interpretation of *non erat mirarier*:

e.g. 5. 1250:

nam fovea atque igni prius est venarier ortum

i.e. 'hunting arose'.

5. 1379-80:

at liquidas avium voces imitarier ore
 ante fuit multo . . .

i.e. 'there was imitating'.

Non erat mirari may therefore be taken to mean 'there was no wondering' or, in full, 'it was not their way ever to wonder how it could come to pass or to feel mistrust . . .', etc.

Furthermore, the sense of the passage seems to be improved. The experience of seeing night and day created alternately does not, in itself, make it *impossible* to wonder on the subject; for the thought has occurred to men of later times, all of whom have had the same experience. If Lucretius meant to say that it was impossible for primitive men, we might have expected him to support his statement with an explicit assertion that such sophisticated speculation was beyond their mental capabilities. As he does not make this point, 'it was not their way to wonder', being less dogmatic, seems a more natural conclusion from the preceding lines.

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PLATO'S 'IDEAL' STATE

IN *C.Q.* N.S. vii (1957), 164 ff. Professor Demos raises the question in what sense, if at all, the state which Plato describes in the *Republic* can be regarded as ideal, if the warrior-class and the masses are 'deprived of reason' and therefore imperfect. The ideal state, he thinks, appears at first sight to be composed of un-ideal individuals. But 'the problem is resolved by separating the personal from the political-technical areas of control. In so far as they are citizens, men in the ideal city will indeed represent one part of the soul and one function. . . . As persons, however, they remain whole and self-ordering' (p. 170). They may possess reason and be in full control of themselves, even though *qua* members of a body politic they have a role which may be equated with *θυμός* or *ἐπιθυμία* alone. Professor Demos finds that each of the three parts of the soul has at least two phases, one specialized and one generalized, so that while only the philosopher-kings have the special ability to plan for the whole city, all citizens have the 'generalized' reason that will enable them to govern their own lives: 'the lack of intelligence in the warrior and the worker is pertinent solely to the technical pursuit of governing' (p. 171, n. 2). Similarly all citizens will have a 'generalized' courage (or moral strength), and the 'necessary' appetites. The individual is limited only with respect to his civic functions (p. 173).

It would seem that this explanation is useful so far as it goes, but that it does not go far enough. It shows how the members of all three classes can have a balanced soul, though Professor Demos is probably drawing *too sharp* a distinction between the private and the political life; as he very fairly admits (p. 173, n. 1), Plato in a number of passages, instead of restricting the rulers to civic functions, includes matters of private life within their purview. But in any case a balanced soul will hardly be enough to make a perfect individual: it is clear that for the highest virtue direct apprehension of the Good is necessary, and only philosophers can achieve that. The fact is, as Professor Hackforth pointed out long ago,¹ that the Rulers whom Plato has in mind in *Rep.* 7 are not just the *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* of Book 2, men with a harmonious blend of reflectiveness and spiritedness, but metaphysicians with a high degree of skill in dialectic; and the conception of goodness has changed accordingly. Perfect goodness is not simply a matter of having each 'part' of the soul performing an appropriate function, but the result of apprehension of the Good; nor is the faculty required to apprehend truth simply a *λογιστικόν*—it is *νοῦς*. It seems, then, that Plato begins by describing ordinary goodness in society and in man, and then passes on to something higher—the philosophic life for the individual, the philosopher-king for the state; and this will explain why the defining of justice in Book 4 does not put an end to the discussion.² Now if the warrior-

¹ 'The Modification of Plan in Plato's *Republic*', in *C.Q.* vii (1913), 265 ff.: an important article which has not, I think, received much attention.

² In Book 5 Socrates still speaks as though the nature of justice has not yet been found. Suppose, he says, we do find out what justice is, are we to demand that every just person must have a share which corresponds

exactly to it? The answer is No: we should think none the worse of a painter who painted an ideally beautiful figure but could not show that a person as beautiful as that could exist. Here, of course, we are concerned with an ideal of perfection—the ideal of the philosopher who has knowledge, which may be acquired after the lengthy education described in Book 7.

class and the artisans do not possess the highest kind of virtue, they cannot be perfect individuals, whether they have a balanced soul or not.

It is sometimes doubted¹ whether the Rulers themselves will be ideal men, on the ground that restraints appear to be imposed upon their appetites. There is in fact no unbalance, but rather a canalizing of all emotive forces into one single stream. 'When a man's desires are firmly set in one direction, we know that his desire for everything else is correspondingly weakened—as when a stream has been diverted into another course. So, when the current of his desire is set towards knowledge and all that sort of thing, it would concern itself only with the pleasure that the soul enjoys all by itself, and abandon the pleasures of the body' (485 d-e). This is not suppression of desires, but sublimation. But we need not, in any case, ask how such a soul could have the *σωφροσύνη*, for example, described in the early part of the *Republic*,² for that is something inferior to the *σωφροσύνη* which arises from apprehension of the Good, and distinguishes the ideal man.

If the warrior-class and the artisans are without personal knowledge of the Good, which is as important for personal virtue as it is for the direction of a state, they will not be ideal men. Is the state that Plato describes 'ideal' = 'perfect'? The answer must be No. Professor Demos (p. 165) takes the reference to it at 529 b (cf. 500 e) as a pattern laid up in heaven to mean that it is not only 'ideal', but also, apparently, a Form;³ but there is no need to press such an expression so far. Again, because Plato tells us that what is conveyed in words (*λόγους*) may not be realizable in fact (473 a; 472 d), and the state outlined in the *Republic* is 'written in words', Demos concludes that Plato is dealing with the ideal state (p. 166). He quotes from 529 a-b where it is said that the city that has been described can be found nowhere on earth.⁴ But there is still no need to suppose that Plato is dealing with what he regards as *perfect*, at any rate; and there is therefore no inconsistency. Demos finds it an objection to this sort of view that it makes Plato 'guilty' of thinking in terms both of the actual world and of the world of Forms at the same time, and he suggests that Plato, if talking within the framework of 'the' heavenly patterns, could have found ideal citizens no less than ideal rulers (p. 166). Perhaps he could have; but this only goes to show that Plato was concerned with the best constitution that could possibly come into being; to hope that *all* men would become philosophers would be absurd; but he might well treat as a 'model' constitution—*ideal in the sense that it is not known to exist at present except in λόγους, though not in the sense of being perfect*—a state in which there were some philosophers, with power to mould the community as a whole.⁵ Indeed, that Plato is not thinking of all

¹ e.g. by M. B. Foster, *The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel*, quoted by Demos (p. 164). Demos himself has doubts (p. 168), supposing that the Rulers' duty to the state will come into conflict with private desire.

² *σωφροσύνη* can find no place in the souls of the rulers' (Foster, op. cit., p. 99). But the subordination of appetite to reason and the fulfilment of the proper function of appetite may both be regarded as achieved *par excellence* when appetite has as its object the same end as reason. In any case there is no unbalance.

³ Plato populates his heaven with the forms of just individuals no less than with that of the just state' (p. 164).

⁴ Demos (p. 166, n. 1) says that Plato 'vacillates' on the question whether his 'ideal' state is capable of realization, because while at 502 c he says that it is difficult of realization, but not impossible, he says at 529 a-b that it can be found nowhere on earth. But he does not say that it *never could be*—and I therefore find no vacillation.

⁵ To borrow wording from Demos (p. 165), such a state might be called ideal under the circumstances—not, so to say,

his citizens as perfect is clearly demonstrated by the fact that although Socrates argues in Book 3 that highly skilled judges ought not to be needed, if men realized 'how much better it is so to order one's life as never to stand in need of a drowsy judge', yet he allows that there should be judges in his commonwealth, and, moreover, judges who know what wickedness is. He says that it is useful for a doctor to know about diseases from personal experience of them, but that for obvious reasons a judge's knowledge of wickedness is best derived by other means—by, he says, observing over a long period its evil effects in the souls of others. So Plato's state is not a *perfect* state; there will be at least some wickedness in it. Socrates adds, indeed, that the judges are intended for those whose souls are constitutionally sound, since those who are incurably corrupt will be put to death; but it is clear that even the former class are not expected to be morally perfect as the Rulers are. They may be tolerably just, having their reasoning faculty in the ascendant, and manifest virtue of a kind; but this virtue will only be what Plato elsewhere describes as political or civic virtue, based on habit and opinion and subject to corruption through persuasion.

As Demos remarks (p. 168), a just city is a product of the justice of its members. Citizens with harmonious souls will no doubt create a harmonious city, and Demos maintains that citizens with harmonious souls are not incompatible with Plato's 'just' city based on division of functions. The picture that Plato provides of this city reveals that the counterpart in the individual of the 'justice' of this city must be a kind of balance or harmony of parts. But it also reveals that there is a higher kind of virtue, known in Plato's commonwealth to the Rulers alone;¹ in the *perfect* state it would presumably be known to all citizens; and Plato has succeeded in showing, at least by implication, that the perfect individual, he who is to have the highest kind of justice, must have achieved apprehension of the Form. For this reason we cannot be meant to regard Plato's commonwealth as a perfect state, and it seems that Cornford's view (which Demos discusses but rejects), that Plato's state is ideal, if at all, in the sense that it is the best *possible* (attainable), not the best *conceivable*, continues to deserve acceptance.

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ideally ideal. I cannot see that it is 'improper' for Plato to call it a pattern laid up in heaven.

¹ I regard Plato's Rulers as akin to the High Priests of a theocracy (*Phil.Q.* [1955], 69 f.).

A CYPRIAN CONTRACT CONCERNING THE USE OF LAND

MR. MITTFORD has kindly provided me with a photograph and impression of a Cyprian text of uncertain provenance, which he assigns to the fifth or fourth century B.C. An account of the text has been published by Mr. Mitford in *Minos*, VI. i (1958), 37-47. I print below my interpretation, which differs in some respects from his.

The characters on the stone are for the most part clearly legible, and even where there is damage to the surface of the stone restoration is practically certain.

Cyprian text.

a-ri-si-to-ma-ko-se
e-ke-ra-to / to-ko-ro / to-ne
a-u-to / a-ta-u-to
i-te-ka / o-i-ko-na-o-ne
to-ko-ro / o-ne / o-u-ki-te-le-sa
to-a-ra-ku-ri-o / to-e-na /
i-to-ta-la-mo / to-ne / i-te /
ko-i-ki-si / pe-i-se / to-no-mo

Greek transcription.

Ἀριστόμαχος
ἐκκηράτω τὸν χώρον τόννε,
(?) ὠτὸν ἀντ' αὐτῷ.
ἢ θήκαν οἰκονάων
τὸν χώρον ὅνε οὐ κ' ἵντελέσαι.
τὸ ἀργύριον δοῖναι
ἢ τὸν θάλαμον τόννε. ἔ δὲ
(?) κ' οἰκίσαι πείσει τὸν ὁμόν.

Translation. Aristomachus shall clear this plot of land, (?) this on his own behalf. He is not to pay dues for this land into the house-rent chest. He is to deliver the money into this treasury. If he occupies the land, he is to pay the (?) same fee.

A. Phonological characteristics

(a) *i* for *ē*(*n*) before *t*; *i-te-ka*, *o-u-ki-te-le-sa*, *i-to-ta-la-mo*.

(b) *i* for *ē*; *i-te*, *ko-i-ki-si*, probably equivalent to ἦ δὲ, κ' οἰκήση. But lengthened *ē* is shown by (*k*)*e* in *e-ke-ra-to*, original *ē* by (*t*)*e* in *i-te-ka*. Possibly *ē*(*i*) tended to become *ī* only if a dental stop or sibilant followed or if the long vowel were final.

The original diphthong *ēi* is shown as (*p*)*e-i* in the first syllable of *pe-i-se* and as (*s*)*e* in the second syllable. The latter case has parallels in the writing of final *ai* as *a*; see below, (c).

(c) *a* for *āi* in final position: *o-u-ki-te-le-sa*, *to-e-na*.

In view of the similar treatment of final *ēi*—see above, (b)—it seems likely that the author (or the engraver) did not distinguish the final diphthongs *āi*, *ēi*, and presumably *ōi*, from final *a*, *e*, *o*.

(d) Absence of initial and medial *f*: *o-i-ko-na-o-ne*, (*k*)*o-i-ki-si*, *to-e-na*.

In the first two cases Cypr. *vo* and in the third *ve* would normally be written. There appears to be reason to suspect that, despite the unmistakably Cyprian quality of other dialectal features, the influence of Ionic speech may be present here.

(e) Absence of final *n* when the next word begins with a stop consonant: *to(n)-ko-ro(n)/to-ne* 2, *to(n)-ko-ro* 5, *to-a-ra-ku-ri-o(n)/to-e-na*, *i-to-la-la-mo(n)/to-ne*. Absence of final *n* also when the next word begins with a vowel: *i-te-ka(n)* 4 *to-ko-ro(n)* 5. So too at the end of a sentence: *to-no-mo(n)*. Final *n* is written only in the ending of the gen. plur. fem.: *o-i-ko-na-o-ne*. See below on *a-u-to a-la-u-to* 3.

(f) *p* for original *k^w* before *e*; *pe-i-se*.

B. Morphological characteristics

(a) Gen. plur. fem. ending *-āōn*, uncontracted: *o-i-ko-na-o-ne*.

(b) Nom. acc. sing. neut. ending *-n* added to stem of definite article: *to-no-mo*, if equivalent to τὸ ὁμόν. Cf. *n* added to the gen. sing. (τῶν) in Cyprian.

(c) Deictic syllable *-ne* added to case-forms of definite article: *to-ne* 2, 7, *o-ne*. Cf. Schwyzler 679. 27 ἵν τὰν θιὸν τὰν Ἀθάναν τάννε.

(d) Aor. act. infin. of δίδωμι (Att. δοῦναι) uncontracted: *to-e-na*.

(e) Third sing. aor. subj. act. *-ī*, probably from *-ē*; *ko-i-ki-si*.

(f) Modal particle κ(ε); *o-u-ki-te-le-sa*, *ko-i-ki-si*.

C. Commentary.

The text bears a certain resemblance in content and expression to the famous Idalian decree for Onasilos (Collitz, *S.G.D.I.* 60; Schwyzler, *Dialectorum graecarum exempla epigraphica potiora* 679).

2. ἐκκηράτω. L.S.J. quote only Sophocles fr. 473 Σκυθιστὶ ἐκκεκαρμένος and Apollonius Rhodius 4. 1033 ἐκ θέρος οὐλόων ἀνδρῶν κείρατε γηγενέων, both referring to the cropping of hair. But the simple verb κείρω is used from Homer onwards of cutting down vegetation (trees, shrubs, crops, etc.). In classical times it is associated chiefly with the laying waste of land in war, but in epic and in fifth-century poetry this is not a necessary part of its connotation; see L.S.J., s.v. II. 1, 2. The basic meaning with regard to vegetation is 'to clear completely'. We may suppose that with ἐκ- prefixed this meaning would merely be intensified. Accordingly I suggest that Aristomachus is given the right to clear the piece of land to which the decree or lease refers. It may have been an area of uncultivated ground overgrown with trees or scrub, and Aristomachus is allowed to cut and carry away for his own use anything that grows thereon. For the importance of standing trees and shrubs in contracts see Schwyzler 679. 9 τὰ τέρχνιζα τὰ ἐπιόντα, etc.

If *e-ke-ra-to* does not correspond to ἐκκηράτω, I do not know what it may mean. Certainly the context and style require an imperative verb here. A gen. sing. masc. noun, giving the name of Aristomachus' father, does not seem possible.

τὸν χώρον τόννε. This inscription may have been one of a number that referred to the same plot of land, and one of the others may have defined the position or extent of the plot. Alternatively, the stone may have been set up outside a building—possibly the *only* building—on the plot, and the reference may have been obvious. It is conceivable that the building was a shrine or a house that was publicly owned. The stone may have been of the same general character as the Attic ὄροι.

The following *a-u-to* can hardly represent *αὐτῷ* as dependent on *τὸν χάρον τόννε* (or *τόν*). Aristomachus would not need permission to clear his own land; and he could not be forced to do so without diminution of his rights as owner, an eventuality that does not seem to be reflected in the rest of this text.

3. *αὐτὸν ἀντ' αὐτῷ*. This is by far the most difficult part of the text. The second group of syllables seems to represent *ἀντ' αὐτῷ*. The question then arises whether this means 'for himself' (Aristomachus) or 'for it' (the land). The answer here depends on what is to be made of the first group, *a-u-to*. This might stand for *αὐτόν*, *αὐτῷ* gen., *αὐτῶν*, *αὐτῶι* (or *αὐτοῖ* loc. dat.), *αὐτός*, or even *αὐτό*. Final *-n* is frequently omitted in this text, including cases where a vowel follows. Final *-s* is not omitted elsewhere in the text, but can be omitted in Cyprian inscriptions. To me the acc. *αὐτόν* seems the most likely reading in terms of the script alone, and after it *αὐτῷ* gen.; but in neither case can I offer a convincing reason for my choice or show that convincing sense follows from it. It may be thought probable that *both* pronouns in the phrase should refer to Aristomachus or *both* to the land, or whatever else may be meant. But even this is less than certain. We may, however, be justified in counting lightly the possibility that either pronoun means 'the same'; in this case the definite article would probably be required (cf. *τὸν ὁμόν* l. 8).

The following interpretations may be considered: (a) *αὐτὸς ἀντ' αὐτῷ* 'himself in virtue of himself', i.e. 'himself and himself alone'. This might be inferred from the Homeric use of *ἀντί* in the sense of 'equal to' (L.S.J., s.v. III. 2) or more generally from the sense 'in place of' (L.S.J., s.v. III. 1 and 3). The meaning of the phrase might then be that the right given to Aristomachus is not transferable and does not descend to his heirs. (b) *αὐτόν ἀντ' αὐτῷ* 'it (sc. the land) in virtue of itself', i.e. this land and no more. But this is far-fetched. (c) *αὐτόν ἀντ' αὐτῷ* 'it (sc. the land) in virtue of himself', sc. 'in his own right'. Here the preposition would be equivalent to *ὑπέρ*. Again the clause would be intended to prevent Aristomachus selling or bequeathing his tenancy.

Of these interpretations I would prefer (c). But I do not rule out the possibility that the inscription as a whole may be one of a series and that *a-u-to a-la-u-to* may refer not to the sentence in which it occurs but to something mentioned in a previous member of the series. I would not even reject entirely the chance that the first *a-u-to* might, despite the absence of the article (see above), represent *αὐτῷ* 'at the same price' and *ἀντ' αὐτῷ* 'for it (the land)'. It is probable in any case that we have to deal here with a fragment of legal jargon that may have been peculiar to Cyprus.

4. *θήκαν* 'money-chest', 'fund'. The word is apparently used first in this sense by Herodotus (see L.S.J., s.v. *θήκη*), although I believe that Aeschylus in *Ag.* 453 may be referring to *coffers* when he speaks of the *graves* of the fallen warriors in relation to Ares the gold-changer. It is conceivable that this word, which occurs chiefly in early times in Herodotus, Attic tragedy, and Plato, is like the digamma-less words for 'house', 'build', a sign of Ionic influence in this text. See above A (d).

οἰκωνάων 'house-rents'. This compound of *οἶκος* and *ὠνή* is not attested elsewhere, but there seems to be no other way of interpreting *o-i-ko-na-o-ne*. The relevance of houses is proved by *κ' οἰκίσαι*, l. 8 and of paying by *οὐ κ' ὑπελέσαι* and ll. 6-7. The word *ὠνή* refers to a variety of transactions, including the collection of dues and the transfer of property (L.S.J., s.v. II. 1, 2): it can

also denote the price paid (L.S.J., s.v. III). Here *οικωνόων* may mean the rent or tax paid for occupation of a house on rented land.

5. οὐ κ' ὑπελέσαι 'he is not to pay'. The form is equivalent to εἰς-τελέσαι, Cyp. ὑν performing the functions of both ἐν and εἰς. The compound εἰστέλλω seems not to occur in this sense before the third or fourth century A.D.; but the word occurs in Plato with the meaning 'add to the roll' of a class (L.S.J., s.v.). We may compare, however, τελεῖν itself and also ἀποτελεῖν, προστελεῖν, συντελεῖν, all of which denote payment, contribution, and the like.

τὸν χώρον. The use of the accusative after ὑπελέσαι to denote the thing for which payment is made seems odd. But the accusative seems more likely to be represented by *to-ko-ro* than any other case. We may perhaps compare such expressions as Homer, *Il.* 9. 387 πρὶν γ' ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ἐμοὶ δόμεναι θυμαλγέα λώβην, 'until he pays me for the grievous insult in full'. In any case I do not think that it is possible to take ἀντ' αὐτῷ I. 3 with οὐ κ' ὑπελέσαι; this would make the problem of accounting for *to-ko-ro* even harder than it is at present.

6. τὸ ἀργύριον. The price has perhaps been recorded on a separate slab of stone; or it is a standard price prescribed by law and need not be specified (see below on τὸν ὁμόν).

δοεῖναι, cf. Schwyzler 679. 5 δορέναι (also 6 δυρέναι, opt.); Arcadian ἀπυδόας ptcple., δῶναι inf., Ion.-Att. δοῦναι, and Sanskrit *dāváne*. The sense is imperative, and the subject (*Ἀριστόμαχον*).

7. ἢ τὸν θάλαμον τόννε, presumably a particular room where the inscription was set up. From Homer onwards to the fifth century, *θάλαμος* sometimes has the special sense of a room for storing valuables; and in general it is an inner chamber that would often be suitable for this purpose (L.S.J., s.v., especially I. 1b). I conceive that the *θάλαμος* in question was a treasury, perhaps forming part of a temple or shrine, and that this building was situated in or near the area which is rented to Aristomachus (see above, p. 170).

ἢ (or ἔ), cf. Schwyzler 679. 10, etc., ἔ (or ἦ) 'if'.

8. κ' οἰκίσῃ, sc. οἰκίσῃ 3 s. aor. subj. 'dwells', 'settles' on the land rented to him; less probably οἰκίσῃ intr., with the same meaning (L.S.J., s.v. οἰκίζω III).

πέισει, fut. impv. 'he will pay'. Cf. Schwyzler 679. 12 πέισει, in the same sense.

τὸν ὁμόν, probably acc. sing. neut. For τόν see above B (b). Alternatively one might suppose that a masc. acc. noun is understood. In any case it seems unlikely that either τὸν νόμον or τῷ νόμῳ is meant. Perhaps τὸν νομόν 'pay for use of the habitation' is not out of the question; but this sense of *νομός* seems to be a poetical artifice (L.S.J., s.v. II. 1).

I take τὸν ὁμόν to mean 'the same fee'. This might indicate that Aristomachus is not to pay any additional sum even if he occupies the land as well as cropping it of timber. But in view of the Homeric use of ὁμός, it appears possible that τὸν ὁμόν might be the *usual* or *common* fee, approximating to ἴσος or ξυνός; if so, the sense would be that Aristomachus is to pay the standard rate for houses if he builds on the land and lives there.

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SILIANA

1. 377 insignis Rutulo Murrus de sanguine ; at idem
matre Saguntina Graius geminoque parente
Dulichios Italīs miscebat prole nepotes.

'He was of Rutulian blood, born of a Saguntine mother ; but he had Greek blood too, and by his two parents he combined the seed of Italy with that of Dulichium'. So Duff, and Ruperti's 'Murrus matre Graia et patre Romano progenitus' is not the whole story. To Silius Saguntine = Greek (cf. 3. 178 *Graia Saguntos*) because, as Duff says, 'men of Zacynthos had taken part in founding Saguntum'. *prole* = 'with his children'—van Veen's *Itala* may well be right.

1. 642 et quantus crescit in armis!
trans iuga Pyrenes, medium indignatus Hiberum,
excivit Calpen et mersos Syrtis harenis
molitur populos maioraque moenia quaerit.
spumeus hic, medio qui surgit ab aequore, fluctus
si prohibere piget, vestras effringet in urbes.

Hannibal did not have to cross the Pyrenees in order to stir up the Rock of Gibraltar. Mr. G. T. Griffith has healed this passage by a simple transposition.

- et quantus crescit in armis!
excivit Calpen et mersos Syrtis harenis 645
molitur populos maioraque moenia quaerit 646
trans iuga Pyrenes medium indignatus Hiberum. 644

2. 384 bellum se gestare sinu pacemque profatus,
quid sedeat, legere ambiguīs *neu* fallere dictis
imperat.

imperat legere neu fallere is an at least remarkable mixture of constructions. Read *nec*?

3. 29 inrestructa focis servant altaria flammae,
sed *nulla* effigies simulacra *nota* deorum
maiestate locum et sacro implevere timore.

Heinsius's *nullae* is needless and his *vota* ruins the sense, which he, like others since, failed to perceive. It was the *absence* of any statue or familiar images which 'filled the place with solemnity and sacred awe'. This can be added to the passages assembled in my note on Prop. 1. 2. 14 *et volucres nulla dulcius arte canunt*.¹

6. 270 tum fractus demum vires ; nec iam amplius aegra
consuetum ad nisus spina praestante rigorem
et solitum in nubes tolli caput. acrius insta(n)t,
iamque et *sqq.*

Various conjectures and punctuations can be found in Bauer's apparatus. Besides *instant* (Gronovius) the only change needed, I think, is that of *et* to *it*. *nec iam amplius caput [serpentis] it in nubes, solitum in nubes tolli*.

¹ *Propertiana*, pp. 268 f.

6. 515 exclamat fessas tendens ad *litora* palmas:
 'En, qui se iactat Libyae populisque nefandis
 atque hosti servare fidem. data foedera nobis
 ac promissa fides thalamis ubi, perfide, nunc est?'

Regulus' wife watches her husband sail away to Carthage. She would not stretch her hands to the shore: hence Schrader's *a litore. ad sidera*, an old reading, has many parallels, but the address is to Regulus (*perfide*) rather than to the gods. Perhaps *ad lintea*. So the wife of Ceÿx stretched out her hands to him as his ship departed (Ov. *Met.* 11. 686). Silius has *lintea* once elsewhere, in 1. 689.

8. 559 Martia frons facilesque comae nec *pone retroque*
 caesaries brevior.

faciles appears to mean 'growing easily', untrammelled by careful dressing. But why tell us that Scipio's hair was no shorter at the back than in front? And why *two* adverbs? Read *nec tempore utroque*. The hair reached down to both temples in a level fringe, longish, therefore, as became a young man, but not effeminate like that of Statius' God of Sleep (*Theb.* 10. 110 f.): *manus haec fusos a tempore laevo / sustentat crines*. The loss of *lẽ*, leaving *pore utroque* would easily produce the vulgate.

9. 428 nam, rapido subitam portans in morte salutem
 procursu, *incepta* in sese discrimina vertit
 Scipio.

in *sese ed. Lugdunensis*: *sese O*, ad *sese R*¹, *sese in cett.*¹

Scipio saves Varro's life at Cannae. *incepta* cannot be salvaged, either by taking it with *morte* (Bauer) or otherwise. *coepta*, *certa*, *interea*, *suscepta* (*ad se*) are available, but the *mot juste* is *excepta*, 'intercepted', 'took on himself'. Cf. Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 23 *subire coegit et excipere [pericula]* et sim.

9. 649 abrumpere cuncta
 iamdudum cum luce libet. sed comprimit ensem
 nescioqui deus et *mem* ad graviora reservat

Varro after Cannae. *mem* is unknown in poetry and none too well attested in prose: see Neue-Wagener, II. 355. Instead of Bothe's *nescio qui. deus est?* *mene ad graviora reservat!* and Summers's *at quae me ad graviora reservat!* I propose *nece me*, 'for a fate worse than death'.

10. 10 velocius inde
 Haemonio Borea *pennaque citatior* ibat
 quae redit in pugnas fugientis harundine Parthi.

'Swifter than . . . the arrow . . . from the bow of the retreating Parthian' (Duff). Where else does *harundo* mean 'bow'? Read *pennataque ocior*, comparing 2. 95 *pennata . . . harundine*. Perhaps a transposition of syllables produced *pennaque tator*; but more probably *pennaque ocior* was altered to mend the metre.

10. 279 calcaribus aufer,
 qua vulnus permittit, equum atque hinc ocus urbis
 claudantur portae (ruet haec ad moenia pestis)
 dic, oro.

¹ I follow Summers's notation in *Corp. Poet. Lat.*

Paulus tells Lentulus to make good his escape from the battlefield and warn Rome. *hinc ocius dic* cannot go together, hence Bauer puts a colon after *hinc*. But *hinc* should go with *ocius*, cf. Hor. *Sat.* 2. 7. 117 f. *ocius hinc te / ni rapis*; so the colon should follow *ocius*. For the ellipse cf. Pers. 5. 141 *ocius ad naevem*!

10. 343

'non te maioribus' inquit

ausis, dive, voco nec posco ut mollibus alis
des victum mihi, Somne, Iovem. non mille premendi
sunt oculi tibi, nec spernens tua numina custos
Inachiae multa superandus nocte iuvencae.'

Nothing wrong here. But it is characteristic of the poet and his commentators that neither appear to have seen anything inappropriate in making Iuno tell Sleep that she won't ask him to interfere with Argus.

10. 420

dux erat exilio *collectis* Marte Metellus,
sed stirpe haud parvi cognominis.

The survivors of Cannae plan to flee from Italy.

S. Blomgren¹ supports Ruperti: '*dux erat exsilio, ad exsilium, collectis Metellus, Marte quidem parvi cognominis, sed stirpe haud p.c.* h.e. non bello quidem et factis, sed genere clarus'. But he admits that *cognomen* lacks parallel 'de hominis nomine et fama', and the order of words is very harsh. Also the fugitives at Canusium were not 'assembled² for exile'; that plan came into their heads later, put there by *impia formido ac maior Erinys* (417; following 388 f. *iam Latius sese Canusina in moenia miles / colligere*). Yet I do not think *exilio* need be replaced by *exilii* (Summers), let alone *ex illo* [*Marte*] (Heinsius) or *exilis* (Livineius). It means 'the (intending) exiles': cf. Tac. *Hist.* 1. 2 *plenum exiliis mare, hospitium for hospes* in Prop. 1. 15. 20, and similar things thereon collected. But *collectis* must go. *non laetus* (Summers) is the only available substitute. I add *contemptus*, comparing for the abl. *Marte* (as in 9. 436 *Marte viri dextraque pares*) German. 334 *ore vomit flammam, membris contemptior ignis*.

11. 55

*has astu adgressus quo verteret acrius aegras
ad Tyrios mentes, et sqq.*

Despite Gronovius (*Obs.* iv. 4) I doubt if *has* is sound, though he was right to dismiss Barth's *hac*. Perhaps *hos* (the people of Capua).

11. 90

excipit his frendens Fabius: 'Pro *cuncta* pudendi!
sedes, ecce, vacat, belli viduata procella;' *et sqq.*

Fabius addresses the Campanian envoy, come to demand a share in the consulship for his countrymen.

I dislike *pro cuncta pudendi*, not so much as 'duram formulam et moleste graecissantem' (Ernesti), as because *cuncta* is fatuously vague. Fabius is infuriated not by Campanian manners in general but by a particular piece of impudence. There is no comfort in *pro monstra! pudendi* (Burmman) or *prope iuncta pudendi* (Heinsius)—*belli procella* is much better without the limiting epithet (which would refer to Cannae). I doubt if Schrader's *pro summa pudendi!* is Latin. So I put *coepta for cuncta*: lit. 'Fie upon you, scandalous in your undertaking.' *pudenda* would certainly be easier. As Fabius goes on to make clear, it is

¹ *Uppsala Univ. Årsskrift*, 1938, vii. 31 f.

were assembled in one house; but cf. *colli-*

² Blomgren thinks *collectis* means that they were in 389.

the idea of a Campanian such as this envoy taking Paulus' place that is 'shameful'.

11. 153 prorsus enim tanto potiozem nomine habendum
Varronem, ut fugiat consul fulgentior ostro.

This ends the reflections of the Capuan *furiata iuventus* after the rejection of their demands.

'Varro, forsooth, they think more worthy of that high title' (Duff). But *potiozem* is not *digniozem*. *in* is required after *enim* (or *potiozem*): 'a better man in so great a dignity [as the consulship]'. Cf. 13. 859 f. *nec tanto in nomine quisquam / existet, Sullae qui se velit esse secundum*, i.e. no future dictator or ruler of Rome will follow Sulla's example in resigning.

11. 163 magnum atque in magnis positum populisque virisque
adversa ostentare fidem.

magnum *Heinsius*: magna *ChS*, magnam *R*¹ positam *ChS* (v. *Summers, C.R.* 1902, p. 171)
adversa LF: adversam *ChOV* ostentare *ChO*, ostendere *LFV*

adversam ostentare fidem cannot mean 'to show loyalty to the distressed' (Duff). But *haud versam* (Burmman: so *Summers*) removes the essential, loyalty in adversity. Bentley's *adversa ostendere fidem* makes excellent sense, but the elimination of 163 is too high a price to pay. Other conjectures are not worth record. I suggest *adversa re stare fidem*. For *adversa re* see *T.L.L.* i. 871. 14 ff. and for *stare* cf. 6. 472 *stante fide reditus*.

12. 63 sed custos urbi Gracchus tutela vel ipsis
certior arcebat muris iterumque sedere
portis atque aditus iterum sperare *velabat*.

portus *Ch*

Baffled at Naples, Hannibal turns against Cumae. Here too he is foiled by the garrison commander, Gracchus.

The manuscript text¹ is reduced to absurdity by Duff: 'Gracchus . . . kept the enemy away from the place, preventing them from encamping again by the gates and from hoping again to force an entrance'. There was nothing to stop Hannibal from encamping at the gates, and presumably that is what he did. Drakenborch, followed by *Ernesti*, is more subtle: 'dudum notarunt eruditi, veteres interdum duabus pluribusve vocibus unum verbum addidisse, quod uni tantum respondebat, omisso, quod alteri conveniebat. sic hoc loco ad verbum *sedere* intelligendum est *iubebat, cogebat*, vel simile, eodem modo ut apud *Phaedr.* lib. iv. fab. xvii. vers. 31. *non veto dimitti, verum cruciari fame*'. *Ruperti* objects that we have no *verum* or *sed* here, but cf., for example, *Tac. Ann.* 12. 64. 3 *filiis dare imperium, tolerare imperitantem nequibat*. But what about the sense? Gracchus did not forbid Hannibal to hope for ways of entry. On the contrary Hannibal proceeds to look for them in the next verse: *lustrat inops animi, rimaturque omnia circum*. Gracchus showed himself ready to resist a frontal attack and stand a siege. He invited Hannibal to sit down at Cumae, as he had done at Naples, in the hope of finding a weak point which he would not find. Read *vocabat*, comparing for the construction *Lucr.* 5. 945 *at sedare sitim fluvii fontesque vocabant*.

¹ The conjectures are all nugatory.

12. 348 ipse asper paci *crudos* sine viribus annos
barbarici studio ritus refovebat in armis.

Onwards from Virg. *Aen.* 6. 304 *cruda deo viridisque senectus*, *crudus*, as an epithet of old age, means invariably 'vigorous': see *T.L.L.* iv. 1236. 7 ff. So in Silius himself 1. 405 *crudaque virens ad bella senectus*, 16. 331 f. *sunt cruda senectus / quos iuvet*. So *crudos sine viribus* is self-contradictory. *crudo*, 'cruel' (*studio*) is an obvious remedy, but I suspect the fault lies deeper. For example *paci* may be patchwork, and the line originally may have read *ipse asper crudos nec adhuc sine viribus annos*.

12. 407 'Nimium iuvenis nimiumque, *superbe*,
Sperata hausisti
superbi S, corr. Scaliger

Hostus tries to kill Ennius, and is reproved by Apollo.

For *superbi sperata hausisti* a dozen or so conjectures are available in Bauer. I beg to add *sperasti his ausis*, assuming that the last syllable of *sperasti* strayed: *spera[ta] h<(is)ausis<(s)ti*.

12. 619 *fluit* agmen aquarum
fluere does not seem to be used elsewhere of rain. *ruit* Heinsius. *pluit*?

12. 653 cum fulgor hebescere caeli
per subitum coepit, densaeque subire tenebrae,
atque dies fugere, atque armare ad proelia rursus
Iuppiter.

I do not believe in *atque* . . . *atque*. *iamque* *dies*?

13. 679 peterem cum victor adesum
cladibus Hasdrubalem, subito venale, cohortes
Hispanae, vulgus, *Libyci* quas *fecerat auri*
Hasdrubal, abrupto liquerunt agmine signa.

libya LF, Libyco . . . auro R¹

The ghost of Scipio's father tells how his Spanish auxiliaries were suborned to desert.

If *Libyci quas fecerat auri* could mean 'whom Hasdrubal had enslaved to Libyan gold' all would be well. Since it means neither that nor anything else, change there must be. One line of attack has been to make *Libyci* into something which refers to the cohorts instead of the gold: as *Libyae* (*Libyum* Bauer, *Libyas* Summers) . . . *auro* Blass. Schrader's *Libyco quas ceperat* (*emerat* Ruperti) *auro* is far more natural, but I think the verb may rather have been *flexerat*: cf. Prop. 1. 8. 39 f. *hanc ego non auro, non Indis flectere conchis, / sed potui blandi carminis obsequio*.

14. 333 his super insidiis angusta foramina murus
arte cavata dabat, per quae clam fundere tela
tutum erat, opposito mittentibus aggere valli.
nec sine fraude labos, arta ne rursus eodem
spicula ab hoste via vicibus contorta redirent.

334 clam *Burman*: cum *ChLF*, con- *OV* 336 nec *Marsus*: tum *S*

That is the vulgate (commentators compare Liv. 24. 34. 9). It is bad Latin: *ne spicula redirent* cannot mean 'for weapons might come back'—*sine fraude* is not *sine timore* or *sine periculo*. It is bad sense: having been told that the defenders could shoot through the apertures in safety it is disconcerting to hear that they were in danger. And what sort of danger? Even if the besiegers tried to throw back the weapons through the slits, and now and again succeeded, the man behind would mostly be standing out of harm's way. It involves a not very probable change of text—*turn* to *nec*. The fault lies with the punctuation. Substitute:

per quae clam fundere tela
tutum erat, opposito mittentibus aggere valli
(tum sine fraude labos), arta ne rursus eodem
spicula ab hoste via vicibus contorta redirent.

'Through which weapons might be shot in safety. For the rampart's bulk protected the shooters (*then* no hurt accompanied their toil), in case the enemy should in his turn fire back the darts through the narrow opening.'

13. 833 patrios fregit quae curribus artus
et stetit adductis super ora trementia frenis
Tullia et sqq.

Ruperti writes: *stetit vel ipsa super ora patris, vel in curru, qui substitit adductis frenis. utroque scelus augetur: sed neutrum alibi legere memini, et is, qui iumenta ageret, frenos potius inhibuisse dicitur, ne per patris corpus ageretur, itaque vel τὸ adductis pro simpl. ductis positum, vel atrocitas sceleris a Silio aucta videtur*. He should have gone farther. Both Valerius Maximus (9. 11. 1) and Ovid say that Tullia ordered the driver to drive on over the body: *Fast. 6. 608 duc, inquam, invitas ipsa per ora rotas*. She is callous rather than sadistic. I cannot believe that Silius altered the legend to so little purpose, particularly when he can be made to conform to it (in substance) simply by changing *et* to *nec*: 'and did not halt or draw rein in passing over his quivering face'. *super* is pregnantly used: see *Propertiana* p. 287 (on 2. 17. 6).

14. 384 medias inter sublimior ibat
terribilis visu puppis, qua nulla per omne
egressa est Libycis maior navalibus aevum.
sed quater haec centum numeroso remige pontum
pulsabat tonsis, veloque superba capaci
. lento se robore agebat

'*rò sed* importune hic videtur inculcatum', Heinsius. I agree, but his *acta quater* does not convince, neither does Schrader's *ter quater* or Damsté's *sed quamquam*. Perhaps *sic*; 'in such lordly fashion'.

14. 47¹ ille ubi septena modulatus harundine carmen
mulcebat silvas, non umquam tempore eodem
Siren adsueto effudit in aequare cantus,
Scyllaei tacuere canes, stetit atra Charybdis,
et laetus scopulis *audivit* iubila Cyclops.

The usual notion that *iubila* means Daphnis' song is rendered only more ridiculous by appeals to Calp. *Ecl.* 1. 30 *nec montana sacros distinguunt iubila versus* and 7. 3 *ut tua maerentes expectant iubila tauri*. Anyone who likes to consult

a dictionary can satisfy himself that *ubila* are shouts of shepherds to their flocks, or conceivably some sort of yodelling. To the disgrace of editors Gronovius's certain *sedavit*¹ still waits for admission to the text. The first letter having been lost in the last of *scopulis*, *e*, read as *i*, changed places with *au*.

14. 580 nec mora quin trepidos hac clade inrumpere muros
signaque ferre deum templis iam iamque fuisset,
ni subito importuna lues inimicaque pestis,
invidia divum pelagique labore parata,
polluto miseris rapuisset gaudia caelo.

582 ni R^1 : et S

The Romans besieging Syracuse had won a great victory at sea (353–579). They would have followed this up by an immediate assault but for a sudden outbreak of plague.

Obviously something is wrong. The construction *nec mora quin fuisset inrum-
pere* is impossible, but can be saved by *ruisset* (Heinsius) or, better, by *tum*
(Summers) for *quin*. But what of *pelagi labore*? 'This may refer to the corpses
floating in the harbour, or to the exhaustion following a great effort' (Duff).
I do not know which of these suggestions to call the more implausible. And
there is nothing to be said for Heinsius's *apore*, which destroys the connexion
between *pelagi* and the sea battle just lengthily described. In any case who would
talk of a pestilence as *parata labore*? Contrast 12. 78 *quaecumque labore parastis*,
'whatever [triumphs] you have won by effort', Prop. 4. 1. 139 f. *victrices
quascumque labore parasti* / . . . *palmas*. *parata* must be taken with *gaudia* (Catull.
76. 5 f. *multa parata manent in longa aetate*, Catulle, / *ex hoc ingrato gaudia amore tibi*),
and the comma between them removed. This carries further changes of punctua-
tion in its wake, until we are left with the following:

nec mora †quint† trepidos hac clade inrumpere muros
signaque ferre deum templis iam iamque, fuisset
ni subito importuna lues inimicaeque pestis
invidia divum, pelagique labore parata
polluto miseris rapuisset gaudia caelo.

I thus restore to Silius a doubtless prized antithesis. The sea on which they had fought had given the Romans the joy of victory; the sky, tainted by pestilence, snatched it away.

It remains to deal with *quin*. Summers's *tum* [sc. *erat*] will still serve, but *vi* has more point and at least as much diplomatic probability.

14. 680 aemulus ipse
ingenii superum servando condidit urbem.

ipse is Marcellus, *urbem* Syracuse.

ingenium superum is a phrase I have not met elsewhere. Read *ingenio*, 'rivalling the gods in spirit'?

15. 5ⁱ aberunt sitis aspera et haustus
sub galea pulvis partique *minore* labores
timore R¹, vulg.

¹ Heinsius' *desivit* is inadmissible. The form does not occur in poetry.

Pleasure is tempting Scipio. Here are the conjectures: *pastique timore* (Heinsius), *plenique* (or *iunctique*) *t.* (Ruperti), *raptique t.* (Summers), *partique in Marte* (Bauer), *p. in morte* (Blass), *patrisque e more* (Blass), *raptique in Marte* (Summers), *partique labore timores* (Ruperti).

I like none of these, and would fain read *partique labore labores*. The only reward the soldier gets for his toils is further toil. The first step in the corruption is then obvious, but I can give no plausible account of the second—the intrusion of *minore* into the defective line. Perhaps *partoque in honore* should be considered. A fighting general like Scipio will find that command brings fatigues. Even *partique in honore* 'labours won in the shape of command' is not out of the question.

16. 28 *ecce aliud decus haud uno contenta favore
nutribat Fortuna duci.*

uno Ch; parvo, primo F suprascer. et in marg., om. S

uno is explained as a reference to the capture of New Carthage. But Scipio had had other successes by this time, such as his victory over Hasdrubal (15. 471–92). If Heinsius's reports of the Coloniensis were fully reliable I should propose *ullo*. As it is, perhaps *tanto*, which old editions cite from the Puteaneus, may be preferable.

16. 208 *quare, age, laetus have nostros intrare penates
 have Ch, habe S*

'Nota quod verba sunt Syphacis Afri' (*T.L.L.*). Enough said. Read *adi nostros intraque*?

16. 624 *quanti, ut cedas Romamque relinuas,
 emerito ast tanto percussi fulmine belli
 sicine te, ut nuper Capua est accitus ab alta
 Fulvius, aequoreis Libyae revocabimus oris?*

Fabius is attacking the proposal to send Scipio to Africa. *emerit! et* (L. Müller) is usually read, and no doubt it is essentially right. But I would suggest *aut* instead of *et*. 'How glad Hannibal will be to get you out of the way! Or are you suggesting that if need arises we shall send for you as we did for Fulvius?' The point is borrowed from Liv. 28. 41. 13 *quid? si . . . victor Hannibal ire ad urbem perget, tum demum te consulem ex Africa, sicut Q. Fulvium a Capua, arcessemus?*

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THE LANGUAGE OF VIRGIL AND HORACE¹

As in literature poetry precedes prose, so in poetry a special and 'heightened' diction seems to precede everyday language.² Mr. T. S. Eliot has put it thus: 'Every revolution in poetry is apt to be, and sometimes to announce itself as, a return to common speech.'³ How does this apply to Greek and Latin? There are objections to considering words in isolation from this point of view, since neutral ones are apt to go now grey, now purple, according to their company; but if we do not do so, we deny ourselves the only considerable method of investigation (unsatisfactory though it is) that is still open to us. Again, we must recognize that most poems are composed largely of ordinary words, though these are often used in a way that is not ordinary. It is a matter of degree. Pindar, and indeed Aeschylus, used a comparatively high proportion of poetical words. But when Euripides revolutionized Greek tragedy by introducing 'homely things such as we use and live among', he also made concomitant innovations in style which are harder for us to detect. As Aristotle remarked in his *Rhetoric*, 'A poet can beguile us successfully (κλέπεται εὖ) by picking and combining words from the language of daily life. This is what Euripides does, and he was the first to indicate the way.'⁴

There is a certain hesitancy, or even confusion, in Aristotle's remarks on poetic diction. In the *Poetics* he insists that it must be clear, but not mean: a style consisting wholly of ordinary words would be the clearest, but it would also be mean. The poet must therefore give it distinction by the introduction of unusual words or forms, without overdoing this. He concedes, however, that in the iambic verse of tragedy, which reproduces natural speech as nearly as may be, the most suitable diction is such as one might find in prose, namely ordinary words, with metaphor and ornament.⁵ Likewise in the *Rhetoric* he recommends an unusual diction for poetry, but he immediately subjects this to the overriding rule of propriety (τὸ πρέπον), saying that language must be convincing (πίθανον), and sound natural in the mouth of the character concerned.⁶ In fact Aristotle's general view, that poetic diction should be enriched by rare words, is tempered by his Euripidean feeling that in dramatic or quasi-dramatic verse the diction should be more naturalistic.

A further source of confusion lurks in the word σύνθεσις, and, I think, in its Latin descendant *iunctura*, as we shall see.⁷ When Aristotle used συντιθῆναι in the passage quoted just now, he was no doubt thinking merely of the way in which

¹ This paper was delivered to the Joint Conference of Greek and Roman Societies at Cambridge on 9 August 1958.

² See O. Jespersen, *Language* (1922), p. 432.

³ *The Music of Poetry* (1942), p. 16.

⁴ 1404²⁵ κλέπεται εὖ εἰς τὰς ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου ἐκλέγων συντιθῆναι ὁ περ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος. Cf. Aristophanes, fr. 471, on Euripides and himself: χρώμαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στόματος τῷ στρογγύλῳ, τοὺς νοῦς δ' ἀγοραίους ἦντον ἢ κείνος ποιῶ. στρογγύλος seems to mean neat, terse, compact.

⁵ 1458^a-1459^a 'mean'—ταπεινός, 'ordin-

ary'—κύριος, 'unusual'—ξενικός. Oddly enough, the first example he gives of the virtue of unusual diction is a line of Aeschylus,

φαγέδαινα δ' ἢ μοι σάρκας ἐσθλῆι ποδός, which was redeemed from the banal (εὐτέλες) to the noble (καλόν) by Euripides, who heightened ἐσθλῆι to θοινᾶται. For other instances of far from ordinary language in Euripides see F. R. Earp, *The Style of Aeschylus* (1948), p. 72.

⁶ 1404²⁵-5.

⁷ The literal Latin for σύνθεσις is *collocatio*, and this is also ambivalent, since it can refer either to arrangement of topics, or to

Euripides composed his verse of ordinary words. But Longinus (if I may so call the author *περὶ ὕψους*) introduces into a chapter on the structure of periods,¹ dealing with the effect of τὸ συνθεῖναι καὶ ἀρμόσαι (which Hamilton Fyfe translates as 'composition and verbal carpentry') an illustration which seems really more appropriate to Aristotle's point.² After mentioning Euripides as a poet who for the most part employs ordinary language, he continues: 'Thus Heracles, when he has killed his children, uses the words

"I am truly laden with troubles, and there's no room left for more":

γέμω κακῶν δὴ κοῦκέτ' ἐστ' ὅποι τεθῆ.

The expression is extremely commonplace, but is heightened by the aptness of the structure of the line. If you put it together in any other way this will become clear, the fact being that Euripides is a poet in virtue of his handling of words rather than his thoughts.' (σφόδρα δημῶδες τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ γέγονεν ὑψηλὸν τῇ πλάσει ἀναλογούν· εἰ δ' ἄλλως αὐτὸ συναρμώσει, φανήσεται σοι, διότι τῆς συνθέσεως ποιητῆς ὁ Εὐριπίδης μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ νοῦ.) γέμω is not an unpoetic word, being found indeed three times in Aeschylus and three in Sophocles.³ It seems likely, therefore, that the impression of common speech was given by the phrase κοῦκέτ' ἐστ' ὅποι τεθῆ. This introduction of a colloquial phrase to give poignant reality to a moment of tragedy is comparable with Dido's

si quis mihi *paruulus* aula

luderet Aeneas

—almost 'some tiny Aeneas'—or Othello's

the pity of it, Iago,

or Lear's

pray you, undo this button.

It is hard to see how the line could have been *put together* in any other way so as to destroy the ὕψος, and one cannot help suspecting that two wires of traditional Peripatetic criticism have got crossed here, one concerning the effect of σύνθεσις in the sense of the harmonious arrangement of words—ἀρμονία, concinnitas—and the other concerning the effect of it from the semantic point of view, the telling combination of ordinary words and phrases. But it remains noteworthy that so sensitive a critic should throw out as an *obiter dictum*, as if it were a commonplace of criticism, that Euripides was a poet in virtue of his handling of words rather than his thought.

Cicero, who was praised by Caesar for being the first Latin orator to apply selection to vocabulary,⁴ recommended that orators choose words as euphonious as possible, but taken from the common stock, not sought out for sound, *as by the poets*.⁵ Clearly it was orthodox to assume that poetry employed *recherché* words, as the *cantores Euphorionis* did. Nevertheless it was recognized, as by Aristotle, that drama at least might effectively employ ordinary language; for,

fitting together of words, usually with a view to ἀρμονία, concinnitas. The word is also rendered by *compositio*, as in the title of Dionysius' *περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων*.

¹ XL.

² The inappropriateness was remarked by O. Immisch, *Horazens' Epistel über die Dichtkunst* (1932), p. 83 n.

³ Of course, for all we know, γέμω κακῶν may be an unpoetic phrase.

⁴ Cic. *Brut.* 253. Cf. Tac. *Dial.* 22.

⁵ Or. 163: Verba . . . legenda sunt potissimum bene sonantia; sed ea non ut poetae exquisita ad sonum, sed sumpta de medio. Cf. *De Or.* 1. 12.

when discussing tragedy in the *Orator*, Cicero imagined someone as interposing, 'I love Ennius, because he does not depart from ordinary usage in his diction'.¹ But the distinction between dramatic and other forms of poetry in this respect does not seem to have been always kept in view. We have thus the first known phase in European literature of the recurrent interaction between two styles of poetry.² What Euripides had done Wordsworth was to advocate, with his 'selection of the language really spoken by men'. There is a fragment in the second book of Philodemus *περὶ ποιημάτων* to the effect that poems characterized by *recherché* diction are often worthless, whereas poems made of words that are colloquial and ordinary, but well combined, are often good: *ἐξ ἰδιωτικῶν τε καὶ εὐτελῶν, συγκειμένων δὲ καλῶς, χρηστόν*.³ The point is elaborated by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in Chapter III of his *De Compositione Verborum*: 'Many poets, as well as oratorical and philosophical prose-writers, who have picked out words which are definitely beautiful and appropriate to the subject, but have fitted them together in a random and inartistic way, have reaped no benefit from their pains: whereas others have taken words that are humble and unregarded, and by combining them in a pleasing and uncommon way, have invested their style with great charm.' And again he says in Chapter XII: 'No part of speech that signifies any person or thing will prove so mean or squalid or otherwise offensive as to have no possible fitting place in literature'; and he goes on to point out that Homer had used *τὰ εὐτελέστατα τῶν ὀνομάτων*, as had Herodotus and Demosthenes.

This brings us to the Roman poets I wish to discuss; for Philodemus is inseparable from Siro, the mentor of Virgil and the Epicurean poets of the circle that frequented the area of Naples;⁴ and Horace, who refers to an epigram of his which has not come down to us,⁵ can hardly have failed to know his prose works also; while Dionysius came to Rome in 30 B.C., just when Virgil was embarking on the *Aeneid* and Horace on the *Odes*, and remained there, teaching young Romans, at least until 8 B.C., the year of Horace's death.⁶ There is thus every reason for supposing that the Augustan poets were familiar with what Greek critics had said, and were saying, about poetic diction.

Now there is a curious sentence in the part of the Suetonian Life of Virgil which deals with his detractors (ch. 44): 'M. Vipsanius called Virgil a puppet of Maecenas, inventor of a new kind of affected style, neither inflated nor jejune but composed of ordinary words and therefore unobtrusive'. (M. Vipsanius a Maecenata eum suppositum appellabat nouae cacozeliae reperiorem, nec tumidae nec exilis sed ex communibus uerbis atque ideo latentis.) The manuscript reading Vipsarius is an obvious blunder, and M. Vipsanius

¹ *Or.* 36: Ennio delector quod non didicit a communi more uerborum.

² For the modern situation see G. S. Fraser, 'Writing', in *A New Outline of Modern Knowledge*, ed. A. Pryce Jones (1956), p. 329.

³ ii. 275. 9 Hausrath.

⁴ *Catalepton* V. Servius on *Aen.* 6. 264; *Ecl.* 6. 13. Probus, *Vita Verg.* p. 73. 10 Br. Cic. *De Fin.* 2. 119. Philodemus, *Pap. Herc.* 312; W. Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos* (1906), p. 126. Rostagni, *L'Arte Poetica di Orazio* (1930), p. xiii, says that Philodemus probably addressed one of his works to Horace, along with Virgil, Varius, and

Quintilius Varus. But it is more than likely that the corrupt name in *περὶ φιλαργυρίας* should be restored as *Πλωτίου* rather than *Ὀπάτιου* (as he admits elsewhere, p. xxix n.).

Plotius et Varius Sinuessa Vergiliusque occurrere,

says Horace on his journey to Brundisium (*S.* 1. 5. 40); and Plotius Tucca is inseparable from Varius, while Horace is hardly likely to have known the circle in the period when it seems to have centred round Siro (c. 50-40 B.C.).

⁵ *S.* 1. 2. 121.

⁶ *Ant. Rom.* 1. 7.

tout court can only be the great Agrippa. *Cacozelia* was a tasteless excess of any sort; and *atque ideo latentis* is a distant reminder of Aristotle's *κλέπτει δ' εὖ* in the passage on the same subject from the *Rhetoric* which I have already cited (1404^b5).¹ Beside this dictum we may set a remark of Maecenas himself, quoted by the elder Seneca, though it refers to treatment of ideas rather than to diction, to judge from the illustration attached. He said that Virgil managed to be sublime without being tumid, so that his lines were *et magna et tamen sana*.²

Suetonius' probable source was a work he mentions two sentences later, the book 'against the detractors of Virgil' by Asconius Pedianus, who flourished under Tiberius. The story can be taken as authentic, for who would have been likely to father on Agrippa a spurious piece of literary criticism? Not that he was indifferent to culture: he seems to have aspired to be sung by Horace,³ and the elder Pliny tells us that he made a speech recommending that works of art should be taken out of the seclusion of private houses and made accessible to the public. But Pliny adds that he was *uir rusticitati propior quam deliciis*.⁴ We are not here considering his relations with Maecenas (after all, he may only have been teasing), nor his view of Maecenas' relations with the poets of his circle, but the basis and validity of his criticism of Virgil's style. Arresting though it is, the passage has often been surprisingly neglected. It was the subject of an article by Friedrich Marx in the *Rheinisches Museum* for 1925, to which I am indebted.⁵ Marx set out clearly the Greek precedents, but when he came to consider its validity for Virgil he was extremely sceptical about our ability to judge, because of our ignorance of the nuances of Roman speech. The point I want to make is, that he may have been unduly sceptical, in the light of subsequent research. The same year, 1925, saw the publication of W. Baehrens's *Skizze der lateinischen Umgangssprache*, and in 1936 J. B. Hofmann produced his important *Lateinische Umgangssprache*. The publication of our most useful tool, the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, will be complete in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile some relevant work has been done on Horace. I have not been able to see Giuseppina Brunori's extensive analysis of his language, dated 1930, and in any case it has been rather severely criticized.⁶ But in the bimillenary year, 1935, J. Smereka contributed an article to the Polish Academy's *Commentationes Horatianae* which began with useful lists for the *Odes* of archaisms, colloquialisms, grecisms, neologisms, and barbarisms.⁷ Finally, B. Axelson included a most interesting chapter (4) on the diction of the *Odes* in his *Unpoetische Wörter*, published in 1945. It has long been recognized that the *sermones* are largely colloquial, and Horace expressly abjured any claim that they were poetical.⁸ We shall not be concerned with these. The *Odes* present a more difficult problem, for they are *sui generis*; there is no Latin work with which they can be compared. They are mostly far from the colloquial style of Catullus' *nugae*, and many of them are clearly high poetry in the grand manner; but they vary considerably in this respect, unlike epic, which rarely allowed itself to sink below a certain level.

¹ F. Marx, *Rh. Mus.* lxxiv (1925), 185-8; Immisch, op. cit., pp. 86-90.

² *Suas.* 1. 12.

³ *Odes*, 1. 6.

⁴ *N.H.* 34. 62; 35. 26.

⁵ 'M. Agrippa und die zeitgenössische römische Dichtkunst', pp. 174-94.

⁶ *La Lingua di Orazio* (Florence, 1930). K. Büchner, *Report on Horace in Bursian Jahres-*

berichte (1939), pp. 53-56.

⁷ pp. 65-91. Büchner, op. cit., p. 58. There are also some valuable observations in M. Leumann, *Die lateinische Dichtersprache* (Mus. Hel. 1947), pp. 116 ff.

⁸ See, e.g., F. Leo, 'Römische Literaturgeschichte', in *Kultur der Gegenwart*, 1. 8³, p. 445. Hor. S. 1. 4. 39-44; *Ep.* 2. 1. 250-1.

For the *Aeneid* we now have a massive and thorough analysis by A. Cordier, which appeared in 1939. Cordier's work is not impeccable, and must be used with reservations.¹ Thus he has chosen to take no account in his statistics of repeated instances; and we must remind ourselves, for example, that the word *aequor* in the poetic sense of 'sea' occurs a hundred times in the *Aeneid*.² However, that is scarcely more significant than if we found that Wordsworth used 'deep' for 'sea' a hundred times in the *Prelude*; and Cordier's figures do seem to permit of rough generalizations. Let us take his three headings of archaisms, rare words (*γλωτται*), and compounds, and see what emerges about Virgil's practice in the *Aeneid*.

Not only the example of the Homeric poems, but also his devotion to Ennius, might have led Virgil to overload the *Aeneid* with words (or meanings of words), forms, and constructions that were archaisms in his day, the more so as he was by nature *amantissimus uetustatis*³ and Augustus was anxious to encourage reverence for the past. Now Cordier finds that, if we take account not only of archaic words, but of words by that time reserved to certain spheres such as religion, words used in an archaic sense and archaic constructions, the *Aeneid* displays about 250 different examples, or one in every 40 lines.⁴ It is true that some of these recur; on the other hand, constellations of examples are crowded into a few lines where the context calls for them, there being, for instance, no fewer than 22 in the 20 solemn lines where Aeneas comes to the Styx (6. 317-36).⁵ All things considered, an average of 2.52 different archaisms per hundred lines seems too low a percentage to diffuse a markedly archaic flavour throughout. This impression is strengthened by comparison with Cicero's translations from Homer, for which the figure is 11 per cent.⁶ Quintilian remarked that too frequent or obtrusive archaisms constituted the most odious of all affectations, and elsewhere praised Virgil for the unique discrimination he showed in this respect.⁷

Turning to *γλωτται*, which comprise poetic, technical, rare, and foreign words, we find an average of 3.65 per 100 lines of the *Aeneid*. It is true that Lucretius' average is no higher than Virgil's, but that is understandable, since he was largely bent on explaining his subject in language his contemporaries would understand. The percentage in Catullus' *Epyllion*, however, is as high as 8.32, which suggests what we should here expect, a purposeful search for unusual words in the Alexandrian manner. Even in Cicero's verse the percentage is 8.0, so that Virgil's 3.65 indicates a marked reaction against the practice of his immediate predecessors.⁸

For compound words the story is much the same. Leaving aside words like *canifex*, which were part of everyday speech, we find that Cicero used 3.60 per 100 lines in his translations, and as many as 7.88 in his other poems, and Catullus 4.16 in his *Epyllion*; whereas the percentage for the *Aeneid* is only about 1.00.⁹

Cordier nowhere mentions Agrippa's remark,¹⁰ but it does seem relevant to

¹ See F. H. Sandbach in *C.R.* liv (1940), 106-7.

² p. 151.

³ Quint. 1. 7. 18.

⁴ p. 29.

⁵ pp. 67-68.

⁶ p. 29.

⁷ 1. 6. 40; 8. 3. 24: *eoque ornamento accerrimi iudicii P. Vergilius unice usus est*.

⁸ Cordier, p. 150.

⁹ pp. 222-3, 230, 234, 270. The figure for

Lucretius is 1.3: p. 232.

¹⁰ Nor does A. Meillet in his *Esquisse d'une histoire de la langue latine* (1953), nor J. Marouzeau in his *Traité de stylistique latine* (1945), though the meagre indexing of even the most important French works makes it hard to verify a negative statement. W. F. Jackson Knight, in his suggestive Chapter V, says

his conclusion, that Virgil was concerned to keep contact between epic vocabulary and contemporary speech; that he was in reaction against both the Ennian archaizers and the Neoteric experimenters with γλωτται.¹ He may be right in thinking that Virgil's primary motive was to make sure that his national epic was not esoteric. But that does not exclude the possibility that he was also cultivating for its own sake a style which had had its advocates since the time of Euripides. (Incidentally, it is more likely that Agrippa was thinking of the *Aeneid* than of the way in which the *Georgics* ennobled humble things which were conventionally felt to be beneath the dignity of poetry, the process to which Virgil referred as

angustus hunc addere rebus honorem.)²

But before investigating Virgil's practice further, let us turn to his friend Horace. There are two crucial, but unfortunately disputed, passages in the *Epistle to the Pisones* which bear on our subject. The first is ll. 46-49 (accepting Bentley's transposition):

in uerbis etiam tenuis cautusque serendis
hoc amet hoc spernat promissi carminis auctor.
dixeris egregie notum si callida uerbum
reddiderit iunctura nouum.

This I take to mean: 'In disposing words also the aspiring author of a poem should be subtle and cautious, fancying one word and rejecting another. Your language will have distinction if cunning combination makes a familiar word fresh.'³ It is tiresome that the Roman critical vocabulary was even less clearly defined than ours. *Iunctura* is sometimes used for the collocation of words that produces euphony.⁴ But here it refers to semantic collocation, as Heinze, Rostagni, and Steidle have seen. For how else could it be said to make a word fresh? (Wickham's translation, 'setting', is as good as any.) It includes metaphor-making, and a passage in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4. 42) is apposite. The author quotes a sentence; 'Postquam iste in rem publicam impetum fecit, fragor ciuitatis imprimis'. The last word seems corrupt, but it is clear that he considers that *fragor* becomes a metaphor in combination with *ciuitatis*, and he actually refers to this in the next sentence as *nouum uerbum*.⁵

briefly: 'It was partially at least a mixed style out of countless spoken and written idioms of different places and ages. The Romans of the time liked it immediately. Agrippa, who thought it rather a grotesque and dishonest style, was very much in the minority.' *Roman Virgil* (1944), p. 261.

¹ pp. 314-16.

² G. 3. 290. Immisch (op. cit., p. 88) connects Agrippa's remark with Porphyry's note on Horace, *A.P.* 47 (*callida iunctura*), which gives as an example *G. 1. 185*: Nam licet aliqua uulgaris sint, ait tamen illa cum aliqua compositione splendescere. Verbi gratia 'curculio' sordida uox est, ornatu antecedente uulgaritas eius absconditur hoc modo: 'populatus ingentem farris aceruum

curculio'.

³ Rostagni rightly stresses that Horace is here dealing with *εὐλογία* (not *σύνθεσις*) *ὀνομάτων*; but it seems gratuitous to follow him in deriving *serendis* from *serere* 'to sow' rather than *serere* 'to weave'. The latter was a common metaphor for literary composition, and its use with *iunctura* here is echoed by *series iuncturaeque* in the same sense in ll. 242-3.

⁴ Quint. 9. 4. 32 ff. Immisch (op. cit., p. 80) takes it so here.

⁵ Of course *uerba nouare* can mean to create new words as by compounding—*expectorare*, *uersutiloquus*—or otherwise, *senius desertus*, *dii genitales*, *bacarum ubertate incuruere*, Cic. *De Or.* 3. 154.

The other passage in the *Epistle to the Pisones* is ll. 240-3:

ex noto fictum carmen sequar, ut sibi quivis
speret idem, sudet multum frustraue labore
ausus idem: tantum series iuncturaque pollet,
tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris!

'I will aim at a poem created out of the familiar, such that anyone might hope to emulate it, but sweat much and labour in vain if he ventured to emulate it; such is the power of texture and combination, such the dignity that can accrue to words taken from the common stock.' Horace is here speaking of propriety (*τὸ πρέπον*) in relation to the diction of Satyric Drama,¹ which must differ from Comedy, not employing only *inornata et dominantia* (*κύρια*) nouns and verbs (l. 234), because supernatural characters, for instance, must not talk the language of slaves,² but on the other hand avoiding exoticism. It was characteristic of this style that it looked deceptively easy, but was in fact very hard to use well. Such was the art of Euripides, as we saw; and as an epigram in the Anthology emphasized: 'Tread not the path of Euripides, singer, nor aspire to it, for it is a hard way for men to go. It looks smooth, but those who set foot on it will find it rougher than a bed of cruel stakes. Try scratching but the surface of the *Medea*, and you will be doomed to lie below in oblivion. Hands off his garlands.'³ Such also was the plain style of oratory, as Cicero says in the *Orator*: 'The audience, even though they are not orators, are confident that they can speak like that: for that plainness of style (*subtilitas*) looks easy, but nothing is less so when you try.'⁴

We must first consider, however, whether these precepts of Horace are likely to reflect his own practice. The fragment of Philodemus to the same effect which I quoted just now may, as is often the case with him, be a quotation from someone he is castigating; if so, it may be from Neoptolemus of Parium, whom Horace is known to have used for his *Epistle to the Pisones*, so that Horace may have been guided by his source rather than his experience. Again, we have little reason to suppose that Horace or the Pisones were really writing Satyric Drama, so that the second passage may be particularly academic. And finally, we have in the *Epistle to Florus* Horace's advice on diction to the man who would create a poem on true artistic principles. He will boldly cut out words that have too little lustre (*parum splendoris*), revive forgotten words, unearth splendid names that have grown rusty in recent years, admit new ones sanctioned by usage, and flow like a strong, pure stream enriching the Latin tongue. He will prune and refine his language.⁵ There is no suggestion here that there is any virtue in using ordinary words, though the two Epistles must have been written at no great interval of time from one another. Commentators have pointed out a certain similarity between the views given here and those given by Cicero with regard to *propria uerba* in *De Oratore* 3,⁶ and dependence on

¹ I agree with Rostagni that he is still treating of diction.

² Compare this application of the doctrine of *τὸ πρέπον* to *ἥθος* (Arist. *Rhet.* 3. 7) with the observation at ll. 95-98 that Euripides' Telephus, when poor and in exile, rightly uses *sermo pedestris*, not tragic grandiloquence, in his complaints.

³ *A.P.* 7. 50, by Archimedes, or Archi-

melus (third cent. B.C.).

⁴ Ch. 76. Cf. Hor. *Ep.* 2. 124: *ludentis speciem dabit et torquebitur.*

⁵ *Epp.* 2. 2. 109-25.

⁶ Ch. 150: in propriis igitur est illa laus orationis, ut abiecta atque obsoleta fugiat, lectis atque illustribus utatur, in quibus plenum quiddam et sonans inesse uideatur.

Cicero or a common source, apparent elsewhere, cannot be ruled out here. Everything warns us to hesitate before we take Horace's critical utterances as relevant to his own practice in the poetry of the Odes. Let us therefore examine this independently.

Marx, who dealt with Horace incidentally when discussing Agrippa's dictum on Virgil, mentions only one instance of what might exemplify *callida iunctura*, the application of *diuites* to *insulae* (instead of the normal *fortunatae*) at *Epode* 16. 42 and *Odes* 4. 8. 27. But we now have the help of Professor Axelsson's study. His most important conclusion is that Horace, while in some respects more fastidious over *delectus uerborum* than any of his contemporaries,¹ showed a far stronger tendency to admit rather prosaic words, such as *obire*, *ordinare*, *praesidium*, *pecunia*, or *negotium*, than one would expect of a high lyric poet.² An astonishing example is *recte*, *rectius*, found four times in the *Odes* and some thirty times elsewhere in Horace, but never in Catullus, Propertius, Tibullus, Virgil, Seneca (tragedies), Lucan, Valerius, or Silius.³

Can we perhaps suppose that these prosaic words were given distinction or freshness by *series* and *iunctura*? It is hard for us to judge, for how can we recapture the sense of novelty that may have excited a Roman? What did Quintilian mean when he said that Horace was *uerbis felicissime audax*?⁴ If the metaphorical use of *fragor* for a political crash or uproar was a *nouum uerbum* to the author *ad Herennium*, with what a shock of excitement may Horace's audience have first heard the words

auditumque Medis
Hesperiae sonitum ruinae!

A casual perusal of the *Odes* reveals at least a hundred examples of what *may* have been such innovations, for all we know. Most of them fall within recognizable categories.

Some of the metaphors, such as 'to bridle licence' or 'sunny flowers' have become commonplace to us.⁵ Some were extensions of already familiar ones, as *tepebunt* in

quo calet iuuentus
nunc omnis et mox uirgines tepebunt,

and *commissi calores fidibus*.⁶ Some involved witty play on words (*paronomasia*): thus *non erubescendis adurit ignibus* means 'she does not fire you with a flame at which you need blush', with a play on the similar effect on the face of literal and metaphorical flame.⁷ *Opacam porticus excipiebat arcton* means 'a colonnade caught the northern shade', but it also means 'trapped the Bear'.⁸ Messalla is fond of wine, though he is *steeped* in Socratic dialogues; Lydia must bring out

¹ *Unpoetische Wörter*, ch. 4, pp. 98–113. Axelsson does not mention Agrippa's remark in this connexion, but he refers to Marx's article in his Introduction, p. 15.

² pp. 108–10.

³ 10. 1. 96.

⁴ p. 63.

⁵ *Frena licentiae iniecit* (4. 15. 10), *apricos flores* (1. 26. 7). Here are some more metaphors. Verbs: *spem rescare* (1. 11. 7); *mero caluisse uirtus* (3. 21. 12); *sacrare plectro* (1. 26. 11); *merces defluat* (1. 28. 27); *te bearis nota Falerni* (2. 3. 8); *uultus adfulsit* (4. 5. 6); *diem mero fregi* (2. 7. 6); *transiliat munera Liberi*

(1. 18. 7); *carpere obliuiones* (4. 9. 33). *Laudes delerere* (1. 6. 12) and *Notus deterget nubila* (1. 7. 15) are instanced by Heinze *ad A.P.* 47. Nouns: *Carminis alite* (1. 6. 2; Heinze); *copia narium* (2. 15. 6); *inimice laminae* (2. 2. 2); *plenum opus aleae* (2. 1. 6). Adjectives: *auream mediocritatem* (2. 10. 5); *uultus lubricus adspici* (1. 19. 8); *sepultae inertiae* (4. 9. 29); *pigris campis* (1. 22. 17).

⁶ 1. 4. 20; 4. 9. 11.

⁷ 1. 27. 15.

⁸ 2. 15. 16; cf. *excipere aprum* (3. 12. *fin.*) and our phrase 'a sun-trap'.

wine to lay siege to embattled philosophy; Jupiter turns himself into a bribe for Danaë's warder.¹ Horace often uses anthropomorphic language of natural subjects, animate or inanimate, in a charming way reminiscent of the *Georgics*. A farm lets its owner down, the trees blaming now the rains, now the parching heat, now the cruel winters.² The plane-tree is unwed, the ashes are bereaved of their leaves, ivy clings wantonly, and oaks have ears to hear Orpheus.³ A wind may be Bacchic, or commit crime; it may be companion of winter or governor of a sea.⁴ The sea may be too over-mastering; a river may be uxorious, or gnaw its water-meadows.⁵ A jar can be taught to imbibe smoke, or enticed out by a little box of nard.⁶ There are, indeed, passages in which there is a sustained treatment of natural phenomena in terms which suggest human experience.⁷ Personification also plays its part: Love keeps vigil on young cheeks, as in a chorus of Sophocles; Confidence pours out secrets and is more transparent than glass; Care rides pillion behind the horseman.⁸ Sometimes a subtler thought is involved: like the Stoic wise man who is always king the spirit of Lollius has been consul not for his one year only, but all the time he has been winning his moral victories; on the other hand, a consul's lictors have no power to remove the wretched tumults of the mind and the cares that flit round coffered ceilings; and Death, whether summoned or not, hears the poor man's plea for relief⁹ (see further M. Andrewes, *Greece and Rome*, 1950, 106-15).

Besides metaphor and quasi-metaphor there are bold uses of transferred epithet—*adulteros crines*, *sublimi anhelitu*, *uices superbae*¹⁰—and of oxymoron—*splendide mendax*, *insanientis sapientiae consultus*, *sollicitum taedium*,¹¹ and all the variations on the theme of *γλυκύπικρος* "Ερως,¹² not to mention unusual constructions, many of them borrowed from Greek.

Enough has been said to substantiate what is indeed a commonplace, that clever use of words in an unfamiliar setting was a characteristic of Horace's *Odes*. But were these also peculiar in being markedly everyday words? Axelson could find little ground for thinking them specially prosaic in the instances he considered.¹³ Are we then to suppose that in his predilection for prosaic words, Horace was simply insensitive to their associations, or consciously aiming at propriety and adequacy as an ideal of expression, in accordance with his temperamental 'matter-of-factness', his 'formidable realism'¹⁴ (*furchtbare Realis-*

¹ *Socraticis madet sermonibus* (3. 21. 9); *munitaeque adhuc uim sapientiae* (3. 28. 4); *conuerso in pretium deo* (3. 16. 8).

² 3. 1. 30, *fundusque mendax, arbore nunc aquas culpante* . . .

³ 2. 15. 4, *caelebs*; 2. 9. 8, *uiduantur*; 1. 36. 20, *lasciuus hederis ambitiosior*, 1. 12. 11, *auritas*.

⁴ 1. 25. 11, *bacchante*; 3. 27. 20, *peccet*; 1. 25. 20, *sodali*; 1. 3. 15, *arbiter*.

⁵ 1. 14. 8, *imperijsus*; 1. 2. 20, *uxorius*; 1. 31. 8, *mordet*.

⁶ 3. 8. 11, *instituta*; 4. 12. 17, *eliciet*. Other examples: 1. 25. 3, *amat iamua limen*; 4. 11. 7, *ara auct spargier*; 4. 11. 6, *ridet argento domus*; 1. 14. 5, *malus saucius*.

⁷ 2. 9. 1-10; 2. 3. 9-16; 1. 9 throughout; ? cf. *Epode* 13. 1-5. L. P. Wilkinson, *Horace and his Lyric Poetry*, pp. 126-31.

⁸ 4. 13. 8, *Cupido excubat in genis*, cf.

Antig. 782; 1. 18. 16; 3. 1. 40.

⁹ 4. 9. 39; 2. 16. 9; 2. 18. 40, *uocatus atque non uocatus audit*.

¹⁰ 1. 15. 19, 31; 1. 28. 32. Also 3. 2. 16 *timido tergo*; 3. 5. 22 *tergo libero*; 1. 17. 28 *immeritam uentem*.

¹¹ 3. 11. 35; 1. 34. 2; 1. 14. 17. Also 1. 22. 16, *arida nutrix*; 3. 21. 13, *lene tormentum*.

¹² 1. 27. 11, *beatus uolnere*; 1. 33. 14 and 4. 11. 23, *grata compede*; 2. 12. 26, *facili saeuitia*; cf. 1. 8. 2, *amando perdere*.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 110.

¹⁴ *Goethes Gespräche*, Biedermann², 1. 458. E. Castle has suggested that *furchtbare* is a misprint for *fruchtbar*. *Mitteil d. Verein d. Freunde d. human. Gymnasiums*, 33. Heft, Wien, 1936, p. 14. 'Formidable' is Prof. Fraenkel's word (*Horace*, p. 276); otherwise an English reader might assume from the context that Goethe meant 'frightful'.

tāt), as Goethe called it? Axelson quotes, without division into verses, six lines of what he takes to be prosaic diction and everyday word-order from *Odes* 4. 9: *non possidentem multa uocaueris recte beatum; rectius occupat nomen beati, qui deorum munibus sapienter uti duramque callet pauperiem pati, peiusque leto flagitium timet.*¹ I wonder if we are in a position to judge the effect of that in Roman ears. Here, treated in the same way, is a stanza from Tennyson's *In Memoriam*, equally commonplace in vocabulary and word-order, which does not, however, strike me at least as unpoetical in its context: 'I sometimes hold it half a sin to put in words the grief I feel; for words, like nature, half reveal and half conceal the soul within.'

Smereka found 62 different colloquialisms in the 3,134 lines of the *Odes*: quite a high proportion. On the other hand, he found 52 archaisms, which would militate against any naturalistic effect.² Such statistics cannot help us much here, because the *Odes* vary so greatly in tone; nor could we in any case use them satisfactorily for comparisons with epic poetry, since the length of Horace's lines varies so that it is hard to compare his verse with hexameters.

Let us now return to Virgil, and consider his diction in the light of what we have deduced about *noua uerba* with reference to Horace. In Virgil's case we are fortunate in having some corroborative evidence, in the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius. Nettleship, in his excursus on *Virgil and his Ancient Critics*,³ showed that the observations on Virgil's use of language in Macrobius 6. 6, though put into the mouth of Seruius, are independent of the extant Servian Commentary; and that both appear to be drawing on a common source; and further, that this source seems to be a defence against hostile and inept critics. We know from Suetonius⁴ that Asconius Pedianus, who lived under Tiberius, had written a book *Contra Obtrectatores Vergilii*, his opponents including one Herennius, who had made a collection of Virgil's *uitia*, and this book may well be the common source. If so, then the usages quoted were selected for blame or praise not long after Virgil's death, and when we are told that they were novelties, we can accept the evidence as contemporary.

The Macrobian Seruius is asked to say what instances he has noted in Virgil of figurative usage invented by himself, not borrowed from predecessors, or applied by him in a new but fitting way.⁵ He obliges with some examples. *Recens caede locus*, for instance, is *noue dictus*,⁶ and in *frontem rugis arat* the verb is *non nimie sed pulchre dictum*; and *aquae mons, telorum seges, and ferreus imber* are applauded.⁷ Of especial interest, in view of Horace's *uerbum reddiderit iunctura nouum*, are the paragraphs (17-19) on *excogitatio nouorum sensuum*. Here we are told that Virgil was the first person to speak of harnessing waters, with his *glacie cursus frenaret aquarum*, or to say that a flower smiles, with his

mixtaque ridenti colocasia fundet acantho;⁸

and there are ten other instances, most of which would never have struck us as

¹ 45-50, iii. One may doubt, however, whether *occupat nomen* or *callet uti* are phrases of ordinary prose.

² Op. cit., p. 67.

³ Conington-Nettleship-Haverfield, i³, pp. xxix-liii.

⁴ *Vita Verg.* 43-46.

⁵ 6. 6. 1: quae in Vergilio notauerit ab ipso figurata, non a ueteribus accepta, uel

ausu poetico noue quidem sed decenter usurpata. Ausu recalls Quintilian's characterization of Horace as 'uerbis felicissime audax'.

⁶ 3; A. 9. 455.

⁷ 6-7; A. 7. 417.

⁸ 18; G. 4. 136; E. 4. 20. But in Greek we have γελῶντα κρίνα in Meleager, A.P. 5. 147 (ἀναγελῶντα, Giangrande, *Rh. Mus.* 1958, p. 54); cf. A.P. 5. 144. 5.

novelties.¹ Mr. John Sparrow, in an article published in 1930, illustrated our predicament with some good examples.² 'When English is a dead language', he wrote, 'the novelty will have gone from such a phrase as [Tennyson's]

all her dress
Wept from her sides as water flowing away.

Now that Latin is a dead language, can we recapture the thrill given to its first readers by

tota cohors . . . relictis
ad terram defluxit equis?"

Macrobius also provides evidence of Virgil's use of natural language. He defends by analogy with Homer his lines which are 'as it were plucked and shorn and indistinguishable from colloquial speech',³ instancing

omnia uincit Amor: et nos cedamus Amori

and

nudus in ignota, Palinure, iacebis harena.

And a critic named Cornutus, who blamed Virgil for meiosis in calling Busiris merely *inlaudatus* and saying that Scylla merely *uexasse* ships, also blamed him for homely diction in the phrase *dixerat ille aliquid magnum*.⁴ At *Aen.* 12. 296 Messapius gives Aulestes his death-blow with the cry which (as we are reminded by the comic poets) the crowd used to raise when a gladiator was laid low: 'Hoc habet!'—'He's had it!'

Of *callida iunctura*, in the sense I have assumed for it in discussing Horace, Mr. Jackson Knight has drawn attention to many and diverse examples from Virgil, concluding that his art lay in combining his few words so as to elicit a great variety of meanings.⁵

Let me now sum up. There was a long critical tradition that good poetry could be composed of everyday words. Horace on occasion paid lip-service at least to this tradition. Agrippa thought that Virgil had introduced the idea, apparently unaware that it was as old as Euripides in practice and as Aristotle in criticism. Examination of the vocabulary of Horace's *Odes* and Virgil's *Aeneid* has established the fact that both poets do use ordinary words to a marked degree, even if we make allowance for the strong random element that must affect such statistics. To some extent it seems likely that the ordinariness of the words in themselves was offset by bold and clever combinations that imparted freshness and overtones, and by poetical or abnormal constructions; but in many cases there seems to be no question of this. The practice of these two closely associated poets seems therefore to represent a reaction, sufficiently

¹ A. 2. 422, *mentilique tela*; 9. 773, *fer-ranque armare ueneno*; G. 2. 36, *cultusque feros mollire colendo*; ib. 51, *exuerint siluestrem animum*; A. 11. 804, *uirgineumque alte bibit acta cruorem* (cf. *Il.* 21. 168); G. 2. 59, *pomaque degenerant sucos oblita priores*; A. 4. 67, *tacitum uiuit sub pectore uulnus*; A. 5. 681, *duro sub robore uiuit stuppa uomens tardum fumum*; *Ib.* 257, *saeuitque canum latratus in auras*; 7. 792, *caelataque amnem fundens pater Inachus urna*; G. 4. 239, *animasque in uulnera ponunt*.

² 'Thoughts on Virgil's Bimillenary', in the *Nineteenth Century*, Oct. 1930, pp. 512-13.

³ 5. 14. 5: *uolsis ac rasis similes et nihil differentes ab usu loquendi*. Nettleship remarks (*ib.* p. xxx) that *uolsis ac rasis* has all the air of a quotation from a hostile critic.

⁴ G. 3. 4; E. 6. 75; Gellius 2. 6 = Macrobius 6. 7. 4-5; Seru. on A. 10. 547; Cornutus ut sordidum improbat.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 263.

marked to be considered conscious, against the tendency of their immediate predecessors, particularly the νεώτεροι, to enrich their language with words unfamiliar to the plain man.¹ It was no doubt in part a literary reaction of a kind we now recognize. But it was also in harmony with the Augustan idea that the poet had a right and a duty to address the citizens at large.

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¹ In the time of the elder Seneca there were still those who ἐπὶ τὸ λεξικὸν μαίνονται (*Contr.* 9. 26).

ADDITIONAL NOTES ON CLAUDIAN

Mr. ALAN KER in *C.Q.*, n.s. vii (1957), 151-8, proposes to alter the text of Claudian in numerous places where the tradition appears to me to be blameless, in some cases substituting for readings which seem characteristic and admirable others which seem less so. Claudian is an elegant poet, whose mastery of language many regard as comparable with that of the Silver Age poets, and Mr. Ker's dismissal of him (p. 154) as 'a simple writer, with a small and unambitious vocabulary'¹ does less than justice to his powers. I would suggest, in particular, the following points for consideration.

p. 152: *Stil.* 1. 51-52 'uix primaevus eras, pacis cum mitteris auctor / Assyriae' (*uir p. K.*). The word *primaevus* here, as regularly elsewhere (e.g. Virg. *Aen.* 9. 545), refers to one in the prime of youth, an *ephebus* or *adulescens*, but K. does not 'think it can be used in this sense'. Cf. *Stil.* 3 *pr.* 7 'seu patriis primaevus manibus ultor / subderet Hispanum legibus Oceanum'. Instructive is Rutil. Nam. 1. 172 '*primaevus* meruit principis ore loqui; / rexerat ante *puer* populos pro consule Poenos'.

p. 153: *Stil.* 1. 173-6 'uexillum nauale dares: sub puppibus ibat / Ionium. nullis succincta Ceraunia nimbis / nec iuga Leucatae feriens spumantia fluctu / deterrebat hiems' (*nullum* Koch following AP, so K.). The correct interpretation of this widely misunderstood passage (e.g. Birt, Koch, Loeb) was given by Barthius, by whom 'everyone has been misled' states K. The natural sense of *uexillum nauale dares* can only be that rejected by K., viz. 'if you gave the signal to your fleet' (so Barth.). K. has, I think, misunderstood Barth.'s explanation '*nimbis succincta C., nullis deterrebant. frustra hic haereas*'. The words *nullis nimbis* go closely with (*deterrebat*), not with *succincta*, though *nimbis* is understood with the latter, i.e. 'by no rain-clouds could enveloped C. deter', 'however many rain-clouds enveloped C., they were no deterrent' (so Ges.). For the use of *deterrebat* without an expressed object, which K. dislikes (so Loeb), see *Thes. s.u.* 806. 23 ff. and Birt's *Introd.* ccxxv.

p. 153: *Stil.* 2. 149-51 'scis nulla placere / munera, quae metuens illis, quos spreuerat, offert / serus' (*qui* for *quos* K.). The substantival use of the nom. sing. pres. ptcple., viz. *metuens* = *is qui metuit* (without the aid of 'adjs. as nouns or other contrasted ptcples. in oblique cases') is well-attested: cf. Luc. 6. 293 'non sic Hennaëis habitans in uallibus horret' (Schmalz-Hofm. 457).

p. 154: *Bell. Gild.* 162-3 'distantibus idem / inter se uitii cinctus' (*tinctus* K.). The expression *uitiis cinctus* has been sensibly explained: 'uelut suis ipse, iisque contrariis uitii fortior; quasi uitia sint eius comites et satellites' (Delph.). We may say that his vices were to Gildo what the serpents were to the Hydra, Virg. *Aen.* 7. 658 'cinctam . . . serpentibus Hydram'—they gave him support and fortification, and compare Hor. *Epist.* 1. 18. 25 'decem uitii instructor'.²

p. 155: *Eutrop.* 2. 27-28 'bacchatus per operta tremor Chalchedona mouit / pronus et in geminas nutauit Bosphorus urbes' (*undauit* K.). The context requires a bold and vigorous word to indicate an occurrence comparable with an earthquake and it is supplied in *nutauit*, 'reeled', 'staggered' ('le B., balayé

¹ 'and this metaphor, of the dye', continues Mr. Ker, as he alters *uitiis cinctus* into *u. tinctus* (see below), 'is sufficiently trite to

be his'.

² Here the ablative is that of the measure of difference.

par des raz de marée, est ballotté d'une cité à l'autre' Fargues): cf. Hor. *O.*

1. 34. 12 'quo (*Iouis curru*) Styx . . . concutitur'.

p. 155: *Bell. Goth.* 384-5 'ne uos longe sermone petito / demorer, exemplum ueteris cognoscite facti' (*uestri* for *ueteris* K.). K. takes the expression *longe sermone petito* to mean 'a tale taken from distant peoples' ('foreign tales' Loeb). We may object that there is nothing in the context to suggest such a meaning and ask why in addressing Italians it should enter Stilicho's head to draw from the history of foreigners. The expression, which seems to have been misunderstood by Birt, Koch, and others, bears in fact its literal meaning 'far-fetched,' 'recondite'. Stilicho is saying 'Not to detain you with far-fetched speech, I will be direct and cite a concrete parallel in an old (and, therefore, familiar) deed'. Cf. Cic. *De Or.* 3. 40. 160 'transilire ante pedes posita et alia longe repetita sumere', *Diu.* 2. 58. 119 'defensio repetita quam longe est', Sen. *Contr.* 1. 6. 9 'longe arcesso colore', Petron. 139 'accersito sermone', etc.

p. 155: *c. min.* 8, *De Polycaste et Perdicca*. K., contending that it is Perdiccas who has fallen in love with his mother, not, as is generally assumed, she with him, makes the statement, unsupported by the text, that P. 'is sitting with his head in her lap', assumes that 'the mother knows of the passion', and takes the meaning to be that she 'fears to love her son . . . for fear of stimulating his sexual passion for her'. Has K., I wonder, considered v. 3 'pectore dum niueo miserum tenet anxia nutrix (sc. *mater*)', which reveals that P. is at the suckling stage? And the concluding couplet 'ultrices pharetras tandem depono, Cupido. / consule iam Venerem: fors an et ipsa dolet', 'a piece of pure fancy' suggests K., has point only if the passion is the mother's. C.'s ascription of the passion to the mother (Polycaste = the Earth) illustrates the affinity of the Perdiccas legend with that of Attis-Adonis as indicated in Roscher (iii. 1953, cited by Loeb).

p. 156: *c. min.* 40. 4 'carmina seu fundis seu Cicerone tonas' (*ceu Cicerone t. K.*), i.e. 'or resound with Cicero's thunder'. That the text is genuine is proved, should anyone desire proof, by the imitation of Sidonius (a great exploiter of C.), cited and quoted by Birt and, indeed, by K., viz. *carm.* 7. 175 'animi Musis formantur et illo / quo Cicerone tonas', where the latter expression is wrongly stated by K. to stand for *illo Cicerone quem tonas*; the ablative is in either case that of the means; cf. W. B. Anderson's translation of the Sidonius (mistranslated by K.) 'by the C. that bestows on thee tones of thunder'.

p. 157: *Bell. Gild.* 333-5 'Firmumne iacentem / obliti Libyam nostro sudore receptam / rursus habent?' (*auent* Barth., K.). The meaning is 'in again holding L., which my efforts recovered, do they forget how Firmus fell?' That Gildo's Moors are represented as being in possession of Libya is made incontrovertibly clear by, for example, 66 f., 75 f., 113 'Libyam Gildo tenet' and 157-62 ('language intended to be merely rhetorical' suggests K.), 454-9. *receptam* offers no more difficulty than does *quaesita* in 76 '(Maurus) possidet arua / uulneribus quaesita meis'.

p. 158: *Bell. Goth.* 138 ff. 'primus fulmineum lento luctamine Poenum / compressit Fabius . . .'. In place of the admirable and subtle expression *lento luctamine* K. would substitute the more obvious *l. cunctamine* (exc. *Laeti*, Heinsius). In 144 *cunctando* no more requires a word of cognate derivation to refer back to than does *relegat*, which refers back to *Latiis* . . . *deterruit oris*.

I conclude with the discussion of two difficult passages:

p. 152: *Epithal.* 144-7 'prorupit gurgite toruus / semifer; undosi uerrebant brachia crines; / hispida tendebant bifido uestigia cornu, / qua pistrix com-

missa uiro' (*crines hispida*; t. K.¹). The usual interpretation of 146, viz. a hoofed Triton (Birt, Loeb, etc.), seems at first attractive. The use of *uestigia* = *pedes*, to which K. objects, is well established and occurs not only elsewhere (e.g. Catull. 64. 162)² but in C. himself (see Birt's ind.);³ and the ascription to Triton of hoofs, to which K., re-echoing Barthius, further objects, receives some support from a corresponding representation of Tritons in works of art as indicated in Pauly-Wiss. (viii. 300, ix. 831 f.) and Roscher (ii. 92, v. 1166).⁴ Such an interpretation, however, as Gesner in his instructive note has shown, seems disproved by comparison with Apoll. Rh. 4. 1613 ff. *ὑπαὶ λαγόνων δίκραιρά οἱ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα / κήτεος ὀλκαίη μῆκύνετο· κόπτε δ' ἀκάνθαις / ἄκρον ὕδωρ, αἶτε σκολιοῖς ἐπινειοῖσι κέντροις / μῆνης ὥς κεράεσσιν ἐξιδόμεναι διχόωντο*.⁵ The phrase *bifido cornu* can hardly fail to be a representation, certainly somewhat obscure, of *δίκραιρα*, 'two-horned', which refers to T.'s double tail regarded as comparable to horns.⁶ *uestigia* by analogy of the use = *pedes* must then refer to the double tail (so Ges.): if C. may use the word to describe the extremities of a porcupine in *c. min.* 9. 8 'parua sub hirsuto catuli uestigia dorso', he may be presumed by an extension to use it here to describe those of T. The epithet *hispida* (cf. *u.l. aspera*) must be a concise reference to the spines of the tail mentioned by Apoll. (so G.). Transl. 'his spiny tails stretched out (cf. *μῆκύνετο*) with twi-divided, i.e. double, horn, with forking horns'. A closely parallel passage occurs in *c. min.* 53, where C. describes the Giants, whose legs end in snakes (hence designated by Ovid *anguipedes* and *serpentipedes*): 79 ff. 'ense Pelorum / transigit aduerso, femorum qua fine uolutus / duplex semifero conecitur ilibus anguis'; in 8 they are depicted as 'stridula uoluentes gemino uestigia lapsu'; the use of *uestigia* ('course' Loeb, but cf. *lapsu*) seems to correspond closely to that in the above passage, the 'hissing extremities' being, as Birt intimates, the snakes.

In 144 the words *prorupit gurgile* must mean in effect 'surfaced', not 'burst forward in the water' (K.): Triton had been submerged (128 f., 136 f.); cf. Apoll. loc. cit. 1602 *ὁ δὲ βένθεος ἐξεφάνθη*.

p. 154: *Pan. P. et O.* 83-84 'ipsa (Roma), triumphatis qua possidet aethera regnis, / adsilit'. K. is right in maintaining that *qua* cannot here indicate route and that *adsilit* must mean 'leaps on to the car'. He would adopt the easy reading of W, *q̄* i.e. *quae*, without, however, explaining the presence, in all the other manuscripts, of *qua*. Birt (ind.) contents himself with referring to the 'mira libertas' in the use of *qua*. May it be that *qua* here has a force it undoubtedly possesses in the late period, viz. causal, 'by virtue of her possession of the sky'? The causal meaning 'inasmuch as' is a natural development from the restrictive 'in so far as': see Schmalz-Hofm. 768, Löfst. *Komm.* 126 f. where examples from late prose writers are given. It may be significant that we find what looks like an example of an analogous late use of *qua*, viz. temporal

¹ His interpretation of 146 I find obscure: 'His tracks, his wake, was extending out with the aid of the fish's tail, lit. the horn divided at the point where the fish was joined to the man.'

² There are several examples in Statius. The parallel use of *ἵχνος* = *ποῦς* occurs, e.g., in Eur. *Bacch.* 1134, but seems infrequent.

³ Compare (a) 145 above 'undosi uerrebant brachia crines' and (b) *Stil.* 2. 243 'uestigia

uerit caeruleus . . . amictus' (Heinsius).

⁴ Examples of bovine as well as equine hoofs occur.

⁵ For C.'s borrowings from various Greek writers see Birt's *Introd.* lxxii.

⁶ For the representation of T. with a double tail see P.-W. viia. 267, Roscher v. 1156-7.

⁷ *Met.* 1. 184, *Trist.* 4. 7. 17.

(so taken by Birt), in *Bell. Goth.* 412 'inque uicem se uoce (*magistri*) regunt (*armenta errantia*) gaudentque fideles / reddere mugitus et, qua sonus (*uocis*) attigit aurem, / rara per obscuras adparent cornua frondes': the interpretation *qua parte* (Delph.), 'wherever' (Loeb), is at least unsatisfying.

In 83 *regnis*, for which K. would substitute *terris*, is used characteristically as = 'realms of Rome', i.e. the provinces, empire (see B.'s ind. for examples). For the general sense cf. 127 f. '(o *Roma*) longe . . . regendo circumfusa polo', *Virg. G.* 4. 560 ff. 'Caesar dum . . . uictor . . . per populos dat iura uiamque adfectat Olympo'.

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THE SPECIAL VOCABULARY OF THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS

THAT the *Eudemian Ethics* is a genuine work of Aristotle, belonging to a middle stage in his development, is now widely accepted on the various grounds advanced by Jaeger¹ and others from 1909 onwards. (From 1841 there had been universal acceptance of Spengel's ascription of the work to Eudemus himself.) I want to show (in section A) that, quite apart from those considerations, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of *E.E.* on the ground of peculiarities in its vocabulary, as these can be explained in various ways. A presentation of the evidence as regards special vocabulary may in any case be of interest, and may throw some light eventually on its position among Aristotle's writings, if it belongs among them; and for this reason I add a further section (B) on words in *E.E.* uncommon in Aristotle. Some progress in detailed investigation of Aristotle's vocabulary is long overdue, as this is the only form of stylometric examination which can fruitfully be applied in his case.

A. Peculiar Vocabulary

Susemihl, in the index to his edition (Teubner, 1884), claims to mark those words which (as he puts it) 'are not found in Aristotle'. There are 59 words marked by him, but I have discovered that 47 more are peculiar to the *E.E.* among Aristotle's works. As some of my discoveries, e.g. ἀδιαχώριστος, are hardly found in other writers either, this investigation may help towards the establishment of a correct text. Susemihl's marked words are sorted into categories as follows, in an attempt to show that their presence can be explained without ascribing *E.E.* to Eudemus, though of course vocabulary alone cannot prove *E.E.* is not by him. This is followed by applying the same classification to the further peculiar words I have discovered. Words not in Bonitz's *Index* are marked with an asterisk; likewise references missing in Bonitz.

1. Words about which Susemihl was mistaken, and which do occur elsewhere in Aristotle:
εὐνοεῖν (37^b7*; 41^a8, 9, 11, 14) occurs in *E.N.* 56^a4*.
2. Strange words which appear in Susemihl's text without explanation in the apparatus:
ἐπιψεύδεσθαι* (29^b22): Bonitz and Rackham read διαψεύδεσθαι.
3. Unobjectionable words which A. simply had no occasion to use elsewhere:
πεντηκοστολόγος* (47^a19). στρατοπεδεύεσθαι* (27^a20).
4. Words evidently derived from a particular passage in Plato:
ἐμπληκτος (40^b17): from *Pl. Lys.* 214 c-d, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς . . . μηδέποτε ὁμοίους μηδ' αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους. A. writes: ὁ γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἰς ἀλλὰ πολλοί, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἕτερος καὶ ἐμπληκτος. Both passages are in discussions of friendship, and the derivation would bear out Jaeger's connexion of this part of *E.E.* with the *Lysis* (Aristotle, p. 244). The word also occurs in *Pl. Grg.* 482 a, where it is applied to philosophy.
5. Words very frequent in Plato, which A. may therefore be expected to have known, even if he later gave up using them:

¹ Aristotle, pp. 228-58.

κηλεῖν (30^b35). ἐπικαλεῖσθαι *med.* (45^b33): *Euthd.* 275 d, 293 a, 297 c, *Lg.* 664 c, etc. ἐπίπνοια (14^a24): *Grg.* 399 a, *R.* 499 b, *Phdr.* 265 b, *Tm.* 71 c, *Lg.* 738 c, 747 e, 871 c.

6. Words of rather limited occurrence in Plato (some obviously invented by him), which A. could still be expected to know, and might well have adopted at this stage (being still partly influenced by Plato) only to abandon them later:

γαστριμαργία (31^a19): *Phd.* 81 e, *Tm.* 73 a, *Phdr.* 238 a. The adj. -μαργος is used in *E.N.* 18^b19. γνώρισις (37^a31): *Sph.* 219 c, *Plt.* 257 a, *Lg.* 771 d, 763 b. διαταράττω (29^b18): *Lg.* 693 c, 757 a, [*Theages* 121 d]. διειπεῖν (43^a31, ^b7): *Phdr.* 253 d, *Plt.* 275 a. But A. uses it as a legal term 'to declare explicitly in a contract', so perhaps it belongs in class 3 above. κολακικός (22^b4): *Grg.* 502 d; etc., *Sph.* 222 e, *Lg.* 633 d. (Fritzsch conjectured καταλακτικός instead, from l. 2 above it; unnecessarily.)

7. Apparent nonce-words or existing words used once only in Plato, which A. might well have taken over in imitation (whether consciously or not):

ἀπειρόκαλος (33^b1): *Lg.* 775 b. A. has the noun in *E.N.* 1107^b19. νυμφόληπτος (14^a23): *Phdr.* 238 d. πολύπωνος (22^a33): *Lg.* 633 b. προαποθνήσκειν (35^a34): *Smp.* 208 d. ταλαίπωρος (21^a31): *Euthd.* 302 b. A. has the adverb in *Pol.* B 65^a32. φιλογυμναστικός (22^a31): *R.* 456 a. φιλοψευδής (34^a3): *R.* 485 d.

8. Nonce-words in E.E., apparently formed in imitation of Plato's formations (*q.v.* in 7 above):

θεόληπτος (14^a23 conjoined with νυμφόληπτος above). φιλόπικρος (27^b11). φιλοῦγής* (22^a32). φιλωδός (38^a37): *ci.* for MS. φειδωλός. τρυφερότης (21^a9 in the table of excesses): *E.N.* discusses it as τρυφή.

9. Nonce-words in E.E., apparently formed to meet special requirements of the context: (a) *syn-group* in the discussion of friendship:

συγγνωρίζω (44^b26). συμμέθεξις (45^b34). συναίσθησις (45^b24): the verb occurs in *E.N.* 70^b4, 10 as well as in *E.E.* συναποκτινύναι (46^a23). συνδιαμένειν (35^b9). συνευχεῖσθαι (45^b5). συννύαρχειν (41^b27). συνωδίνειν (40^a36).

- (b) *ἀντι-words* in the discussion of friendship:

ἀντιφιλία (36^b3): the form in *E.N.* 55^b28 is ἀντιφίλησις; the verb is common in both *E.E.* and *E.N.* ἀντιπροαίρεσις (36^b3 conjoined with the preceding; 37^a31, 32).

- (c) *Other formations*:

εὐδιάβλητος (37^b23, 25): *cf.* the nonce-word ἀδιάβλητος in *E.N.* 57^a21 and 58^b9. παραλογιστής (32^a14): παραλογιστικός in *S.E.* and *Rhet.*

- (d) *Adjectives* in -ικός formed from unexceptionable words:

ἀνεπιστημονική (20^b25). ἀγνοητικός* (46^a38). ἀπεχθητικός (21^a26; 33^b32): not necessarily a nonce-word, as it is also in *M.M.* 93^a22. λοιδορητικός (21^b14): otherwise only in much later writers. πενητικός (22^a36). ὑποστατικός (22^a33).

- (e) *Words which perhaps should not be read anyway*:

διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθῶσαι (47^b10): Jackson made better sense by reading διὰ τὸ (MSS.) αὐτὸ (Bf) κατορθῶσαιεν.

10. *New or possibly new formations in E.E. from well-attested words:*

δαπανηρία (21^a11): δαπάνημα, δαπανηρός, both several times in *E.N.* κατ-ευνχεῖν (29^a19; 47^b31): εὐνχεῖν in the *Physics* once, εὐτυχία frequent in *E.N.* and other works. ὁμοιοσχημόνως (17^b35): the adj. freq. in *Pr.An.* τρύπησις (42^a17): τρύπημα occurs in *Ath. Pol.* 69. 1.

11. *Unobjectionable parts, not met with elsewhere in A., of ordinary words:*

μεταβιβαζόμενοι (16^b30): the middle or passive of this verb not elsewhere in A. μεταποιούνται (46^b17*): unusual in this passive sense; perhaps corrupt passage.

12. *Words drawn from previous medical writings:*

διαστροφή (26^a21, 30, 31): but Jackson ci. διὰ στροφὴν. ὑπερθερμαίνεισθαι (39^b35). ὑπερψύχεσθαι (39^b34).

13. *Words which could well have been freshly invented by A., but may have been current, as they occur in previous or near-contemporaneous writings:*

κατονομάζεσθαι (21^b10): ?Aristotle frg. 591 (Rose 1886); Thphr. *De Odoribus* 2. ὁμιλητικός (38^b12): Isocrates (perh. different sense); Platonic *Definitions* 415 c.

14. *Rare words:*

ἀγαθοδαιμονισταί (33^b3): unique, but the v.l. ἀγαθοδαιμονισαί occurs also (or only) in a *Rhodian* inscription; private joke πρὸς Εὐδήμον? ἀμφιβάλλειν (43^a12; and 25 in a suspect sentence): but *E.N.* 1162^b28, the corresponding passage on the friendship of utility, has the only instance in A. of the commoner ἀμφιλογος, with which he has replaced the rarer word. πλήκτης (21^b14 coupled with λοιδορητικός—q.v. in 9(d)): perhaps should be in class 12, as it is read once in Hippocrates. σικχός (34^a6): next met in Plutarch; used in *E.E.* in a passage describing extremes.

So much for the 59 words noted by Sussemihl; the 47 additional words I have noted fall easily into the same classification, as follows:

Class 2 above:

ἀδιαχώριστος* (19^b34): nowhere before *Etym. Magnum* and *Suidas*. It is read without comment also by Burnet and Rackham. One would expect the common ἀχώριστος. ἐπιτροπία (47^a30): unique. Better ἐπιτροπεία, which is found in Pl. and A.'s *Pol.* β 10. 1271^b25.

Class 3:

κώνειον* (25^b25). ὀργεῶνες (41^b26): dub. leg., but the alternatives would still be peculiar to *E.E.* ὀρχηστρίς (46^a35). παλαίειν* (27^b27). παράβολος (18^a24): Bonitz suggests reading παράλογος. παρακένουσις (29^a31). πρεσβείον (42^a6). προπύλαιον (14^a2). Σειρήνες (30^b35). συνδειπνείν (46^a7).

Class 5:

κερδαλέος (21^a23).

Class 6:

ἀκινήτως ἔχειν (30^b13): *Euthphr.* 11 d, *Tm.* 38 a; also Isocrates 13. 12. ἀφόβως ἔχειν (28^b26): *Hp. Mi.* 364 b, *Meno* 70 b, *Lg.* 682 c, 752 b. εὐαρμοστία (31^a1): *R.* 400 d, 522 a, al. Also in Isocrates and Platonic *Def.* 411 c. ζημυώδης

(21^a23): *Cra.* 395 b, 417-19 four times, *Lg.* 650 a, 690 e. ναυπηγεῖν* *act.* (47^a25): *Mx.* 245 a, *Alc.* 1. 107 c. Even if these works are not genuine, it is an easy back-formation from the noun and adjective (e.g. *E.N.* 1094^a8), which A. uses. φιλόπονος (22^a38): *Phdr.* 248 d, *R.* 535 c and d, *Lg.* 824.

Class 7:

ἀποστερητής (32^a15): *R.* 344 b. βλάξ (47^a18): *Grg.* 488 a. περίφοβος (29^b7): *Phdr.* 239 b. προπετῶς (14^b12): *Phil.* 45 a; also *Isocrates* and *Problems*. Adj. is found in *E.N.* ὑποβολή (39^a37): *R.* 538 a; ci. Vict. for ὑπερβολή.

Class 9(a):

συνήμερευσις (39^b19): vb. in Pl. and *E.N.* freq. συνδυήν (40^a38).

Class 9(c):

ἐγκρατεύεσθαι (23^b13): connected with ἀκρατεύεσθαι. εὐνοῖζεσθαι (41^a8). σκύνεισις (19^a21).

Class 9(d):

κακοπαθητικός (21^a31).

Class 10:

αἰσθητικῶς ἔχειν (30^b37): first later in *Arrian*. ἀναισθήτως διακείσθαι (31^a1): otherwise once in *Problems* γ. ἐταιρικῶς (προσφέρεσθαι) (43^a5): the adj. occurs in *E.N.* ὀψοφαγία (31^a20): the adj. is in *E.N.* and *E.E.* πτύελος (masc.) (35^a38): it is neuter in *H.A.* and *G.A.*; might be just a grammatical error by A. or an early editor.

Class 12:

δυστράπελος (34^a5): also *Soph.* lyric. εὐθέτως (37^a3): perhaps the adj. should be read anyway, with von Arnim and Rackham. κρεωφαγία (14^b23).

Class 13:

χρηστῶς* (14^a21): found in *Hdt.*, *Hp.*, and *Aristophanes*, acc. to *L.S.J.*⁹. πώλησις (32^a3): *Xen. Oec.* 3. 9.

Class 14 (many of these need not be read):

ἀνεστραμμένως (42^b7): only in papyrus of ii b.c. and *Etym. Magnum*.¹ ἀντεστραμμένως is common in A. ἀντικρυς ἦ (43^a37): earliest occurrence in this sense. Accepted by *L.S.J.*⁹, but Jackson read ἀντικρούση. αὐταρκεῖν (42^a8): only in a papyrus of iii a.d. Read by Fritzsche and *L.S.J.*⁹ for MS. αὐτάρκη; *Rac.* reads αὐταρκες. μονάρχης (16^a2): *Fr.*'s conjecture, viz. μοναρχῶν for MS. μοναρχιών. But surely it should be the common μοναρχῶν, with *Burnet* and *Rac.* ἐξουσιάζειν (16^a2): nowhere else in this sense. μοναυλικός (42^a25): 'probable' (*L.S.J.*⁹) conj. of *Spengel*. λαφύκτης (32^a16): unique; accepted by *Bonitz*, *Susemihl* (not in his index), and *L.S.J.*⁹.

Had I not given the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and the *M.M.* the benefit of the doubt as regards their authenticity, my additional list of peculiar words in *E.E.* would have been even longer. Those who regard these two works as certainly spurious have only to extract from the following section (B) the words which occur elsewhere in A. only in the two works.

¹ Subsequently found also in A.'s *Pol.* δ. 11.1298^b38 (though some MSS. there read ὠτρεστ).

B. Vocabulary of the *E.E.* uncommon in A.'s writings

For clarity this section takes the form of a table (see pp. 202-5), with some conclusions following. All the references available in Bonitz are given, and others (marked with an asterisk) so far as I have been able to discover them. Words that are found also in *E.N.*, even though uncommon, are not usually given, except where this fact has escaped Bonitz. Abbreviations, where not the same as L.S.J.⁹, are those used by Bonitz, even where the entry is not given by him.

Conclusions from section B, and from other evidence appearing in the course of the investigation:

1. As might be expected, there are affinities in vocabulary between *E.E.* and the early works of A., especially in the use of Platonic words. (These affinities are probably stronger than appear from the table, as some of the entries in the counterbalancing column 'Other Works' belong to works or parts of works that may be early; and many of the *Politics* references are to books generally accepted as earlier.)

2. There are specially strong affinities in vocabulary between *E.E.* and *Rhetoric*, above all *Rhetoric* β. (This chimes in with von Arnim's view that, for reasons of doctrine, *Rhet.* β 9 is prior to *E.E.*; but his conclusion that *E.E.* is therefore late is unnecessary. The late historical allusions in the *Rhetoric* occur in the last two chapters of book β, and I regard the rest of the *Rhetoric* as being much earlier, perhaps belonging to A.'s last years in the Academy. Düring's important article 'Aristotle and Plato in the mid-4th century', *Eranos*, 1956, also takes this view, that only *Rhet.* β 23-24 is late. Note that in my table only two of the uncommon *E.E.* words occur in these chapters of the *Rhetoric*.)

3. The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* ought not to be disregarded in studies of A.'s development, but serious consideration should be given to Case's view (in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., s.v. Aristotle) that it is the earliest work of A. on rhetoric. (Ross, in *Aristotle* [5th ed., 1949], p. 16, n. 2, thinks Case succeeded in showing that if this work is earlier than the *Rhetoric* it must be by Aristotle. As the evidence for *later* date is linguistic it needs re-examination in the light of the linguistic evidence about *E.E.* presented here.)

4. There may be nothing against the authenticity of the *M.M.* on grounds of vocabulary for those who accept *E.E.* as A.'s, since (pending detailed investigation) *M.M.* seems to be far less peculiar in its vocabulary than *E.E.* (This is not of course to say that *M.M.* is authentic; merely that arguments against it must proceed from other grounds. It is worth noting incidentally that Jaeger's objections to *M.M.* on account of certain features of its syntax (*Aristotle*, 2nd ed., pp. 441-2) are also shaky, given the genuineness of *E.E.*, which he accepts. Some of the counter-evidence was produced by von Arnim in 'Nochmals die aristotelischen Ethiken', *Sitzb. d. Wien. Akad.* 209, in 1929, e.g. the use of a neuter plural subject with a plural verb is found in *E.E.* 31^b35, 32^a10, and in the common book *E.N.* ε 4. 1131^b30. Stock gives these, and says it is common in the *Metaphysics*, but gives no instances. Mr. G. E. L. Owen refers me to 1079^a20, 1079^a28, 1079^b12-13, which parallel passages with the singular at 990^b24 and 31, and 991^a9; and points out that here the plural verb may be used to indicate a heterogeneity within the subject.)

5. Work on A.'s vocabulary might provide some solid grounds for relative dating, but it would need great care, as Bywater is almost alone among Aristotelian editors in attempting and apparently achieving completeness in

Word and E.E. references	Plato	Early works	Rhetoric	Politics	Other works
ἀγανατεῖν (44 ^a 34 ^a)	V. freq.	*M.M. β 3: 99 ^b 24; β 11: thrice	β 2: 79 ^a 6 β 24: 01 ^b 25
φθεῖν [of men] (30 ^b 32 ^a , 34 ^a , 43 ^b 27 ^a ; 47 ^b 22 ^a)	V. freq.	..	α 12: 72 ^b 22, 23; α 15: 76 ^a 31; β 6: 84 ^b 14
ἀδοξεῖν (30 ^a 24)	..	ρ 38: 45 ^b 16	..	η 7: 28 ^a 7	..
ἀήνητος (29 ^a 28)	Mx. 243 d; R. 375 b	..	α 1: 54 ^b 34	..	τ 34: 184 ^b 6 ^a ; Zi δ 10: 537 ^b 3
ἀεροδραῖα (30 ^b 32 ^a)	V. freq.	..	poss. α 10: 69 ^a 2; β 8: 85 ^b 30, 32; β 17: 91 ^a 1	..	π 24: 59 ^b 22 H η 6: 49 ^a 10
ἀερόσας (31 ^a 3 ^a)	..	M α 3: 994 ^b 32	[π α once] [ο twice]
ἀλόγιος (29 ^a 21; 32 ^a 17; 48 ^a 7 ^a)	Passim	..	β 8: 86 ^a 5, 6, 7 β 9: 86 ^b (×4); 87 ^a 9	β 9: 71 ^a 30 η 14: 33 ^b 40	..
ἀναπετικός (29 ^a 40; 17 ^b 18)	..	M.M. 20: 91 ^a 31	[π and φ] Φ α 5: 188 ^b 12
ἀνάλωμα (33 ^a 35 ^a)	Passim	..	β 5: 83 ^a 8	..	Z γ α 1: 779 ^a 3
ἀνάξιος (32 ^b 13; 39 ^a 7, 9)	Freq.	ρ 35: 40 ^a 35
ἀνδρομοστος (30 ^b 28)	γ 15: 86 ^b 2	..
ἀνέγερτος (16 ^a 3)	Mx. 242 e, 243 e; Ap. 36 a	θ 4: 36 ^b 41	..
ἀνελπιστος (15 ^a 13)	μ α 12: 348 ^a 27
ἀντιθέτω (24 ^a 39 ^a ; 31 ^b 8 ^a)	..	M.M. α 9: 86 ^b 18 ^a ; K 14: 15 ^a 9 ^a	..	δ 4: 91 ^a 39 ^a *	[x] M μ in quotation
ἀπειργεῖν (45 ^b 34)	Passim	..	β 23: 00 ^a 5
ἀπειστος (37 ^b 28)	Freq.	ρ 16, 17, 30 (×8) M.M. α 29: 92 ^a 30
ἀρόκεια (21 ^a 6, 27; 33 ^b 34)	..	τ 13: 150 ^b 18; M.M. β 8: 02 ^b 18 ^a
ἀρτίως (17 ^a 11 ^a)	Passim	M.M. α 33: 95 ^a 18 M.M. α 29: 92 ^b 30
ἀτυχής (47 ^a 2, 13 ^a)	Lg. 905 a
αυθάδεια (21 ^a 6, 28; 33 ^b 4)	Ep. 4, 321 b; R. 590 a

Word and E.E. references	Plato	Early works	Rhetoric	Politics	Other works
αὐθιγός (32 ^a 2; 33 ^b 36*)	R. 548 c; <i>Plt.</i> 204 b; <i>Lg.</i> 692 a; 950 b	M.M. a 29: 92 ^b 31	α 9: 67 ^a 37; γ 3: 66 ^b 3
ἀφαιρετός (41 ^b 23)	<i>Plt.</i> 303 c	Γ α 1: 315 ^a 13
γαμνή (21 ^b 20)	<i>Lg.</i> 841 d, 868 d, 874 c	f. 172: 150 ^b 27
γεννίασις (32 ^a 21; 33 ^b 1)	α 9: 57 ^a 2	Z μν 10: 672 ^b 28; μβ 5: 363 ^a 14; τ 34: 183 ^b 2; [τ]
διαλογία (22 ^b 5)	β 8: 68 ^b 17	..
διασκοπεῖν (17 ^b 16)	Freq.	f. 40: f. 83	..	γ 9: 86 ^b 5	..
διανοῦν (16 ^a 12*)	Freq.	M.M. β 6: 63 ^b 30- 64 ^a 2; f. 229: 1519 ^b 1	M β 4: 60 ^a 20
δυσίατος (30 ^a 8)	<i>Lg.</i> 731 E, 854 a, 916 a, 934 a
ἐμψυον (34 ^a 33)	V. freq.	..	α 2: 58 ^a 22; α 4: 59 ^b 6	..	[τ]; O β 1: 284 ^a 32; H α 10: 61 ^a 1*
ἐνθουσιασμός (48 ^a 33*)	Tm. 71 c	f. 12: 1475 ^b 41	..	θ 5: 40 ^a 11, 42 ^a 7	..
ἐπίβροτος (15 ^a 10)	<i>Passim</i>	..	γ 17: 18 ^b 25 β 16: 91 ^a 10
ἐρίσθαι (15 ^b 9)*
ἐτούτως (29 ^a 38: v.l. ἐτοιμος)	Freq., esp. <i>Lg.</i>	ρ 39: 45 ^b 26 (adj.); ρ 2: 21 ^b 14
εὐδαιμόνιος (14 ^b 5)	<i>Passim</i>	ρ 1: 21 ^a 13	β 12: 89 ^a 25	γ 9: 81 ^a 2	..
εὐξανάπυτος (37 ^b 49)	R. 409 a
εὐθύνειος (48 ^a 40*)	α 9: 67 ^a 4; β 9: 86 ^b 12; β 10: 87 ^b 22	η 3: 25 ^a 22, 25 ^b 15	μτ 2 (twice)
εὐρηγία (21 ^a 8; 33 ^b 25; 48 ^b 37; 47 ^a 1)	<i>Passim</i>	ρ 3: 23 ^b 19; τ β 2: 109 ^b 37; 110 ^a 2, 3
ἐφ' ὁδός (30 ^a 33)	<i>Phd.</i> 95 b	τ α 12: 65 ^a 14*	μ α 6: 43 ^b 3 [θ ounce]
ἠθικῶς (43 ^a 13)	γ 18: 18 ^a 38, 39
κατηλκός (15 ^a 22)	<i>Sph.</i> 223 d, 224 d	α 9 (×6)	..
καταλλακτικός (22 ^b 2)
κατάπληξ (21 ^a 1; 33 ^b 27)	..	M.M. α 30: 93 ^a 1	α 9: 67 ^b 17	..	[καταπληξ in E.N. etc.]

Word and E.E. references	Plato	Early works	Rhetoric	Politics	Other works
καταφρονητικός (3 ^a 39, ^b 15; 33 ^b 35)	<i>Adiamb</i> in <i>Thl.</i> 161 c	..	β 2: 79 ^b 31; β 11: 88 ^b 25; β 15: 90 ^b 19	..	H δ: 24 ^b 29*
κενώς (17 ^b 21)	φ α 1: 403 ^a 2
κυβερνητική (20 ^b 24*; 47 ^a 6*)	Freq.	M.M. α 1: 83 ^a 13*, 17*	..	γ 11: 82 ^a 10	H β 2: 04 ^a 10*; H γ 3: 12 ^b 5*
κώλυσις (23 ^b 23)	<i>Sph.</i> 220 b	ρ 2: 21 ^b 28	7 θ 10: 161 ^a 15
μαθητής (43 ^b 21*)	Freq.	M A 5: 986 ^b 22
μετοχή (17 ^a 29, ^b 9)	<i>Ep.</i> 7, 345 a	M ζ 4: 1030 ^a 13
ναυκληρία (47 ^a 21*)	<i>Lg.</i> 643 e	α 11: 58 ^b 22	..
δέξιμος (21 ^b 12)	α 10: 68 ^b 20; β 5: 82 ^b 20; β 12: 89 ^b 9	<Syn. ἀκρόχολος once in E.N. instead>	..
ὀρθοπαραγῆν (30 ^b 6)	<i>Gr.</i> 485 b;	α 13: 60 ^a 26	..
παιδαίριον (14 ^b 30*)	<i>Smp.</i> 207 d, 210 d	ρ 14: 31 ^a 14	[ο]
παρωνυμῆζεν (28 ^a 35)	..	Φ γ 3: 245 ^b 11, 28
παρωνυμῶς (28 ^a 36)	..	K (× 8); T β 2-4 (× 4)
περίπατος (14 ^b 23)	<i>Phdr.</i> 227-8 (× 4)	f. 224	[π]
περιωδιῆται (15 ^b 20)	<i>R.</i> 583 d; <i>Lg.</i> 732 c	π ο 11: 145 ^a 12
προτιμῶν (15 ^b 34)	<i>Passim</i>	ρ 3: 24 ^a 29; ρ 8: 28 ^b 22
προχείριος (22 ^a 3)	<i>Smp.</i> 204 d; <i>Alc.</i> 2. 144 d	τ θ 1: 156 ^b 39; τ θ 14: 163 ^a 25; μ β: 369 ^b 24
σολίκων (21 ^a 35; 33 ^b 1, 6)	..	M.M. α 27: 92 ^b 2, 3	β 16: 91 ^a 3, 4
στροφή (46 ^b 9 and poss. × 3 in 27 ^a ; see δια- στροφή at 12 above)	Z μ δ 11: 692 ^a 6
συγκεχεμένως (16 ^b 35)	Adj. only	ρ 26: 35 ^b 6	H γ 2: 45 ^b 16

Word and E.E. references	Plato	Early works	Rhetoric	Politics	Other works
συγχωρεῖν (14 ^a 7)	Extremely freq.	[π once]; τ 117; 176-28 ^a ; O β 14; 297 ^a 11 ..
συμμετέχειν (45 ^b 35, 38)	<i>Thd.</i> 181 c	η 10: 30 ^a 21	..
συνεπαίνειν (21 ^a 26)	<i>Hp. Mi.</i> 363 a; <i>Mx.</i> 246 a	..	γ 14: 15 ^b 28
συνεσθαι (45 ^a 13)	<i>Lg.</i> 881 d	f. 461: 155 ^b 43	Γ β 1: 329 ^a 6
συνωμολογέιν (16 ^b 29)	Freq.	..	β 20: 93 ^b 17	η 1: 23 ^b 23	..
ταπεινότης (33 ^b 13)	<i>Plt.</i> 309 a	..	β 6: 84 ^b 4	..	φ 2: 807 ^a 26
υπερνωτισσάσθαι (40 ^a 12)	H γ 9: 15 ^a 25
υπομενετικός (29 ^b 5; 32 ^a 26)	[<i>Def.</i> 412 b, 416 a] (-μενη-)
φάλαγγος (32 ^a 4)	<i>R.</i> 347 b; <i>Grg.</i> 515 c	f. 178: 1508 ^a 1 τ β 3: 11 ^a 3	[π γ 28: 875 ^b 3]
φάλαγγος (27 ^b 10 Sylburg and Fritzsche, rejecting [as does L.S.J.2] the unique φάλαγγος of the MSS.)
φάλαγγος (25 ^b 5 ^a)	..	M.M. α 16 (× 3)	Zi β 14: 505 ^b 20
φάλαγγος (16 ^b 96)	<i>Phd.</i> 91 a	α 1: 436 ^a 20
φάλαγγος (28 ^b 2)	Zi β 5: 79 ^a 25
φάλαγγος (19 ^a 3)	θ 7: 42 ^a 12	[o once]
φάλαγγος (39 ^a 15 ^a ; 47 ^a 18 ^a)	Freq.	f. 248: 1524 ^a 2, 4	..	α 7: 55 ^b 31	[θ twice]
φάλαγγος (40 ^b 24 ^a)	H δ 13: 27 ^b 16
φάλαγγος (25 ^a 14)	<i>Phd.</i> 99 ^b	Zi ζ 2: 560 ^a 9; 17: 571 ^a 33

indexes. Bonitz did not even aim at completeness for the philosophical works in his *Index Aristotelicus*, as Susemihl and others would have discovered if they had read his preface (p. iv). A possible linguistic mark of a comparatively early work is the free invention and frequent use of adverbs, especially with ἔχειν and διακεῖσθαι. As regards rejecting books as spurious, on the other hand, even if one could be sure that given words are not found elsewhere in A.'s works, this would create a very weak presumption against the genuineness of the work containing them, since A.'s undoubted writings bristle with such words.

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THE REVERSE OF VAHLEN

UNTIL 1923 most critics were content to interpret *περιπέτεια* as 'a reversal of fortune'. Then, in 'The Reverse of Aristotle' (*C.R.* 1923, pp. 98-104),¹ Mr. F. L. Lucas argued persuasively for Vahlen's interpretation of the term as 'a reversal of intention', 'any event where the agent's intention is over-ruled to produce an effect the exact opposite of his intention'. The result has been wide acceptance for Vahlen's theory.² This may be a case of truth prevailing after two thousand years of error, but it looks to me more like an instance of *quid facundia posset*. I suggest that we simple-minded Ajaxes have fallen victims to the wit of Odysseus.

Like Ajax on another occasion we are doomed to fight in a fog unless we first clear away an ambiguity that obscures the issue, and lends a spurious plausibility to the Vahlenite argument. 'Reversal of intention' can mean two very different things:

- (a) complete change of purpose, reversal of policy;
- (b) complete frustration of an unchanged purpose.

Now (b) is what the Vahlenites mean, but Mr. Lucas illustrates his thesis by a clear example of (a):

In Ibsen's *Doll's House* Nora, trying to save her husband, thereby loses him; and the ensuing cry of recognition rings clear in her own words: 'It burst upon me that I had been living here these eight years with a strange man.' In consequence, she herself abandons the husband she has been struggling so desperately to keep. The *peripeteia* is complete (*Tragedy*, 1957, p. 114; cf. *C.R.*, 1923, p. 103).

But Nora's attempt to save her husband's life has been entirely successful, for he is still alive; so have her struggles to keep him, for he still wants to live with her. There is thus no 'reversal of intention' in sense (b). There is, however, a 'reversal of intention' in sense (a); for having ceased to love her husband she no longer wishes to keep him.

Let us now examine some of Mr. Lucas's arguments.

Aristotle's examples

The definition of *peripeteia* is supported by two illustrations:

ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι ἔλθων ὡς εὐφρανῶν τὸν Οἰδίπου καὶ ἀπαλλάξων τοῦ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φόβου, δηλώσας ὅς ἦν, τοῦναντίον ἐποίησεν καὶ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ ὁ μὲν ἀγόμενος ὡς ἀποθανούμενος, ὁ δὲ Δαναὸς ἀκολουθῶν ὡς ἀποκτενῶν, τὸν μὲν συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀποθανεῖν, τὸν δὲ σωθῆναι (1452*24-29).

Mr. Lucas translates the first as follows:

Thus in the *Oedipus* the messenger comes to cheer Oedipus and set his mind at rest about his mother, but by revealing who he is produces the opposite effect (*C.R.*, 1923, p. 99).

But the messenger does not 'come to set Oedipus' mind at rest about his

¹ And in *Tragedy*, London, 1927 (revised and enlarged 1957).

(Cambridge, 1934), i. 91; House, *Aristotle's Poetics*, pp. 96, 99; Wimsatt and Brooks, *Literary Criticism* (New York, 1957), p. 44.

² Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity*

mother', for until the situation is explained to him, he does not know that Oedipus has any fears in that direction (*O.T.* 989-91). Unless we are prepared to believe¹ that Aristotle had forgotten the plot of his favourite play, we must find some other translation for *ὡς ἀπαλλάξων*.² *ὡς* with a future participle can, of course, express simple purpose, but in the case of *ὡς ἀποθανούμενος* it obviously does not do so, for Lynceus presumably had no intention of dying if he could help it; and we may reasonably assume that in the four parallel uses of the construction the meaning is roughly the same. The only interpretation that makes sense in all four cases is a very vague one: 'being in a situation which may be expected to lead to the development indicated'. The construction, in fact, conveys expectation³ without any necessary implication of intention; and its use by Aristotle in this context makes it clear that 'reversal of intention' was not an essential part of his conception of *peripeteia*.

The plot of the Iliad

In 1459^b14 the *Iliad* is classed as 'simple'—that is, without a *peripeteia*—whereas it abounds in reversals of fortune (*C.R.*, 1923, p. 99; cf. *C.R.*, 1923, p. 102).

The implied argument seems to be as follows:

- (a) the *Iliad* abounds in 'reversals of fortune';
- (b) the *Iliad* contains no 'reversals of intention'; therefore when Aristotle calls this poem 'simple', he means that it is without 'reversals of intention'. Therefore *peripeteia* equals 'reversal of intention'. Q.E.D.

The weakness of the theorem is that neither (a) nor (b) is true.

(a) If 'reversal of fortune' is to be an adequate equivalent for *peripeteia*, it must correspond in meaning with one of the *O.E.D.* definitions of the verb *reverse*: 'To send on a course contrary to the previous one', and imply, as Mr. Potts points out,⁴ movement 'first one way and then the other'. I suspect that the opposite of this, continuous movement in a single direction, is what Aristotle meant to express by the word *συνεχούς* in his definition of a 'simple' plot:

λέγω δὲ ἀπλήν μὲν πρᾶξιν ἥς γινομένης ὥσπερ ὤρισται συνεχούς καὶ μιᾶς ἀνεν περιπετείας ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ μετάβασις γίνεται . . . (1452^a14-16).

The objection to this interpretation is that, in our text of the *Poetics*, the idea has not been previously expressed, whereas *ὥσπερ ὤρισται* implies that it has. But this would not be the only example of such a discrepancy (cf. the conflicting definitions of *λέξις* at 1449^b34-35 and 1450^b13-14). In favour of the interpretation is the fact that it saves Aristotle from appearing repetitive and unsystematic. He has already insisted at length on the need for unity in *any* plot, and his business here is to differentiate between two *kinds* of plot. If

¹ As Bywater apparently was, *Festschrift Theodor Gomperz* (1902), p. 170.

² Rostagni translates *ὡς εὐφρανῶν*, 'con l'apparenza di recar gioia', *Aristotele Poetica* (Turin, 1945), p. 61.

³ Cf. *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν* (1452^a4), a passage which may indeed be referred to (*καθάπερ εἰρηται*) in Aristotle's definition of *π.*, cf. Glanville, *C.Q.*, 1947, pp. 73-78, and Rostagni, *op. cit.*, p. 60. Potts (*Aristotle on*

the Art of Fiction (Cambridge, 1953), p. 31) translates the first example: 'Thus in the *Oedipus* the arrival of the messenger, which was expected to cheer Oedipus up by releasing him from his fear . . .'. There is no reason why the expectation referred to should not include that of the audience, the majority of whom did not know even the 'well-known' stories in advance (1451^b25-26).

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 81.

συνεχοῦς καὶ μᾶς means merely 'coherent and unified',¹ he is guilty of including in the definition of the species something that has already formed part of the definition of the genus.

Whether or not, however, Mr. Potts's interpretation of a 'complex' plot is confirmed by Aristotle's use of the word *συνεχοῦς*, it is certainly confirmed by his example of a 'simple' epic. The theme of the *Iliad* is the Wrath of Achilles (*Il.* 1. 1-7), and its plot must be considered in relation to him. From start to finish the movement of Achilles' fortunes is in a single direction: a downward one, without any upward swerves. So far as he is concerned, the poem contains no 'reversals of fortune'.

(b) 'Reversals of intention', however, are fairly frequent. Here are some of them:

(1) Patroclus borrows Achilles' armour, in the hope that 'the Trojans may mistake me for you, and stop fighting, and the Achaeans may have a breathing-space, and a respite from war' (16. 41-43). The result is that the capture of the armour encourages the Trojans to make a fresh attack (17. 208-34), and after a bitter struggle over the body of Patroclus the Achaeans are routed, losing a great deal of their equipment in the process, 'and there was no rest from war' (17. 758-61).

Two other passages emphasize the 'tragic irony' of Patroclus' 'blinded human effort' (*C.R.* 1923, pp. 103, 102). When he begs Achilles to lend him the armour, Homer comments: 'Thus he spoke in his folly, for he was begging for his own evil death' (16. 46-47). And Hector, as he kills him, says: 'You fool! You thought you were going to plunder our town, and take the women of Troy back to your own country as slaves . . . but you are going to stay here and be eaten by the vultures' (16. 830-6).

(2) Achilles lends Patroclus his armour, in order that he may win 'great honour and glory' for him (16. 84). The result is that Hector sends the armour back to Troy, 'to be a great glory to him (i.e. Hector)' (17. 131).

(3) Hector puts on the armour of Achilles, and leads an attack designed to end in the capture of Patroclus' body, which he plans to have dragged back to 'the horse-taming Trojans' (17. 230) and fed to the dogs (17. 126-7). He offers half the armour to the man who succeeds in getting the body back, but the other half he means to keep for himself, 'and he and I shall have equal glory from it' (17. 229-32). The result is that his own body is dragged back to the Greek ships by the horses of Achilles (22. 395-404) who has previously assured him that nothing on earth can save his head from the dogs (17. 348-54). Elsewhere both Zeus and Achilles comment on the reversal of Hector's blinded efforts (17. 201-8; 22. 331-6).

Simple and complex plots

If *peripeteia* means 'reversal of the situation', how is it possible for Aristotle to make the presence or absence of π , the basis of his classification of tragedies (1452^a12-18) as 'complex' or 'simple'? Can one divide dramas into those where the situation changes and those where it does not? The latter type must be all but non-existent up to M. Maeterlinck's invention of the 'Static Drama'. The *Iliad*, Aristotle's only named example of a 'simple' composition . . . (*C.R.*, 1923, p. 102).

This delightful *reductio ad absurdum* is largely contrived by the silent substitu-

¹ Rostagni equates *συνεχοῦς* with *ἁλῆς*, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

tion of 'change' for 'reversal', which eliminates the original implications of two-way movement, and also of *εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον*; but it derives added plausibility from the questionable assumption in the last half-sentence.

Epic, says Aristotle (1459^b7-9), can be divided into the same types as Tragedy, ἡ γὰρ ἀπλήν ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἢ ἠθικὴν ἢ παθητικὴν. He is clearly referring to 1455^b32-1456^a2, where he names four types of tragedy, πεπλεγμένη, παθητικὴ, ἠθικὴ, τὸ δὲ τέταρτον—and here the text becomes corrupt, but it is surely reasonable to assume, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, that the fourth type is again ἀπλή, which perfectly describes the only surviving play on the list of examples given.¹ The movement of the hero's fortunes in the *Prometheus Vincit* is again a steady downward one, without any apparent upward trend comparable to the moment in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* where the messenger arrives with 'good news for Oedipus and Iocasta' (934). The plot of the *Persae* is precisely similar, and even the *Agamemnon* is very nearly a 'simple' tragedy, since the audience is carefully prepared for the murder in advance, first by the ominous *aposiopesis* of the Watchman (36-39), then by the gloomy forebodings of the Chorus, and finally by Cassandra's increasingly explicit predictions. There is nothing *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν* about the denouement. Nearly half, in fact, of the surviving plays of Aeschylus belong to this 'all but non-existent' type of drama—not to mention the original *Tamburlaine* of Marlowe.

Bywater's irrelevance

Meanwhile Bywater's edition of 1909 had added nothing except the entirely pointless observation (which makes one doubt if he ever really understood his opponents) that on Vahlen's theory the *peripeteia* of the *Oedipus* would be 'a fact in the life of the messenger, not the turning-point in that of Oedipus'. It is, on any theory, both of these. The intention that is over-ruled and reversed, as Vahlen expressly said, *need not* be the hero's, though it usually is (*C.R.*, 1923, p. 100).

At the risk of incurring the same terrible pity as Bywater, I would question the entire pointlessness of his remark. Let us consider it in the light of two other passages:

The *peripeteia*, in short, is the working in blindness to one's own defeat: the *anagnorisis* is the realization of the truth, the opening of the eyes, the sudden lightning-flash in the darkness.

Then there came

On that blind sin swift eyesight like a flame.

This flash of revelation may appear, as Aristotle points out, either before it is too late, or after; before, as in the *Cresphontes* . . . Or the flash may come after the catastrophe, serving only to reveal it and complete it, as when Oedipus discovers his guilt . . . (*Tragedy*, 1957, pp. 113-14).

Then in the first example of *peripeteia* given by Aristotle the 'working in blindness to one's own defeat' is done by the messenger. As Lock put it (*C.R.*, 1895, p. 251):² 'He tries to dispel the hero's fears; in the very act he proves them but

¹ Hamilton Fyfe (*Aristotle's Art of Poetry* (Oxford, 1940), p. 51) says that the reference is 'certainly not' to the *P.V.* Gudeman (*Aristoteles Poetik* (Berlin, 1934), p. 318) says that it is; Rostagni (op. cit., p. 107) leaves

the matter open, but reads *ὅψις* for the fourth type.

² Quoted approvingly by Lucas, *C.R.*, 1923, p. 99.

too true.' If the messenger is the one who is blind, he is presumably also the one whose eyes are opened. Yet Aristotle seems to say (1452^a30-32) that *anagnorisis* is an increase in the knowledge of the persons 'marked out for good or bad fortune'; and certainly invoking a lightning-flash to cure the myopia of a minor character sounds rather like using a chisel to open a matchbox. Besides, the instance given by Aristotle of a flash that comes too late applies only to Oedipus (1453^b30-31).

Such, then, is the essence of Aristotle's theory of the tragic plot. At its best, tragedy is a story of human blindness leading human effort to checkmate itself—a Tragedy of Error. The *hamartia* is the Tragic Error; the *peripeteia*, its fatal working to a result the opposite of that intended; the *anagnorisis*, the recognition of the truth (*Tragedy*, 1957, p. 122).

The *hamartia*, we know (1453^a7-12) belongs to the tragic hero; its 'fatal working', we are now told, constitutes the *peripeteia*; yet in Aristotle's first example of a *peripeteia* the intention that is reversed, the human effort that checkmates itself, belong to a minor character.

But 'the intention that is over-ruled and reversed need not be the hero's, though it usually is'; 'but the *Oedipus* is rather an exceptional case' (*Tragedy*, 1957, p. 117). Then why did Aristotle go out of his way to muddle his audience by selecting, as his first illustration of a newly defined term, an *unusual* instance? No competent lecturer, let alone a philosophical genius, quotes an exception to exemplify a rule.¹

Nor is this the only piece of incompetence with which the Vahlen theory would credit Aristotle. It also implies that his second illustration of *peripeteia* is misleadingly expressed. If the point he wanted to make was the frustration of the killer's intention, why did he mention the *victim*, who had no intention of dying, first? It is significant that when Vahlenites refer to this example they tend to reverse Aristotle's order, and mention Danaus first, Lynceus second.²

Translation of anagnorisis

The *anagnorisis* (which it is misleading to render 'recognition' instead of 'discovery'—Aristotle expressly says, 1452^a34-36, that it may be not only of persons, but also of *things* and *facts*—) is the realization of that blindness, the opening of the eyes that Ate, who 'hurts' men's minds, or Fate, or just human weakness had sealed . . . (*C.R.*, 1923, p. 102).

'Recognition' is a mistranslation. We associate the word too closely with the narrow sense of discovering a *person's* identity; whereas *anagnorisis* may equally well signify the discovery of *things* unknown before . . . (*Tragedy*, 1957, p. 113).

'Recognition' seems to me an eminently suitable translation; for though it certainly suggests the discovery of a person's identity, one can also speak of 'recognizing' a fact. Nor do I see anything misleading in the predominance of

¹ Aristotle could, if he wished, have cited from the *O.T.* a 'reversal of intention' of a major character, Iocasta (707-847). This passage is ignored by Lucas in his synopsis (*Tragedy*, 1957, p. 97).

² Atkins, op. cit. i. 91; Wimsatt and Brooks, op. cit., p. 44; whereas Bywater (op. cit., pp. 168-9) retains Aristotle's order.

Lock (*C.R.*, 1895, p. 251) bravely begs the question: 'Apparently the action of Danaus himself in arresting Lynceus led to the deliverance of Lynceus and his own doom.' The play is unknown except for this reference and that at 1455^b29 (Gudeman, op. cit., p. 223, Restagni, op. cit., p. 61).

the 'narrow sense', since Aristotle's own words make it clear that he regarded this narrow sense as primary, and the discovery of things or facts as a secondary extension of the meaning:

Of course, there are other kinds of *anagnorisis*. It may occur in relation to inanimate objects and quite trivial things, and one may 'recognize' that someone has or has not done something. But (ἀλλά) the kind that is most intimately connected with the plot and the action is the above mentioned (1452^a32-38)¹.

He then refers to some eighteen different examples of *anagnorisis*. One of these, ἡ τῆς κερκίδος φωνή (1454^b37), seems to be a discovery of a fact: the other seventeen are discoveries of the identity of persons. In order, however, to support the Vahlen theory of *peripeteia*, one is forced to ignore this evidence, and distort Aristotle's clearly expressed view of *anagnorisis*.

Linguistic evidence

On the use of *περιπέτεια* in *H.A.* 590^b13-19 Mr. Lucas comments:

... the polyp eats the crab, the crab the conger, and the conger the polyp . . . Surely here, too, we have the hoist with one's own petard, the return of the boomerang—the eater is eaten by its food's food (*C.R.*, 1923, pp. 100-1).

It is hard to see how the polyp is 'hoist with its own petard'. There is no causal connexion either suggested by Aristotle or deducible from common sense between the eating of the crab by the polyp, and the eating of the polyp by the conger. The polyp would be eaten by the conger just the same if it refrained from eating the polyp: there is no hint of a 'Revenge Tragedy'. Nor is there any 'reversal of intention' on the polyp's part. Its intention in eating the crab is presumably to satisfy its hunger, and the only circumstances in which this intention could be said to be reversed would be if the polyp felt even hungrier after eating the crab than before.

In fact, there is no trace of *intention* in the passage at all, and the opening sentence makes it clear that the essence of the *περιπέτεια* is the *unexpected*: 'Crabs overpower even big fishes, and some of the latter have a rather surprising experience (*περιπέτεια*)'. One does not expect a conger, which is big enough to eat a polyp, to be overcome by a tiny crab, which dies of fright at the mere proximity of a polyp.²

The peripeteia in the Bath scene (1454^b29)

Surely the point is that we have here, too, a genuine *peripeteia*. Odysseus had *himself* rejected the ministrations of the other handmaidens, because they were minxes, in favour of some old woman who would wash his feet decently and in peace; he forgot that Eurycleia was the very person who would recognize his scar. His device recoiled on his own head—one *peripeteia* more (*C.R.*, 1923, p. 103).

Let us consider this in the light of Mr. Lucas's definition: 'The issue of an

¹ Cf. Rostagni, op. cit., p. 62: 'Il riconoscimento che più direttamente aderisce e alla favola e all'azione, e che perciò è più lodevole, è il riconoscimento delle persone; gli altri (cui si applica il πρὸς) vi aderiscono

soltanto in via subordinata e indiretta. . . '.

² Similarly one does not expect a clever man to be deceived, or a brave man to be beaten (1456^a19-23).

action, aimed at a result x , in the opposite of x .' The issue is clearly the recognition of Odysseus; so to make it a 'genuine *peripeteia*' the result aimed at by Odysseus in refusing to let the handmaidens wash his feet must have been to avoid recognition. But it was nothing of the kind: the handmaidens were too young to remember him anyway. His only motive was to spare himself the sort of insults on his personal appearance that he had twice already suffered from one of the minxes, Melantho (18. 326-36; 19. 65-69). His feelings are perfectly understood by Eurycleia (19. 370-4). So far, then, from being a 'device' to avoid recognition, his choice of Eurycleia was merely a concession to his own vanity. For the aim of this action to be reversed Eurycleia would have had to be even ruder than Melantho.

In fact it is a *peripeteia* like that in Agathon's play about Sisyphus (1456^a19-23): it is a case of a clever man being unexpectedly caught out. Throughout the scene with Penelope, Odysseus has been displaying his talent for deception (19. 203; 209-12). His plans are going well, and his fortunes are rising steadily. Then, all of a sudden, they start hurtling down to disaster:

Oft as the mounting larks their notes prepare,
They fall, and leave their little lives in air.

Aristotle's definition

... Aristotle has himself given a perfect lucid explanation of what he means (xi, 1), which may be paraphrased as follows: 'A *peripeteia* occurs when a course of action intended to produce a result x , produces the reverse of x ' (*Tragedy*, 1957, p. 111).

The sentence paraphrased runs as follows: 'Ἐστὶ δὲ περὶπέτεια μὲν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή' (1452^a22-23). The present participle must be either Conative ('the things being attempted') or Continuous ('the actions in progress'). Mr. Lucas's paraphrase seems to be based on the Conative interpretation; but 'the change into the opposite of the things being attempted' can only signify a 'reversal of intention' in sense (a), as when Nora's attempt to keep her husband is changed into an attempt to leave him. It cannot signify a 'reversal of intention' in sense (b),¹ which would mean making the participle simultaneously Conative and Consecutive: 'the change into the opposite of the results-of the-attempts'. The paraphrase, in fact, is quite incompatible with the text.

If, however, the participle is taken as Continuous, Aristotle's words will yield, without distortion, the following sense: '*peripeteia* is a reversal of the course² of the action'. On the basis, then, of this definition, and of Aristotle's illustrations, I would interpret the term as follows: '*Peripeteia* occurs whenever the course of the action appears to be leading to a conclusion x , but suddenly switches round and starts heading for the reverse of x .'

¹ Vahlen paraphrased: '... was man that oder thut zu einem bestimmten Zweck, das aber nicht diesen sondern den gerade entgegengesetzten zur Folge hat.' Bywater's comment is a triumph of understatement: 'I cannot help feeling some doubt as to the meaning thus assigned to τῶν πραττομένων'

(op. cit., p. 170).

² Rostagni's 'il cambiamento della situazione, τῶν πραττομένων, "in senso contrario al previsto" o "al prefisso"' (op. cit., p. 60) is not quite satisfactory because of the static connotations of 'situazione'.

Since Aristotle's day there has been a steadily increasing tendency in all departments of thought to shift the emphasis from the objective to the subjective. Among the first signs of this were Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Christianity, and the climax of the process is the modern preoccupation with psychology. The Vahlenites, I feel, have made the mistake of interpreting Aristotle without making due allowance for this change of attitude. To us the most interesting things about drama and fiction are:

- (1) the feelings and motives of the characters, especially when unconscious;
- (2) the philosophical content of the composition as a whole.

But if one tries to see the *Poetics* as it is, one is inevitably struck by its comparative lack of concern with either of these things. Aristotle's main interest seems to centre on the technique necessary to hold the attention and stir the emotions of the audience, and everything that he says is really subservient to this. Thus, though he does indeed show a preference for crimes committed unconsciously (1454^a2-9), this is not because he is fascinated by the psychology of the individual, nor because he expects literature or drama to express a philosophical view of the human situation, but simply, as the argument of chapter 14 makes clear, because such crimes offer the easiest method of combining maximum emotional effect with maximum plausibility. κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον no sane man is going to murder a close friend or relation except under the influence of ignorance or misunderstanding.

It is therefore mistaken to praise Aristotle in such terms as these:

There is nothing more brilliant in the *Poetics* than this recognition by Aristotle of the Tragedy of Error, of the *peripeteia*, as the deepest of all. Life is like that, with its clash of ignorant armies in the gloom (C.R., 1923, pp. 103-4).

For Aristotle is not much more concerned with 'the tragedies of life' (*Tragedy*, p. 180) than any modern organizer of a correspondence course on 'How to write a short story', or inventor of a 'Plot Formula'. All he really cares about in this treatise is what will be most effective and successful with audience or reader. And that is where *peripeteia* comes in. It is merely a device to produce the maximum effect on the audience, by first leading them up the garden path, and then showing them something nasty in the woodshed (Oedipus); or arranging for the hero to be on the very point of being murdered by the villain, and then letting the Flying Squad arrive with a screech of tyres, to rescue the hero and arrest the villain (Lynceus). The box-office appeal of film melodramas of the latter type is only partially due to the reversal of the villain's intentions: the average audience will identify itself with the hero, and that is why Aristotle mentions Lynceus first, and makes his survival the climax of the sentence.

Although Aristotle's first example on a superficial view gives some support for Vahlen's interpretation, the second obviously refutes it; and it is hard to believe that it would ever have been taken seriously but for three things: a natural desire to combine *hamartia*, *anagnorisis*, and *peripeteia* into a neatly interlocking system, which can only be done by Procrustean methods; a failure to differentiate sufficiently between Aristotle's attitude to literature and drama, and our own; and the wit and stylistic charm of the theory's chief advocate. For on this subject Mr. Lucas has played the part of Homer:

ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄλογα οὐκ ἂν ᾖν ἀνεκτά, εἰ αὐτὰ φαῦλος ποιητῆς ποιήσκει· νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητῆς ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον (1460^a35-1460^b2).

Since this article was written, G. F. Else's *Aristotle's Poetics: the Argument* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957) has become available in this country. Else's interpretation of *περιπέτεια* (pp. 343-9) agrees in general with my own. He translates *ὡς εὐφρανῶν* etc., 'when it seems that he will make Oedipus happy'; but needlessly emends the text by inserting a *ὁ* before *ελθών* at 1452^a25 (p. 342).

PAUL TURNER

DIEUCHIDAS OF MEGARA

A NOTORIOUS passage in Diogenes Laertius' account of the life of Solon appears in a modern edition in the following form (1. 57, ed. Hicks):

τά τε 'Ομήρου ἐξ ὑποβολῆς γέγραφε ραψωδεῖσθαι, οἷον ὅπου ὁ πρῶτος ἔλθεν, ἐκεῖθεν ἀρχεσθαι τὸν ἐχόμενον. μᾶλλον οὖν Σόλων 'Ομηρον ἐφώτισεν ἢ Πεισίστρατος, ὥς φησι Διευχίδας ἐν πέμπτῳ Μεγαρικῶν. ἦν δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ἔπη ταυτί. "Οἱ δ' ἄρ' Ἀθήνας εἶχον" καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς.

It is immediately evident that the second sentence in this passage is incomplete; as it stands it fails to tell us what it was that Dieuchidas said, except in so far as it implies some connexion between either Solon or Peisistratus and the lines which we now read at *Iliad* 2. 558 ff. Many scholars have striven to fill the lacuna in accordance with their own views of what Dieuchidas ought to have written,¹ and some have sought to use the resulting text as a substantive argument for Dieuchidas' knowledge of the so-called 'Peisistratean recension'. None has gone farther in this direction than Dr. R. Merkelbach, for whom Dieuchidas is incontestably 'der älteste Zeuge' for the recension (*Rh. Mus.*, n.f. xcv [1952], 24, 27); this assertion is the keystone of Merkelbach's argument, and must therefore be supposed to be accepted also by those scholars who have avowed their agreement with his views.²

Merkelbach accepts Leaf's supplement to the passage from Diogenes, except that he prefers *ἄρα* to Leaf's *γάρ*; it is not obvious therefore why he should treat the thus reconstructed Dieuchidas as evidence for anything to do with Peisistratus, any more than Leaf does. I have, however, discussed in a previous paper the question whether our sources (including Dieuchidas) contain sufficient evidence to justify us in believing that Peisistratus (or any other Athenian) was responsible for the first constitution in writing of a standard text of the *Iliad* or *Odyssey* (*T.A.P.A.* lxxvi [1955], 1-21); and I do not see any reason now to retract my main conclusion that our sources do not contain such evidence. So far as Dieuchidas is concerned the position now remains exactly as it was in 1905 when Eduard Schwartz published his article on Dieuchidas in *R.E.*: 'aus ihr [sc. the reference in Diog. Laert. 1. 57] folgt aber weder, dass D. dem Peisistratos eine Rezension des Homertextes zuschrieb, . . . noch, dass er an eine Sammlung der zerstreuten Gedichte durch Peisistratos glaubte; das ist eine wissenschaftliche, aus Hipparchs panathenaischer Festordnung herausgesponnene Hypothese, die mit der Fehden der attischen und peloponnesischen Chronisten erst in jüngere Zeit zusammengebracht ist.'

In the paper already referred to I accepted the conventional view of Dieuchidas as a fourth-century writer; but I have since come to think that the matter calls for further inquiry. We know of Dieuchidas, the historian of Megara, from

¹ For example, Ritschl (quoted with approval by Wilamowitz, *Homeric Untersuchungen* [1884], p. 240): . . . Πεισίστρατος, <ὅσπερ συλλέξας τὰ 'Ομήρου ἐνέποιήσε' τινα εἰς τὴν Ἀθηναίων χάριν.> ὥς φησι . . .; Leaf, *Iliad* i² (1900), xviii, who preferred to supply <ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τὰ ἔπη εἰς τὸν κατάλογον ἐμπούσας, καὶ οὐ Πεισίστρατος>; F. Jacoby,

Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, No. 485 F 6, who proposes to insert 'ex. gr.' <ὅς τὰ ἔπη ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν ποίησιν αὐτοῦ>.

² These include Professors P. von der Mühl (Kritisches Hypomnema zur Ilias [1952], ix, 9) and D. L. Page (*The Homeric Odyssey* [1955], p. 135, n. 32), and Mr. Raphael Sealey (*R.E.G.* lxx [1957], 342, n. 83).

a single *testimonium* (Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6. 2. 26. 8) and eleven fragments,¹ which are ascribed to him by name, though the name does not always appear in the manuscripts in the conventional form (*διευτυχίδας* is not uncommon; *δευχίδας* and *δε ευτυχίδας* occur). Not one of the fragments calls him specifically a Megarian (*Μεγαρεύς*);² Clement (T 1, F 1) calls him *Μεγαρικός*, and his work is called *Μεγαρικά* six times (F 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10). That it was a substantial work is shown by the fact that it extended to at least five books (F 6), but it is not possible to determine from the fragments the period which it covered. Clement (F 1) tells us that Dieuchidas 'transferred' (*μετέβαλε*) the beginning of his *λόγος* from the *Deucalionia* of Hellanicus, so that he must have gone back at least to the flood; of the other fragments, two (8, 11) deal with Megarian geography, two (3, 10) with Megarian legend, one (2) with general Dorian custom, two with Lycurgus (his *acme*—4; his mother's name—5), one with Melampus (his mother's name—9), one with Rhodian legend (7), and one (6) with Solon or Peisistratus. Of the items of information which Aristotle, Plutarch, and Pausanias claim to derive from unspecified Megarian sources (487. 1–13), only one deals with an event later than the latest mentioned in the fragments explicitly credited to Dieuchidas (Plut. *Pericl.* 30. 3 = F 13; the murder of the Athenian envoy Anthemocritus in 432/1).³

The fragments thus give a *terminus post quem* in the sixth century B.C. for the composition of Dieuchidas' work, though if 487. 13 were his, this would have to be brought down to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War; the only incontestable *terminus ante quem* is given by the fact that Plutarch quotes him (*Lycurg.* 1. 8 = F 5). This bracket can be narrowed only by *Quellenkritik*, and it has long been agreed that the most likely text for the employment of this process is the passage already referred to from the *Stromateis* of Clement of Alexandria. In the course of a long discussion of the Greek fondness for imitation and plagiarism (Book 6, ch. 2) he mentions that the historians Eumelus and Acusilaus transferred Hesiod's works into prose, and published them as their own (26. 7). He goes on (8): *Μελησαγόρου γὰρ ἔκλεψεν Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Εὐδήμος ὁ Νάξιος οἱ ἱστορικοὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ Προκοννήσιος Βίων, ὃς καὶ τὰ Κάδμου τοῦ παλαιοῦ μετέγραψεν κεφαλαιούμενος, Ἀμφίλοχος τε καὶ Ἀριστοκλῆς καὶ Λεάνδριος καὶ Ἀναξιμένης καὶ Ἑλλάνικος καὶ Ἐκαταῖος καὶ Ἀνδρσίων καὶ Φιλόχορος Διευχίδας τε ὁ Μεγαρικὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐκ τῆς Ἑλληνικοῦ Δευκαλιωνείας μετέβαλε.*

This is Stählin's text; Jacoby inserts (ὃς) after *Μεγαρικός*, thus adding Dieuchidas to the list of those who exploited Melesagoras. It is not clear to me that he is right to do so; the use of *τε* alone as a connective (unique in this passage) suggests to me rather that *Διευχίδας* . . . *μετέβαλε* should be regarded as an afterthought (I should be inclined to put a colon after *Φιλόχορος*), and that Dieuchidas had nothing to do with Melesagoras. Quite apart from that, the whole list is obviously an unholy muddle, as we can see if we look up the several authors in

¹ For the fragments I follow Jacoby (No. 485 F 1–11); of the *testimonium* (T 1) he prints only what is immediately relevant—the full text can be found at No. 330 T 4. My debt to Jacoby's work needs no emphasizing; it will be obvious that without it I could not even have begun to write this paper.

² Hereas/Heragoras (No. 486) on the

other hand is twice called ὁ Μεγαρεύς (F 1, 4—both from Plutarch).

³ If I had to suggest a source for this fragment, I should be inclined to ascribe it to Hereas (486); three of his four known fragments (F 1, 3, 4) come from Plutarch, and he seems to have had an anti-Athenian bias of which there is no direct evidence in the fragments of Dieuchidas.

Jacoby. To begin with, the author who is given as the source of all these plagiarisms, Melesagoras/Amelesagoras (330), is listed among the *Pseudepigrapha*,¹ rousing the immediate suspicion that, if there is plagiarism or imitation afoot, Clement or his informant might just as well have put his accusation the other way round and said that Melesagoras plagiarized from Gorgias and the rest. Passing over the oddity of calling Gorgias *ιστορικός*,² we come to Eudemus of Naxos, who has no existence outside this passage unless (with Jacoby) we combine him with Eudemus of Paros (497), who exists only in the list of *ἀρχαῖοι συγγραφεῖς* preserved by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De Thuc.* 5).³ Bion (332), like Amelesagoras, is classified by Jacoby under the *Pseudepigrapha*; Amphilochus (VI) is dimly, but datelessly, to be discerned in Müller (*F.H.G.* iv. 300); Aristocles (33) is a mythographer of minuscule importance and unknown date; Leandrius (492) is hard to distinguish from Maeandrius (491); but between them they have some solidity and a *terminus ante quem* of the middle of the third century B.C. After Leandrius we come into more familiar company (Anaximenes—72; Hellanicus, Hecataeus,⁴ Androtion, Philochorus); and Dieuchidas may well be thought to belong to this more respectable section of the alleged exploiters of Melesagoras. But one is bound, I think, to have misgivings over the value of the list: is it as Clement wrote it? And if it is, did he take it over complete from some predecessor, or did he add to it bits of information picked up from his own reading? Or even, since he was obviously a well-read and able (though perhaps credulous) man, did he compile it himself?

It is well that we should have questions like these in mind when we address ourselves to the problem of determining more closely the date at which the *Megarica* ascribed to Dieuchidas were written, because it is a favourite assumption of the *Quellenforscher* that lists of this kind, once compiled, are as unalterable as the laws of the Medes and Persians, and that one can therefore argue safely that any author whose name is included in a list like this must have written before the original list was compiled. This was clearly the view of the young Wilamowitz who, in discussing the date of Dieuchidas (*Homerische Untersuchungen* [1884], 239 ff.) asked, with reference to this very passage of the *Stromateis*, 'bestreitet jemand, dass die quelle des Clemens Aristobul ist, Aristobul, der zeitgenosse Aristarchs?' He went on to argue that since Ruhnken had established that 'hier nur schriftsteller angeführt werden, die etwa bis 300 v. Chr. geblüht haben', Dieuchidas must have lived in the fourth century. He supported this by pointing out that a scholiast on Pindar's ninth *Nemean* (30 a Drachmann = 485 F 3) mentions Dieuchidas as an authority on a par

¹ Should not Eumelus (77, 451) rank as another? Even Pausanias found it a bit hard to swallow the idea that an eighth-century poet could have composed a prose *συγγραφή* (2. 1. 1).

² He just scrapes into *F. gr. Hist.* as No. 407 on the strength of Philostratus' reference to his Pythian and Olympic *λόγοι* (*Vit. Soph.* i. 9. 2).

³ This list consists of Euagon of Samos (identified by Jacoby with Eugaion—535), Deiochus of Proconnesus (out of whom Jacoby makes D. of Cyzicus [471] and Bion of Proconnesus [332]), Eudemus of Paros, Democles of Phygele (VI—a work ascribed

to him was known to Demetrius of Scepsis in the second century B.C. [Strab. 1. 3. 17]), Hecataeus of Miletus (1), Acusilaus of Argos (2), Charon of Lampsacus (262), and Amelesagoras of Chalcidion (out of whom Jacoby extracts an unnameable Chalcidionian and A. of Athens (?) [330]). If this list is intended to be chronological (as it rather seems to be), there is a very strong chance that everyone mentioned before Hecataeus of Miletus should be classified with the *Pseudepigrapha*.

⁴ Jacoby accepts this as a reference to the Milesian (1), but there is at least as good a chance that the Abderite (264) is meant.

with Herodotus (5. 67) and Menaechmus of Sicyon (131 F 1);¹ that Plutarch (*Lycurg.* 1. 8 = 485 F 5) likewise treated him as an authority for the story of Lycurgus, on a par with Timaeus, Xenophon, and Simonides; and that he is quoted by Clement (*Strom.* 1. 21. 119. 4 = F 4) for the date of Lycurgus. One of Wilamowitz's conclusions is that 'schon ein menschenalter vor Aristoteles las Dieuchidas einen attischen Homer'; that is to say, that Dieuchidas must have been born in the late fifth century.

Wilamowitz's arguments, as it seems to me, have probative value only for those who have already made up their minds on the main issue and are seeking for reasons to convince themselves and others of the truth of their beliefs. If Ruhnken really did argue that all the authors in Clement's list were active before about 300 B.C., he must have been arguing in a very small circle about some of them, since he cannot have had any evidence one way or the other about Amphilocheus, Aristocles, 'Bion', 'Melesagoras', and Dieuchidas. Aristobulus, if he is indeed the source of Clement's list, might have included authors of works published after 300 B.C. without the slightest difficulty or impropriety; and before the list reached Clement's library, not to mention the printed page of Stählin's edition, it may well have undergone alterations by editors and scribes whose desire to show off their knowledge or wish to abridge a dreary task outran their scruples. As for the other points Dieuchidas need not be earlier than Menaechmus (and may well be later; Pindar's scholiast quotes him for a piece of specifically Megarian information for which he would be a relevant authority whatever his date), and his statements about Lycurgus were obviously something *sui generis*, which might be quoted as a curiosity at any time without implying anything as to the date or reliability of the informant.

It seems therefore that the literary evidence about Dieuchidas' work amounts to this: there was in existence by Plutarch's time a substantial work entitled *Megarica* and ascribed to an author named Dieuchidas (his nationality is unknown, and his father's name can only be conjectured—see below, p. 221). This work dealt mainly with Megarian geography, cult, and legend; but it must also have contained an historical (or at least quasi-historical) element. The evidence does not allow us to be dogmatic about the nature of this historical element: the reference to Solon (or Peisistratus) suggests that it included an account of the alleged arbitration of the sixth-century Athenian claim to Salamis,² and this would be in place in an organized account of Megarian history, such as one would expect a *Megarica* to contain; but there is no other evidence that Dieuchidas in fact gave such an account, and the reference to Solon (or Peisistratus) may have come from an historical digression within a framework of local description. Digressions must have occurred in Dieuchidas' work: Melampus' mother and Rhodian foundation-legend are, on the face

¹ Wilamowitz also mentions Timaeus, but I cannot find him in Drachmann's text. Menaechmus wrote about Alexander the Great, and lived in the time of the Diadochi (Suid. s.v. *Μεναιχμος*—T 1). I do not see why Jacoby is so confident that he is identical with the Menaechmus whom Aristotle is said to have defeated by his book on the *Pythionikai* (Hesychius, *Ind. Arist.* 123; cf. I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* [1957], p. 86).

² I say 'alleged' deliberately; Herodotus' silence about the whole transaction, in spite of its double attraction for him in its combination of international arbitration and Athenian text-slinging, seems to me to cast grave doubt upon the historical truth of any version of the story in which any Athenian is made to quote lines from the *Catalogue of Ships*, whether those lines are said to have been forged *ad hoc* or taken from an already existing text.

of it, remote from Megarian interests; and although the references to Lycurgus are almost equally unexpected in a *Megarica*, they may belong to an account of his Homeric activities, which might have formed a digression within the account of what Solon (or Peisistratus) did to, with, or for Homer. In any case it is the mention of Solon (or Peisistratus) which gives the *terminus post quem* for the work's composition; the *terminus ante quem* is given by the fact that the work was quoted by Plutarch, but how long before Plutarch's time it had been composed and whether Plutarch had direct knowledge of it,¹ we cannot tell; my own suspicion (and it is no more than a suspicion) is that it may have been composed by someone in touch with the Pergamene school, perhaps as late as the first quarter of the second century B.C.

So far I have been dealing essentially with the consequences of what Willamowitz wrote in 1884; it was he who established the belief that Dieuchidas must have been a fourth-century author, and thereby prepared the ground for the crucial step, which was taken by E. Bourguet in publishing certain inscriptions from Delphi (*B.C.H.* xx [1896], 221-41). In lists of *ναποιοί* and other officials for the years 338-329 B.C.² he noticed the occurrence of two names which were familiar to him from *F.H.G.*: Dieuchidas, a Megarian (4. 388) and Medeius, a Larisaean (*Scr. Alex. Magn.*, p. 127). In a footnote (p. 233, note 1) he ventured to identify the Dieuchidas and Medeius of the inscriptions with the historians,³ and though Bruno Keil soon after justly observed that the identification 'schwebt . . . in der Luft' (*Hermes* xxxii [1897], 413, note 1),⁴ little notice was taken of his doubts and today, as Jacoby (*Noten* [1955], p. 231) truly says, the identification 'scheint allgemein akzeptiert'. I submit, however, that the time has come when this general acceptance ought to be investigated.

We may begin with Medeius. Strabo (11. 14. 12) refers to οἱ περὶ Κυρσίλον τὸν Φαρσάλιον καὶ Μήδιον τὸν Λαρισαῖον, ἄνδρες συνεστρατευκότες Ἀλεξάνδρῳ (129 T 1, cf. 130 Jacoby) as evidence for a story that Armenus of Armenion, a Thessalian town between Pherae and Larisa, was the eponym of Armenia. Neither of them appears again as an historian; but the name of Medius (this is the usual form in the manuscript tradition) is reasonably well known to ancient writers as a boon companion and flatterer of Alexander's (129 T 3-5), a trierarch in Alexander's fleet on the Indus (T 2), ξέναγός in a force sent by Perdikkas against Ptolemy's Cypriot allies in 321 (T 6), admiral for Antigonos in 314-312 (T 7 a, b), commander of Demetrius' left wing at Salamis in 306 (T 7 c), and an adviser of Antigonos after the battle (T 7 d). Whether or not all these are references to the same person, Alexander's Medius at least (and he is the one referred to by Strabo) cannot possibly be identical with the Delphic Medius, since their fathers have different names; Alexander's Medius was the

¹ The more I read Plutarch, the more my conviction hardens (a) that he possessed, or had ready access to, most (if not all) of the works which he mentions, and (b) that he had both the will and the ability to read the books to which he had access, and to compile his lives and essays direct from the texts of the authors whom he quotes, without the help of anthologies and other predigested sources of information.

² *S.I.G.*³ 1, Nos. 237-51; the tables inserted between pp. 340 and 341 summarize the information very conveniently.

³ He seems to have missed the fact that Dieuchidas' father, Praxion, bore the name of another historian who is alleged to have written *Megarica* (484. 1).

⁴ This is what Keil really wrote; Schwartz's suggestion that his 'Bedenken . . . sind schwerlich begründet' (*R.E.*, s.v. Dieuchidas) goes quite as far as is at all fair. Jacoby's 'Der widerspruch von Keil . . . ist nichtig' (*Noten*, p. 231) would be excessively severe, even if 'widerspruch' was an accurate description of what Keil wrote.

son of Oxythemis (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 7) whereas the Delphic Medeios was the son of Aristophylidas.

The case of Dieuchidas is not so easily dismissed. In the first place, the Delphic Dieuchidas was the son of one Praxion; and a certain Praxion, if we may believe the transmitted text of Suidas, s.v. *Σκίρον* [σ 623 Adler], wrote a *Megarica* in at least two books (484. 1 Jacoby). D. W. Prakken (*A.J.P.* lxxi [1941], 348, n. 2) argued that Suidas' *Πραξιων* should be emended to read <Διευχιδας . . . ὁ Πραξιων(ος)>; and though his views in general were drastically disposed of by Jacoby (*Noten*, p. 230), I am not entirely convinced that Prakken was wrong on this particular point. His proposal has at least the merit of eliminating one of the 'single appearance' authors who inevitably clutter up Jacoby's pages, and is therefore gratifying to those for whom Occam's razor is a favourite implement. Occam's razor is, however, a dangerous weapon, especially where problems of homonymy are concerned; and even if the historian is to be recognized as 'Dieuchidas, son of Praxion, of Megara', it does not follow inexorably from that that the historian and the *vaonoiós* must have been the same person.

The example of the three writers who have borne the names 'Winston Churchill' will suffice to show that different people may have the same name either because they belong to the same family in different generations (the first Sir Winston being an ancestor of the second) or through coincidence (the American novelist was not, so far as I know, related to his English namesakes); and it may be that Dieuchidas the author was either an ancestor or a descendant (whether direct or collateral) of the *vaonoiós*.¹ Again, though Dieuchidas is a very unusual name, the possibility of coincidence cannot be excluded absolutely; and lastly there is the possibility (I should be almost inclined to say 'the very strong probability') that the identity of name between the historian and the *vaonoiós* may be due to sheer bad faith. I suggest, as an alternative to the currently accepted hypothesis that the historian was the same person as the *vaonoiós*, that someone who lived considerably later than the *vaonoiós* (say in the early second century B.C.), having written a *Megarica* to which he wished to give a certain *cachet* of antiquity, fathered the book upon 'Dieuchidas, son of Praxion', the eminent Megarian whose name was carved up for all to read in the sacred precinct at Delphi.² This alternative suggestion can no more be proved or disproved than Bourguet's; but the fact that several explanations of the observed homonymy between the historian and the *vaonoiós* can be given without implying any contradiction of the evidence must, I think, suggest that there is very little justification for putting Dieuchidas forward as a fourth-century witness, even in matters where our sources give an intelligible report of his opinions. To claim Dieuchidas, on the basis of the passage from Diogenes Laertius quoted at the beginning of this paper, as a witness at all (let alone 'der älteste Zeuge') to the Peisistratean recension of Homer, does little credit to those who either make, or implicitly accept, the claim.

If the foregoing exercise in the *ars nesciendi et scientia* recommended by Gottfried Hermann seems unduly Pyrrhonic, I can only urge, in Professor A.

¹ 'Ancestor' has to be included as a theoretical possibility; on the literary evidence the historian *may* have lived as early as the sixth century—and even on Wilamowitz's argument it is not very likely

that he could have lived to hold office at Delphi in 329.

² Does the refusal of our sources to call him a Megarian mean that they, or their informants, saw through the deception?

Lesky's words, that 'es bedeutet auch einen Fortschritt, Nichtwissen an die Stelle von Scheinwissen zu setzen' (*Anz. f.d. Altertumswiss.* xi [1958], 5). We cannot properly be said to know that Dicaearchus the historian was identical (or even contemporary) with his namesake the *ραποιδός*, and it is at least misleading to write as if we did know.

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THUCYDIDES ON THE CAUSES OF THE WAR¹

It is no doubt often salutary, even a necessary condition of progress, that we should shelve the great problems of a preceding generation without precisely solving them; but a controversy may be shelved too soon, and I fear this may have been the case with the great 'Thucydidean question' as it stood in the days of Wilamowitz and Schwartz. The analysts said some wild things, and their disagreements about early and late passages, or about the range of an editor's activities, have been found disheartening. For these or other reasons, since Schadewaldt's brief and stimulating book of 1929, scholars seem mostly to have stopped dissecting the text and taken to examining the qualities which Thucydides displays all through it.²

Clearly there is much to be learnt from the study of the Thucydides who is, so to speak, common to all parts of the work, but too much insistence on the unity of his thought may be as dangerous as a wild desire to carve it up into dated stages. Perfect unity is improbable, seeing that he spent thirty years or more in writing—and still a quarter of the war was not set out in publishable form. Of what was published, some had certainly been revised at a late period of his life,³ and we cannot be sure how much more revision he intended, how far he was satisfied with any part of the text he had written. This being so, indifference to these questions of chronology and revision is possible only for those who believe very devoutly in the homogeneity of his work, but for those

¹ This article has grown out of a paper read to the Oxford Philological Society in 1953. My thanks are due to the many friends who have discussed the subject with me then or at other times, especially for correspondence and conversation with A. W. Gomme, H. T. Wade-Gery, M. I. Finley, and P. A. Brunt, but I must emphasize that I have by no means always taken their advice and that they are in no way responsible for what may strike the reader as vain speculation: it is of course in the nature of the problem that it cannot be approached without the airing of subjective impressions.

The following are referred to by author's name only: E. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, ii (1899), 269-436, *Thukydides*; E. Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (1919); W. Schadewaldt, *Die Geschichtsschreibung des Thukydides* (1929); A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. i (1945). References to Thucydides are to the first book unless otherwise stated.

² H. Patzer, *Das Problem der Geschichtsschreibung des Thukydides und die thukydideische Frage* (1937), merely wished to get the 'question' out of the way; by multiplying late passages (in my belief, recklessly) and by arguing that there are no traces of a

coherent 'early plan' in the work. J. H. Finley, in 'The Unity of Thucydides' History' (*Athenian Studies presented to W. S. Ferguson*, 1940, pp. 255-97) and in his book *Thucydides* (1942), concluded from the consistency of Thucydides' thought that the work must all have been written at the same period, therefore after 404. J. de Romilly, *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien* (1947), did not deny that early and late passages can be distinguished, but was sure Thucydides never substantially changed his mind: her despair over the state of the 'question' (p. 12) is perhaps unnecessarily deep. C. Meyer, 'Zetemata 10', *Die Urkunden im Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (1955), is a recent example of German work which ignores or combats the views of the earlier analysts.

³ We can be certain that there has been revision, because of discrepancies between such post-war comment as 2. 65 and the narrative to which it should refer: see the excellent demonstration of Gomme, *J.H.S.* lxxi (1951), 70-73. These would be unaccountable if comment and narrative had been written all in one sweep. Gomme's analysis will not of course tell us the interval that elapsed between the two.

who even suspect that he changed and developed it must be of the first importance to try to distinguish early from late passages, to try to determine how the returned exile of 404 differed from the young man who set out to write the history of the war in the moment when it began.

Nor is there any need to despair. The fact that earlier explorers quarrelled about the way, or took a demonstrably wrong track, does not mean that no track exists. Even with a theme so often examined as Thucydides' treatment of the causes of the war the possibilities are by no means exhausted. Here Schwartz in his radical way decided that Thucydides late in life reversed his position completely: having once thought that the determining factor was Athens' pressure upon Sparta's allies, especially on Corinth, and that Sparta herself was reluctant to fight, then in the late 'Retraction' he turned over to the view that the true cause was rather Sparta's fundamental hostility to Athens. Impressed by Lysander's conduct of the war and burning to repel attacks made on Perikles' policy, he adopted views 'diametrically opposed' to those he had held earlier and began to compose a new version of book 1; the editor combined this in a mechanical way with the old version which Thucydides had meant to cancel, thus producing the results which Schwartz (102-53) found so little satisfactory. It has never been difficult to pick holes in this analysis,¹ but it is perhaps surprising that it is so often merely rejected and that there has not been more search for alternative analyses. If Thucydides changed his mind the change need not be a mere reversal. He might well have wished to modify rather than to cancel, and the possibilities are manifold, not to be extinguished by rebutting Schwartz or any single scholar.

There are some real grounds for surprise at the state in which book 1 has come down to us, and the wording of 1. 23. 6 suggests to me that the famous sentence which expounds the *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις* is (as Schwartz thought) a later addition to a text on the whole composed early. The explanation is, no doubt, that Thucydides' thought about these matters developed and altered, but one can imagine changes less drastic and dramatic than that which Schwartz proposed, changes involving a less than total break between the early and the late Thucydides.

1. THE *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις*

1. 23. 6: τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν. The formula may be roughly translated: 'Athenian expansion alarmed the Spartans and compelled them to war'. For the meaning of *πρόφασις* see Gomme, ad loc., and Pearson in *T.A.P.A.* lxxxiii (1952), 205-23: in the main it is an explanation, true or false, that is given or could be given for an action; here, the true explanation which the Spartans gave, or would give if they analysed their motive honestly, for the decision which their assembly took in 432 (cf. 88, and Sthenelaidas' last sentence in 86. 5, μήτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἶτε μείζους γίγνεσθαι). The word *ἀναγκάσαι* is ambiguous in the same way that 'compulsion' is ambiguous when we use it in a political context: it may be absolute, or conditional; in this case the latter, i.e. Sparta must fight if she wished to retain the hegemony of her league (cf. 118. 2). Thucydides is not so much assigning responsibility as accounting for

¹ Pohlenz, immediately afterwards, in *G.G.N.* 1919, pp. 97 ff., and many scholars since.

action, that is, for the Spartan decision on which his attention is fixed for most of the book, 23-125 at least. But of course Athens' expansion is the active element, the motive power behind the whole development, without which the situation of 432 would not have arisen, and to this extent the long-term policy of Perikles and others is labelled as a cause of war.¹

There are three main reasons for thinking that 1. 23. 6 and the excursus 88-118 were not written at the same time as 23. 5 and the exposition of the αἰτίαι in 24-87.

(a) 23. 5 is an emphatic full close, and the statement that the author has set out the αἰτίαι so that no one need ever be in doubt about them leads naturally into the exposition as it begins in 24. It is not simply that the removal of 23. 6 would leave no visible gap in the text—this argument is rightly suspect: the point is that the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις makes a positive interruption, so that the thread needs to be picked up again with αἱ δ' ἐς τὸ φανερόν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι κτλ.² before we can go on to Epidamnus.

(b) The ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις is said to be ἀφανεστάτη λόγῳ, in contrast to the αἰτίαι stated in public. This leads one to expect that the ensuing discussion will be about these particular quarrels and not about the underlying cause, but in the speeches set down in book 1 the reverse is the rule. In the Corcyra debate (32-44) much is indeed said about the rights and wrongs of this particular case, but we find here also the well-known echo of the πρόφασις in 33. 3, where the Corcyreans describe the Spartans as φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πολεμῆσειοντας. In the first debate at Sparta the Corinthians allow one sentence (68. 4) to Corcyra and Potidaia, and devote almost all their speech to the danger caused by Athens' expansion. The Athenian envoys (72-78) and Archidamos (79-85) refer very briefly to the αἰτίαι and discuss them not at all. Sthenelaidas (86) refers to them when he says that Sparta must stand by her allies, but he echoes the πρόφασις at the close (86. 5, quoted above) when he urges that Athens must not be allowed to increase her power.

All this has of course been noted before;³ and since the πρόφασις thus pervades book 1, even those parts which Schwartz and others have assigned to the earlier version of it, it has been argued that 23. 6 itself therefore belongs to this earlier version. But the more these allusions to the πρόφασις are multiplied, the more inappropriate ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ becomes. When Thucydides wrote these words his mind was not on the debate at Sparta, or not on the form which it now takes in his text.⁴

(c) After the debate Thucydides comments (88) that the Spartans were impelled to their decision not so much by the speeches of their allies as by their

¹ If we trace the development back to 478, as Thucydides invites us to do, then Kimon contributed as much as anyone. Thucydides' liking for abstractions like τοὺς Ἀθηναίους covers this up, and much besides.

For some further nuances in the meaning of πρόφασις see R. Sealey, *C.Q.*, n.s. vii (1957), 1 ff. But, as will be seen, I have not followed him in his inferences from the tense of ἀναγκάσαι, and I believe that 23. 6 and 88 expound substantially the same doctrine.

² Recapitulation, surely, not a fresh point, as it is required to be for Hammond's

scheme, in which Thucydides states his theses in one order and proves them in the inverse order (*C.Q.*, n.s. ii [1952], 134-5). Arguments from the order of presentation are not in any case decisive for my present problem, since, if Thucydides made additions, he could make those additions conform to the general system of the book.

³ It is, for instance, set out very clearly by de Romilly (see p. 223, n. 2), pp. 22-37.

⁴ The question, what he was thinking of when he wrote them, is considered below, § 5.

fear of the growing power of Athens, οὐ τοσοῦτον¹ τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐπὶ μείζον δυνήθωσιν. The only allied speech we have been given is the Corinthian (68–71) and this speech is concerned throughout with the danger that Athens' power will grow still further and with the need for Sparta to take action to restrain it—that is, with the motive which Thucydides says was more important to Sparta than the allies' speeches. He meant, no doubt, that Sparta was not merely driven by her allies' complaints and threats but took her decision primarily for her own reasons. But the words in which he has expressed this do not take adequate account of the content of the Corinthian speech.² When he wrote τῶν ξυμμάχων τοῖς λόγοις his mind was on the αἰτίαι in general, not on the particular form he had given to the preceding debate.

The appearance of contradiction in these two passages, 23. 6 and 88, or at least the opposition they suggest between αἰτίαι and πρόφασις, is the more remarkable in that there seems to be no incompatibility at all in fact. The πρόφασις states in general terms an historical fact true of the Pentekontaetia as a whole, and the feeling which this fact aroused at Sparta: the αἰτίαι, at least from the Peloponnesian point of view, are simply particular instances of the expansive pressure which Athens exercised, arousing specific fears in Corinth and Megara. The essential identity of αἰτίαι and πρόφασις comes out clearly at 118. 2 where Thucydides closes and sums up the Pentekontaetia excursus—the growth of Athens' power, the very little that Sparta did to check it, πρὶν δὴ ἡ δύναμις τῶν Ἀθηναίων σαφῶς ἤρετο καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας αὐτῶν ἤπτοντο. The doctrine is clearly the doctrine of 23. 6 and 88, Thucydides is once more expounding the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις, but the concluding words can refer to nothing except the particular pressures which Athens was bringing to bear on Corinth and Megara in 432,³ in fact to the αἰτίαι.

Thus πρόφασις and αἰτίαι fit tidily together, and the disturbing element is in the formulation, in the language Thucydides uses in 23. 6 and 88. When he wrote these two passages his mind was not moving along the same lines as when he wrote 24–87. It seems to me impossible that he should have written 23. 6

¹ As Westlake points out in *C.Q.*, n.s. viii (1958), 103–4, this formula does not imply that he wished to deny the importance of the allies' speeches; only that he insists on the deeper importance of his πρόφασις.

² This point was taken up in passing by E. Kapp in his review of Schadewaldt, *Gnomon*, vi (1930), 100: 'schon das schliesst m.E. aus, dass diese Korintherrede gleichzeitig mit 1,88 entstanden wäre'. I do not remember having seen it elsewhere.

³ In the text I have, after some hesitation, taken τῆς ξυμμαχίας αὐτῶν ἤπτοντο, as Gomme does, as a reference to the late 430's; the τότε δέ with which the next sentence begins is unequivocally 432. But as Gomme points out, 'it might be said that the power of Athens was clear enough, and her aggression against Sparta's allies had begun, a good deal earlier', and τὸ δέ τι καὶ πολέμοις οἰκείοις ἐξειργόμενοι should refer to the Messenian Revolt and the Arcadian Wars

(for the date of the latter cf. *Phoenix*, vi [1952], 1–5), so that the latter part of the long sentence reads as if it were all leading up to the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War. Possibly the sentence is incomplete (if the editor bears any responsibility, as Wade-Gery tentatively suggests in *O.C.D.*, s.v. Thucydides, p. 903, it is in the negative sense that he refrained from filling a gap). But it can be understood as it stands, in the light of Thucydides' known belief that Athenian power was at its height just before the war: ἐκάλειον and ἡσύχαζον between them cover the whole of the Pentekontaetia, ὄντες . . . ἐξειργόμενοι can be taken as a parenthesis, after which πρὶν . . . ἤπτοντο brings us back to the present, the crucial moment when it was realized that Athens' use of her power was intolerable. If there is a gap, one of the direct supports of my argument is gone, but I think the argument may still stand.

and 88-118 at the same time as 23. 5 and 24-87, but it remains to be seen if the assumption that they were written at different times will yield an explanation more palatable than Schwartz's hypothesis.

2. A SINGLE CAUSE FOR A SINGLE WAR

The clue lies, in my belief, in Thucydides' conception of the whole twenty-seven years as a single war; and in the difference between Corinth's position in 432 and her position in 421-414. Looking only at the Archidamian War, Corinth's threat to secede might well seem to have played a large part in determining Sparta's decision; whereas during the Peace of Nikias Corinth did not merely threaten, she actually seceded, but without effect, and the eventual resumption of the war was not due to Corinthian agitation or blackmail. But Thucydides, believing the war was a unity, could not assign different reasons to the different parts of it. If in his first version of book 1 he had given a very prominent role to Corinth there was some need for retraction—not for any alteration in the record of fact, but for some change of emphasis, for a new formulation that would take account of the different circumstances of 414. For such a purpose the *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις* is exactly what was required. It is, I shall argue, equally true for 432 or 414, and it entails no contradiction of the facts already recorded about the outbreak of the Archidamian War. Athens' expansion and Sparta's fear of it were the cause of war throughout, whether the occasion was Corinthian resentment over the Corcyra affair or the Sicilian expedition as expounded by Alcibiades.

It is certain that if there were two versions of book 1 the Corinthians were active for war in the earlier version, perhaps even maliciously active. Corcyra and Potidaea were in any case Corinthian quarrels, a fact which Thucydides keeps in our view throughout. Corinth's hatred of Corcyra is the mainspring of the *Κερκυραϊκά* (25. 3-4);¹ Corinth refuses peaceful composition of the quarrel (28-29. 1);² there are elements in the Corinthian speech at Athens which Thucydides can hardly have meant us to find plausible—the parallel drawn between Samos' relation to Athens and Corcyra's to Corinth (40. 5-6), and a very forced interpretation of the clause in the Thirty Years Peace which permitted *ἄγραφοι πόλεις* to join either alliance (40. 2, contrasted with 35); and the affair closes with *αἰτία δὲ αὕτη πρώτη ἐγένετο τοῦ πολέμου τοῖς Κορινθίοις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους* (55. 2). The case of Potidaea is indeed introduced (56. 1) as a further quarrel *τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις*, but this means no real difference: the narrative begins (56. 2) *τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων*, and the Corinthians remain the only active agents; the closing chapter (66) stresses this fact (the war had not yet broken out, for this was private Corinthian

¹ Not that Corcyra's treatment of Epidamnus is presented as admirable (e.g. 24. 6-7) or that Thucydides overlooks the sanction given by Delphi to Epidamnus' appeal to Corinth; but though this gave Corinth some justification (*κατὰ τε τὸ δίκαιον ὑπεδέξαντο τὴν τιμωρίαν*) Thucydides' emphasis is all on Corinth's underlying hatred, which he analyses at some length.

² Her reasons for rejecting the first proposals of Corcyra are presented as plausible (28. 4), but the second Corcyrean proposal, the offer of an armistice pending arbitration, seems more practicable than the Corinthian alternative, and no case at all is put up for the final Corinthian refusal, *οὐδὲν τούτων ὑπήκουον* (29. 1). Cf. also 39. 1-2.

action),¹ which is the more significant in view of Sparta's promise meanwhile to help Poteidaia (58. 1), a promise of which Thucydides surprisingly takes no further notice except for the Corinthian reminder in 71. 4 which shows that it was not forgotten.²

Again, it is heavily emphasized that the Corinthians summoned (67. 1) and stage-managed (67. 5) the first congress at Sparta, and their speech is the only allied speech we read, their threat to secede from the league occupying an emphatic place at the end of this speech (71. 4-7). It is perhaps worth noting that the other arguments of this speech, as Thucydides presents them, might not sound specially convincing to an Athenian: the particular plea that the intervention at Corcyra proved Athens' settled intention to make war (68. 4 οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυραν τε ὑπολαβόντες βιά ἡμῶν εἶχον) is readily answered from Thucydides' narrative in which Corinth not Athens had tried to use force on Corcyra; the general charge against Athens' national character (70. 9 πεφύκεναι ἐπὶ τῷ μῆτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μῆτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους εἶναι) has a standard answer, found in Thucydides' Funeral Speech as well as in the much-quoted lines (576-7) of Euripides' *Suppliants*. Finally, Corinth works on the other cities before the second congress (119) and makes the only speech in Thucydides' account of it. At 125 the Spartans step into the lead and the Corinthians into the background.

The narrative 24-67, including the Corcyra debate, has often been taken to belong to the earlier stage of Thucydides' work, and it can at least be said that it carries no evident mark of lateness.³ If there is to be a distinction between the *αἰτίαι* of 23. 5 and the *πρόφασις* of 23. 6, this narrative clearly belongs with the former. The speeches of the first congress at Sparta (68-86), on the other hand, have widely been regarded as late. But the particular reasons relating to in-

¹ The controversy over the meaning of *ἰδίᾳ* (see Gomme, ad loc., and Steup: both perhaps analyse the position too formally, and I do not much like the idea of 'private oaths' at 5. 30. 2) does not affect the question: whether 'separately' or 'unofficially', the Corinthians are the active party and other Peloponnesians are involved only to the extent that some of their citizens had joined Aristeus' expedition. Hammond's somewhat different picture is obtained by citing from 56 and 66 only those clauses which speak of *Πελοποννησίοι* rather than *Κορίνθιοι* (*C.Q.*, n.s. ii [1952], 135) and by neglecting *μετὰ Κορινθίων* in 58. 1 (*C.Q.* xxxiv [1940], 151).

² There has been some misunderstanding of 58. 1 τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπέσχετο αὐτοῖς, for which see Busolt-Swoboda, *Gr. Staatsk.* ii. 687 with n. 4, and the passages there cited. τὰ τέλη means the 'competent authority', so that the precise reference varies with the context: where only the assembly is competent it can mean the assembly, as it does in Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 23, and one would suppose that the assembly was the competent authority here. In fact the

Corinthians say ὥσπερ ὑπεδέξασθε to the Spartan assembly later (71. 4), so the original promise was probably a quite regular decision of that body, and 'unverbindlich' (Schwartz 101) only in the realistic sense that there was no conceivable way of enforcing it.

The promise to Poteidaia must not be left out of account in assessing Thucydides' beliefs about the causes of the war, but the measure of its practical importance is the fact that the Corinthians felt it necessary to continue their agitation. The Spartans were not committed beyond recall until an army had been sent out and had crossed the Attic border: even the decision in 87, which Thucydides does regard as critical, did not preclude further negotiation.

³ Patzer (see p. 223, n. 2), who wants everything to be late, suggests (57) that the Corcyreans' reference in 36. 2 to their commanding position on the route to and from the West was composed after the Sicilian expedition. The whole history of Athens' intermittent interest in the West shows that this is unnecessary, to say nothing of 2. 7. 2.

dividual passages do not amount to much,¹ and in general the speeches hang well together as a discussion of the issues raised by the narrative. I can see no obstacle to supposing that they were in the main composed at the same time as 24-67, whereas the inconsistency between 88 and the preceding debate strongly suggests that there is a chronological break here, i.e. that 88 and the following chapters were written later than 87 and the preceding. If so, there is some justification for treating 24-87 as in the main a single unit; and then it can fairly be argued that this account stresses Corinth's responsibility and is therefore likely to have been written earlier than 421-414, a period which (at least in Thucydides' view) exposed Corinth's impotence to influence Spartan policy.

About this there is no doubt. Corinth rejected the Peace of Nikias (5. 17. 2, etc.), took the lead in promoting Argos' new league (5. 27. 2), and was regarded (e.g. by the uninstructed Boiotians, 5. 38. 3) as having revolted from Spartan hegemony—though in fact, as is indicated by their plot with the ephors Kleoboulos and Xenares (5. 36. 1, 38. 3), the intention was rather to change the direction of Spartan policy and then rejoin Sparta. Sparta's policy did change, in the desired direction, and when the situation crystallized Corinth fought without hesitation on Sparta's side (cf. 5. 48. 2-3, 50. 5, 55. 1, 57. 2); but it is clear from Thucydides' narrative that he did not think that Corinth's secession played an important part in these developments, except to the limited extent that it is one symptom of the trouble inside the Peloponnese with which Sparta had to cope. It is the same with the help sent to Syracuse and the resumption of the war in Greece: the Corinthians urge both courses (6. 88. 8-10), but the Spartans still hesitate, and Thucydides seems to think that Alkibiades' persuasion had more weight (6. 88. 10, 93. 1, 7. 18. 1). The Corinthians, without question, play a much less prominent part in books 5-7 than in book 1, though Syracuse is quite as much their affair as Corcyra or Poteidaia.

There seems to me to be basis enough here for the hypothesis outlined above about Thucydides' reasons for the insertion of 23. 6 and 88-118. The description and discussion of the *αἰτίαι*, 23. 5 with 24-87, will represent Thucydides' earlier account of the origins of the war, an account in which Corinth played a prominent and perhaps not wholly innocent part: it may be wrong, as several writers have suggested, to speak of Corinth driving an *unwilling* Sparta into war,² but from the mere space given in these chapters to Corinthian speech and action, and the stress laid on them, we are bound to conclude that the

¹ The record of Pausanias is enough basis for 77. 6, which has been taken as a reference to Lysander and his harmosts (e.g. Schwartz 115); and Archidamos, who in fact bequeathed the war to his son Agis at an early stage, might surely have enunciated the possibility in fact in 432 (81. 6): see Gomme's notes. Only the Athenian speech gives rise to serious doubts, not because of particular anachronisms (and not, indeed, because the embassy could not have taken place) but because parts of it, especially 77, seem generally out of key with their context (cf. Hammond, *C.Q.* xxxiv [1940], 150). Something may have been added here, though not necessarily after 404. The argument that the speeches are late because some

of them use the idea of the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις is of course no more acceptable to me than to de Romilly (cf. p. 225, n. 3).

² Cf. Hammond, *C.Q.* xxxiv (1940), 151. 'Willingness' is not the only consideration: Spartan hesitancy is still an important factor, and it was quite uncertain whether or how soon the willingness of a majority might be translated into official action. 28. 1, where Spartan and Sikyonian envoys join Corcyra in 435 in trying to persuade Corinth to a settlement, is no evidence of a general desire for peace on Sparta's part. It was in no circumstances to her interest that Corcyra and Corinth should sink one another's ships: this is Athens' interest, ξυγκρούειν . . . ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοισι (44. 2).

author thought them a very important factor in the Spartan and Peloponnesian decision to make war. At some time after 413¹ Thucydides made up his mind that the Archidamian and Dekeleian Wars formed a single historical unit, the Peace of Nikias an unreal interlude. But if it was a single unit, then there must be a unitary cause, operative throughout, and in the light of Corinth's record in 421-414 he might well come to think that he had assigned too large a part to Corinth in his account of the outbreak of the Archidamian War. The facts of 435-432 remained, of course, what they had been, and in the event I suspect he made very little alteration in his original record, but he might well want to think afresh and seek to discover a common factor in the situations of 432 and 414.

The ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις is in my belief the product of this fresh thinking, a statement of the common factor. As has been argued already and is most clearly seen at 118. 2, the πρόφασις and the αἰτίαι are for 432 merely two aspects of the same thing, since Athens' expansion was at the expense of Sparta's allies, especially of Corinth, and this is what alarmed the Spartans. The causes of the resumption of the war in 413 are nowhere so clearly stated. Thucydides lays far more stress on the means which Alkibiades suggested for harming Athens, the dispatch of Gylippos and the fortification of Dekeleia (6. 93. 2, 7. 18. 1); and on the fact that the Spartans this time believed they had formal justification (7. 18. 2-3): he is concerned to explain how their resolution was worked up to the point of fighting,² not why they wanted to fight. But the reason is not in doubt. Alkibiades, after the personal apology with which he begins his speech (6. 89), goes straight on (6. 90. 1 *περὶ δὲ ὧν ὑμῖν τε βουλευτέον . . . μάθετε ἤδη*) to expound Athens' plan for turning the resources of the West against the Peloponnese. It hardly needs a formal statement in the historian's own person that Sparta decided to help Syracuse and to attack Athens for fear of what might happen next if Syracuse fell. The ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις is fully operative in 414, and Alkibiades' speech (6. 90-91) is the vehicle by which Thucydides expounds it.

The 'true cause' is thus one which operates equally well for both parts of the war, both in 432 when Corinth seemed so influential and in 414 after Sparta had taken no special notice of her secession. The adoption of this formula did not absolutely compel Thucydides to alter what he had written, for there is no contradiction: it was still true that Athenian pressure on Corinth and Corinth's reaction to that pressure had great influence at Sparta in 432: the change is rather that he now understands more clearly why Sparta was afraid, perhaps even sees more justification for Corinth's anxiety. But as a matter of technique it may seem surprising that he chose to keep his existing text and add 23. 6 and the long digression 88-118, rather than to rewrite book 1 entirely. However, the additions make his point clearly enough, and reasons are not too difficult to imagine. For instance, he was surely a slow worker, and may well have been reluctant to sacrifice a long stretch of completed work, especially when there was so much left to write.

¹ The conclusion no doubt formed gradually in his mind, and was prepared by the gradual breakdown of Nikias' treaties—we may for instance assume that Thucydides began his inquiries into the battle of Mantinea at once, and expected to make use of

them—but there could be no certainty till after the formal resumption of war.

² Their general reaction to Alkibiades' speech is ἐπερρώσθησαν, 6. 93. 1. Cf. 7. 18. 2, ἐγγεγνήτο τις ρύμμη.

This then is an hypothesis about the genesis of Thucydides' first book. It is no objection to it that the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις was not a wholly new conception but one which had played a large part in his first draft—this is rather an advantage, in that his change of mind does not involve a complete break with all that he had ever thought before. The difference between the two drafts is still large and important enough. It is a fundamental change of emphasis when Thucydides in 23. 6 adopts as his own (ἡγοῦμαι) a proposition which in the earlier draft was merely a Corinthian assertion accepted by the Spartan majority. To make this clear we need to look more closely into the question of Thucydides' earlier views. My next hypothesis is that in his younger days he accepted with comparatively little criticism the account which Perikles himself gave, in public, of his policy and the reasons for it.

3. THUCYDIDES AND PERIKLES

Much attention has been given to the latest phase of Thucydides' development, to the climate of opinion he would have found when he returned to Athens in 404, to his reaction against post-war criticisms of Perikles;¹ rather less to the question what we might expect when Thucydides was young and Perikles was still alive, what the historian then thought about the statesman and his policies. This is natural enough, for it is the mature Thucydides who interests us, whose views we want to define. But for close definition we need to devote attention to the young Thucydides as well; and, I would suggest, without too much reverence, for there is no reason to assume that the critical faculty which he displays in the certainly later passages was already fully developed when he began his work at the beginning of the war—indeed, evidence of the kind discussed in the last section rather suggests that his understanding did develop and deepen.

The historian tells us himself (4. 104. 4, 105. 1) that his father's name was Oloros and that he possessed mining rights and great influence in Thrace. Hellenistic scholars could add the evidence of his tombstone, that he was buried ἐν τοῖς Κιμωνείοις and that his deme was Halimous.² In spite of Busolt's doubts,³ most scholars would add this sum up the way Kirchner did—the name Oloros and the Thracian connexion come from Kimon's family, but (since Kimon's deme was Lakiadaï) not by male descent; most simply and probably, Oloros' father had married a sister of Kimon. This gives us a large piece of the family background. It is true that the victor of the Eurymedon did more than any other single man to establish Athens' empire and bears very little resemblance to Perikles' later critics, but still he quarrelled violently with Ephialtes over both foreign and domestic policy and no one brought up in his tradition would easily become an adherent of Perikles.⁴

We cannot, of course, be sure that Oloros, or even his father, shared the opinions of Kimon and of Thucydides son of Melesias, Kimon's κηδεστής and political successor; and we are in some doubt about the historian's maternal ancestry and the source of his name. Marcellinus says (2) that the historian's mother was Hegesipyle, a rare name which would pretty well prove that she

¹ Meyer, p. 393; Schwartz, pp. 141 ff., 235 ff.; and others since.

² Plutarch, *Kim.* 4. 2-4; Marcellinus 17, quoting Polemon ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀκροπόλεως.

³ *Gr. Gesch.* iii. 618-20. But cf. Stras-

burger's introduction to Horneffer's translation of Thucydides, p. xlv.

⁴ For a different view of the relations between Perikles and Kimon see R. Sealey, *Hermes*, lxxxiv (1956), 234-7.

too belonged to the Kimon family, and if this were right there would be much to be said for Cavaignac's stemma,¹ which makes Hegesipyle the daughter of Thucydides son of Melesias and of another sister of Kimon: in this case the historian got his name from his maternal grandfather and we could be almost sure that Oloros adhered to the family party. But Marcellinus' item has been doubted, and it is certainly possible that the name Thucydides, which is not so rare,² came into the Halimous family from elsewhere.

But the fact that Cavaignac's stemma cannot be proved must not be allowed to distort the probabilities. It would be quite a large coincidence if two of Kimon's sisters had married into families addicted independently to the name Thucydides, and it is much more than a bare possibility that the historian was deliberately named after the politician.³ We ought not then to shrink from the speculation that Thucydides' immediate background was solidly Kimonian and his adherence to Perikles an act of revolt;⁴ a momentous act which might leave traces in his work. There are important topics relevant to such an inquiry which I cannot pursue very far here: for instance, whether he carried over into his Periklean phase, as a convert might, some attitudes and prejudices more appropriate to the Kimonian background from which he started. Considerations like these might help to account for the ambiguity of his attitude to democracy or his over-insistence on Athens' unpopularity in the empire.⁵ But the question here is of his attitude to Perikles at the time when, so he says, Perikles urged the Athenians on to war.

For greater clarity we must also consider his age at the time of his conversion. I take it that Thucydides was born about 460.⁶ He would know nothing directly about Kimon's struggle with Ephialtes and the bitterness it engendered, but would be dependent here on what his elders told him. (How patient was the young Thucydides with his elders?) The argument about

¹ *Rev. Phil.* 1929, p. 283; the stemma is also printed by Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* lii (1932), 210 = *Essays in Greek History*, p. 246; see his comments.

² It is by no means common either, but in the fifth century we have one from Erechtheis (Tod 26. 30 = *P.A.* 7266), one *Ἀχεροδούσιος* (*P.A.* 7271), and one *Γαργήτριος* (*P.A.* 7272, whom Kirchner identifies with two others whose demes are not stated): that is, with the son of Melesias (*Ἀλωπεκῆθεν*) and the historian (*Ἀλμουσίος*), from five different demes. The chances are against all these families being connected by marriage.

³ If Oloros' father was named Thucydides (which would mean, probably, that two sisters of Kimon married men of this name), and if the historian was an eldest son, then his name would be almost dictated by convention and would not be significant of anyone's politics. In any other case the element of choice would be greater, and Oloros could not be unaware that he was giving his son a name with very particular associations.

⁴ J. H. Finley started an interesting speculation along these lines (*Thucydides*, pp. 20 ff.), but drew back (pp. 30-31) on the

ground that the Kimonian connexion is not demonstrable and (more regrettably) that it is not important.

⁵ Cf. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *Historia*, iii (1954), 1 ff.

⁶ Disregarding the Apollodoran estimate (244 F 7) which merely chooses the outbreak of the war for his ἀκμή, the only ancient statement is from Marcellinus (34), that he ended his life ὑπὲρ τὰ πενήκοντα ἔτη. This needs to be considered, if only because it is not based on an obvious calculation: if it has any basis in fact, we must take it, at least, that he was under 60 when he died, whenever that was. Among modern arguments, the most important is from his strategia in 424, best in the form which Steup gave it (introduction, pp. iii-iv), viz. that he could not speak as he does of Alkibiades in 420 when he was on the point of election (5. 43. 2), or as he allows Nikias to speak in 415 (6. 12. 2), if he himself had been elected at Alkibiades' age or younger. This would mean that he was well over 30 in 424, say about 35; which might be reconcilable with Marcellinus so long as we do not extend his life long beyond 404.

peace with Persia probably passed over his head at the time, and the first political event which can have made much direct impression on him is the struggle between his namesake and Perikles in the middle 440's; the first big military expedition on which he could have served was against Samos.

Thus the Perikles who gained his loyalty was the impressive statesman who had overcome all opposition and could speak his mind with authority, not the rising demagogue who had collaborated in the overthrow of the Areopagus and introduced pay for juries—which may have made it easier for Thucydides to draw distinctions between Perikles and Kleon, and occasionally to sneer a little at the democracy which Perikles had helped to build. In any case Thucydides was not much interested in constitutional questions. But the empire and foreign policy, the power and glory of Athens, engaged his emotions very much, and here we can easily imagine him reacting against the son of Melesias, who had scruples about the tribute and opposed the Parthenon. The elder Thucydides does not seem to have made much of his brief political opportunity in the 440's,¹ and the glamour might well seem to be on Perikles' side. Nor must we forget the intellectual glamour of Perikles' circle—not that the Athenian aristocrats were anti-intellectual, but youthful impatience might perhaps distinguish between the friend of Protagoras and Anaxagoras and the friend of the wrestling-masters.

Whatever the reason for the choice, there is no doubt that the historian made it and adhered to it. If it was youthful conversion from a quite opposite way of thinking, then probably the choice was made not in the analytic and critical spirit which he exhibits later when he generalizes about other men's political behaviour; we might expect something more wholesale and enthusiastic, the convert's style. It is at least a possibility that Thucydides in youth swallowed Perikles and his politics whole, and then the long years of exile and reflection left him in the end not indeed less loyal but more circumspect, with a deeper understanding of the nature and implications of these policies; still passionately convinced that they were right, but not so much overpowered by the immediate impact of the Olympian statesman and orator.

4. THE BASIS OF THE EARLIER DRAFT

It is this kind of possibility that might be tested between the two drafts which have been distinguished, on quite other grounds, as earlier and later versions of book 1. For this purpose we need now to examine the Athenian decision as Thucydides presents it, in two main stages, the Corcyra debate in 433 and the debate which is the occasion of Perikles' speech at the end of the book.

Corcyra's appeal represents, in this narrative, the first formal impact of this first dispute upon Athens. The Athenian decision is, on the face of it,

¹ For the elder Thucydides see Wade-Gery's article (p. 232, n. 1 above). There is some controversy over the extent to which he gained any real ascendancy in any part of this period: Wade-Gery thinks in terms of a temporary eclipse of Perikles, Gomme (pp. 386-7) and Ehrenberg (*A.J.P.* lxi [1948], 160-3) doubt if matters went as far as this: the case cannot be argued here, involving as it does the whole question of the founda-

tion of Thouria (on which see *A.T.L.* iii. 305 with nn. 19-20 for a modification of Wade-Gery's view). In any case the sources make it plain that Thucydides' main activities fall between 449 and 443, that he campaigned vigorously against Perikles in these years, but (I think) that he had no constructive policy of his own. This is enough for my present purpose.

important, and after it the development is continuous: thwarted at Corcyra, the Corinthians took up the cause of Poteidaia and pressed on until they had obtained Sparta's support. Yet in a sense Thucydides does not treat it as crucial, for when he is telling us why the Athenians decided to help Corcyra he says that they already thought war inevitable: 44. 2 *ἔδοκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίου πόλεμος καὶ ὡς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς*; and he gives us very little explanation of this belief. We have so far only the partisan assertion of the Corcyreans in 33. 3—the Spartans are eager for war because they fear Athens, the Corinthians are powerful at Sparta and are Athens' enemies—and the fact that at 42. 2 the Corinthians do not very strenuously deny the imminence of war. Did Thucydides believe the Corcyrean assertion, and imagine that his readers would accept it as adequate motivation?

There is nothing else in the text that we can invoke—certainly not the *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις*. Even supposing (as I do not) that this was already formulated when 44. 2 was written, the *πρόφασις* is presented in 23. 6 as Thucydides' personal view (*ἡγοῦμαι*) and as *ἀφανεστάτη λόγῳ*, whereas in 44. 2 we have the report of a public assembly in which arguments must be openly stated, indeed this argument had already been stated by the Corcyreans. Nor does the *πρόφασις* contain the kind of motive that we need. The Athenian majority would hardly acknowledge that Athens' general policy compelled Sparta to fight, even in the weakest sense of 'compelled': we should rather expect them to take the line that Sparta and Corinth were thwarting their legitimate interests, that is, they would credit Sparta with a more positive will to war than the formula of 23. 6 conveys. Public statement of the *πρόφασις* belongs in Peloponnesian assemblies. Nor does the Pentekontaetia excursus help us here. Ending as it does with the Thirty Years Peace in which Athens and Sparta composed their differences, and the Samian revolt in which the Peloponnesian League did not intervene, it may have been meant to convince us that there was in general no probability of the two powers continuing at peace, but it will not do as an explanation why war was considered unavoidable at Athens in 433. In fact we need the reference back at the end of the excursus to Corcyra, Poteidaia καὶ ὅσα πρόφασις τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου κατέστη (118. 1) in order to get us back into the war atmosphere.

What, then, had Thucydides in mind when he wrote 44. 2? The comments of eminent critics show that I am not alone in feeling that there is a gap here. Schwartz (127–8) believed that the Megara decree preceded the debate on Corcyra and that Thucydides would have filled in the gap with τὰ Μεγαρικά if he had completed his original design. But Schwartz was probably wrong about this original design, and there are objections to putting the decree so early:¹ further, the form of Thucydides' back reference at 118. 1 (the phrase quoted just above) suggests that he was satisfied with the order in which the αἰτίαι stand. Nor is there much profit in general in searching for a significant event

¹ The only directly attested date is that of Megara's complaint at Sparta, in the second half of 432 (Philochoros 328 F 121, but we knew this already from Thucydides). Gomme inclines to follow Steup in taking 42. 2 as a reference to the decree, which would mean it was passed before the Corcyra debate; but he notes the difficulty created by the word *πρότερον*, and it seems to me that the phrase

is a little less uneasy if the reference is back to c. 460, in which case the decree had probably not been passed when these words were, supposedly, spoken. Brunt, *A.J.P.* lxxii (1951), 269 ff., would date it well before 433, before the beginning even of the Epidamnus episode: this, if true, would remove it still more definitely from the context here under discussion.

between the revolt of Samos and the beginning of the Epidamnus incident, powerful enough to account for a conviction that war was inevitable but still somehow passed over by the same Thucydides who records this conviction. Meyer (320-6), combating a wild hypothesis of this kind by Nissen, sought a solution in the Corcyra incident itself which, he argues, was bound in any event to disturb the precarious equilibrium achieved in 446. It may indeed be so, but Meyer's explanation does not give us what we need. He shows how Thucydides could have understood the inevitability, and Perikles before him, 'in contrast to the mass of the Athenians' who did not (325). But Thucydides' statement, true¹ or false, is about this mass of Athenians and we need some reason accessible to them.

There is none in the text except for the Corcyrean assertion quoted above, and review of the problem turns us back to the same question: did Thucydides think this assertion true and sufficient? He suggests indeed in 44. 2 that the moment of decision was already past before Athens was directly involved in the Corcyra dispute: does this mean that he himself thought that others had resolved on war elsewhere and earlier? The sentence with which Perikles begins his detailed argument in the speech at the end of the book points in this direction: 140. 2 *Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πρότερόν τε δῆλοι ἦσαν ἐπιβουλευόντες ἡμῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἤκιστα*, it has been clear on earlier occasions that the Spartans were plotting against us, and the present instance is as clear as any, for they refuse arbitration. If this represents an argument which Perikles actually used, Thucydides may have believed it sound, and it fits in well with what the Corcyreans say at the other end of the book.

A speaker in Perikles' position² would be bound to go into the prehistory of the dispute, and the theme of Spartan wickedness would lend itself to oratory, beginning no doubt, as Jacoby suggests,³ with mythological instances. More recent history would feed it too, from the time when the two cities first came into conflict: Kleomenes' attempts to coerce Athens were not forgotten (*Ar. Lys.* 274 ff.); the story of the refortification of Athens after the Persian War must have been a favourite before Thucydides related it in 89-93; and there is the promise to help Thasos in the 460's (101. 2), the Tanagra campaign linked with conspiracy inside Athens (107. 4), the invasion of 446 timed to coincide with the revolt of Megara and Euboia (114). All these might be called *ἐπιβουλαί*. More recent and relevant, but less certain, is the case which arose in 440. Thucydides' Corinthians tell us (40. 5) that the Peloponnesian League debated intervention on behalf of Samos, and A. H. M. Jones has argued that Sparta must therefore have voted for war herself before the League met.⁴ This may well be true, but since Thucydides allows no explicit statement

¹ The Kallias decrees, as Meyer (p. 324) already noted, suggest that the assembly did by this time expect war.

² Thucydides gives us but this one speech, and it has been surmised that it is in a sense composite, summing up what was said on various occasions. I mean no more than that Perikles is bound on some occasion, and likely on many, to have gone back thus into the past.

³ In R. Zahn, *Die erste Periklesrede*, p. 88, n. 33.

⁴ *Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc.* 1952/3, pp. 43-44.

Jones assumes that the procedure would normally be along the lines described for 432 by Thucydides, and he is clearly right in saying that Sparta could not be committed to war without her consent: moreover, there was at least one precedent for the league's rejection of a Spartan proposal (*Her.* 5. 91-93). But it does not certainly follow that the Spartan assembly always took its decision first, and it is to be noted that a conference might be called by some other member, to judge from 67. 1.

about Sparta, we should perhaps mark this instance as uncertain. To suspicious minds, of course, the mere holding of the conference would seem provocative.

All this and more was familiar to Thucydides, and some of it must be referred to in his *πρότερον* . . . *ἐπιβουλευόντες*. He does not expatiate—this is in line with his general avoidance of the standard oratorical themes¹—but we cannot deduce that he thought Perikles' proposition either untrue or unimportant: it is at least set down in the text, and in a fairly emphatic position, after the prologue of the speech and at the head of the substantive argument. And for once we have outside evidence of the sort of thing Perikles said on this topic. Plutarch includes in his meagre collection of Perikles' remembered sayings (*Per.* 8. 7) that 'he saw the war already coming from the Peloponnese', *καὶ τὸ τὸν πόλεμον ἤδη φάναι καθορᾶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου προσφερόμενον*. The phrase is hardly memorable for its wording, and its content would not be very startling in 433, when a majority in the assembly could be convinced that war was coming and acted on that conviction. If it was remembered, the reason is surely that Perikles said it when it was not so obvious,² so that later it was quoted as an instance of his prevision; and if he said it before the thing could be called obvious, his assertion was presumably that some Peloponnesians were plotting war secretly.

I take it, then, that Perikles did in 432 charge Sparta with having long plotted war against Athens, and made the charge more often and at greater length than Thucydides cared to record; that he, or a speaker on his behalf, made the same charge during the debate on the Corcyrean alliance and was eventually believed; and that he had made the same charge in public before 433. What he said and thought in private is another matter, not to be known directly to his younger followers, whatever might be suspected³—but would it be unreasonable to guess that the young Thucydides did *not* turn his critical searchlight on Perikles' motives but rather on his opponents', that he accepted the version which Perikles gave in public and rejected with contempt all that might be said on the other side to Perikles' discredit?

Such an attitude, it seems to me, would account for the way in which the *αἰτίαι* are presented in 24–87. To assess this we must think away the *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις*, which as the text now stands is a considerable support to the charges made by the Corinthians in their first speech at Sparta. Without that support, the reader is left, so to speak, much freer to dismiss the general charge, and a

¹ Cf. Strasburger, *Hermes*, lxxxvi (1958), 17 ff., on his attitude to the standard praises of Athens.

² Cf. Meyer, p. 324.

³ There are, I think, two distinguishable problems here:

(1) In large areas of his history, Thucydides confines himself to public statement and neither asserts nor speculates about concealed aims, although not only Perikles, but the leaders of the Spartan war party too, must have entertained wider designs about which they did not make speeches, and Thucydides can hardly have felt no curiosity about such matters. His reticence can be extremely frustrating in detail—we might be better off if we had been told his view of

what Perikles expected to make of the capture of Epidauros (2. 56. 4) or Nikias of the Solygeia expedition (4. 42–45)—but it is by no means uniform: he tells us about plans of Demosthenes in 426 (3. 95. 1) and 424 (4. 76) which were certainly not made public in advance, and there is speculation enough about Tissaphernes' private mind (8. 46. 5, 87. 4). A survey of the cases might be helpful. The answer is possibly along the lines of Schadewaldt's distinction between his earlier and later conceptions of his task.

(2) The problem here before us, on the other hand, is to discover what Thucydides himself accepted from Perikles as the basis of his own conception of the nature of the war.

patriotic Athenian could certainly read it as a disguised encomium. The Corinthians come on the whole badly out of the Corcyra episode (as I have argued above—especially when they refuse arbitration, unlike Athens in 432), their arguments at Athens are suspect and unconvincing, they are throughout warmongers. Sparta, though more hesitant, is no less guilty. When the Corcyreans say that Sparta wanted war, this is only what Perikles had long said and was to say in Thucydides' text at the first opportunity, what the majority of Athenians had come to believe by 433, what Thucydides when he wrote 44. 2 thought so nearly self-evident that a hint in the preceding speeches was all the orientation his readers needed. Sparta accepted the Corinthian case; even the prudent Archidamos only wanted to postpone action; the majority preferred the violent Sthenelaidas; no notice was taken of Athens' offers of arbitration or of her care to keep within the letter of the treaty.¹ Perikles' speech at the end of the book sustains the view that Athens was bound to fight.

The leisure of exile, his growth as an historian, more continuous contact with the Peloponnesian point of view, the somewhat different course of the events which led to the breakdown of the Peace of Nikias, all helped to change Thucydides' views. Sparta and Corinth were not acquitted, but their actions become more intelligible. Perikles was not condemned, the power and glory of empire did not cease to be worth pursuing, but it was recognized that the pursuit of them was not compatible with peace. The adoption of the *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις* as Thucydides' own view changed the emphasis almost everywhere.

5. ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ

The central idea was not a new one, indeed the danger from Athens' expansion was bound to be a topic of discussion and even of noisy indignation among the Peloponnesians, in no sense secret, so that it could hardly fail to find its way into a responsible account of their deliberations. What, then, of *ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ* and *ἐς τὸ φανερόν λεγόμεναι*? Is it not, still, eccentric to announce in advance that this theme was not discussed in public, when the speeches which in fact discuss it were, in my belief, already written and Thucydides had no intention of cancelling them?

One answer has been suggested to me, that he meant that these Spartan fears were not to be mentioned in the formal embassies which passed between Sparta and Athens (126. 1-2, 139. 1-3), whereas the *αἰτίαι* were brought out at this level. This interpretation at least brings 23. 6 more into line with the rest of the book, and certainly the distinction between things which ambassadors can and cannot say might in an appropriate context be conveyed by these phrases. But the context here gives no help at all. The rest of the book is full of *λόγοι* in which Thucydides' true cause is anything but inconspicuous, and the conference to which most of these *λόγοι* were addressed was public enough (cf. 72. 1, 73. 1): if the Corinthian speech was not made *ἐς τὸ φανερόν*, then *τὸ φανερόν* is being given a somewhat special sense. Nor does there seem to be

¹ Thucydides keeps this point well in our view: cf. 44. 1, 45. 3, 49. 4, 53, 78. 4, 85. 2, 86. 3, 140. 2, 141. 1, 144. 2, and indeed 7. 18. 2. Sthenelaidas' rejection of arbitration is put in stark and shocking form, 86. 3 οὐδὲ δίκαις καὶ λόγοις διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ αὐτοῦς βλαπτομένους—an assertion of the right of

self-help which would make all arbitration clauses useless for ever: even if Perikles' offers were throughout insincere, this style of intransigence could not be justified. The violent tone of this speech is not accidental, and the assembly which is swayed by it is not being treated as innocent.

much point in the distinction which these words, thus interpreted, convey: it is not clear why Thucydides should be at pains to tell us, somewhat obscurely, that this was a conception which lay just below the diplomatic surface, an idea which could be freely expressed at Sparta but not by a Spartan at Athens.

But if we allow *λόγω* to refer to *λόγοι*, there is one speech in which the *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις* indeed plays no part, and that is Perikles' speech at the end of the book: there is one place only, Athens itself, where no one could usefully assert in public that Athenian expansion justified war. It therefore seems possible that Thucydides had Athens in mind when he wrote these somewhat unexpected words. The view which he was hereby abandoning was an Athenian view, publicly stated by Perikles and accepted by a majority of the Athenians: the view which he here adopts, though it was doubtless familiar to Perikles' private mind, was one with which no orator could hope to sway the Athenian assembly. The historian adopts it as his own, while still nevertheless asserting the superiority of Perikles' mind and the correctness of his policies—a complicated effort of reorientation, and the fact that he is partly arguing with himself may help to explain the obscurity of his expression.¹ It cannot be denied that it is on this hypothesis obscure—there is no signpost pointing us towards Athens—but it is obscure on any hypothesis, and I prefer an interpretation which gives some point and depth to the distinction he is making. This was a view which his countrymen in general did not see or could not accept, but still deeply and importantly true, a fact which the historian with his superior insight could perceive and must bring to the surface.

Further revision might perhaps have altered this phrase and indeed ironed out the other contradictions from which this essay began—they are, as I argued above (p. 132), contradictions in expression and not of substance. But as it stands the text must perpetually invite conjecture without allowing verification.

6. CHRONOLOGY

Only a part of Thucydides' general development is in question here, but I must attempt to make plain what I suppose to be implied in the conjecture I have put forward.

The early stage seems relatively plain. At what might be called undergraduate age Thucydides broke with his family's Kimonian connexions and fell under the spell of Perikles. The approach of war and the atmosphere of crisis will rather have enhanced the feelings he then entertained about both Perikles and the opposition, and his first draft about the causes of the outbreak is a wholeheartedly Periklean document, incorporating a defence of Perikles against the contemporary charge that the Megarian decree was not worth a war, but not searching critically the basis of Perikles' policies. I suppose this first draft to include the main part of what we now read as 23–87, 119–25, 139 onwards, and that it was among the first parts of the history to be written. A public career of the kind which qualified a man for the strategía must have occupied a good deal of his time, but obviously did not prevent him from collecting materials for his history, and I do not imagine that it need exclude actual composition, even the writing of speeches like those of the first book. After 424

¹ In the same way I would argue that Thucydides' consciousness that he had something to retract is responsible for the un-

necessary air of contradiction in 88 (p. 226 above).

there was ampler leisure. I would suppose also that the bulk of book 2 was written early, but it is hard to guess how much more.

The problems multiply as soon as one begins to consider the effect on his mind and work of the Peace of Nikias and subsequent events. The immediate effect of the Peace must have been discouraging, to see the greatest war in history end tamely in compromise, and he would be predisposed to expect its breakdown, of which symptoms appeared soon enough. It is to be presumed that he went on taking notes of diplomatic and military movements, even before he certainly knew to what use he would put them; that the Sicilian expedition early appealed to him as an irresistible subject; while the resumption of the war showed how the whole period could be treated as one connected theme.

For reasons which I hope to discuss elsewhere, it is my belief that books 6-8 were written relatively soon after the events which they describe,¹ and this implies, among other things, that the connected narrative was broken off not because of the author's illness or death but for some other reason, and that there was then a considerable interval before the end of the war in which he either stopped writing or turned his attention back to the earlier narrative. There are large problems here, for which further study might suggest solutions, but the question what he might have done after breaking off book 8 is not by any means the worst of them. There was still the need to collect data about the war as it proceeded. He must have come to his conclusion about the unity of the war before he ever started on book 8, and this means that book 5 needed to be written as a bridge between the two phases of the war.² It means also that he could have revised book 1 during this period, adding 23. 6, 88-118, and very probably the later excursuses 126. 2-138.³

It is certain that some passages of revision were written after 404, notably 2. 65, but it is far from certain that there are many such, and not even likely that 1. 23. 6 is one of them. It cannot fairly be argued, as Meyer 316 ff. does, that the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις is a conception which Thucydides could not have reached till the war was over. He is accounting, not for the fact that Sparta pursued Athens to a surrender, but for the fact that it was impossible to maintain the Peace of Nikias, and the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις would be equally valid if peace had been made after Kyzikos or Arginousai—though with the proviso that any subsequent attempt by Athens to resume her imperial career would have destroyed the basis of such a peace as surely as Alkibiades and the Sicilian expedition destroyed the basis of the Peace of Nikias. We do not, therefore, need Lysander to account for the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις, much less Schwartz's other main factor, post-war Athenian criticism of Perikles and the policy of empire. Thucydides' reaction to such criticism is important, and the restrained fierce passion of Perikles' last speech (2. 60-64) is among the most moving things in the whole work; but the cool reflection on the implications of imperial policy which underlies the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις is, it seems to me, the product of a very different mood.

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¹ A late date for these books was made the basis for Schädewaldt's view of a change in Thucydides' general aims; a view which seems to me extremely valuable even if it has to be put on another basis. The particular passages on which Schädewaldt relied could almost all have been written before the end of

the war, and the crucial 6. 15 is in part a later addition. I am glad to note that Westlake (p. 226, n. 1 above) prefers the earlier dating.

² It is also a possibility that parts of book 4 were written comparatively late.

³ See the first chapter of H. Münch, *Studien zu den Exkursen des Thukydides* (1935).

NOTES ON OVID: II¹

Addenda

Amores 1. 15. 37-38, 2. 14. 29-30 (*Notes* I, p. 59)

It was wrong of me not to have referred to the treatise of K. Guttman, *Sogenannte instrumentales ab bei Ovid* (Dortmund, 1890), which I had in fact glanced at some years ago and forgotten; see particularly p. 32.

2. 4. 45-46 (*Notes* I, p. 60)

The case for *moribus* is clinched, as Professor J. A. Davison has kindly pointed out to me, by *C.I.L.* iv. 4592 (= Diehl, *Pomp. Wandinschr.* 455): *Eutyphis Graeca a. II moribus bellis*. Other inscriptions employ the phrase, but omit the tariff.

2. 6. 39-42

optima prima fere manibus rapiuntur auaris,
implentur numeris deteriora suis:
tristia Phylacidae Thersites funera uidit
iamque cinis uiuis fratribus Hector erat.

39 manibus *om.* S (*cf.* 55, *ubi ales om.*); *Parcis Müller* auaris] auernis *Heinsius*; ab atris *Baehrens*

Before venturing to emend 39 it is as well to be certain of the meaning of 40. Here are some suggestions: 'fill out their tale of years' (Showerman); 'accomplissent toute [*om.* Ripert] leur destinée' (Ripert, Bornecque); 'compiono interamente il loro destino' (Munari); 'überdauert die Frist' (Harder and Marg). This is no doubt what the words, in the context of 41-42, might be expected to mean, but is this sense in the Latin? Riley was bolder with his 'fills its *destined* numbers', but it was left to Némethy to state explicitly that the passive and the active voices of the Latin verb are interchangeable and that *implentur numeris suis* means 'implement numeros annorum suorum'.

A serious attempt to explain the verse was made by Crispinus, the Delphin editor, who ingeniously compared Macrobius, *Comm. in somn. Scip.* 1. 13. 11-13, a passage which it may be as well to quote, as the simplest way of demonstrating that his explanation cannot possibly be correct.

addit [*sc.* Plotinus] etiam illam solam naturalem esse mortem ubi corpus animam, non anima corpus relinquit. constat enim numerorum certam constitutamque rationem animas sociare corporibus. hi numeri dum supersunt, perseuerat corpus animari; cum uero deficient, mox arcana illa uis soluitur qua societas ipsa constabat, et hoc est quod fatum et fatalia uitae tempora uocamus. anima ergo ipsa non deficit quippe quae immortalis atque perpetua est sed inpletis numeris corpus fatiscit: nec anima lassatur animando sed officium suum deserit corpus cum iam non possit animari. hinc illud est doctissimi uatis 'explebo numerum reddarue tenebris' [Virg. *A.* 6. 545]. haec est igitur naturalis uere mors, cum finem corporis solus numerorum suorum defectus adportat, non cum extorquetur uita corpori adhuc idoneo ad continuationem ferendi.

¹ Continued from *C.Q.*, n.s. viii. 54-66, referred to hereafter as '*Notes* I'. The notes on *A.A.* 1. 114, 133-4, 585-8, 2. 555-6, *Rem.* 446 and 756 have been read to the Cambridge Philological Society and are, I

hope, the better for the various helpful suggestions and criticisms which they there provoked. To Mr. Alan Ker, who has been kind enough to read and criticize the paper in typescript, I am especially grateful.

I do not think it necessary to examine Crispinus's suggestion in detail: it suffices to remark (1) that it is in the highest degree unlikely that Ovid, tinged with Pythagoreanism as he may have been, would have slipped in a reference to the doctrine of the soul as a *ἀμυμία* (which is what Macrobius appears to be discussing) in this cryptic fashion; (2) the phrase *impletis numeris* in particular tells against Crispinus, being in no way parallel to Ovid's words but rather to, for example, Juv. 6. 249 *omnes implet numeros*, Pliny, *N.H.* 18. 325 (*luna*) *alternis . . . mensibus xxx implebit numeros*.

It seems more likely that *numerus* in the passage under discussion bears its not uncommon sense of 'part' of a whole, without any such special connotations as are suggested by the Macrobius passage. Its use with *impleri* is unusual, but may be supported by Seneca *Contr.* 7 *praef.* 2 *non omnis quaestio per numeros suos implenda est?* (= 'should it not be completely developed?'), id., *Ep.* 71. 16 (*ueritas*) *habet suos numeros, plena est* (cf. Cic. *de diu.* 1. 23 *quicquam potest casu esse factum, quod omnes habet in se numeros ueritatis?*, *de fin.* 3. 24 *recte facta . . . omnes numeros uirtutis continent*); an analogy is offered by id. *de nat. deor.* 2. 37 *mundus perfectus expletusque omnibus suis numeris atque partibus*. In other words, *impleri* here has its literal sense 'be filled (with)', i.e. 'be equipped with'; for this sense compare further, for example, Livy 7. 2. 7 *impletas modis saturas* ('with their full complement of tunes'), Aetna 274 *implendus sibi quisque bonis est artibus*, Ovid, *Fasti* 3. 657 *luna . . . mensibus impleat annum*.

If this explanation is correct, *implentur numeris suis* means no more than 'are complete'. As to what? Their allotted span of years, say the translators (though without vouchsafing the process of reasoning which has led them to this rendering), and this would seem to be implied by 41-42. But 39, as it stands in the manuscripts, contains no reference to this idea: it means 'Greedy hands carry off the best things first'. (That the hands are those of Orcus is an inference from 41-42: it is not in the Latin.) Then follows 40: 'Inferior things are complete', i.e. remain untouched.¹ It then follows that the paradigm adduced at 41-42 is not wholly relevant to this sentiment, but this is sometimes a characteristic of rhetorical comparisons. The fault, if there is one, is that of Ovid, not of his scribes. Compare *Am.* 1. 9. 33-40, where Müller proposed to excise 33-34, 37-40 on the ground that they are irrelevant. So in truth they are, but, regrettably enough, this does not prove that Ovid did not write them.

Ars Amatoria 1. 63-64 *siue cupis iuuenem, iuuenes tibi mille placebunt;
cogeris uoti nescius esse tui.*

cogeris a, Itali; cogeris et ROSAω; cogère et Heinsius²

¹ The opposite is *carere numeris suis*, as at *Tr.* 1. 8. 48 *ut careant numeris tempora prima suis*, correctly explained by Owen, who cites Cic. *de fin.* 3. 24, quoted above, and *Met.* 1. 427 *animalia . . . quaedam imperfecta suisque | trunca . . .* 'the beginning of our friendship lacks its (remaining) component parts, i.e. does not correspond to the end'. His other parallel, *Am.* 3. 7. 17-18 *quae mihi uentura est, siquidem uentura, senectus, | cum desit numeris ipsa iuuenta suis?* must be disallowed: there *numeri* means 'function, duty'; cf. *Her.* 4. 88 *Veneri numeros eripuisse suos, Rem.*

372 *ad numeros exige quidque suos, Consol. ad Liu.* 285 *numeros impleuit principis*.

² Sigla used in the *Ars* are as follows: R = Par. lat. 7311 saec. ix (Regius), r = eiusdem man. sec. saec. x an xi incert.; O = Oxon. Bodl. Auct. F iv 32 saec. ix (Book I only); S_aA = Sangallensis 821 saec. xi (I. 1-230 only); A = Lond. mus. Brit. Add. 14086 saec. xi, a = eiusdem man. sec. saec. xi; ω = all or most of the *recentiores* used (some twenty), ε = some or a few. Some individual *rec.* are mentioned by name.

Both sense and context (62 *ueniet*, 63 *placebunt*, 66 *erit*) demand the future in 64. *et* was added because the form *cogēris* was unfamiliar (cf. Stat. *Ach.* 1. 91, where most manuscripts have *credideris* for *credēris*) and to give a dactyl. For the latter tendency compare A.A. 1. 287 *illius lacrimis* RA ω ; *illius et lacrimis* σ ; 2. 680 *inuēnit* RA σ ; *inuēnit et* recc. duo; *inuēnit* ω ; and Notes I, p. 59 n. 7.¹

1. 114 rex populo praedae signa petenda dedit.

petenda *codd.*; petita Bentley, Madvig; petente Burman

Some editors keep *petenda*, but I suspect that they cannot have weighed the consequences. Crispinus's paraphrase in the Delphin edition 'signa poscenda praedae' exposes its absurdity—for why should the Romans have been expected to ask for the signal, as the gerundive would imply?—and was contradicted by his note: 'Debuerunt nempe expectare omnes donec signo aliquo indicaret Romulus . . .'. This latter interpretation was followed by Riley ('the signal to be awaited') and Bornecque ('le signal qu'il fallait attendre'); it gives good sense, but does violence to the meaning of *peto*. An old suggestion is that the phrase is equivalent to *praedae signa petendae*. The frequent use of *petere* with *praeda* (A.A. 2. 2, *Am.* 1. 8. 92, Tib. 1. 1. 34) makes this tempting; but in spite of the notoriously lax use of this figure by the ancient poets² I am inclined to agree with Burman's comment: 'An hoc Latine dicatur vehementer dubitavi.'

petenda has satisfied several editors and gives good sense: the people in their eagerness urged the king to give the signal (cf. Caes. *B.G.* 3. 19. 2 *cupientibus signum dat*, Lucan 7. 47 *signa petit pugnae*, though parallels are hardly needed). But it is curious that the phrase *signa praedae* in the sense of 'the signal of (for) rape' has not seemingly caused disquiet. *signa rapinae* (*Met.* 14. 818) is normal, for *rapina* denotes an action: it so happens that the distinction between the two words is neatly if inadvertently drawn by Ovid himself at *Tr.* 1. 11. 29–31 *ille meo uereor ne speret sanguine praedam | haec titulum nostrae mortis habere uelit. | barbara pars laeua est auidaeque adsueta rapinae* etc. *praeda* in the sense of the act of spoliation = 'plundering' is fairly frequent in double phrases where the second word leaves the meaning in no doubt,³ but undoubted examples of the word used thus on its own are harder to come by. The most striking instance is at Sall. *Iug.* 55. 5 *igni magis quam praeda ager uastabatur* (and even there the presence of *igni* in the immediate context is significant); cf. Livy 2. 25. 5 (<*oppidum*> *captum praedae datum*).⁴ Possibly Ovid, *Met.* 10. 537 *tutae . . . animalia*

only by its title.

¹ Compare on the similar intrusion of *-que* Housman at Manil. 4. 776 and on the way of scribes with conjunctions in general Knoche, *Handschriftliche Grundlagen*, p. 298, n. 3. To the list of conjectures at Prop. 2. 8. 8. perhaps may be added *uincēris*, *uincēs*: *haec*, etc.

² 'quibus . . . haec res regatur finibus, nemo tradidit, neque dictu facile est', Lobeck on Soph. *Aj.* 7; cf. Hey, *Archiv*, xiv. 108, Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 504. The harshest enallage with a participle which I have been able to find is in Maistas 16. 41 (Powell, *Coll. Alex.* 69–70). The dissertation of A. Merz, *Quatenus Ovidius et complures circa Messallam poetae enallages adiectivi quae vocatur figura usi sint* (Vienna, 1914), is known to me

³ e.g. Cic. *de Rep.* 2. 26 *sine depopulatione atque praeda*, Verr. 2. 19. 47 *socii praedae ac rapinarum*, Livy 38. 23. 2 *consul captis castris direptione praedaeque abstinet militem*, etc. I am indebted to Mr. P. G. W. Glare for many of the references on which this discussion is based.

⁴ This passage seems to disable Roby's explanation (*Lat. Gr.* ii. xxxix) of Livy 27. 44. 4 *castra . . . praedae relictas* as predicative dative (cf., however, Lucret. 5. 875 *praedae lueroque iacebant*); the dative seems much more like that at Cic. *Fam.* 4. 1. 2 *urbem . . . sine fide relictam direptioni et incendiis*.

praedae represents a transitional sense, for it is clear that the transition from 'booty' to 'plundering' is not difficult (as witness the reverse transition of *rapina*). But I have not come across any passage which seems to me to establish *signa praedae* as standard Ovidian Latin, though it is clearly not indefensible and might have been constructed on the analogy of, for example, *signa pugnae* (*Fast.* 3. 216); Ovid's habit of repeating himself must not blind us to his experimental attitude to language and make us assume that any expression for which no parallel can be found elsewhere in his works is *ipso facto* non-Ovidian. But when all is said I find myself still troubled by *signa praedae*.

What of Burman's neglected *petente*, which has possibly suffered by being advanced side by side with the unlikely *repente* (cf. Axelson, *Unpoetische Wörter*, pp. 32 f.)? It is nearer the *ductus*, for what that is worth. By itself it would not meet my objection to *signa praedae*, and the amphibole of *signa*, though possible (cf. *Notes* I, p. 63), is scarcely a thing to import. A slight additional change gives:

rex populo praedam signa petente dedit.

I do not advance this with complete confidence, since the word-order, though *a priori* not un-Ovidian, is one that I cannot parallel exactly. Perhaps it is safest to obelize.

I. 133-4

scilicet ex illo sollemnia more theatra
nunc quoque formosis insidiosa manent.

133 sollemnia *codd.*; sollemni *Madvig*

Madvig (*Adu. Crit.* ii. 78) altered the text on two grounds: 'Neque *sollemnia theatra* ferenda sunt neque *ex illo more*, qui non mos fuit, sed res semel acta'. This was published in 1873, but the meaning of *mos* still continued to elude Ovid's editors, though they had only to consult their author: *Met.* 2. 345-6 *illae more suo (nam morem fecerat usus) | plangorem dederant*. Ehwald, printing *sollemni*, punctuated the verse to ensure that the words *ex illo sollemni more* were construed together, and Bornecque did the same, translating 'par fidélité à cette antique coutume'. *ex illo* stands for *ex illo tempore* (*Her.* 14. 85, *Fast.* 5. 670), like ἐκ κείνου; for the phraseology of Ovid's aetiological fantasy compare *Ap. Rhod.* 4. 250-2 τό γε μὴν ἔδος ἐξέτι κείνου [*ex illo*] . . . ἀνδράσιν ὀψιγόνουσι μένει καὶ τῆμος [*nunc quoque . . . manent*] ἰδέσθαι.

But though the second of Madvig's objections is sound, his first invites scrutiny. *sollemnis*, it is true, is usually applied to occasions rather than to places; but compare perhaps *Virg. A.* 2. 202 *sollemnis . . . ad aras*, *Ovid, Met.* 14. 262 *sollemni solio* (v.l. *sublimi*, fort. recte). *festus* is similarly used of places, though not very often (*Thes. L.L.* 6. 630. 55 ff.); *Ovid* appears to be the only author who uses it with *theatra* (*Met.* 3. 111). The usage might be explained as a transferred epithet, but *sollemnis* seems not improper for theatres which, whatever went on in them in Ovid's day, had been formally dedicated (*Plut. Pomp.* 52, *Dio* 39. 38. 1—the word used is καθιέρωσις: cf. Wissowa, *Rel. u. Kultus d. Römer*, pp. 467 f.); and its use here designedly piquant in the context.

If *sollemnia theatra* be allowed to stand, *more* must be absolute, as at *Virg. A.* 7. 247 *hoc Priami gestamen erat cum iura uocatis | more daret populis . . .*, *Plaut. Trin.* 1033 ff. *St. ambitio iam more sanctast, liberast a legibus; | scuta iacere fugereque hostis more habent licentiam: | petere honorem pro flagitio more fit. CH. morem inprobum! |*

ST. strenuosos praeterire more fit, Cic. Fam. 11. 29. 3 more magis hoc quidem scribo quam quo te admonendum putem. It is less common than the plural moribus, but consuetudine offers an analogy, and Ovid is in general free in his use of unaccompanied modal ablatives (P. Hau, *De casuum usu Ovidiano*, pp. 110 f.). The word-order suggests that more qualifies sollemnia rather than the verb: 'our theatres, traditionally sacred', though I must admit that the latinity of this interpretation gives me pause, and I should have been reluctant to mention it at all were it not that Professor D. S. Robertson has proposed it to me independently. On the other hand, if more be taken with manent, the suggestion that the present state of affairs had the sanctity of tradition (cf. Bömer on *Fast.* 3. 632 for the sense 'geheiligter Brauch') is characteristic (cf. my article *Nequitiae poeta in Ovidiana*, pp. 201-9).

1. 231-6 saepe illic [*sc. in conuiuuiis*] positi teneris adducta lacertis
purpureus Bacchi cornua pressit Amor,
uinaque cum bibulas sparsere Cupidinis alas,
permanet et capto stat grauis ille loco.
ille quidem pennas uelociter excutit udas,
sed tamen et spargi pectus Amore nocet.

231 positi r Oxon. Bodl. Doruillianus 170 saec. xiii; positus ROAw; poti Lachmann 234
capto Itali; coepto R Par. lat. 7997 saec. xv; cepto OAw 236 Amore scripsi

The obscurity of these verses led Weise in his edition and Gruppe (*Minos*, pp. 468 f.) to expel 233-6, and Palmer (*ap. Edwards*, in the *Corpus* text) 235-6. This, as Housman more than once remarked, is an unsound and illogical method of proceeding. The conceit in these lines is an elaborate one and, one might venture to suggest, not very well expressed; but close study seems to me to show that it is not unintelligible.

231-2. Baccus and Cupid *wrestle*: the powers of love and wine contend for mastery (*sc. of the lover's heart*: see on 234 below). *pressit* = 'has held fast': *Met.* 9. 187 uosne, manus, ualidi pressistis cornua tauri?, *A.A.* 1. 188 paruus erat manibusque duos Tyrinthius angues / *pressit*; though the common sense 'embrace' (*Am.* 1. 4. 35, *Her.* 11. 58) is no doubt felt as well (cf. *Met.* 4. 369). For Cupid as a wrestler compare Soph. frag. 941. 13 Pearson τὴν οὐ παλαιόυσ' ἐς τρὶς ἐκβάλλει θεῶν; Theoc. 1. 97, 7. 125 (see Gow, ad locc.), Plaut. *Pers.* 4-5 cum Antaeo deluctari mauelim / quam cum Amore. For Bacchus cf. Eur. *Cyc.* 678 δεινὸς γὰρ οἶνος καὶ παλαίεσθαι βαρὺς (cf. Plaut. *Pseud.* 1250 f.). For a similar contest between Eros and Pan compare *C.I.L.* iv. 3407 (= Diehl, *Pomp. Wandinschr.* 821, Kaibel 1103), Seru. ad Virg. *E.* 2. 31. The choice of reading in 231 now becomes clear: Bacchus, the wine, is put on the table, and Bacchus, the god, reclines at table, and *positi* means both things.¹ This deliberate ambiguity is a favourite trick of Ovid's, to which I have already referred (*Notes* I, p. 61).

233-4. The two gods then wrestle, and Cupid, as implied by *cornua pressit*, wins the mastery of the lover's heart: this must be the force of *capto . . . loco*. For *capere* in this sense compare *A.A.* 1. 358-9 . . . quo facilis dominae mens sit et apta capi. / mens erit apta capi tum, cum . . ., *Am.* 3. 2. 40 an . . . capta . . . femineus pectora torret amor?, Rem. 108 uetus in capto pectore sedit amor (cf. Mosch. 1. 17 ἐν

¹ *positus* = 'reclining' at *Her.* 4. 98, *Met.* 3. 350 (*merum*), al. On the repetition *positis* 13. 638 (reading *positique*), Hor. *Epod.* 2. 65; (229) . . . *positi* see 1. 338 n. below.
= 'served' (of wine) at *A.A.* 1. 565 (*Bacchus*),

σπλάγχνοις δὲ κάθηται, Xen. *Symp.* 8. 1 ψυχῇ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἰδρυμένον); and for *capere* as uox amatoria in general see *Thes. L.L.* 3. 334. 66 ff. For *capere locum* in the military sense of 'capture' instead of the more usual 'reconnoitre' compare Caes. *B.G.* 5. 9. 6, Sall. *Cat.* 61. 2. (The only inexplicable thing is that *capto* should ever have been corrupted, but corruption there undoubtedly was in 234, for no editor has ever attempted to retain or explain *coepto*.) But during or after the bout Bacchus sprinkles wine, or is himself sprinkled, on Cupid's wings, weighing him down¹ and preventing him from flying away: that is, wine prepares the heart for love and makes it stay there. This conceit of Love's settling in the heart and refusing to leave is a literary commonplace: compare, besides the passages cited above for *capio*, *Anth. Pal.* 5. 212. 5-6 (Meleager) ὦ πτανοί, μὴ καὶ ποτ' ἐφίπτασθαι μὲν, Ἐρωτες, / οἶδατ', ἀποπτήνηαι δ' οὐδ' ὅσον ἰαχέετε;., Prop. 2. 12. 13-18 (where see the commentators).

235-6. Up to now the scene is fairly clear, and the expression no more confusing than is usual in conceits of this kind.² Now there is a new and abrupt development: Love suddenly *flies away*. That this is the meaning of *pennas* . . . *excutit*, and not, as the *Thes. L.L.* (5. 2. 1312. 55) and the translators would have it, 'shakes out his wings', sc. to dry them, is clear, I think, from *Met.* 6. 702-3 *haec Boreas* . . . *locutus* / *excussit pennas*; *excuto* in fact here and at, for example, *A.A.* 1. 22 means no more than the simple *quatio*, which is a normal word for the motion of the wings in flight (*Met.* 4. 677, *Virg. A.* 3. 226, *Hor. C.* 3. 29. 53-54). Moreover, *uelociter* can only refer to the speed of flight, i.e. motion through the air, not to the frequency of flapping the wings, for which the word would be *crebro*. The sense then is: 'Love flaps his damp wings and swiftly flies away'; to do justice to the Latin an English translation has to use two verbs. This I take to mean that the passion inspired by wine is impermanent and lasts just so long as the intoxication that gave it birth.

236 is even more abrupt and puzzling. 'But for the heart to be sprinkled by (with) Love is harmful.' The ambiguity in *Amore*, to which I have tried to draw attention by capitalizing, is like that in *positi* at 231 (see above). This seems to imply that Cupid, as he flies away, shakes the wine off his wings (*excutit*); the wine is still tinged with love, so that the god leaves some traces of himself behind and the lover does not get off heart-whole (*nocet*). This, if I am right, is an obscure way of saying that even the transitory passion inspired by wine cannot evaporate without leaving some mark behind. The expression of 236 is in fact less obscure and more pointed than has been allowed. For love conceived as a poison ancient literature affords numerous parallels: *Am.* 1. 8. 103-4 *blandire noceque*; / *in pia sub dulci melle uenena latent*, *A.A.* 2. 520 *quae patimur, multo spicula felle madent*, Plaut. *Cist.* 69 *Amor et melle et felle est fecundissimus*, Prop. 2. 12. 19 *intactos isto satius temptare ueneno*, *Virg. A.* 1. 688 *occultum inspires ignem fallasque ueneno*.³ For the idea of love as a fluid distilled into the heart compare Lucret. 4. 1060 *Veneris dulcedinis in cor* / *stillauit gutta* (where Bentley compared Eur. *Hipp.* 526 Ἐρως Ἐρως, ὁ καρ' ὀμμάτων / σπάζεις πόνον), Plaut. frag. dub. 1 Lindsay *amoris imber grandibus guttis* / *non uestem*

¹ Possibly as many as three meanings can be discerned in *grauis*: (1) 'with wet garments', cf. *Met.* 1. 266, 4. 729, *Virg. A.* 5. 178; (2) = *uino grauatus*, on which sense see *Thes. L.L.* 6. 2. 2282. 79 ff. (cf. Lee on *Met.* 1. 224); (3) 'troublesome', for which com-

pare *nocet* in 236 and my remarks.

² Compare the remarks of Butler and Barber on Prop. 2. 12. 13-18 and 1. 9. 23-24; and on the latter passage see also Davison, *C.R.* lxi. 57-58.

³ Cf. Dilke at Stat. *Ach.* 1. 303.

modo permanuit, sed in medullam ultro fuit. For the two ideas combined compare *A.P.* 16. 199. 5-6 (Crinagoras) ἐν δὲ πικρὰ καρδία βέλη / πήξας ἀφύκτων ἰὼν ἔστασας πόθων, / Ἔρως. For *spargi* compare *Met.* 4. 520 *seu dolor hoc fecit seu sparsi causa ueneni* (referring back to 506-7 *uergit furiale uenenum* / *pectus in amborum*; a passage which recalls *Iliad* 19. 352-4 ἡ δ' Ἀχιλλῆϊ / νέκταρ ἐνὶ στήθεσσι καὶ ἀμβροσίην ἐρατεινὴν / στάξ', ἵνα μὴ μιν λιμός κτλ.), 2. 801 *inspiratque nocens uirus piceumque per ossa* / *dissipat et medio spargit pulmone uenenum* (cf. also 14. 403, 15. 359, *Virg. G.* 3. 419, *Ciris* 70). *nocet*, which has been irresponsibly altered, scarcely needs illustration; compare, however, for example, *Am.* 1. 2. 6, 46, *Her.* 20. 231-2 (Ehwald, *Burs.* 109. 248, compared *A.A.* 1. 166 *uulnus habet*). Love flies away, but the damage is done, the wound is inflicted: cf. *Anacreontea* 31. 27-29 Bergk τανύει δὲ καὶ με τύπτει / μέσον ἡπαρ, ὥσπερ οἶστρος / ἀνὰ δ' ἄλλεται καχάζων.

Gruppe's remark (*Minos*, pp. 468 f.) that these verses 'von sehr gesuchtem und gedrechseltem Inhalt' reflect the taste of 'einer spaeteren, anakreontisch spielenden Zeit', while affording no grounds for their excision (indeed the word 'spaeteren' begs the question), are not without justice. For this type of erotic allegory compare in particular *Anacreontea* 5 Bergk, which is perhaps worth quoting in full:

στέφος πλέκων ποθ' εὖρον
ἐν τοῖς ῥόδοις Ἔρωτα.
καὶ τῶν πτερῶν κατασχὼν
ἐβάπτισ' εἰς τὸν οἶνον
λαβὼν δ' ἔπινον αὐτόν,
καὶ νῦν ἔσω μελῶν μου
πετεροῖσι γαργαλίζει.

Admittedly the conceit in this poem is much more clearly expressed; but I am not defending our passage on its literary merits. I have tried to show that nothing in it is alien to an Augustan poet whose taste was not always impeccable. One might hazard a guess that 231-2 were a description of a picture which he had seen (though I have not come across any evidence of this subject) and 233-6 his own rhetorical exploitation. Certainly his visual imagery was deficient, and though obscurity is in general a sign of corruption in his text, there may be exceptions, obscurities which were due simply to his failing to visualize clearly what he was describing. I feel that this passage may well come within that category.

- I. 277-8 conueniat maribus ne quam nos ante rogemus,
femina iam partes uicta rogantis aget.

278 aget *A*ω; agat *R*, *recc. duo*; (blanda rogansque cog)at *O*

agat, introduced into the text by Heinsius, has had a long life and a career of unquestioned respectability, which must be my excuse for dilating on a point which might otherwise seem trivial. It is in fact contrary to the usage, not only of Ovid, but of the hexameter and elegiac poets in general. The paratactic expression of conditions which is such a marked feature of Latin verse was discussed in particular by Blase at *Glotta* xi. 161 ff., where he presented a list of all those known to him. For Ovid his list is neither complete nor accurate; but what matters is that *none* of the examples which he cites of what he conveniently calls the *sit . . . sit* type, the class into which acceptance of

agat would bring our passage, will bear examination, with the single exception¹ of Hor. C. 1. 11. 6 *sapias, una liques et spatio breui | spem longam reseces*. Nothing can be built on this, even ignoring the fact that the passage is in a lyric metre, for there and at, for example, Ovid, *Am.* 1. 4. 29, Pers. 5. 167 *sapias* is colloquial, and its conditional force may not be strongly felt. The *sit . . . erit* type, on the other hand, is exceedingly common in Ovid: *A.A.* 2. 41, 650, 3. 587-8, *Am.* 2. 2. 59-60, 3. 20. 9 ff., *Her.* 2. 83-84, *Rem.* 559, 743 et mult. al. The convenience of this type, which even with *si* gained ground at the expense of *sit . . . sit* (Blase, *Archiv* ix. 45), is obvious: of the examples cited by Owen at *Tr.* 2. 33 seven out of ten are of pentameters ending with a form of *ero* (cf. Axelson, *Ovidiana*, pp. 121-35). There is here the added point that *agat* would be ambiguous (Brandt in fact duly fell into this trap), *aget* is not. See Virg. *E.* 4. 53-56 for a similar textual point, and compare my note on *Am.* 2. 16. 27-30 (*Notes* I, p. 63).

1. 327-9 Cressa Thyesteo si se abstinuisset amore
 (et quantum est uno posse carere uiro!),
 non medium rupisset iter . . . etc.
328 uno *ro*; unum *R*; uni *Aω* carere *O*; placere *RAω*

O's uno . . . *carere* was, we learn from the *Corpus* apparatus, defended by Postgate, but as subsequent editors do not appear to have been convinced it may be worth while to demonstrate, I hope conclusively, that it is the only reading which makes sense in the context. For some reason editors are reluctant to concede any authority to O when it takes a line of its own. A careful examination of R and O has convinced me that there is little to choose between them in point of sincerity—if anything, O is the more sincere—and has shown that, though O has gross blunders in plenty and though it not infrequently agrees with R in presenting an interpolated reading, there is no other passage where O is *alone* in presenting such a reading. R on the other hand has the interpolated *Venus* at 1. 684, where O (with Par. lat. 8430, saec. xiii) has *duas*; and since *Venus* there is false, why not *placere* here? Further, the confused state of affairs in R certainly does not point to *uni* in its exemplar. There is then no need to allow great authority to *uni* . . . *placere*; what of its sense?

Clearly it is the very reverse of what the context requires. 'How great a thing to please one man alone!' is a natural enough sentiment in the mouth of a husband or lover (cf. Prop. 1. 2. 26, 2. 1. 47-48, 4. 11. 68), but quite out of place here in this cynical denunciation of women's lust. uno . . . *carere* on the other hand gives exactly what is needed, as was explained fifty years ago by R. Pichon, *De sermone amatorio apud Latinos elegiarum scriptores* (Paris, 1902), p. 60: 'Ironice enim a femina non petit Ovidius ut uni viro fida sit, sed ut uno abstinat: quod quo facilius est, eo acutius ait poeta: "Quantum est".'² In other words, *quantum* = 'what a little thing': for this sense cf. *A.A.* 1. 671 *quantum defuerat pleno post oscula uoto?*, Plaut. *Capt.* 51 *homunculi quanti* [gen.] *sunt, quom recogito!*, Cic. *Tusc.* 5. 109 *quanti uero ista ciuitas aestimanda est, ex qua*

¹ At [Tib.] 4. 5. 16, whether *quam* or *hanc* be read, *queat* cannot be apodotic; at Prop. 1. 19. 20 *tum* makes all the difference; at Lucan 10. 192 we cannot know that *relinquam* is subj. and not fut. indic.; Ovid, *Her.* 21. 183-4, 213-14 are simply not

relevant.

² I have never seen Pichon's work, which seems to be scarce in this country. This passage was kindly transcribed for me in Paris by Mr. I. D. Hood.

boni sapientesque pelluntur?, Prop. 4. 6. 65 *quantus mulier foret una triumphus!*, Hor. Sat. 2. 4. 81–82 *uilibus in scopis, in mappis, in scobe quantus / consistit sumptus?*, etc.; and cf. *quotus* at Am. 2. 12. 10, Her. 12. 89, etc. For *carere* = ‘do without’ (a person) Ovid affords numerous parallels: e.g. A.A. 2. 249, Rem. 540, etc. ‘A great feat, truly, to be able to endure the loss of one man!’ Never set your heart on a man—there will be another one along in a minute.

1. 338

Hippolytum rabidi diripuistis equi.

rabidi RO; rapidi Aw; pauidi Heinsius ex rec., edd.

The choice is clearly between *rabidi* (cf. Notes I, p. 66) and *pauidi*, which editors have preferred in spite of its scanty manuscript support. Both give excellent sense: for *pauidi* compare Fast. 6. 741 *solliciti terrentur equi*, Met. 15. 517–18 *horrent / quadrupes monstrique metu turbantur*, Virg. A. 7. 780 *iuenem monstris pauidi effudere marinis*, Eur. Hipp. 1218 *εὐθὺς δὲ πῶλούς δεινὸς ἐμπύπτει φόβος*; for *rabidi* Fast. 3. 265 *Hippolytus furis direptus equorum*, Met. 15. 521 *rabies . . . equorum*, Eur. Hipp. 1230 *μαργῶσαι φρένας*. There is nothing to be alleged against *rabidi* but its repetition so soon after 332 *filia purpureos Niso furata capillos / pube premit rabidos inguinibusque canes*; and it is presumably this consideration that has determined the actions of the editors of this text in preferring *pauidi*. I say ‘presumably’ since, as usual, none of them has condescended to be explicit. The point is of no little interest. It is well known that Ovid is not very sensitive to such repetitions; I cite a few cases only which are directly parallel to this, of epithets repeated after a short interval at the same place in the verse: A.A. 229, 231 (not an epithet, but worth citing: cf. my note above), Am. 1. 14. 12, 18; 2. 9. 40, 44; 2. 19. 42, 45; 3. 1. 45, 53; Her. 19. (158), 161, 167.¹ On the analogy of these passages there is seen to be no objection on this score to *rabidi* here. The passage which is customarily cited in support of *pauidi*, Rem. 744 *nec faciet pauidos taurus auitus equos*, rather tells against it: *pauidi* here rather looks like an intrusion from that verse.

1. 351

sed prius ancillam captandae nosse puellae
cura sit.

captandae Itali; captando Riccardianus 489; captatae cett.

¹ A puzzling case is that of Am. 1. 5. 1–2, which I have postponed discussing until now: *aestus erat, mediamque dies exegerat horam; / adposui medio membra leuanda toro*. Such repetitions as *mediam . . . medio* in adjacent verses can be paralleled in other poets: Virg. A. 1. 504–5, 12. 883–4, Lucan 3. 621–2, 4. 426–7; but I know of no sufficient parallel in Ovid. The last line of the poem, *proueniant medii sic mihi saepe dies*, seems to echo the first (a fact which I had overlooked until a member of my lecture class acutely pointed it out to me), which makes it more likely that *medio* in v. 2 is corrupt than *mediam*. It is not difficult to think of corrections: either Burman’s *uacuo* or *uiduo* would do very nicely; but *medius* is vox propria in this context, indeed it is almost true to say that in the erotic vocabulary *medio toro iacere* is a *t.t.* for ‘sleep alone’. Have we then a play on

words? ‘It was the middle of the day, and I was lying in the middle of my bed.’ The figure *transductio*, the use of the same word in a somewhat differing sense, is dear to Ovid (see, for example, Owen on Tr. 2. 376); but is the difference between the spatial and temporal senses of *medius* striking enough to lend itself to rhetorical exploitation in this way? Compare perhaps Juv. 11. 111–12 *uox / nocte fere media mediamque audita per urbem*. The conceit seems a feeble one, but it is the best explanation I am able to suggest. On the whole problem of unconscious repetitions see Vahlen, *Opusc. Acad.* i. 356 ff., A. B. Cook, C.R. xvi. 146–58, 256–67, W. H. S. Jones, Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc. 181 (n.s. 1). 19–22, Housman, Lucan, p. xxxiii, Poutsma, Mnem. xli. 397–425, Laughton, C.P. xlv. 73–83, Gries, C.P. xlv. 36–37, J. Jackson, Marginalia Scaenica, p. 17.

Mr. Ker (*Ovidiana*, pp. 224 f.) argues for *captatae*, comparing *Fasti* 2. 337 *uenerat ad strati captata cubilia lecti*. But (1) the passage from the *Fasti* should perhaps rather be referred to the *Thes. L.L.*'s rubric (3. 377. 34) 'loca et alia, quae eundo petuntur', whether one translates with Bömer 'die er suchte', or more picturesquely, with Riley and Frazer, 'grope'; (2) *captare* with a person as object, *sensu erotico*, as here, means something like 'attempt': *A.A.* 1. 403 *nec teneras semper tutum captare puellas*, *Her.* 20. 43 *sit dubium, possisne capi; captabere certe*, and especially *Met.* 11. 768-9 *si'uas captatam saepe per omnes | adspicit Hesperien*; (3) the attempt has not yet begun: 1. 1-264 instruct the lover where to find his mistress; 265 promises instruction in the art of capture, *nunc tibi, quae placuit, quas sit capienda per artes | dicere . . . molior*; but it is promptly followed by a digression (269-350) on female lasciviousness. Then and only then follow the tactics to be employed in the chase and capture, so that at 351 the quarry is still *captanda*, not *captata*. For the corruption of gerundive to participle compare *Fasti* 3. 557; the Riccardianus is one of the best of the *recentiores*. *Ter. Haut.* 300 f. is perhaps hardly to be pressed in support of *captanda*, but it is at all events worth quoting: *disciplinast isdem numarier | ancillas primum ad dominas qui adfectant uiam*.

1. 427-8 si non esse domi, quos des, causabere nummos,
 littera poscetur, ne didicisse iuuet.
428 ne . . . iuuet *ROA*; nec . . . iuuet *a*; nec . . . iuuet *ω*

Dr. Shackleton Bailey's interpretation, apropos of *Prop.* 3. 11. 24 (*Proper-tiana*, p. 170), that *ne* = *ut non* seems to be the right one. Compare also *Juv.* 16. 8 *commoda . . . quorum | haut minimum illud erit, ne te pulsare togatus | audeat*, where Duff further compares *Mart.* 4. 64. 20 *essedo tacente, | ne blando rota sit molesta somno* (there is no question of *intention* on the part of the traveller, he is too far away for the wheels of his carriage to be audible).

1. 489-90 neue aliquis uerbis odiosas offerat aures,
 qua potes, ambiguus callidus abde notis.
490 qua *ego, Francofurtanus* (*ut uid.*); quam *ROA*, *edd.*

This is the only remaining passage in Ovid, with one possible exception,¹ where modern editors have clung to *quam potes* in the belief that it means 'so far as you may', 'autant que possible', 'wo möglich', i.e. *quantum potes*; a belief in which Lewis and Short, p. 1504, continues to encourage the public. The normal *qua potes* is required here, for Ovid cannot possibly mean <*tam*> *ambiguus quam potes* 'make your meaning as obscure as you can', which is the only interpretation I can think of which would allow *quam* to be retained. I am almost ashamed to publish this note, but after all these years it may be thought that *quam* deserves an epitaph.

1. 558 saepe reges dubiam Cressa Corona ratem.
 reges *A*; rege *RO*; reget *Merkel*, *edd.*

Ovid here prefers that form of the legend in which Ariadne herself was transformed into a constellation, as the words of the preceding verse *caelo*

¹ Vollmer, *Herm.* lii. 467, defended *quam* at *Rem.* 325, but not even Bornecque has followed him.

spectabere sidus indicate; compare also *Fast.* 3. 459–60, *Her.* 6. 115–16, *Prop.* 3. 17. 7–8, *Hor. Epod.* 17. 41. The other, more usual, version is found at, for example, *Met.* 8. 178 ff. *rege* in RO gives no ground for Merkel's emendation: their common ancestor often omitted final *s*, rarely final *t*.

1. 585–8 *tuta frequensque uia est, per amici fallere nomen;
tuta frequensque licet sit uia, crimen habet.
inde procurator nimium quoque multa procurat
et sibi mandatis plura uidenda putat.*

'Deceit practised under the cloak of friendship is safe and common; safe and common it may be, but it is wrong. This too is how an agent takes on more than he should and thinks himself entitled to exceed his instructions.' In the passage immediately preceding these verses (579–84) Ovid has said that it is worth the lover's while to conciliate his mistress's protector (*uir*). The attentive reader will be surprised by the unwonted ebullition of conscience which follows, and when he reads on he will find that these four verses have even less to do with what in turn follows them. Further, what have *procuratores* to do with all this? The last objection seems to have occurred to Bentley, who met it in Benteleian fashion by proposing to excise 587–8; but it is less formidable than the fundamental impropriety of the whole quatrains in its present context.

If 585–8 be transposed to follow 1. 742 we there have the following sequence:

conquerar, an moneam mixtum fas omne nefasque?	
nomen amicitia est, nomen inane fides.	
ei mihi, non tutum est, quod ames, laudare sodali:	
cum tibi laudanti credidit, ipse subit.	742
tuta frequensque uia est, per amici fallere nomen;	585
tuta frequensque licet sit uia, crimen habet.	
inde procurator nimium quoque multa procurat	
et sibi mandatis plura uidenda putat.	588
'at non Actorides lectum temerauit Achillis;	743
quantum ad Pirithoum, Phaedra pudica fuit;	
Hermionam Pylades, qua Pallada Phoebeus, amabat,	
quodque tibi geminus, Tyndari, Castor, erat.'	
si quis idem sperat . . . etc.	

739–42 'Friendship and good faith are empty names. If you praise your mistress to a friend, he takes your place.' 585–8 'This kind of deceit is all too common; and this too is how agents exceed their instructions.' 743 ff. 'But [says an imaginary interlocutor] there have been classic cases of friends and agents who have not betrayed their trust.' To which Ovid cynically answers: 'If you hope that such people are to be found today, you will hope anything.' The *exempla* in 743–6 then answer the observations in 585–8: Patroclus did not steal Achilles' mistress, nor did Pirithous and Pylades betray the trust reposed in them by Theseus and Orestes.¹

¹ Cf. Brandt, ad loc. The Romans insisted strongly on *fides* as an essential element in friendship: Cic. *de am.* 65 *firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est eius, quam in amicitia quaerimus, fides: nihil est enim stabile, quod infidum est. Sex. Rosc.* 111 in

priuatis rebus si qui rem mandatam non modo malitiosius gessisset . . . uerum etiam negligentius, cum maiores summum admisisse dedecus existimabant, 112 ergo idcirco turpis haec culpa est, quod duas res sanctissimas uiolat, amicitiam et fidem. nam neque mandat quisquam fere nisi amico neque

If this transposition be accepted, *tuta* at 585 and 586 cannot stand. Heinsius (who saw nothing objectionable about 585–8 where they stand in the manuscripts) at one time thought of emending to *trita*, which in any case is an extremely probable correction: for *trita uia* compare Quint. *Inst.* 1. 6. 22 *recta est haec uia, quis negat? sed adiacet et mollior et magis trita*; and compare too Housman's correction of *tuta* to *trita* at 1. 518 (*C.R.* iv. 341–2).

It remains to discuss the mechanism of the transposition, and here no certainty is attainable. The verses might have been omitted from their original position on account of the partial homoearchon *cum tibi* (742) . . . *et sibi* (588), but the reasons for their reinstatement several pages earlier are difficult to conjecture. Another possibility is the following sequence of events: (1) They were written in the margin at 584 by way of comment; (2) they were there incorporated into the text; (3) they were deleted at what was taken to be their second appearance after 742. I propose this with some diffidence since, whatever may be true of other Latin authors, there is very little evidence for transpositions of this kind at an early stage in the history of Ovid's text.¹ For an analogy from the later stages of the tradition compare *Ibis* 133–4: most manuscripts either have these verses in the correct place or both there and after 40, but Vindob. Lat. 885 has them only after 40 (see A. La Penna's edition, pp. lxxviii, 29). But however the present state of affairs may have come about, it seems scarcely credible that if Ovid wrote these lines—and there is no reason to doubt it, even though Weise excised them, *more suo*: the quasi-legal reference to *procuratores* is perfectly in character—he intended them to stand where they are now found in our texts.

1. 729–32 palleat omnis amans: hic est color aptus amanti;
 hoc decet, hoc multi non ualuisse putant.
 pallidus in Side siluis errabat Orion,
 pallidus in lenta Naide Daphnis erat.

730 putant *roAw*; putent *R* 731 *om. O* Side *Schultze*, *praemonstrante Heinsio*; lincea *R*; linca *Aw*; licea *Diuiensis*; licien *Frankfurtanus*; lotica *Neapolitanus*; alia etiam minus *probabilia dett.* orion *aw*; arion *RA*

Consideration of 730 must begin from 731–2. The pattern of these four verses, a general precept supported by two mythological *exempla*, is found elsewhere in the *Ars*; for the moment I defer citing the parallel. The references in 731–2 are obscurely phrased, but it is inconceivable that Ovid could have been so foolish as to destroy the faith of his readers in his teaching by quoting instances where it was ineffective: Orion and Daphnis must be alleged here as

credit nisi ei quem fidelem putat, de nat. deor.
 3. 74 *inde tot iudicia de fide mala, tutelae mandati pro socio fiducia*, Plaut. *Most.* 25–28 *haecine mandauit tibi, quom peregre hinc it, senex? | hocine modo hic rem curatam offendet suam? | hocine boni esse officium serui existumas | ut eri sui corrumpat et rem et filium?* For *mandatum* see *Thes. L.L.* 8. 267. 46 ff. 'in sermone forensi iuris privati *mandatum* est contractus, quo amicus (procurator) iussu amici (mandatoris) huius negotia gratis gerenda suscipit', and the further literature cited there. Ovid's penchant for legal phrases is notorious: Iddekinge's useful work (*De insigni in poeta*

Ouidio Romani iuris peritia, Amsterdam, 1811) did not say the last word on this subject.

¹ The elaborate series of transpositions proposed by J. Tolkiehn (*Festschrift für L. Friedländer*, pp. 433 ff., *Neue Jahrbücher* xi. 326 ff.) in Book I represent mere wasted ingenuity. Müller, *Rh. M.* xvii. 532 f. rightly observed that 2. 669–74 are out of place, but I cannot agree that the best place for them is after 2. 702. Damsté's transposition (*Mnem.* xxxix. 444) of 3. 487–8 to follow 490 is more attractive than most of his suggestions and is adopted by Bornecque, but it is hardly necessary.

lovers to whom pallor brought fruition. This is odd in the case of Daphnis, who was a standard παράδειγμος of unhappy love: Ovid, *Met.* 4. 276-7 *uulgatus taceo . . . pastoris amores* / *Daphnidis Idaei*, Theoc. 5. 20 αἱ τοὶ πιστεύουσαι, τὰ Δάφνιδος ἀλγε' ἀροῖμαν; but it appears from [Theoc.] 8. 92 that according to one variant of the legend he married a nymph called Nais: κῆκ τούτω πρῶτος παρὰ ποιμέσσι Δάφνης ἔγεντο, / καὶ νύμφαν ἄκραβος ἔων ἐτι Ναῖδα γάμεν. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Orion's case was parallel, for though his erotic history was a chequered one and supported a number of mutually inconsistent stories, there are some similarities between his adventures and those of Daphnis: each lost his sight,¹ and each got drunk at a critical moment,² and they are mentioned together by Diodorus (loc. cit. below). What we should therefore expect in 731 is the name of Orion's wife; and *Side* (Apollod. *Bibl.* 1. 4. 3. 2) had already been mentioned in passing by Heinsius long before Schultze suggested it as an emendation. *Side* appears to be known in no other connexion; and here an analogy may be illuminating, that of *Am.* 3. 6. 25-26 *Inachus in Melie Bithynide pallidus isse* / *dicitur et gelidis incaluisse uadis*. Ovid's catalogue of rivers in that poem affords him an excuse for the display of much obscure learning; *Melie* is mentioned elsewhere, but again it is from Apollodorus (2. 1. 1) that we learn, almost casually, that she was the wife of Inachus. In accepting *Side* in 731 we may assume either that Ovid was better acquainted than we are with a form of the Orion and Daphnis legends in which they attained their hearts' desire through suffering; or, more probably, that his fertile imagination, as often, acted on a mere hint. It remains to suggest the source of the word that ousted *Side*. We learn from Philargyrius (ad Virg. *E.* 5. 20) that the nymph to whom Daphnis swore constancy (see Gow, *Theocritus* ii. 1) was called *Lyc*a or *Hedina* (other writers give her other names). It is at least possible that *naide* in 732 was glossed *lyca* by somebody who thought that it meant merely 'nymph'; the subsequent corruption to *linces*, *linca* might have been facilitated by a reminiscence of Hor. *C.* 2. 13. 39-40, where Orion and lynxes are associated.

It can then be shown with reasonable probability that 731-2 adduce *exempla* to support the dictum of 729 *hic est color aptus amanti*. If 730 had been entirely lost its general sense could have been recovered easily by comparison with 2. 641-6 *parcite praecipue uitia exprobrare puellis*, / *utile quae multis dissimulasse fuit*. / *nec suus Andromedae color est obiectus ab illo*, / *mobilis in gemino cui pede pinna fuit*. / *omnibus Andromache uisa est spatiosior aequo*: / *unus, qui modicam diceret, Hector erat*; for *multi* compare further 1. 159, 2. 332, 396, 3. 316, *Rem.* 528, 716. Thus those editors who have sought to emend *multi* away are on the wrong track: Heinsius's *uultu*, Hertzberg's *stulti*, Müller's *nulli* can be discarded without compunction. For the same reason we can also discard what may be called the vulgar interpretation, which keeps *multi* and accepts *putent* from R, translating 'even though the many may believe . . .'; an interpretation which is also ruled out on two other grounds, namely (1) *multi* cannot be paralleled in Ovid = οἱ πολλοί, except in the phrase *e multis* (*A.A.* 3. 7, *Am.* 2. 7. 4, *Rem.* 682); (2) *hoc . . . hoc* should naturally be parallel, as they are at 3. 614 *hoc decet, hoc leges duxque pudorque iubent*.

On these premisses the best solution so far proposed is Palmer's *hoc multis*

¹ Ael. *uar. hist.* 10. 18, Parthen. *erot.* 29, Diod. 4. 84, Seru. ad *E.* 5. 20, 8. 68 (Daphnis); Apollod. *bibl.* 1. 4. 3, [Erat.] *cat.* 32 (Orion).

² Ael., Parthen., Diod., locc. cit. (Daphnis); Parthen. *erot.* 20, *Σ Nic. ther.* 15, [Erat.] loc. cit. (Orion).

non u. putas?, 'Do you not think that this has helped many?': for *ualere* + dative cf. Prop. 3. 7. 42 *cui soliti non ualuere doli*. *putas* might have become *putant* under the influence of *amanti* above; but it would be palaeographically more plausible to read *putem?* on the strength of *putent* in R: the confusion of *nt* and *m* in R is exemplified at, for example, *A.A.* 2. 273 *praecipiant* for *-am*, 552 *sunt* for *sum*. But there is a fundamental objection to both solutions, that a defensive question is not what the sense and rhetoric require.

putant, I think, is unjustly suspected. The meaning 'it is (generally) thought' is perfectly tolerable: cf. 2. 582 *uix lacrimas Venerem continuisse putant*, where *putant* seems to be a mere variation for *ferunt*. *putent* in R may well be a mere aberration: compare in R 1. 254 *harene*, 735 *corpore*, 2. 44 *aeries*, 3. 224 *comes*, and in RO 1. 277 *conuenient*, 657 *fallent*, etc. If *putant* be allowed to stand, the seat of the corruption must be *non ualuisse*; for corruption there must be, unless we are to believe that Ovid wrote the opposite of what he obviously intended. It is possible, though I do not advance this suggestion with the certainty of complete conviction, that the original was:

hoc decet, hoc multis [= Palmer] *mox ualuisse putant*.

'This [*sc. pallere*] is becoming, this, they say, has done the trick for many in the end.'

Since the appearance of H. J. Rose's article in *C.Q.* xxi. 57-66 it is, or should be, common knowledge that *mox* does not mean 'soon'; Norwood's suggestion (*C.J.* xxxvi. 421-3) of 'in due course' seems to come as near it as anything. For *mox* = *denique* or *tandem* compare, besides the examples added by Rose, *Am.* 1. 8. 73-75 *saepe nega noctes: capitis modo finge dolorem; | et modo, quae causas praebeat, Isis erit. | mox recipe, ut nullum patiendi colligat usum* . . ., *Met.* 4. 610-15 *neque enim Iouis esse putabat | Persea, quem pluuiis Danae conceperat auro. | mox tamen* ['in the end' Miller] *Acrisium . . . paenilet*, 6. 531, 717, 9. 634, *Fast.* 1. 373-4 *ille sua faciem transformis adulterat arte; | mox domitus uinctis in sua membra redit*, 2. 233, *Virg. A.* 10. 438. It may reasonably be objected by anyone who scrutinizes these passages that in them *mox* is used in a way which emphasizes its connexion with what has gone before (cf. Rose, p. 65). That it need not be so used is shown, I think, by *Virg. G.* 1. 24-25 *tuque adeo, quem mox quae sint habitura deorum | concilia incertum est . . . Caesar*. As the source of *non ualuisse* I suggest a reminiscence of *A.A.* 2. 402, where these words are found in the same position in the verse.

1. 759 pectoribus mores tot sunt, quot in orbe figurae.

'There are as many dispositions in the (female) breast as there are faces in the world.' The absurdity of *orbe* is evident without more ado from a literal rendering. Nor can matters be righted by construing *in orbe* ἀπὸ κοινῶν. Bentley's *ore*, known since 1905 to readers of E. Hedicke's *Studia Bentleiana* but unregarded by editors of Ovid, is palmary: 'there are as many dispositions in the female breast as there are types of face', or, more elegantly, 'women's dispositions are as varied as their beauty'. For the expression in *ore figurae* compare *Ter. Eun.* 317 *figura oris*, *Cic. de Or.* 1. 114 *figura totius oris et corporis*. For the collective singular *ore* compare, for example, *Am.* 3. 12. 36, 3. 13. 29,

Met. 7. 625, *Fast.* 1. 444;¹ also *A.A.* 3. 509 *uultu . . . uestro*, 808 *uestro corpore*; and for the alternation, dictated purely and simply by metrical convenience, of plural and singular in *pectoribus . . . ore* cf. 1. 252 *de facie corporibusque*, 277–8 *maribus . . . femina*, 530 *pedem . . . comas*, 2. 183–4 *tigris . . . leones . . . taurus*, 545 *uxore mariti*, 3. 73–74 *corpora . . . ore*, 774 *tergo . . . terga*, 781 *femur . . . pectora*, etc. (cf. Naylor, *C.R.* xxi. 43). The *in* is of course ἀπὸ κοινοῦ: cf. *A.A.* 1. 333, 724, 763 *hi iaculo pisces, illi capiuntur ab hamis* (notice here too the alternation of singular and plural), and see *Notes I*, p. 55.

The corruption of *ore* to *orbe* can be paralleled in Ovid's manuscripts at *Am.* 2. 11. 28, 3. 1. 64, 3. 3. 6, *Her.* 16. 226, and elsewhere at, for example, *Cons. ad Liu.* 88.

2. 31–32 dixerat haec, sed et haec et multo plura licebat
diceret, egressus non dabat ille uiro.

32 diceret *Ker*; dicere et *Aw*; dicere *Ra* egressus *RAw*; progressus *r*; regressus *a*, *edd.*

With the apparatus criticus thus set out in full Mr. Ker's simple and elegant correction ought to command instant assent. My purpose in repeating it here is to add an argument not mentioned by Mr. Ker himself (*Ovidiana*, p. 225), which ought to weigh heavily: that his correction at last abolishes the unexampled scansion *rēgressus* (cf. Platnauer, *Lat. Eleg. Verse*, p. 63).

2. 269–70 quin etiam turdoque licet missaque corona
te memorem dominae testificare tuae.

269 corona *RAw*; columba *Par. lat.* 7994, *Antuerpiensis man. sec.* 270 testificare *Itali, Antuerpiensis man. sec.*; testificare *RAw*

A *corona* would be a possible lover's gift: *Martial* 11. 89 *intactas quare mittis mihi, Polla, coronas? / a te uexatas malo tenere rosas*. The dove, on the other hand, being the bird of Venus, was the lover's gift *par excellence*: *Met.* 13. 833, *Petron.* 85, *Theoc.* 5. 96, etc. The manuscript authority of *columba* is slender, but it is not unheard of in Ovid's text for the truth to be preserved by two *recentiores* only. It will be seen that the second hand of the Antwerp manuscript (in fact contemporary with the first) is alone² in offering *testificare* in 270; and for *Par. lat.* 7994 see 2. 726 n. below, though there I think that it is wrong. If *columba* is right, *corona* might be due to a reminiscence of *missa corona* at 1. 582.

A third possibility, which I have not seen suggested, is that *turdoque . . . missaque corona* is a hendiadys for *missa corona turdorum*. Compare *Martial* 3. 47. 10 *coronam pinguibus grauem turdis*, 13. 51. 2 *mihi de turdis facta corona placet*. This is a gift much more likely to appeal to the *orba senectus* mentioned in 271!

2. 387 nec mea uos uni donat censura puellae.

donat *RAw*; damnat *Heinsius ex Lincolniensi, edd.*

¹ I am bound to admit that in all the examples of *os* used as a collective singular that I have found in the *Augustan* poets it means 'mouth', not 'face'. But cf. perhaps *Ter. Heaut.* 572 *concedas aliquo ab ore eorum*, *Cic. de rep.* 3. 15 *ut esset posteris ante os docu-*

mentum, Phil. 8. 20 *ante os oculosque legatorum*, etc.

² I learn from Mr. H. C. Gotoff that *testificare* is found in five manuscripts, all of the fifteenth century, in Roman libraries: independent conjecture, or survival of tradition? There is usually no means of knowing.

The *Lincolniensis* cannot now be identified, but it is not weight of authority which has maintained *damnat* in the text all this time. What are its intrinsic merits? Presumably the quasi-legal flavour, which is enhanced by the proximity of *censura*; but that flavour is lost if *damno* is taken in its classical sense of *destino* (*Thes. L.L.* 5. 1. 18. 82 ff.), and for the sense 'condemn to', with the penalty in the dative case, there seems to be no good example earlier than Apuleius (*ibid.* 15. 66 ff.). *donat* is perfectly good in itself and it too has a legal flavour, the sense 'hand over', as a slave or chattel: *Thes. L.L. ibid.* 2007. 17 ff., especially 27-29. Compare *Am.* 1. 3. 12 *me qui tibi donat Amor*.

2. 555-6 sed melius nescisse fuit: sine furta tegantur,
 ne fugiat uicto fassus ab ore pudor.

556 uicto fassus *Ras*; uicto falsus *As*; uicto laesus *rs*; ficto fassus *Madvig*

In modern texts it is *Madvig's* solution which is usually accepted; translators render 'lest the shame of confession fly from her dissembling countenance' or the like. His *ficto* for *uicto* admittedly removes a real difficulty; one can only agree with his remark (*Adu. Crit.* ii. 79) '... *victum os* in tali re quid sit, non intelligo'. But *fassus pudor* has been too readily accepted. The sense, as the context shows, is this: the lover is to forbear uncovering the delinquencies of his mistress, lest she cast discretion (*pudor*) to the winds and become openly promiscuous. The *pudor* which she may be forced to abandon is not the blushing modesty which confesses guilt, the *pudor* of *Am.* 2. 5. 33-34 *haec ego, quaeque dolor linguae dictavi; at illi / conscia purpureus uenit in ora pudor*, but the harlot's professional modesty inculcated by the *lena* at *Am.* 1. 8. 35-36, something for which 'discretion' would be a better rendering: compare the story of Mars and Venus told just below, 571-2 *bene concubitus primo celare solebant: / plena uerecundi culpa pudoris erat*, 589-90 *hoc tibi perfecto, Vulcane, quod ante tegebant, / liberius faciunt et pudor omnis abest*.

The Neapolitanus presents the following text:

ne fugiat fasso uictus amore pudor;

and this, ignoring *amore*, which arose from an untimely reminiscence of *Am.* 3. 10. 29, was accepted by Heinsius. (It perhaps ought to be expressly said that this aberration, *amore* for *ab ore*, casts no discredit on the authority of N in the article of *fasso uictus*, indeed it even strengthens it in ever so slight a degree; but I lay no stress on this point since, whatever my views on the existence of brilliant anonymous emendators in the *aetas Ovidiana*, they are of no importance here: I commend the lection of N on its merits.) The sense is perfect: 'lest, once she has confessed, all modesty [i.e. the mock-modesty which lends an appearance of decency to her offences] forsake her'. For *uictus pudor* compare *Am.* 3. 10. 29, just cited, *Met.* 1. 619 *uictus pudor esset amore*; for *fasso ab ore* compare the much harsher *Am.* 3. 8. 22 *hoc fassas tangis auara manus?*

Interchange of inflexions as a source of corruption in Latin texts is well attested; interchange of stems, as here, is less common. Housman gave examples from the tradition of the *Metamorphoses* and the *Eclogues* in an early paper (*Trans. Camb. Phil. Soc.* iii. 145); compare also Prop. 2. 32. 2, where editors have all accepted *lumina crimen*, restored by the Itali from the archetype's *crimina lumen*.

2. 725-6

sed neque tu dominam uelis maioribus usus
desine, nec cursus anteat illa tuos.

725 dominam *codd.*; domina Heinsius, Owen
7994 nec ω; ne RAs

726 desine RAw, *edd.*; desere Par. lat.

desine is rendered by those who have to justify this universally received text by a translation as if it were *desere*: 'neither . . . leave your mistress behind', 'ne va pas . . . la laisser en arrière', 'Sonst kommst du / Ihr zuvor'. *desere* is indeed easy and obvious: for the meaning 'leave behind' cf., for example, 2. 84 *altius egit iter deseruitque patrem*, *Met.* 8. 224 *deseruitque ducem*; and for confusion between *desero* and *desino* in manuscripts see *Thes. L.L.* 5. 1. 723. 9 ff. (in Ovid's manuscripts at *Am.* 2. 16. 41, *Met.* 3. 478, 7. 850, *ex P.* 2. 7. 83). But *desine* has overwhelming manuscript support, for what that is worth (see 2. 555-6 n. above; for Par. lat. 7994 cf. also 2. 269-70 n.), and I think that its face can be saved. Owen's neat *domina* had also occurred to Heinsius (*Bodl. Auct. S. v.* 10, p. 249), but neat as it is, its adoption slightly obscures the clean antithesis which ought to exist between the two clauses. Rather for *desine* read *desice*: cf. *Her.* 5. 75 *sic Helene doleat defectaque ploret* (*defectaque P*; *desertaque GEω*, *edd.*), *Ibis* 121 *solito defecta favore* (*defecta*] *deserta VZ*, al.: see La Penna's critical note). In minuscule script *desice* is as like to *desine* as *defecta* to *deserta*, and much more like than *desere* to *desine*.

3. 61-62

dum licet, et ueros etiamnunc editis annos,
ludite . . .

61 etiam num riceditis R

Several conjectures have been made in order to eliminate the supposedly objectionable phrase *ueros edere annos*; I do not give them because the publication in 1702 of Broukhusius's edition of Propertius rendered them all superfluous, even though the majority of them appeared after that event. In his note on Prop. 2. 7. 55 Broukhusius, attacking a correction of this passage by Gronovius, explained '*Edere significat profiteri*' and quoted Cicero *de leg.* 3. 7 to show that the reference was to making a return of one's age to the censors: *censoris populi aeuitates suboles familias pecuniasque censeo*; he further referred to *A.A.* 2. 663-4 *nec quotus annus eat nec quo sit nata require | consule, quae rigidus munera censor habet*. His interpretation has now been before the public for two centuries and a half; it required no deep researches on my part to find it, for the substance of it is given in Burman's note. All that I need add here is that *edere* in this connexion seems to have been a *t.t.*: see *Thes. L.L.* 5. 2. 91. 71 ff., in particular 92. 40, where it cites Pliny, *N.H.* 7. 163 *CXX annos Parmae tres edidere* (cf. *ibid.* . . . *Veleiatium, in quo CX annos sex detulere*). 'While you may, and while you still give your real age to the censors'; the words mean no more in effect than 'while you are still young', precisely the sense which through three centuries of misplaced ingenuity Ovid's editors have been striving to impart to them by emendation.

3. 96

quid, nisi quam sumes, dic mihi, perdis, aquam?

In *Notes I*, p. 65, I credited Gilbert with this punctuation. It is in fact at least as old as C. H. Jahn.

3. 231-2 aurea quae pendent ornato signa theatro
inspice, contemnes: brattea ligna tegit.

231 pendent *codd.*; splendent *Burmannus* 232 contemnes *Madvig*; contempnens *R*;
quam tenuis *A* ω tegit *ignotus ap. Thes. L.L.*; tegat *RA* ω ; beat *Madvig*

In 231 Burman's *splendent*, accepted by some editors, is attractive but quite needless. *pendent* means 'stand on high': Ovid *ex P.* 1. 8. 51 *ipse ego pendentis, liceat modo, rupe capellas*, | *ipse uelim baculo pascere nixus oues*, Virg. *E.* 1. 75-76 *non ego uos posthac uiridi proiectus in antro* | *dumosa pendere procul de rupe uidebo*, Juv. 7. 45-46 *subsellia . . .* | *. . . et quae conducto pendent anabathra tigillo*.

Consideration of 232 must start from the word or words after *inspice*. Editors unanimously accept *quam tenuis*, I cannot tell why: *Madvig*'s correction hardly differs from the reading of the best manuscript by one letter, for the intrusive *n* is common in *R*.¹ The sense is excellent: 'look at them closely and you'll despise them'. This leaves the last word in the verse to be dealt with. *Madvig* (*Adv. Crit.* ii. 79) saw that an indicative was needed, but he advanced no parallels for *beat* and, I think, would have been hard put to it to find any. His suggestion that *tegit* here arose from *tegas* in 230 is plausible, but it is equally possible that only the ending *-at* was due to corruption from this source. The repetition *tegas* (230) . . . *tegit* involved by accepting the correction of the anonymous author of the article *brattea* in the *Thesaurus* would not necessarily have been felt as offensive: see *Sedlmayer, Wiener Studien*, ii. 293.

3. 261 rara tamen menda facies caret: occulle mendas . . .
menda] mendo *R*, *edd.*

Every editor since Merkel has accepted *mendo* from *R*, this being what has been known for the last century as scientific method. Real science teaches as follows: (1) Ovid everywhere else prefers *menda* to *mendum*, except at *Rem.* 417 (and even there the manuscripts are divided); (2) this sentence is an example of the rhetorical figure known as *adnominatio*, which the change in declension spoils;² (3) *R* and its congeners not infrequently substitute *o* for *a*.³ It is this third consideration which chiefly ought to prevent one from going the whole hog and, retaining *mendo*, correcting *mendas* to *menda*; a solution which I mention so that it need not occur to anybody again.

3. 325-6 quamuis mutus erat, uoci fauissae putatur
piscis Arioniae, fabula nota, lyrae.

So punctuate 326. The conventional punctuation, with a comma after *piscis* only, leaves *uoci* unexplained. For *fabula nota* in apposition to the whole sentence compare 1. 681-2, 2. 561-2, though the parallels are not exact.

3. 455-6 discite ab alterius uestris timuisse querelis,
ianua fallaci ne sit aperta uiro.

¹ It seems to have been a feature of α , the common ancestor of *ROS*₂: 1. 207 *consistens* *S*₂, 277 *conuenient* *RO*, 423 *inspiciens* *O*, 729 *hinc* *R*, 738 *amans* *O*, 2. 466 *habent* *R*, 3. 280 *ferens* *R*, 771 *sint* *R* (see below), etc.

² See S. F. Bonner, *Roman Declamation*, pp. 154 f. There is a good example at v. 397

of this book: *quod latet, ignotum est: ignoti nulla cupido*.

³ 1. 53 *andromedon* *O*, 327 *obstenuisse* *O*, 455 *peroretur* *R*, *perhornetur* *O*, 514 *labet* *ego* *R*, 723 *undo* *O*, 2. 79 *noxosque* *R*, 179 *orbore* *R*, 262 *collidus* *R*, etc.

- 375-6 grande sonant tragici: tragicos decet ira cothurnos;
usibus e mediis soccus habendus erit.

376 usibus R; uersibus *cett.*

Editors all accept the reading of R but I have never seen the verse correctly translated. *habere* here has its common sense, which is given very scant recognition by Lewis and Short, of 'wear' (*Thes. L.L.* 6. 2396. 84 ff.). The meaning is 'the sock must be worn in accordance with ordinary usage'.

- 445-6 grandia per multos tenuantur flumina riuos,
laesaque diducto stipite flamma perit.

446 laesaque Put.¹ (u.l.), Monacensis 14809 saec. xii; haesaque R; cassaque r; magnaue E s; totaque Put.¹, rec. unus; letaue Put.² (u.l.), rec. duo; lataque s; sectaque s; altaque s, florilegia [cf. Notes I, p. 54]; saeuauque Merkl diducto Put. s, florilegia; deducto E s; seducto R s; subducto s

The materials out of which my text of 446 is constructed have been long available, though what I consider to be this obvious solution has eluded editors. To take the easier matter first, *diducto* is obviously right: sense alone could decide, but compare Quint. *Inst.* 5. 13. 13 *quae uero turba ualebunt, diducenda sunt . . . urgent uniuersa; at si singula quaeque dissolueris, iam illa flamma, quae magna congerie conualuerat, diductis quibus alebatur concidet, ut, si uel maxima flumina in riuos diducantur, qualibet transitum praebent.*¹ What of the first word of the verse? The second hand of the Puteaneus, which is certainly contemporary with the first hand and may be identical, often agrees with R: *haesaque* is the sort of nonsense that is not uncommon in R and, taken in conjunction with the reading of Put.², clearly points to *laesaque* as the reading of R's exemplar. Of the other manuscript readings those that are not absurd are obvious normalizations: *laesaque* must be considered first both on the grounds of its superior authority and as *difficilior lectio*. Can *laedere* = 'extinguish'? If flames can be killed, they can be injured: *Rem.* 808 *lenis alit flammis, grandior aura necat*, Pliny, *N.H.* 31. 1 *terras deuorant aquae, flammis necant*. A further analogy, if not a parallel, is provided by *ex P.* 4. 2. 18 (of a stopped-up fountain) *scilicet ut limus uenas excaecat in undis [inundans Madvig] | laesaque suppresso fonte resistit aqua . . .*

The sense then is: 'If the sticks are raked apart the flames will be extinguished and die.' (For the collective singular *stipite* compare *Fast.* 5. 506 *ignis in hesterno stipite paruus erat*.) The weakness of my interpretation, which I concede in advance, is that *laesa* is not what one expects after *grandia* in 445. To this I answer that in the prevailing uncertainty I am disposed to trust more than usual to manuscript authority: here, if anywhere, is where we ought to have some faith in α.

- 725-6 et loca saepe nocent; fugito loca conscia uestri
concubitus . . .

Most editors read not *saepe*, but *muta*. Why this should be so forms a short but instructive chapter in the history of scholarship, to be compared with

¹ The idea was no doubt a rhetorical commonplace; it is allied to the proverbs about *concordia* (Otto, *Sprichwörter*, s.v.): cf.

Aesop 53 Hausrath, Babrius 47, Plutarch, *de garrul.* 17 (511c), Publ. Syr. 289, Sall. *Iug.* 10. 6.

what has happened at *Am.* 3. 13. 4 (see *Mnemosyne*, s. 4, vol. 10, p. 318).¹ Heinsius found at 723 *multa* in R for *muta* (Put. also has *multa*, though he does not mention this); misreading his notes, he annotated 725 '*Et loca saepe nocent*' [*multa* Regius], and admitted *multa* to his text, followed by Burman and C. H. Jahn. Merkel's compositor, if I understand his note aright,² altered *multa* to *muta*, and thus established the vulgate. Truly, *habent sua fata lectiones*.

755-6

illic adsidue ficti saltantur amantes;

quid caueas, actor, quid iuuat, arte docet.

756 quid *RE Put.* ω; quod *rec. duo* actor ε; auctor r (aut-*R*) *E Put.* ω quid *Put.* ω; quod ε; qua *RE* ε iuuat *R* ε; iuuat *E Put.* ω docet *R* ω; nocet *E Put.* *Lentiensis*

I give the *textus receptus* of 756: 'By his skill the actor teaches you what to avoid and what is serviceable' (Riley). This may seem to give a tolerable sense: the lover is not to go to the theatre if he wants to be cured, for the romantic mimes which he will see there (755) will be instructive in the art of love, i.e. they will, so far from disenchanting him, make him more of a lover than ever. (For a parallel to the expression one can point to Prop. 1. 10. 19-20 *Cynthia me docuit semper quaecumque petenda / quaeque cauenda forent: non nihil egit Amor.*) But is not this a curiously oblique way of reinforcing the positive prohibition which was laid down at 751 *at tanti tibi sit non indulgere theatri*? If Ovid was to seem to want to keep his pupils out of the theatre, would he not have been more direct and unambiguous?

The text that I have printed is a thing of shreds and patches. The following is the text as offered by the *Etonensis*, which differs by two letters from the text of R (I ignore the common *auctor* / *actor* confusion):

quid caueas, actor, qua iuuat arte, nocet.

Ignoring *quid caueas* for the moment we have: 'The actor's art is as harmful <to you> as it is delightful.' What could be neater or more suitable? For the expression compare *Tr.* 4. 1. 35 *nos quoque delectant, quamvis nocere, libelli*. This leaves the first two words of the verse to be dealt with. Perhaps *id caueas*:³ *id cauere* is good Latin, though I know of no parallel sufficiently close to justify its citation in support of the phrase as used here (cf. *Thes. L.L.* 3. 632. 41 ff.); and though Ovid in his admonitory formulae does not use the plain jussive subjunctive of the second person very frequently, it is not unheard of: *Rem.* 117, 403, *A.A.* 2. 200, 543, 3. 263-4.

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¹ I cannot forbear adding a postscript to the instructive history there retailed. In the summary of my note printed in *C.R.*, n.s. viii. 195 for 'first Aldine' read 'second Aldine'.

² It reads '725 con. operae. multa libri.' Besides envying Merkel his printer one should note the confident assertion (founded on complete ignorance) that all the manuscripts have *multa*. Just so did Müller, *Rh.M.* xvii. 528 f. reprove Heinsius: 'die abweichende Angabe des Heinsius ist irrig', preferring to believe Merkel, who had never

seen the reading of R at 1. 293, the passage in question, rather than Heinsius, who had handled the manuscript himself. But Heinsius lived in the seventeenth century and it stood to reason that he could not collate.

³ I cannot pretend that I find this entirely compelling. Perhaps it is a mistake to trouble about the *ductus litterarum*; no correction based on *quid* of those kindly suggested by various friends has seemed to me convincing. Should one be bold and write (*exempli gratia*) *tu caueas: actor eqs.*?

ARISTOPHANES, *FROGS* 1407-67

I

AESCHYLUS has just defeated Euripides in the verse-weighting round of their contest. In 1407-10 he issues a final challenge, that with two lines he could outweigh Euripides' whole household. But as it stands the challenge is incomplete; to finish it we need something like 'and my poetry would easily appear the heavier'. Perhaps Aeschylus is interrupted by the next speaker—or, it has been suggested, by a thunderclap heralding the arrival of Pluto.

But when a speaker in Aristophanes is interrupted the words of the interruption normally have some bearing on the speech interrupted. The interrupter may be asking an eager question about the remark he interrupts (e.g. *Frogs* 7, 130), or commenting on it (e.g. *Frogs* 159, 554), or providing it with a different ending from that which the first speaker intended (e.g. *Frogs* 239, 1208). Indeed a speech which neither is complete in itself nor leads on to the next speech or event is dramatically weak and shows bad workmanship on the part of the dramatist. That it is bad workmanship does not of course prove that Aristophanes never wrote such a speech; but it is not what we should expect of him.

Now, when Aeschylus' speech breaks off in 1410, what follows it? Dionysus' remark *ἄνδρες φέλοι* . . . This remark, though it might be said to be a comment on the whole contest of lines 907-1410, has no particular bearing on Aeschylus' remark in 1407-10; it is not a comment on it, a question about it, or a suggested ending to it. Still less would a clap of thunder fulfil any of these functions. So either the interruption of Aeschylus' speech is a dramatic fault, or there is no interruption—that is, a line from the end of the speech has been lost.

When does Pluto appear? It is now generally agreed that he speaks 1414. Since 1414 is an answer to 1411-13, he must be present by 1411. There is no indication in the text that he appears before 1410. It has been suggested that he appears at 830; but if there is no indication in the text that he appears before 1410, it is most unlikely that he does so, for three reasons.

(a) It would be most unnatural for the arrival of a god, the ruler of the world in which the action of the play is taking place, to pass unnoticed and ignored by the other characters.

(b) If Aristophanes allowed a character to be present for nearly 600 lines before speaking, he would be committing the very fault for which Aeschylus is criticized in 911-20, and committing it to a far greater extent than Aeschylus himself (as far as we know) was ever guilty of doing.

(c) When a fresh character appears in Aristophanes, his arrival is normally announced in one or other of these ways: he immediately speaks himself; or he is addressed by name (e.g. *Frogs* 832); or, if his name is unknown to the other characters, he is addressed as *οὐ* or *οὗτος* (e.g. *Birds* 1199); or he is referred to (usually as *οὗτος* or *οὗτοσι*) by one of the other speakers (e.g. *Clouds* 8, *Peace* 1043, *Thesm.* 96). (This rule of course does not apply to silent characters, nor to very unimportant characters who have only two or three lines to say altogether, e.g. the servants in *Clouds* 56, *Wasps* 248.)

So Pluto does not appear before 1410; and the facts mentioned in (c) show that Dionysus' speech in 1411-13 is not a sufficient announcement of his arrival. Therefore at least one line announcing Pluto's arrival must have dropped out before 1411. It might be a line spoken by Pluto himself; but I think the arrival of so important a personage is more likely to have been hailed by a line from another speaker, employing the word *οὗτος* or *οὐτοσί* and saying something like 'Here comes Pluto!' This line will have been spoken either by the chorus-leader or, possibly, by Dionysus.

In 1411 Dionysus refuses to judge between the contending poets. This refusal to judge suggests that he has just been asked to make the judgement. 1411 is not an answer to Aeschylus' challenge in 1407-10, still less to a line heralding the arrival of Pluto. It is an answer to some such remark as 'Now you must make your decision'. This would be a natural remark for Pluto to make; it is the kind of remark which he does in fact make in 1467.

So there are three separate reasons for thinking that there is a gap in the text between 1410 and 1411: Aeschylus ought to complete his speech, someone ought to announce the arrival of Pluto, and someone, probably Pluto, ought to make a remark to which 1411 is the answer. Taken together I think that these reasons amount to proof.

I believe therefore that at this point we have lost several lines of the text—probably three, with a meaning something like this:

Ae. . . . and I'll easily outweigh him, household and all!

Ch. Stop the quarrel! Here is King Pluto.

Pl. Have you decided the contest, Dionysus?

II

In 1411-16 the verb *κρίνω* occurs three times, not always in the same sense. In 1411 it means 'judge', and its object is both the contestants. In 1416 it means 'judge the better' or 'select', and its object is only one of the contestants. Which meaning does it have in 1415? If *τὸν ἕτερον* is its object, it must mean 'judge the better' as in 1416. But is *τὸν ἕτερον* the object of *κρίνω* or of *λαβών*? In other words, at what point in the line does Pluto begin to speak? Of the best manuscripts, RU give no indication of a change of speaker at all, while VAM give *τὸν ἕτερον* to Pluto. Enger was the first to give *τὸν ἕτερον* to Dionysus, and he has been followed by many editors. (Stanford, for example, follows Enger without even remarking that his reading is not that of the manuscripts.)

Dionysus and Pluto are bargaining. (We must remember that Pluto is generally a hard-hearted god, who can only with difficulty be persuaded to allow a dead man to return to life.) Dionysus wants Pluto to allow him to take a poet back to the world of the living. Pluto wants Dionysus to settle the dispute between Aeschylus and Euripides. (It is true that in 811 it was the two poets themselves, not Pluto, who asked Dionysus to be the judge. But Pluto too wants him to make the decision; he asks him to make it certainly in 1467, and perhaps also, if my conjecture is correct, in the line that has fallen out before 1411.) Dionysus says (1411): 'I won't judge between them.' Pluto replies (1414): 'In that case (*ἄρα* implies 'If you do as you say', as in 252) you won't achieve what you came for' (i.e. I shall not let you take a poet away with you). Dionysus says (1415): 'And if I do judge between them?' Pluto replies (1415): 'You will take one of them away with you.' Pluto faces Dionysus with

an ultimatum and a dilemma: if he makes no judgement he may not take away a poet, but if he makes a judgement he may take one. For this concession Dionysus thanks Pluto with the word *εὐδαιμονοίης* (of which 'God bless you' is, in the circumstances, a rather Irish translation).

This makes it clear that *ἐὰν δὲ κρίνω* in 1415 presents the alternative precisely opposite to *αὐτοὺς οὐ κρίνω* in 1411. Therefore *κρίνω* has the same sense ('judge', not 'judge the better') in both these lines; therefore a plural object must be understood with it in 1415; therefore *τὸν ἕτερον* is the object not of *κρίνω* but of *λαβών*. Similarly 1414 presents the opposite alternative to Pluto's statement in 1415-16; and, since 1415-16 is a statement, it is likely that 1414 is also a statement, and not a question (as Stanford, for example, makes it).

III

In 1435-6 Dionysus asks the two poets for their opinions about how the city can be saved. In 1437-41 Euripides gives a ridiculous answer to this question. In 1442-50 he gives another answer which, though it begins in the style of a Euripidean oxymoron, contains advice probably intended by Aristophanes to be taken seriously. In 1451-3 Dionysus makes a comment and asks a question, to which Euripides replies; of these three lines 1452-3 certainly, and perhaps 1451 also, refer not to 1442-50 but to the ridiculous suggestion in 1437-41.

Editors have treated this passage in three different ways. Some (e.g. V. Coulon in the Budé edition, and R. E. Wycherley in *C.R.* lix [1945], 34-38) have accepted the text as the manuscripts give it. Some (following Aristarchus) have cut out 1437-41 and 1452-3. Some (e.g. H. Dörrie) have kept all the lines but rearranged them. I believe that Dörrie's rearrangement of the lines is the right one; and since he has already made a detailed review of the problem and defence of his view in *Hermes* lxxxiv (1956), 296-319, I need give no more than a summary of my reasons for agreeing with it.

We are not justified in cutting out 1437-41 and 1452-3; they were in the text in the time of Aristarchus, their style and humour are quite in Aristophanes' manner, and faulty syntax in 1438, though it may justify emendation of that line, does not justify excision of the whole of the passage in which the line occurs. Yet we cannot accept the lines in the order in which they appear in the manuscripts; for 1442 hardly makes sense when it comes directly after 1437-41, and 1452-3 comment on, and so should follow, 1437-41, not 1442-50. Where would 1442 naturally come? Clearly after 1462. Euripides expresses his willingness to advise when Aeschylus refuses to do so; *θέλω φράζειν* (1442) is a retort to *οὐ βούλομαι* (1461). 1442-50 should therefore follow 1462. Should 1451 go with them? Probably not; Palamedes is a model of ingenuity, and so the exclamation *ὦ Παλάμηδες* appropriately follows the description of aerial missiles in 1437-41 rather than the political advice of 1442-50.

So far I have followed Dörrie's treatment of the passage 1433-66; but some further problems remain in it.

IV

What is the syntax of 1437-8? If the two lines are intended both to be parts of the same clause, then they are ungrammatical, for *τις* cannot be the subject of *αἶποιεν*. Yet if they are not both parts of the same clause, what are they? Is it possible that 1437 begins a conditional sentence, which is broken off before even the protasis (let alone the apodosis) is complete, and 1438 is a wish?

This perhaps does not positively break the rules of grammar, but it is certainly a clumsy and incoherent way of speaking. Of course it is not impossible that the speech of a character in a comedy should be ungrammatical or incoherent if the character is a bad speaker or is surprised or nervous. But Euripides is an exceptionally fluent and self-possessed character. An ungrammatical or incoherent speech is therefore utterly inappropriate, and I think that 1437-8 should be emended.

The problem is that the nominative *τις* is not the subject of any finite verb. I do not see how it can be cut out or altered to another case (to make it genitive absolute, for example, is metrically impossible); therefore it must be provided with a verb. Either *πτερώσας* or *αἶροιν* must be converted into a 3rd singular optative (for I do not see where else an optative for *τις* could be inserted). We might write *πτερώσαι*; in this case we should have also to write either *καῖροιν* (ending 1438 with a dash) or *αἶροιν ἄν* (ending 1438 with a full stop). But in Attic the normal 3rd singular aorist optative of *πτερώω* would be not *πτερώσαι* but *πτερώσειε* (though in *Wasps* 726 we do find *δικάσαις* for *δικάσειας*). Or we might write *αἶροι* or *ἄρειν*; in this case *αῦραι* must be wrong. If we write *αὔρα* ('on the breeze' or 'by means of a breeze') instead of *αῦραι*, we are hardly making any change at all (for Aristophanes will have written both these words alike as *ΑΥΡΑΙ*). *αἶροι αὔρα* will not scan, but *ἄρειν αὔρα* will, and so is perhaps the most likely of the alternatives.

I therefore tentatively suggest that Aristophanes wrote *ἄρειν αὔρα* in 1438. Its corruption probably began with the conversion of *αὔρα* into *αῦραι*. This seemed to demand a plural verb, and the occurrence of *ναυμαχοῖεν* and *ραῖνοιν* at the beginnings of 1440 and 1441 helped to persuade somebody to change *ἄρειν* into *αἶροιν* instead of merely into *ἄρειαν*.

V

What is the purpose of *μέν* in 1442? It may mean 'but', if (*pace* Denniston) adversative *μέν* is a possible usage in Attic. (Professor Dover has drawn my attention to *Clouds* 654, where *μέν* does seem to mean 'but'.) If it does not mean 'but', it implies a *δέ*-clause ('whereas Aeschylus refuses to speak, because he doesn't know what to say') which is so obvious that it is omitted.

VI

Dörrie believes that the advice given in 1443-4 and 1446-50 should be spoken by Aeschylus. He thinks that Aristophanes means the advice to be taken seriously (for its tenor is very similar to, for example, that of the 'coinage' passage of the *Parabasis* (718-37), which is no doubt meant seriously), and that such advice is out of place in the mouth of Euripides. Accordingly he re-allocates a number of the speeches in this passage.

This seems to me impossible. 1443-4 and 1446 ff. must be spoken by Euripides, for these reasons:

(a) *ἅπαντα πίσθ'* and *πίστ' ἅπαντα* are a parody of a well-known trick of Euripides' style. The trick consists of putting together two adjectives, or an adjective and a noun, which are the same except that one has and the other lacks the privative prefix *ἀ-*. The result is an oxymoron or a paradox. Examples are: *γάμον ἀγαμον* (*Hel.* 690), *πόρον ἀπορον* (*I.T.* 897), *φύλα τὰ πρότερον' ἀφύλα* (*Trö.* 287). This kind of verbal trick is not at all in the manner of Aeschylus. (It is true that in 1465 Aeschylus is made to utter a remark of the same kind; but that merely

makes it all the more probable that 1443-4 belongs to Euripides. To give Euripides and Aeschylus one Euripidean paradox each is perhaps permissible; to give two to Aeschylus and none to Euripides—except in a scene like 1261-1364 where each deliberately and openly parodies the other throughout—would be very strange.)

(b) It is not true that Aeschylus' remarks are all sensible and Euripides' all foolish. If they were, Dionysus would not find it as difficult as he does to make up his mind which is the better, and the audience would be able to foresee the result of the contest long before it is announced. Aristophanes intends the contest to be a close one. If, in reply to Dionysus' final test-question, Aeschylus were to give the serious advice contained in 1446-8 as well as that in 1463-5 while Euripides contributed nothing but the facetious fantasy of an aerial vinegar-raid, the result would be a foregone conclusion.

(c) It is important to observe how carefully Aristophanes balances against each other the tests which the rival poets undergo and the speeches which they make. They first appear at 830. In the scene 830-74 each of them speaks 13 lines. In 885-94 each utters a prayer of 2 or 3 lines. Euripides attacks Aeschylus in a scene totalling 66 long iambic lines (905-70) and 21 short ones (971-91); Aeschylus attacks Euripides in a scene totalling 73 long anapaestic lines (1004-76) and 21 short ones (1077-98). Aeschylus' prologues are criticized in a passage of 58 lines (1119-76), Euripides' in one of 74 lines (1177-250). Lines in the lyric parodies of 1261-364 are hard to count, but of the four songs Aeschylus and Euripides sing two each. In the verse-weighting scene (1378-410) the verses are weighed line for line. In answering Dionysus' question about Alcibiades Euripides gives three lines of advice (1427-9), Aeschylus either three or two (1431-2). In short, throughout the contest the speeches of the contestants are approximately (though not exactly) equal.

So in the passage 1437-65 we should expect to find that the two poets give answers of approximately the same length to the question asked by Dionysus in 1435-6. If, while placing 1442-50 after 1462, we allow the speakers to keep the lines given them by the manuscripts, that is what we have. In 1437-41 Euripides offers four lines of frivolous and ridiculous advice; in 1454-62 Aeschylus in three lines and three incomplete lines refuses to offer any advice at all. So far, tit-for-tat. Then in 1442-50 and 1463-6 each in turn gives a serious piece of advice.

That Euripides should utter the advice contained in 1443-4 and 1446 ff. is therefore essential in order to preserve the balance of the scene. It may perhaps cause slight surprise that this piece of advice is somewhat longer than that given by Aeschylus. Even if we exclude from the reckoning 1443-4 on the ground that it is merely a prelude inserted to raise a laugh and restated more clearly in 1446-8, yet still Euripides seems to have five lines (1446-50) while Aeschylus has only three (1463-5). Perhaps this difference is too small to matter. But there is another possible explanation, which will appear shortly.

VII

Dörrie believes that there is a lacuna of two lines between 1450 and 1463.

We should certainly expect Dionysus to make a comment after the suggestion contained in 1446-50, as he does in, for example, 1430 and 1466. In the manuscript order of the lines 1451 appears as his comment on 1446-50, but, as I have already explained, I think that 1451 should follow not 1446-50 but 1437-41.

However, it is not necessary to suppose that his comment on 1446-8 is lost; it is probably 1449-50. 1449-50 do little but repeat what has already been said in 1446-8—except that they make a logical mistake. 1446-8 merely assert that if the Athenians changed their policy they would be successful. 1449-50 assert that, since their present policy is unsuccessful, the opposite policy could not help being successful, which is a *non sequitur*. This is just the kind of foolish comment which Dionysus might make on a serious suggestion. (In 1466 he again makes a foolish comment on a serious suggestion.) If we accept that 1449-50 are spoken by Dionysus, we may notice that now Euripides in 1446-8 gives three lines of serious advice, just as Aeschylus in 1463-5 gives three lines of serious advice, and that Dionysus then makes a comment containing *γε* (which may be roughly translated 'Yes') near the beginning, just as his comments in 1430, 1451, and 1466 have *γε* near the beginning.

But this does not affect the fact that Aeschylus' speech in 1463-5 needs something to introduce it. We need here a line from Dionysus with roughly the same sense as *σὺ δὲ τίνα γνώμην ἔχεις*; in 1430 or *τί δαὶ σὺ; τί λέγεις*; in 1454, calling on Aeschylus to take his turn in offering a suggestion. It may even be that we have lost more than one line here. When Aeschylus last spoke (in 1461) he refused to give political advice. Now (in 1463) he is willing to give some, probably because he realizes that otherwise Euripides will have gained an advantage in the contest from his sensible suggestion in 1446-8. But it is possible that he still needs more persuasion than an abrupt *τί δαὶ σὺ; τί λέγεις*; Perhaps we have lost as much as two or three lines of dialogue between Aeschylus and Dionysus.

1435-66 now make a well-balanced scene. Dionysus asks his question. Euripides gives four lines of ridiculous advice; Aeschylus in three lines and three incomplete lines refuses to give any advice. Euripides then offers to make a suggestion; after two short preliminary remarks (1442 and 1443-4) he gives three lines of serious advice, which are followed by a foolish comment from Dionysus. Aeschylus then probably makes one or more preliminary remarks (which we have lost), and gives three lines of serious advice, which are followed by a foolish comment from Dionysus.

VIII

We can now consider together the gap in the text at 1410-11 and the one at 1450-63. How are these gaps likely to have occurred? It is of course possible that a sleepy copyist anxious to finish his task simply left out a line or two from time to time without realizing that he did so. But another possibility is that near the end of an early copy of the play the ends (or beginnings) of successive leaves (or one leaf with lines written on both sides) became worn or torn, so that the last (or first) few lines on each of them were lost. If this is what happened, to find two lacunae in the same scene is less, not more, surprising than it would be to find only one; and in this sense the two may be said to support each other. It also becomes likely that the two lacunae are of about the same length, so that, if there are three lines missing after 1410, there may well be three lines missing after 1450 also. However, this would mean that each page contained 55 lines, which may seem an improbably large number. This suggestion of how the missing lines were lost can be called no more than a guess.

IX

I now give the text which I suggest may be the correct one. To save space I have omitted lines 1417-34, on which I have made no comments.

- Αι. καὶ μηκέτ' ἔμοιγε κατ' ἔπος, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν σταθμὸν
αὐτός, τὰ παιδία χῆ γυνή, Κηφισοφῶν,
ἐμβὰς καθήσθω, ξυλλαβὼν τὰ βιβλία·
ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ ἔπη τῶν ἐμῶν ἐρῶ μόνον 1410
(.)
- Χο.
Πλ.)
- Δι. ἄνδρες φίλοι, κἀγὼ μὲν αὐτοὺς οὐ κρινῶ.
οὐ γάρ δι' ἔχθρας οὐδετέρῳ γενήσομαι·
τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι σοφόν, τῷ δ' ἥδομαι.
- Πλ. οὐδὲν ἄρα πράξεις ὥνπερ ἦλθες οὐνεκα.
- Δι. ἐὰν δὲ κρίνω;
- Πλ. τὸν ἕτερον λαβὼν ἄπει, 1415
ὀπότερον ἂν κρίνης, ἵν' ἔλθῃς μὴ μάτην.
- Δι. εὐδαιμονοίης.
- Δι. ἀλλ' ἔτι μίαν γνώμην ἐκάτερος εἵπατον 1435
περὶ τῆς πόλεως ἦντιν' ἔχεται σωτηρίαν.
- Ευ. εἰ τις πτερώσας Κλεόκριτον Κινησίαν
ἄρειεν αὔρα πελαγίαν ὑπὲρ πλάκα—
- Δι. γέλοιον ἂν φαίνοιτο. νοῦν δ' ἔχει τίνα;
- Ευ. εἰ ναυμαχοῖεν, κἄτ' ἔχοντες ὀξύδας 1440
ραίνουεν εἰς τὰ βλέφαρα τῶν ἐναντίων.
- Δι. εὖ γ', ὦ Παλάμηδες, ὥ σφοδράτη φύσις. 1441
ταντὶ πότερ' αὐτὸς ἡῦρες ἢ Κηφισοφῶν;
- Ευ. ἐγὼ μόνος· τὰς δ' ὀξύδας Κηφισοφῶν.
- Δι. τί δαί σύ; τί λέγεις;
- Αι. τὴν πόλιν νῦν μοι φράσον
πρῶτον τίσι χρῆται· πότερα τοῖς χρηστοῖς; 1455
πόθεν;
- Δι. μισεῖ κάκιστα.
- Αι. τοῖς πονηροῖς δ' ἡδεται;
- Δι. οὐ δῆτ' ἐκείνη γ', ἀλλὰ χρῆται πρὸς βίαν.
- Αι. πῶς οὖν τις ἂν σώσειε τοιαύτην πόλιν,
ἢ μήτε χλαῖνα μήτε σιούρα ξυμφέρει;
- Δι. εὗρισκε νῆ Δί', εἶπερ ἀναδύσει πάλιν. 1460
- Αι. ἐκεῖ φράσαμ' ἂν, ἐνθαδὶ δ' οὐ βούλομαι.
- Δι. μὴ δῆτα σύ γ', ἀλλ' ἐνθένδ' ἀνίει τὰγαθά. 1462
- Ευ. ἐγὼ μὲν οἶδα καὶ θέλω φράζειν.
- Δι. λέγε. 1442
- Ευ. ὅταν τὰ νῦν ἄπιστα πίσθ' ἡγώμεθα,
τὰ δ' ὄντα πίστ' ἄπιστα—
- Δι. πῶς; οὐ μανθάνω.
ἀμαθέστερόν πως εἰπέ καὶ σαφέστερον. 1445

- Εν. εἰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἷσι νῦν πιστεύομεν,
τούτοις ἀπιστήσαιμεν, οἷς δ' οὐ χρώμεθα,
τούτοις χρησαίμεσθα, σωθείημεν ἄν.
- Δι. εἰ νῦν γε δυστυχοῦμεν ἐν τούτοις, πῶς
τάναντί' ἂν πράξαντες οὐ σωζοίμεθ' ἄν; 1450
- ⟨.⟩
- Αι. τὴν γῆν ὅταν νομίσωσι τὴν τῶν πολεμίων 1463
εἶναι σφετέραν, τὴν δὲ σφετέραν τῶν πολεμίων,
πόρον δὲ τὰς ναῦς, ἀπορίαν δὲ τὸν πόρον. 1465
- Δι. εὖ, πλήν γ' ὁ δικαστὴς αὐτὰ καταπίνει μόνος.
- Πλ. κρίνοις ἄν.

I am indebted to Professor K. J. Dover for several helpful comments.

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DOUGLAS MACDOWELL

LIVIUS RESARTUS

IN an earlier article (*C.Q.*, N.S. vii [1957], 68–81) a reconstruction was proposed of the stemma of the primary manuscripts of Livy. If such a stemma has been correctly drawn up, it must work, that is, it must enable an editor to arrive by routine methods at the reading of the archetype. The archetype itself need not have good readings—it may have bad ones, emended by later manuscripts—but, good or bad, it gives the tradition from which all correction must start. If these readings make grammatical, linguistic, and contextual sense and if there is no external tradition such as citations in grammarians or scholia, they may be taken to constitute what Livy wrote; if they do not make sense, then the editor must resort to correction on the basis of them. Secondary manuscripts, which are in fact the product of earlier emendation, are to be entirely disregarded except for the intrinsic merit of individual emendations. So, too, there is no justification for following particular manuscripts without knowing where they stand in the transmission and what they represent. Picking and choosing among manuscripts without a stemma is simple nonsense.

On these points the two main critical editions of the century (edited by Conway–Walters for the Oxford Classical Texts series and by M. Bayet for the Association Budé) display an unfortunate whimsy, an over-devoted addiction to Herodotus' philosophy— $\pi\alpha\nu\ \alpha\nu\ \epsilon\iota\eta$. O. Pettersson, in his *Commentationes Livianae* (Upsala, 1930), protested against Conway's approach, particularly in matters of word-order, and cut away much dead wood from the text, but since a new revision cannot be expected for some years, it may be useful to gather the evidence from the first five books and to show how a strict adherence to the stemma establishes the text. The passages have been selected for their illustrative value or intrinsic interest in order to show how a proper reconstruction of the archetype gives not only the authoritative reading but the acceptable one, and a much larger number of non-controversial or unenlightening ones have been omitted together with others where there is a residue of doubt. The result may seem to be little more than a register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of editors but this is far from being its intention.

The outline stemma of the Nicomachean manuscripts is as follows, the *sigla* being those used in the previous article:



μ = M (Vorm.), supported by A^2 (contamination)

π = EOUFB

λ = H(T)DRL

N.B. The agreement of OE^2 with λ against the rest may generally be attributed to contamination. The archetype may be dated to the late fourth century, the hyparchetypes to the following century.

It will be seen that if $\mu\pi$ or $\mu\lambda$ agree against λ or π respectively on any

reading, that reading must have been the reading of N. If $\pi\lambda$ and μ agree on separate readings, the fact that there is a straight choice as to which represents the archetype gives clear grounds for critical argument. The decision between them may depend on whether there is any external confirmation (e.g. the Veronensis (= *Ver.*) which is not Nicomachean) or whether it can be shown that the reading of one or the other conforms to a type of failing common in that family.

Passages where $\mu\pi$ agree against λ and restore a reading that can be accepted:

2. 15. 1 P. Lucretius inde et P. Valerius Publicola consules facti.

sic π P. Lucretius et P. Valerius Publicola μ P. (Sp. RDL) Lucretius inde et T. Herminius P. Valerius Publicola λ M. Horatius iterum et P. Valerius Publicola, tum Sp. Lartius et T. Herminius *Gronovius alii alia*

Only λ has *T. Herminius* which must therefore be an intelligent guess (as 8. 23. 2; see *C.Q.* 1957, p. 70) to put right the chronological difficulties; it cannot be the archetypal reading. The trouble arises from the fact that Livy has omitted at least one pair of consuls that traditionally belong to the early Fasti. As compared with Dionysius of Halicarnassus he gives the following lists:

509 L. Iunius Brutus
L. Tarquinius Collatinus
Suff. P. Valerius
Sp. Lucretius (2. 8. 4)
M. Horatius Pulvillus

508 P. Valerius II (2. 9. 1)
T. Lucretius

506 P. Lucretius
P. Valerius Publicola

505 M. Valerius (2. 16. 1)
P. Postumius

504 P. Valerius IV (2. 16. 2)
T. Lucretius II

508 Π. Ουαλέριος τὸ β'
Λουκρήτιος

507 Π. Ουαλέριος ὁ προσαγορευθεὶς
Ποπλικόλας τὸ τρίτον
Μ. Ὁράτιος Πόλβιλλος τὸ β'

506 Σπ. Λάρκιος
Τ. Ἑρμῆνιος

505 Μ. Ουαλέριος ἀδελφὸς Ποπλικόλα
Π. Ποστόμιος Τούβεργτος

504 Π. Ουαλέριος ὁ Ποπλικόλας τὸ
τέταρτον
Τ. Λουκρήτιος τὸ δεύτερον

That Livy narrates the events of the first few years of the Republic according to the version of Licinius Macer is clear from the chronology and description of the battle of Lake Regillus (Licinius frs. 9, 11 Peter) and from details like 18. 5 where his main source made T. Larcus the first dictator and his variant (= Valerius Antias) the non-consular M'. Valerius; it is, too, noticeable that from chapter 22 he follows a new Valerian source and so repeats the stories of Cora and Pometia in a different context (Weissenborn; Seemüller, *Die Doubletten in der Ersten Dekade*). Again, we may contrast Livy's version with the jottings of early Roman History in Cicero's *Brutus* which derive from Valerius Antias (Jordan, *Hermes*, vi [1872], 196 ff.). Licinius Macer based his framework of consular Fasti on the *libri lintei* which can be shown to be an unreliable and defective list of magistrates (*J.R.S.* xlviii [1958], 45). It should therefore cause

no surprise that his list for 506 (P. Lucretius and P. Valerius Publicola) does not agree with the conventional list in Dionysius (from Valerius Antias according to Peter, *Hist. Rom. Rel.*, cccxxvii), that he has lost one complete year, and that in P. Lucretius he has recorded a purely mythical personage. The defective state of the *libri lintei* explains why he dates the war with Porsenna to 508 while Dionysius dates it to 507 (5. 20) and puts the dedication of the Capitoline temple by Horatius in 509 rather than 507. A whole year was missing in the *libri lintei* and Licinius had no trace of a second consulate for Horatius.

All attempts to secure from the manuscripts at 2. 15. 1 two pairs of consuls start from the wrong premiss. Besides, the repeated *praenomen* in μ is not a trace of a telescoped name. In several manuscripts p or \tilde{p} = *proprium* (sc. *nomen*) is inserted before a name to indicate to the reader that he is coming to a proper name (O. Rossbach, *B.Ph.W.*, 1920, p. 697 n. 1 and, independently, E. Harrison, *Cambridge University Reporter*, 27 May 1930). This phenomenon is frequent in the manuscripts of Livy, particularly in M, e.g. 2. 43. 3, 51. 4, 61. 1, 64. 2, 3, 12. 5, 24. 1, 31. 5, 4. 1, 5. 8. 1, 12. 10, 16. 1, 47. 9, 18. 8).

(Discussions by E. Schwartz, *P.-W.*, 5. 949; A. Klotz, *Livius u.s. Vorgänger*, p. 213.)

3. 61. 7 haec ubi . . . dicta dedit, advolat deinde ad equites.

avolat λ

The distinction is one of outlook. We are not concerned with the scene he is leaving (as in 1. 57. 8) but with his destination. So 2. 20. 10 *tum ad equites dictator advolat* (cf. 2. 24. 1, 25. 41. 2).

4. 49. 1 latores . . . actionem deposuere. At duo bella insequens annus habuisset ni . . .

At duo *Petrarch, Welz*; aduo M; arduo π ; duo λ ; duo assidua vel ardua *Edd. vet.*

At is required to point the contrast between the attainment of internal peace by the checkmating of the agitation of the tribunes and the threat of external war; cf. 5. 48. 1, 49. 1.

Passages where $\mu\lambda$ agree against π and restore a reading which can be accepted:

3. 50. 7 illis quoque enim filias sorores coniugesque esse

enim om. π *Conway, Bayet*

enim is needed to make explicit why Verginius thought that his fellow soldiers would sympathize (Gronovius). For its position cf. 2. 18. 4 *id quoque enim traditur*.

3. 69. 6 cum consules in contione pronuntiassent tempus non esse, . . . omnes iuniores

cum consules cum in contione P; consules cum in contione P²; consules cum in contentione FB; consules in contentione U; cum in contione RDL

As every schoolboy knows, where *consul(es)* is the subject both of a *cum*-clause and of the main verb, it precedes the *cum* as 3. 3. 10 *consul, cum . . . isset, . . . rediit* (cf. 2. 28. 5, 3. 72. 1): where it is the subject only of the *cum*-clause, it follows the *cum* as 2. 43. 7 *cum consul . . . instruxisset, pedes noluit* (cf. 3. 64. 7,

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be the object of *expugnassent*, it should be the agency employed, i.e. <per*> *tribunos militum*.

5. 12. 4 *res* . . . *militia ita gererentur ut nullo bello ueniretur ad exitum rei*.
rei λ; *rei rei* M *corr.* MP; *spei* π

Editors follow π, understanding 'to that fine that the army nevir cum to the end of thare purpois be na manner of battall' (Bellenden). There is no parallel for *exitus spei*, which would in fact mean 'until all their hopes were finished'. *ad exitum rei* gives the right sense ('failed to reach a definite solution') and the phrase is found again at 3. 53. 2, Quint. *Inst.* 4. 2. 41. It is only doubted because of the preceding *res*, but this awkwardness is a feature of Livy's early writing (cf. 1. 60. 1, 2. 31. 7, 35. 4, 18. 2 Pettersson).

5. 30. 4 His adhortationibus principes concitati; patres, senes iuvenesque, cum ferretur lex agmine facto in forum venerunt.

Distinxi. senesque iuvenes π; *senesque RDL principis Gronovius, Weissenborn patres secl. Walters; [patres] senesque et iuvenes Bayet*

The juxtaposition of *principes* and *patres* is hard. An apposition would demand *principes patrum* (Conway), while to delete *patres* involves the improbable concept of youthful *principes*. A bare, unqualified *principis* (sc. Camillus) would be quite without precedent in Livy. Two stages are involved: the *principes* are stirred by Camillus' appeals and in their turn organize a demonstration of the whole body of *patres*.

5. 34. 8 ipsi per Taurinos saltusque Iuliae Alpibus transcenderunt
saltusque iuliae alte alpes π; *saltusque iuriae alpes* H

π's reading is a valueless dittography. The difficulties consist simply in the fact that Livy appears to bring the Gauls over the wrong pass. The Julian Alps are in the extreme north-east of Italy above Trieste, nowhere even remotely near Turin, and the whole narrative militates against believing that two infiltrating columns were on the move, one from the north-west and another from the north-east (D'Arbois de Jubainville). But before abandoning the archetype, two possibilities should be considered. Can we be sure that Livy (and his source) were as well-informed geographically as we are? A mere mistake like Thucydides' *Τερναῖος κόλπος* (6. 104. 2) cannot be excluded. Further, as Heurgon has recently argued (*R.É.L.* xxxiv [1956], 85-87), it is by no means certain that what we know as the Julian Alps were so called in 25 B.C. since they were not incorporated in the empire till 15 B.C. or later. Nor were the Cottian Alps, which Livy ought to be meaning, given that name before 8 B.C. (Amm. Marc. 15. 10. 2); they may well have been referred to as Julian up till that time.

N read *Iuliae Alpibus* and the minor aberrations of its descendants cannot be used for the conjectures that litter the *apparatus* of Conway and Bayet.

2. 34. 9 cur ego plebeios magistratus, cur Sicinium potentem video
potentem μλ; *pollentem* π

With the exception of Rhenanus (1535) most editors have without justification persisted in reading *pollentem* or *potentem pollentemque* (Gruter, Gebhard).

Even Conway inclines to it. For *potens* with a pejorative flavour cf. 3. 19. 3, 65. 8, 1. 54. 4.

3. 37. 5 *id modo plebs agitabat quonam modo tribuniciam potestatem . . . repararent*

id . . . quonam om. M plebe PRDL; plebem P²FUB

The reading of μ can be inferred from Rhenanus's text which has *plebs* in common with HO. *id agitāt aliquis* followed by an Indirect Question is standard in Livy (39. 55. 5, 29. 10. 8, 35. 34. 2) whereas *id agitāt* (sc. *exercet*) *aliquem* (Bayet) is never found.

Passages where there is a straight choice between μ and $\pi\lambda$:

1. 7. 13 *inde institutum mansit donec Pinarium genus fuit ne exiis sollemnium vescerentur*

eo sollemnium λ ; sollemnibus π Bayet; eorum sollemnium Walters

-ibus is a common error for *-ium*. λ 's *eo* is mere dittography.

1. 52. 4 *ceterum et capita nominis Latini stare ac sentire cum rege videbant et Turnus sui cuique periculi . . . recens erat documentum.*

videbant et Turnus $\pi\lambda$; videbantur M; Turnus om. M

videbantur is impossible since Livy is stressing the observation of the Latin rank and file; it simply arose from a mangled transposition—*videbant Turnus et*—to which M is liable (cf. 1. 1. 10, 1. 3. 4, etc.). Meyer parallels the expression *Turnus erat documentum* by 28. 39. 17, Cicero, *Rab. Post.* 27, to which should be added Cicero, *De Domo* 126 and Seneca, *Dial.* 1. 3. 9.

2. 36. 4–6 *cuius repentinae cladis ne causa dubia esset . . . Tunc enimvero deorum ira admonuit.*

nem causa M; ne causa $\pi\lambda$; ne cui causa Alscefski; ne causa ei Conway, Bayet cura M om. RDL; cura ea Conway; cum ira Bayet

Certainly the gods are angry (Macrob. *Sat.* 1. 11. 3 *ob quam causam indignatus Iuppiter*), but to insert gratuitous demonstrative pronouns limits the scope of the lesson which they are intending to teach the Romans in general as well as the unfortunate Latinus.

2. 57. 3 *dum consules tribunique ad se quisque omnia trahant*

tribunique consules μ PDL; tribuni et consules OH; tribuni consulesque P²FUB; tribuni, consules Bayet; tribunique et consules Alscefski, Conway

Alscefski perhaps, but no Roman could have been insensitive enough to abandon the constitutional order and name the tribunes before the consuls in the senate. N has merely misplaced a word (*consules*) as a comparison with *Ver.* shows that it often does.

2. 60. 2 *nec ullo ante bello latius inde actae praedae. ea omnis militi data est.*

acte praede ea omnis M²Vorm.; act(a)e praed(a)e omnis $\pi\lambda$; acta est praeda. ea omnis Conway, Meyer; acta est praeda. et omnis Bayet; acta praeda. ea omnis Wesenberg, Madvig

The plural is common in these phrases, sometimes as a real plural when two parties collect the spoil separately (1. 32. 3, 5. 32. 4) or when the spoil is of

different kinds (10. 2. 8, 2. 64. 3, 3. 38. 3), but often, as here, generally (1. 5. 4, 5. 12. 5, 5. 24. 2, 10. 12. 8, etc.). There is no difficulty in the switch from the plural to the collective *ea omnis* (D. Heinsius). The omission of *ea* in $\pi\lambda$ was due to haplography as at 4. 7. 12, 5. 44. 3.

3. 27. 1 patriciae gentis sed qui cum stipendia . . . pedibus propter paupertatem fecisset, bello tamen primus longe . . . habitus esset.

sed qui cum M; et qui cum *dett.* Luterbacher, Bayet; sed qui tum $\pi\lambda$; cum *secl.* Conway

A double opposition is implied, as Pettersson saw. Tarquinius is a patrician *but* too poor to be a knight. Tarquinius fought in the ranks *but* his prowess made him the leading figure in the army. See Mikkola, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

4. 4. 5 hoc ipsum, ne conubium patribus cum plebe esset, non decemviri tulerunt paucis his annis pessimo exemplo publico, cum summa iniuria plebis?

sic MA²P²; pessimo exemplo $\pi\lambda$; pessimo publico Klockius

Klockius' conjecture, which secures a familiar phrase, has been widely accepted and would mean 'with damage to the public weal', which, besides being repetitious with *summa iniuria plebis*, is untrue. In fact the prevention of *conubium* is only an injustice and a harm to the *plebs*; it is as a precedent for an Apartheid policy that it is dangerous to the State as a whole.

The reading of μ (supported by A² and P²) provides the right sense and balances *exemplum* against *iniuria* as in Cicero *De Leg.* 3. 32 *plus exemplo quam peccato nocent*.

4. 8. 2 morum disciplinaeque Romanae penes eam regimen, senatui equitumque centuriis decoris dedecorisque discrimen, sub dicione eius magistratus publicorum ius privatorumque locorum, vectigalia populi Romani sub nutu atque arbitrio essent.

senatus *codd. corr.* M. Müller conditione π eius magistratus ius publicorum ius privatorumque *Ver.*; eius magistratus publicorum privatorumque M; sub dicione eius magistratus *secl.* Conway; sub dicione eius magistratus, ius publicorum privatorumque Bayet

π 's *condicione* is a mere mistake, as is the dittography in *Ver.*, *magistratus ius* (echoed from 4. 7. 3 *magistratus eius ius*). The archetype reading, supported by *Ver.*, is unimpeachable, providing a doubly balanced clause 'regimen . . . discrimen', followed by the chiasmic 'sub dicione . . . sub nutu atque arbitrio'.

4. 51. 5 aptissimum tempus fuerat . . . delenimentum animis Bolani agri divisionem obici, quo facto minuisset desiderium agrariae legis.

fuerat M; erat $\pi\lambda$ ad tempus Madvig; in tempus Seyffert

The pluperfect is required for the implied condition: 'it would have been a very suitable occasion to appease their anger. . . As it was, a sense of injury was aroused' (B. O. Foster).

(*Aptissimum tempus* followed by acc. and inf. has raised doubts since the only comparable phrase in Livy is *aptius erat* (without *tempus*) followed by acc. and inf. (28. 43. 14, 32. 28. 7). But *aptum tempus* is a standard phrase (1. 9. 6, 35. 19. 2, 10. 20. 9) and, if any change is needed, it will be *obiendi**)

2. 34. 10 *rapiant frumentum ex agris nostris quemadmodum tertio anno rapuere. utantur annona quam furore suo fecere*
fruantur utantur MVorm.

The reading *fruantur* was wrongly classed (*C.Q.* 1957, p. 76) as a case where μ preserves an extra-Nicomachean reading by contamination. It is merely an echo of *rapiant fru-* and can be discarded, although it has been recently accepted again by Meyer.

4. 8. 4 *mentio inlata ad senatum est rem operosam . . . suo proprio magistratu egere.*

ad senatum MP²; ab senatu(m) PB) $\pi\lambda$; ab iis in senatu Pighius; ab . . . in senatu Novak; apud senatum Madvig

No exact parallel for *mentio inlata ad senatum* is found but it is modelled on the common *res delata ad senatum* (4. 14. 3, etc.) and the alternative (*ab senatu*), preferred by Lallemand and Luterbacher, is ruled out by the fact that *mentionem inferre* is only used of individual speakers in the senate (cf. 4. 1. 2, 4. 47. 6).

4. 33. 4 *Non ferro exstinguitis ignes? non faces . . . ereptas ultro inferetis?*

inferetis $\pi\lambda$; inferctis M; infertis Conway

The sentences are not strictly parallel, the sense being: 'if you will not use swords, then at least use torches'. This demands a future tense in the second half. Foster, missing this, suggested *exstinguetis* as well.

1. 2. 1 *bello deinde Aborigines Troianique simul petiti*

simul om. M Weissenborn, Bayet

M is guilty of numerous accidental omissions at the opening of the first Decade. The omission here could be paralleled by 1. 25. 10 *prius itaque quam alter qui (om. M Conway, Pettersson cf. 5. 44. 3) nec procul aberat*; 1. 53. 4 *excepit deinde eum (om. M Conway) lentius spe bellum*; 2. 27. 9 *vi agebatur, metusque omnis et periculum libertatis (om. M Gronovius, Pettersson) . . . in creditores a debitoribus verterant*.

1. 24. 6 *Fetialis erat M. Valerius; is patrem . . . Sp. Fusium fecit.*

is om. $\pi\lambda$

Many editors before Bayet, including Gronovius, have followed $\pi\lambda$, and Pettersson compares 3. 31. 2 for the asyndeton. But the omission is an inevitable haplography after *-ius* and the demonstrative pronoun *is* an essential ingredient in the text-book character of the narrative; cf. below, *id . . . peragit, id ubi dixit . . .*

2. 58. 5 *odisse plebem plus quam paterno odio; se victum ab ea*

odio M; odio quod $\pi\lambda$; odio. Quid? Weissenborn, Bayet

Appius Claudius was not a superb orator but *Quid?* is too frigid even for him; *quod* is found added by manuscripts to make the connexion of thought clearer. So at 4. 44. 3 *quidnam id rei esset? (quod codd.) . . . ne quaestorem quidem . . . factum*.

In the preceding examples it can be seen that a systematic use of the stemma will reveal authoritative and acceptable readings. But the archetype is not always right. Where it is corrupt or mistaken, however, it is often possible to see the kind of errors which it makes and to correct them. For instance a comparison with *Ver.* shows that N sometimes contained variant readings which are likely to be due to the editorial activities of Nicomachus. In other cases N has errors endemic to uncial manuscripts.

Passages where the archetype is in error but can be corrected:

1. 14. 9 prius paene quam Romulus quique cum eo visi† erant circumagerent frenis equos, terga vertunt.

quique cum eo quique cum equis abierant visi erant M.RDL; quique cum eo equis ierant P^oFB

N read, with misgivings, the double *quique cum* $\begin{pmatrix} \text{equis ierant} \\ \text{eo visi erant} \end{pmatrix}$

Romulus, like William the Conqueror, had pretended to run away, thereby catching his pursuers off their guard. *cum equis ierant* does not convey this nor can *visi erant* stand by itself to mean 'were seen' (Madvig, M. Müller), since in all cases it is qualified by *procul* (4. 40. 2, 7. 23. 6); *fusi* (Bayet) or *pulsi* (Grunauer) *erant* is inaccurate, for the Romans only pretended to be routed. Either a verb has dropped out before *visi erant*, e.g. *avehi* (Walters), *abire* (Weissenborn), or we should simply read *virī** (cf. Vergil, *Aen.* 7. 682).

1. 21. 4 et Fidei sollemne instituit. ad id . . .

et soli Fidei *codd.* Rossbach, Bayet, sed ante ad quattuor litterae in M et E vacant.

The space in ME shows that N was uncertain where *soli* could or should go and betrays it as being a marginal stray (*ex sollemne*). It is meaningless anywhere.

1. 23. 8 Etrusca res quanta circa nos teque maxima sit, quo propior Volscis, hoc magis scis.

propior Volscis M π ; propior es Volscis λ ; Volscis *secl.* Voss, Conway Tuscis Strothius Veiis *Iac. Gronovius* propiores vos estis Bayet

The Volsci have not yet appeared in history and do not do so for another 130 years (1. 53), nor is there any rival tradition which dates their emergence early, but no conjecture based on *es* is conceivable since *es* was not read by the archetype. *Volscis* is probably an anticipation of the succeeding *scis*, corrupted from *vel* or *v.l. scis* (cf. 1. 45. 2 *iam tum vel tantum* π). We are left with *quo propior, hoc magis scis* which may be compared with Tacitus, *Ann.* 1. 34. 1 *sed Germanicus quanto summae spei propior, tanto impensius pro Tiberio niti*.

4. 6. 10 patricios desperatio . . . adipiscendi honoris . . . deterrebat.

adipiscendi λ ; adpiscendi M; apiscendi π

N probably read *adpiscendi* which was then 'corrected', but this points to *adipiscendi* not *apiscendi*. *Apiscor* (a rare word found in early Latin at Sisenna fr. 94 and in Cicero's letters before being taken up by self-conscious writers like Pliny and Tacitus) has an archaic and dignified flavour which makes it appropriate to the two contexts (both in speeches) where it certainly occurs in Livy (4. 3. 7 and 44. 25. 2). The choice of the word gives a special character to

the speaker which is wholly irrelevant and uncalled for here—a point overlooked by Gries (*Constancy in Livy's Latinity*, p. 82).

4. 35. 4 spectaculum comitate etiam hospitum ad quam publice consenserant advenis gratius fuit.

Gronovius hospitium ad quam publico consensu venerant advenis gratius (ad- PUEH) fuit πλ; hospitium ad quam consenserant consilio publico consensu venerant advenis gratius a fuit M; hospitium ad quam publico consensu venerant advenis ad (... xi litt ...) fuit Ver.

It is clear from the context that the Romans have decided, as a matter of public policy, to put on an act of sociability, and therefore the subject of the relative clause must be the Romans and not the visitors to the Games. But to agree on a common policy is not, in Latin, *venire ad* but *consentire ad* (cf. Cicero, *Ad Att.* 15. 18. 7 *exercitu ad benevolentiam erga nos consentiente*) and on this point the archetype of the Nicomachean and non-Nicomachean manuscripts was already corrupt—a corruption which arose from the succeeding *advenis* and gave birth to the muddled *advenis ad* ... of Ver. and *advenis* ... *ad* fuit of N. No reconstruction based on *venerant* will work.

M's dittography must represent a conjectural gloss of its own because it does not correspond to anything in Ver. (see *C.Q.* 1957, p. 76) and so does not possess any independent validity at all as an external tradition. It made the correction *consenserant* rightly but this should not have led editors, from Rhenanus to Mommsen and Bayet, to woo its other contributions (*consilio publico*) which is a late Latin phrase (Solinus 53. 12; Sulp. Severus *Chron.* 1. 37. 3, etc.).

5. 7. 13 tum primum equis suis merere equites coeperunt.

sic Ver. tum hic primum equos si merere M; tum primum equos sumere cett.; tunc primum Weissenborn; hinc primum Walters, Bayet equo suo mereri Bayet

N preserves the remains of *equis suis* which is shown to be right both by the Periocha ('equis suis mereri') and by 4. 7. 5 *equis se suis stipendia facturos*, but M indicates that his text is defective by the symbol *h.d.* (cf. E. A. Lowe, *Studi e Testi*, 126 [1946], 36–79) corrupted into *hic*. There are no grounds for Weissenborn's or Walters's conjecture. Except for special emphasis *tum primum* is invariable in Livy (e.g. 1. 7. 13, 2. 58. 1, 3. 63. 11, 4. 29. 8, and especially 1. 35. 8).

The best commentary on the passage is to be found in J. Walker, *Supplementary Annotations on Livy* (1822).

5. 46. 9 inde, qua proximum fuit a ripa, per praeruptum eoque neglectum hostium custodia saxum in Capitolium evadit.

hostiae custodiae μ; hostium custodia(m EOPFB) π; hostium custodiae λ

N is corrupt but M's vacillation over *-ae* points to *custodia* which, in view of 24. 46. 1 *maxime neglectum custodia vidit*, must be read (Weiss., Madvig).

Passages where the isolated testimony of a single manuscript has wrongly been preferred to the consensus of N:

- π E 4. 55. 3 duo singuli singulos sibi consules adservandos adsidua opera desumunt

singuli singulis π; singulis singulos E Bayet; singulis Ver.

- O 1. 59. 1 cultrum ex vulnere Lucretiae extractum, manante cruore, prae se tenens

manantem O Conway, Bayet

Blood can drip from things (45. 16. 5) and things can drip with blood (40. 39. 9) but in the archetype blood dripped (Burck).

2. 32. 10 conspirasse inde ne manus ad os cibum ferret nec os acciperet datum nec dentes conficerent.

nec dentesq. conficerent M; nec dentes quae conficerent λ; nec dentes acciperent quae conficerent O; nec dentes quae acciperent conficerent Walters

N had the corrupt *dentesq.* or *dentes quae* but intrusive *-que* is too common to need illustrating and should not be used as a basis for conjecture (*quicquam* Weissenborn; *quid* Wimmer; *malae dentesque* Heerwagen; *denique* Freudenberg, H. J. Müller; *gulae* (!) Cornelissen).

Early quotations of this famous analogy (in Lambert of Hersfeld and Eginhard) are too free to throw light on the text.

2. 40. 3 ubi . . . nuntiatum Coriolano est adesse ingens mulierum agmen, is primo, ut qui . . . motus esset, multo obstinatio . . . erat; dein familiarium quidam . . . inquit

is primo Bauer; in primo codd. secl. O Edd. vet., Conway; primo dett. Madvig

in primo = primo is not found; primo is required to balance dein, is to balance familiarium quidam.

3. 2. 1 in Latino agro stativa habuit castra. quies . . . exercitum tenuit.

castra om. OH [sic], Conway habuit; castris Gronovius, Bayet

The position of the verb is not uncommon (Kühnast, *Livian. Syntax*, p. 314) and the phrase *stativa castra* is normal (Caesar, *B.C.* 3. 30. 3, 37. 1; *Bell. Afr.* 26. 3).

3. 16. 6 concilium inde legi perferendae habere

legis O Conway, Bayet

Cf. 2. 8. 3 comitia collegae subrogando habuit (Drakenborch).

5. 44. 3 pro tantis populi Romani beneficiis

sic Ver. H pro tantis prolat(in)is p(i)r MRDL pro tantis beneficiis p.R. pristinis O; pro tantis pristinis p.R. π; pro tantis p.R. pristinis Conway

- U 4. 60. 3 Tr. pl., communis ordinum laetitiae concordiaeque soli expertes, negare tam id laetum patribus universis nec prosperum fore quam ipsi crederent.

partibus U Zingerle, Harant; patribus secl. Madvig, Bayet laetum patribus nec prosperum civibus universis Conway post Crevierum

Livy uses *universus* only of the senatorial order except where it is opposed to *singulus* (e.g. 2. 35. 5, 2. 9. 8, 2. 44. 5). *patribus universis* is, therefore, secure.

The point is simply that the *patres* think that they will steal the demagogues' thunder by getting in first with an offer to pay the troops but they will not all

be so pleased when they start asking who is to foot the bill. Their own pockets or new taxes on the people?

5. 6. 1 plurimum intererat insuescere militum nostrum non solum parta victoria frui sed . . . pati taedium

parata U Edd.

The revolt against the archetype, here supported by *Ver.*, was led by Burman (on Petronius 16; cf. Ovid, *Epist.* 8. 82) but *victoria frui* means 'to enjoy the fruits of victory' not 'to win a victory'. It is premature to enjoy the fruits of a victory which is still only *parata* and not yet *parta* (cf. 3. 62. 3). Claudius is reminding the troops that they must win victories as well as enjoy them afterwards.

S(orbonicus; related to P/P² and used by Bayet):

- S. 5. 45. 8 oppressae ab hoste inuisitato inaudito

inuisitatos audito λ; inusitato S Bayet

See G. W. Williams, *J.R.S.* xlv (1955), 228.

- P²FB 3. 40. 2 oratio fuit precibus quam iurgio similior, orantis per sui fratris parentisque manes ut . . .

similis perorantis codd.; similis orantis P²FB Kratz Bayet

perorantis will hardly suit C. Claudius' abject tone, and *orantis* is picked up by *orare* in 40. 3 below. The error arose partly from the succeeding *per manes*, but editors who insist on reading *similis* in defiance of Wölfflin's demonstration (*Livian. Krit.*, p. 14) overlook the fact that the two troubles cannot be separated.

- F 4. 2. 2 cuius rei praemium sit in civitate, eam maxime semper auctibus crescere; sic pace bonos, sic bello fieri. maximum Romae praemium seditionum esse; fid et singulis universisque semper honori fuisse.

ideo F Weissenborn, Conway; ideo eas Ernout

The strict parallelism between *cuius rei praemium . . . eam . . . semper* and *Romae praemium seditionum . . . semper . . .* shows that the subject of *honoris fuisse* must be not the *praemium* but the activity which produced the *praemium*. *id et* (H. J. Müller, Bayet) or *id* (Madvig) is thus impossible. *ideo* breaks the symmetry and is wholly without authority as a reading.

Sense and traces favour *seditiones*.^{*1}

5. 47. 2 seu vestigio notato humano qua nuntius a Veii pervenerat seu sua sponte animadverso ad Carmentis saxo adscensu aequo

saxos ascensu λ; saxo in ascensu Mπ; saxo in adscensum F Heraeus, Conway, Bayet

aequus in . . . is not found, so that Heraeus's trust in F proves ill placed, whereas (*in*)*iquus adscensu et simm.* is common in Livy. N was already corrupted by an intrusive *in* from 'animadverso'. See Shackleton Bailey on Propertius 4. 4. 83 *mons erat adscensu dubius*. Mountaineers notice a cliff or a route up a cliff, not *saxi* (Gronovius) or *saxorum* (Drakenborch) *adscensu*.

^{*1} This conjecture owes much to discussion with Mr. D. M. Last.

- B 1. 12. 7 haec precatus veluti si sensisset auditas preces
veluti B.R. *Frigell, Conway, Burck* sed cf. 1. 56. 12, 21. 8. 6.
- λ. H 1. 3. 3 urbem . . . reliquit, novam ipse aliam condidit
relinquit H E^x. FB *Conway, Bayet*
2. 46. 1 prope certa spes erat non magis secum pugnatueros quam pugnaverint
cum Aequis.
pugnarint M om. H *Conway, Bayet*
- See, for example, *Praef.* 7, 4. 32. 2, 6. 14. 11 (Pettersson), and 2. 56. 14.
5. 4. 1 Atque ego . . . postea disseram
Atqui OEH *Conway*

The opening of a new section in Claudius' speech, which calls for a mild resumptive particle, not a strong adversative. This effect is achieved by *Atque ego* (28. 28. 1, 34. 4. 11), not unlike Horace, *Sat.* 1. 10. 31 (see Fraenkel, *Horace*, p. 130 n. 3; cf. p. 327 n. 5). *Atqui ego* is not found in Livy (Fügener).

- L 4. 22. 6 donec perfosso a castris monte erecta in arcem via est
a castris om. L *Conway, Bayet*
5. 50. 2 fana omnia, quod ea hostis possedisset, restituerentur terminarentur
expiarenturque, expiatioque eorum in libris per duumviros quaereretur.
quoad Mommsen terminarenturque expiarenturque λ; terminarenturque L *Bayet*,
Burck; expiarenturque Ver. Gruter, *Lutcherbach*

Mommsen argued that since not all the shrines were captured (e.g. the Capitoline temples, on the traditional account, were saved) Livy could not have written 'because the enemy had occupied *fana omnia*'. But the implication of 49. 3 (*in conspectu habentes fana deum*) is that for rhetorical purposes Camillus regards the whole religious world of the Romans as in enemy hands. Furthermore *quod* is guaranteed by the succeeding sentences: *cum Caeretibus hospitium publice fieret, quod . . . recepissent . . . ludi Capitolini fierent, quod Iuppiter . . . tulatus esset*.

The *quod*-clauses do not correspond to the technical *quod . . . verba fecerunt* of S.C. and, indeed, there is no trace of official language in this passage. It is therefore inappropriate to turn the three verbs into a 'solemn tricolon' (G. W. Williams, l.c.).

- R 3. 5. 14 ut Romam reditum est, iustitium remissum est; caelum visum est
ardere plurimo igni
reditum est et R *Conway, Bayet*; remissum Gruter, *Conway, Bayet*¹

The writing is bald but intentionally so. As at 2. 19. 2 (*his consulibus Fidenae obsessae, Crustumeria capta*; see Fraenkel, *Plautinisches im Plautus*, p. 156) Livy

¹ Bayet's *apparatus* suggests that he places some confidence in the readings of R (e.g. at 1. 41. 1 he gratuitously accepts the present *eicit* for N's *elecit*)—an inconsiderable manuscript although its fourteenth-century corrector (R²) was a scholar of genius. It has a

slight historical interest in that it passed through the hands of Torquato Bembo and Fulvio Orsini and was lent by the Bembo family to supply the text for the Aldine edition of 1518 (Bembo *ep.* mcclix).

aims to reproduce the language of official announcements, so here, in a passage devoted to prodigies, he recaptures the flavour of the *Annales*, *quo nihil ieunius*.

5. 42. 6 nec tranquillior nox diem tam foede actum excepit; lux deinde noctem inquietam insecuta est nec ullum erat tempus quod . . . cesserat.

inquiet R; inquieta Gronovius, Madvig, Conway, Bayet; inquietam inquieta Schaezel lux . . . insecuta est secl. Crevier

Periods not moments of time are unquiet and *lux* is the dawn not the day. In particular *inquietus* is associated with what one would naturally expect to be quiet, viz. the night, as at Val. Max. 8. 14. ext. 1 *noctes inquietas*; Tacitus, *Ann.* 1. 65. 1 *nox per diversa inquit*; Seneca, *Clem.* 1. 9. 3 *nox illi inquieta erat*; cf. Milton, *Paradise Lost* 5. 9-11 'his wonder was to find unwak'nd Eve / with tresses discompos'd and glowing cheek / as through unquiet rest'. Note also Livy 10. 43. 12; Seneca, *Epist.* 56. 8; Apuleius, *Met.* 8. 9. 2; Ps.-Quint. *decl.* 15. 7 p. 282. 26; Pliny, *Epist.* 6. 20. 2.¹

Passages where the unanimous consensus of N has been wrongly abandoned in favour of the reading of secondary manuscripts or of conjecture:

1. 39. 3 'Videsne tu puerum hunc' inquit (Tanaquil)

vidine M; tu om. PFUB; viden dett. Gronovius, Conway, Bayet

videsne is certainly found at 6. 29. 1 and 7. 34. 4 and commands the manuscript authority here (cf. Cicero, *Ac. pr.* 2. 57 *videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo?*). *viden* is confined to poetry (Vergil, *Aen.* 6. 779; Terence, *Heaut.* 2. 3. 11; Sil. Ital. 12. 713) and is not to be defended as a characterizing touch in Tanaquil's speech, for Tanaquil is presented as a tough, un-heroic, un-poetic figure (Frigell, *Epilegomena*, pp. 56-57).

1. 53. 3 ubi cum dividenda praeda quadraginta talenta argenti refecissent

divident M; dividita Ed. Mog. 1518, Edd., Conway, Bayet

Divido frequently comes to mean the same as *divendo*, when the proceeds are realized from the distribution of the booty. See *Thes. L.L.* 5. 1599. 55 ff. and cf. 4. 16. 2, 31. 4. 6, 31. 50. 1; Suetonius, *Iulius* 54. 2.

3. 36. 3 Idus tum Maiae sollemnes ineundis magistratibus erant. Initio igitur magistratus primum honoris diem . . . insignem fecere.

Initio igitur magistratu Duker, Madvig, Conway, Bayet

What is wrong with the phrase? Cf. Caesar, *B.C.* 3. 20. 1 *initio magistratus tribunal . . . collocavit*; Cicero, *In Vatinius* 27 *cum lex esset aequa promulgata initio magistratus*.

3. 68. 4 numquam vestrum quisquam re, fortuna domum auctior rediit

fortuna, re λ; fortuna dett. re Rhemanus, Conway, Bayet

Res and *fortuna* are often coupled, e.g. Cicero, *Verr.* 2. 59, 3. 16, 4. 11; *Phil.* 13. 6.

¹ I owe the Milton reference to Mr. C. B. Ricks and the others to Mr. C. J. Riley and the kindness of the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*.

4. 9. 8-9 in agros . . . excursiones facit; urbem quoque omnis etiam expertem ante certaminis multitudine opificum ad spem praedae evocata obsidere parat.

omni Morstadt, Edd. experte Drakenborch, Luterbacher; expertium Walters, Bayet

The city, *qua* bricks and mortar, has not been jeopardized up till now, although the surrounding land has been pillaged. Now *opifices* are being massed to attack the city itself. *expers* . . . *certaminis* is guaranteed by 40. 8. 4 *expertes* . . . *certaminum* (Walker) and conjectures based on Morstadt's *omni*, because the city has been subject to riots and disorder if not physical attack, destroy the neat abl. abs. *multitudine* . . . *evocata* and produce the un-Livian *omnis* . . . *multitudo* in exchange for the idiomatic *expers omnis* = 'utterly unaffected by' (*Praef.* 5, 23. 5. 11).

4. 55. 5 ea adversa civitatis res vires tribuniciae actioni adiecit.

civitati D⁴ Madvig, M. Müller, Conway, Bayet

adversa res, as in Cicero, *Pro Sulla* 57; *Tusc. Disp.* 3. 21, is the equivalent of a noun (*incommodum*) and is followed by a genitive. A dative is only used when *adversa* is predicative, i.e. *res est adversa mihi*.

4. 58. 12 ne domi per otium memor libertatis coloniarumque aut agri publici aut suffragii libere ferendi consilia agitet.

que secl. Edd. vet., Madvig, Conway

libertatis corresponds to *suffragii libere ferendi, coloniarum* to *agri publici*; the freedom of the colonies does not enter in.

5. 13. 11-12 repulsos deinde insecuti victores ingentem ediderunt caedem; nec ita multo post iam palantes veluti forte oblatis; populatores Capenatis agri reliquias pugnae absumpsere.

Distinxit Walker palantibus veluti tuti forent Madvig; palantes veluti secl. Conway; palatis veluti forte oblatis Bayet alii alia

Punctuation removes the difficulties. It is the victim not the attacker who is *oblatus* (cf. 5. 15. 4 *sed* . . . *propior interpret* . . . *oblatus*, 9. 31. 7, 10. 19. 16, 40. 55. 5). Rabble *palantes* are met with in 2. 26. 3, 4. 55. 4, and *veluti forte*, which has been doubted, is substantiated by 24. 48. 7 *velut forte congregata turba* (Pettersson).

5. 21. 10 cuniculus delectis militibus . . . plenus in aede Iunonis . . . armatos repente edidit

in aedem dett. Conway

The mine had already penetrated *into* the temple so that the troops are released inside and not into it. Cf. 29. 14. 3 *in aede Iunonis Sospitae strepitum editum*.

5. 26. 10 videbatur . . . diuturnus labor . . . ni fortuna imperatori Romano simul et cognitae rebus bellicis virtutis specimen et maturam victoriam dedisset.

simile cognatae Heusinger; simul et coniunctae Madvig; simul incognitae vir eruditissimus apud Gronovium, Walker [et] maturam Petrarck, Weissenborn, Conway

Camillus' *virtus* in war is already known: he is now given an opportunity of displaying his *virtus* in another sphere and at the same time securing a speedy victory. So 5. 27. 13 *vos fidem in bello quam praesentem victoriam maluistis*. For *cognitae . . . rebus* cf. 21. 53. 18; for *specimen virtutis* cf. 8. 7. 18.

Baillet well translates: 'à la fois révéler sa puissance si connue à la guerre et hâter sa victoire.'¹

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¹ I am indebted to Dr. A. H. McDonald for his encouragement and his criticism of this paper, and to Prof. S. Billanovich for his willing generosity in disclosing the early history of the *Mediceus* and discussing the problems of the text.

THE DATE OF COMPOSITION OF SUETONIUS' *CAESARES*

THE only external evidence we have of the date of publication of Suetonius' *Caesares* is the statement of Iohannes Lydus¹ that it contained a dedication to Septicius Clarus as praetorian prefect—a statement, incidentally, which is related to the correct nomenclature of the office, and not in any way to the persons concerned. This dedication, lost along with the opening chapters of *Iulius*,² must accordingly have been made some time during the years 119–22, before Septicius and Suetonius were dismissed from their respective posts, apparently for lack of respect to the empress.³ What is by no means certain is that the dedicatory epistle was attached originally to the whole series of Lives; nor that all the Lives were completed, far less published, while Suetonius was still employed as *ab epistulis* to Hadrian. Various arguments have been adduced from Suetonius' alleged use or alleged neglect of the *Annals* of Tacitus; but Syme is surely right in his conclusion⁴ that there is no positive evidence that Suetonius used either the *Annals* or the *Histories*, the latter of which were certainly available for his use. If the *Annals* were completed before the death of Trajan, as was suggested by Meister⁵ with much more cogent arguments than Syme⁶ gives him credit for, and certainly with more regard for the context of the vexed passage in *Ann.* 2. 61 than Syme himself accords it, then it must simply be argued that Suetonius recognized the double unsuitability of employing Tacitus for his own work. In the first place, borrowings from the *Annals* would require much more thorough assimilation than he normally allowed his material, if they were not to stand out from the non-descript style of the *Caesares*; and secondly he was well aware of the cavalier use Tacitus had made of sources which might more safely be used at first hand. But in our present state of knowledge Tacitus' dates can throw no light at all on Suetonius⁷.

For clues to this problem we can search only in the Lives themselves. Here the outstanding feature of significance is the disparity between the earlier and later Lives in respect of the use of documents. These are frequent in the first two Lives, especially the long and varied citations of Augustus' correspondence; and more of these occur in *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, and *Claudius* where those Lives overlap the lifetime of Augustus.⁸ And that is all. The single quotation from a letter of Nero⁹ is plainly taken from a narrative source which Suetonius was using, and in no way appears to come directly from the original (which was in all probability in Greek, considering the occasion of its dispatch, the nationality of the recipient, and the strange syntax of the Latin). Contrast the claims made particularly in *Tib.* 21. 3, *Cl.* 3. 2, and in the *Vita Horatii*. Again, the reference to the autograph of Nero's poems⁹ is such an isolated exception as to emphasize the complete lack of documentary sources elsewhere in the later Lives. Yet

¹ *de Mag.* 2. 6.

² Macé, *Essai sur Suetone*, p. 200.

³ S. H. A. *Hadr.* 11. 3; but see Crook, in *Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc.* cxxxiv, n.s., no. 4 (1956–7) pp. 18–22, for a suggested re-dating of this dismissal to 128 or later.

⁴ Tacitus (1958), pp. 781–2.

⁵ *Erano*, xlv (1948), 94–122.

⁶ *Op. cit.* 768–70.

⁷ Macé, p. 182.

⁸ *Nero* 23. 1.

⁹ *Ibid.* 52.

Suetonius plainly recognized the value of such evidence (cf. especially the use of a letter to clinch his argument about Caligula's birthplace in *Cal.* 8. 4), which, unlike orthodox historians, he did not mind quoting in full, Greek and all—a habit which he bequeathed to those unscrupulous forgers, the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*.

Some reason must be given for this change of method. Macé,¹ well aware of the problem, suggests that Suetonius simply lost interest in the subject; or else that he was pressed by Septicius to publish before he was ready, and was thus prevented from quoting the letters of Titus or the will of Vespasian. Neither of these suggestions is plausible or supported by any sort of evidence; nor is the unexplained statement of della Corte,² that where he could no longer make use of the correspondence of Augustus, as he did for the Lives of that emperor and his successor, he turned to the personal recollections of his grandfather, father, and himself. More credible might be the view that Hadrian took exception to his secretary's exploitation of the archives for such purposes and forbade further use of this material. But if it was the appearance, or private reading, of *Augustus* which drew his attention to Suetonius' practice, the ban would presumably have prevented the use of those extracts which have come down to us in the following Lives. What we have to account for is the fact that *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, and *Claudius* are well provided with quotations from Augustus' letters, but with nothing from those of the emperors in question.

The obvious explanation for this phenomenon (which Macé and others seem not to have been prepared to consider) is that Suetonius ceased to draw on the imperial correspondence because he ceased to have access to it: that is to say, because he was dismissed from his employment as *ab epistulis*, and thus was deprived of the use of such records as were the responsibility either of that bureau or of those of his previous imperial posts, *a studiis* and *a bibliothecis*. We do not know whether his dismissal involved Suetonius' withdrawal from the capital, perhaps to Hippo Regius in Numidia, which appears to have been his *patria*;³ but he appears to have been able still to carry out the research implied in *Vesp.* 1. 3–4 in the north-east corner of Samnium (perhaps familiar country, if Syme is right in suggesting⁴ that he had family connexions with Pisaurum). Nor is it clear what would have been the standing in the public libraries of a former director who had incurred imperial displeasure; nor how easy historical research would be to a writer deprived of the use of the libraries.

However this may be, it is important to consider the view of M. A. Levi,⁵ that Suetonius never drew on the imperial archives at all. The suggestion is made, and followed by della Corte,⁶ that the correspondence of Augustus, together with Antony's letters to him, was actually published—or at least that copies were available in the public libraries and presumably elsewhere. Antony's letters, as quoted in *Aug.* 69, indeed raise a grave problem, since they could hardly have been published with the approval of the recipient or his heirs, and can hardly have been perused except at the time of dispatch (possibly by Pollio, though he could hardly have published them), or by a subsequent researcher in the imperial files, who is more likely to have been Suetonius than anyone else. Augustus' letters, on the other hand, are quoted, or referred to, by

¹ pp. 183, 210–11.

² *Suetonio, eques Romanus* (1958), p. 154.

³ Marec and Pflaum, *Libya*, i (1953), 214, with the doubtful concurrence of Syme,

p. 780.

⁴ p. 781.

⁵ *Divus Augustus* (1951), pp. xliv ff.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 168.

various later writers: Nepos¹ seems merely to have learnt from Atticus concerning the frequency of Octavian's letters to him; Tacitus² to have read a life of Virgil containing suitable extracts such as Macrobius³ quotes from Virgil's own letters (Tacitus' words, *testes Augusti epistulae*, no more prove the accessibility of the original letters than the following phrase, *testis ipse populus*, proves the Augustan plebs still to have been alive); the elder Pliny⁴ quotes letters which he does not appear to have seen; Charisius appears to be quoting from a work by Hadrian⁵ or by Suetonius himself,⁶ as does Priscian;⁷ Macrobius⁸ is always dubious when he professes to quote directly. Gellius⁹ claims to have read in his own home a book of Augustus' letters to the young C. Caesar; and this is confirmed by Quintilian,¹⁰ indicating that such a book was indeed in circulation. Suetonius never quotes from this collection, presumably for the very reason that it was easily available to the public. Quintilian elsewhere¹¹ claims to have studied the autograph of Augustus' letters, *quas sua manu scripsit aut emendavit*. These were clearly not at the disposal of the general public; but there is no reason to suppose that the official professor of rhetoric and imperial tutor would have had much difficulty in perusing the same archives which were available to Suetonius *ex officio*. It is hypercritical to question Suetonius' own statements¹² about his inspection of these autographs: *litterae ipsius autographae ostentant . . . ; notavi et in chirographo eius illa praecipue: non dividit verba . . . saepe non litteras modo sed syllabas aut permutat aut praeterit*. These details must be derived from somebody's inspection, and presumably from that of Suetonius. In the latter passage, however, he does not claim to have broken Augustus' code for private letters, but in fact derives his knowledge of it, as Levi saw, from Augustus' own statement in a letter *ad filium*, perhaps to be found in the book of letters *ad C. Caesarem*, and known to us from a quotation by Isidore,¹³ who took it from some work of Suetonius, whether an *epimetrum* to the *de viris illustribus*, as Reifferscheid suggests,¹⁴ or from a distinct work *de notis litterarum*. Dio¹⁵ is also aware of this code, though in a different context, for he declares that it was employed in letters to Agrippa, Maecenas, and other close friends. Suetonius' oblique reference to the letter in *Augustus* rather confirms his practice of refusing to quote verbatim material which was available elsewhere, even in his own published works. Levi's doubts thus appear quite unjustified.

A further point of Levi's is also invalid: that Suetonius himself, in his *Vergil* and *Horace*, quotes extracts from other letters of Augustus at the time when he was not yet employed in the palace; and that therefore these letters must have been accessible outside the archives. This argument always depended on our ignorance of Suetonius' early career; and the epigraphic evidence available since 1950¹⁶ suggests that his appointment as a *studii*, leading on to that of a *bibliothecis*, is to be dated a number of years before the death of Trajan. It is doubtful whether the *de viris illustribus* belongs before Pliny's death, in

¹ Atticus 20. 1-3.

² Dial. 13. 2.

³ Sat. 1. 24. 11.

⁴ N.H. 18. 94, 139, 21. 9.

⁵ C.G.L. i. 129, ii. 209 K., Malcovati, *Augusti Operum Fr.* (1947), p. 14, no. xviii, n.

⁶ Cf. Roth, pp. 303-4.

⁷ C.G.L. x. 43 K., Roth p. 305.

⁸ Sat. 2. 4. 12.

⁹ N.A. 15. 7. 3.

¹⁰ Inst. 1. 6. 19.

¹¹ Ibid. 1. 7. 22.

¹² Aug. 87, 88.

¹³ 1. 25. 2.

¹⁴ *Suetonii Reliquiae*, pp. 137, 419.

¹⁵ 51. 3. 7.

¹⁶ Mæc and Pflaum in *Contes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscr.* (1952), pp. 76-85, *Ann. ép.* (1953), no. 73.

order to account for his exclusion from among the orators, or after it, to explain the divergency from his account of his uncle's death.¹ In any case, throughout his employment in the palace Suetonius will have had access to the archives; in which he presumably studied the wills of Augustus and Tiberius,² in both of which he noticed the differences of handwriting of the two emperors and their secretaries—a point which would hardly have been mentioned in any ordinary historical source or been comprehensible except to a man who had himself worked extensively in the imperial secretariat and could compare documents of all sorts. Levi objects to his use in *Aug.* 101. 2 of the phrase *heredes instituit* as improper legal language; but Gaius himself, whom Levi quotes as authority for this ruling, admits that such language was still actually in common use in his own day. In any case Suetonius does not say whether he is reproducing Augustus' original words.

Thus the implication of the facts is clear enough: that Suetonius undertook the composition of the *Caesares* at some time during his tenure of office on the Palatine, and, while the archives were not particularly rich in material for *Iulius*, soon found in the files of Augustus' letters a unique source of information, not only for that emperor but for his three successors. Having already formed the project for the lives of the Julio-Claudians at least, he made excerpts from the letters to illustrate points for the following emperors; and at the same time made observations on the wills of Augustus and Tiberius. It was probably at this time that *venere in manus meas pugillares libellique* of Nero's poems written in his own hand;³ which he similarly noted for future use in connexion with a well-known controversy concerning that emperor's originality. With the material at his disposal he completed the excellent life of Augustus, which was then published, probably together with *Iulius*, both introduced by the dedication to Septicius Clarus. If Hadrian disapproved of the use which his secretary had made of the official files, he may have shown it at this juncture; and it is possible that for a short time Suetonius continued to compile material for *Tiberius* without further use of the archives. More probably his abandonment of this source of material coincides with his dismissal from office. With the excerpts already collected he was able to enrich the next Lives, so far as they went; and he had already carried out the competent piece of research on the birthplace of Caligula which stands out so conspicuously from the rest of that Life. In no other context does he cite the *Acta*, nor use authorities against one another with such relevance. Admittedly for many of the main controversies in the later Lives documents could hardly have established the truth: for example, the manner of Claudius' poisoning,⁴ the origin of the Fire in 64,⁵ the one sin of Titus;⁶ but for many other problems documentary evidence would have been of the greatest value, especially for the sketchy biographies of Galba, Otho, and Vitellius.

But lack of documents is not the only feature of the later Lives. With the end of Augustus a striking decline sets in, with a growing tendency to generalizations and to the replacement of proper names which must have appeared in the literary sources (we continually know them from Tacitus or Dio) by vague descriptions or even generic plurals. Such a practice is virtually unknown

¹ Macé, pp. 68 ff.; della Corte, op. cit., pp. 94–96.

² *Aug.* 101. 1, *Tib.* 23. 76.

³ *Nero* 52.

⁴ *Cl.* 44. 2.

⁵ *Nero* 38. 1.

⁶ *Tit.* 10. 2.

in *Iulius*, where all individuals are named, except for certain freedmen,¹ whose names were probably never recorded, and Artemidorus the soothsayer, who appears as *obvio quodam*,² perhaps following one of the sources indicated by Plut. *Caes.* 65 as not stating the identity of Caesar's would-be helper. Similarly in *Augustus*, apart from the unspecified catalogues of victims in 13. 1-2 and 15 (of whom the *patrem et filium* of 13. 2 are known from Dio³ as the Aquilii Flori) and the consular's wife in Antony's libel in 69. 1, who was probably never named, there are virtually no anonymities but the *vir praetorius* in 100. 4, who is known from Dio⁴ to have been Numerius Atticus and is the only individual whose identity is patently obscured in the whole Life.

With *Tiberius* Suetonius evidently begins a deliberate policy of concealing names and often multiplying individuals into vague plurals. Examples of the latter tendency are the *immaturae puellae* in 61. 5 (Seianus' daughter), *praesidibus* in 32. 2 (Rectus, according to Dio⁵), a series of other known persons in 32 and 35, even the *provincias gravioris caeli* in 36 (specified by Tacitus and Josephus as Sardinia); while individuals are left unnamed in 24. 1, 27, 58 (two), 61. 4, and 61. 6, not to mention others whose identity we have lost altogether. In *Caligula* and *Claudius* plurals are harder to find: Caligula's two champions in *Cal.* 14. 2, the actors in *Cl.* 21. 2, perhaps the elderly generals in *Cl.* 24. 3, who presumably represent simply Curtius Rufus,⁶ but there are a great number of unnamed individuals, many of them identifiable from extant sources.⁷ In *Nero* the *matronas anus* of 11. 1 refers to Aelia Catella;⁸ *quaestoriae dignitatis et nonnullis ex equestri ordine* of 15. 2 to Nerva and Tigellinus;⁹ *hieronicarum* in 24. 1 to Pammenes;¹⁰ the subject of *affirmant* in 28. 2 is almost certainly Fabius Rusticus;¹¹ *quidam* and *nonnulli* in 36. 2 are Subrius Flavius and Sulpicius Asper respectively, as both Tacitus and Dio make clear; and notorious individuals left unnamed are Montanus in 26. 2 and Caesellius Bassus in 31. 4, among many others. After this, examples decrease in number again: most distinctive are the *legiones* in *Gal.* 10. 2 (VII Galbiana), *quidam tradunt* in *Otho* 7. 1 (Cluvius Rufus¹²), and probably *praestantes poetae* in *Vesp.* 18 (apparently Saleius Bassus¹³); with such unnamed individuals as Phoebus in *Vesp.* 14 and the Vestals' lovers in *Dom.* 8. 4.

A few of these anonymities might be explained in terms of tact, as Tacitus¹⁴ claims to spare the memory of descendants still alive. Thus the omission of Nerva's name¹⁵ might still be discreet twenty years and more after his death, although Tacitus has no such scruples, nor over many others whose identity Suetonius conceals. And there can be no such reason for glossing over Seianus' daughter¹⁶ or the Attalids.¹⁷ Sometimes the effect is simply to add weight to some charge against the emperor in question (e.g. many of the victims of tyrannical persecutions), or to multiply into a tendency what was in fact a single example of cruel or depraved behaviour. That the latter is Suetonius' main purpose is suggested by the number of gross generalizations which must refer to single

¹ *Iul.* 2. 48.

² *Ibid.* 81. 4.

³ 51. 2. 5-6.

⁴ 56. 46. 2.

⁵ 57. 10. 5.

⁶ *Tac. Ann.* 11. 20.

⁷ See especially *Cal.* 27-29, *Cl.* 24-26.

⁸ *Dio* 61. 19. 2.

⁹ *Tac. Ann.* 15. 72.

¹⁰ *Dio* 63. 8. 5.

¹¹ *Tac. Ann.* 14. 2.

¹² *Plut. Otho* 3. 2.

¹³ *Tac. Dial.* 9. 5.

¹⁴ *Ann.* 14. 14. 5.

¹⁵ *Nero* 15. 2.

¹⁶ *Tib.* 61. 5.

¹⁷ *Nero* 28. 1.

occasions: such as *Tib.* 62. 4 *nemo punitorum non . . .*; *Cal.* 30. 1 *non temere in quemquam nisi . . .*; *Cl.* 33. 1 *nec temere unquam . . .*; *Nero* 32. 4 *nulli delegavit officium ut non . . .*; *Vesp.* 16. 2 *procuratorem rapacissimum quemque . . .*; and a whole series of patent exaggerations involving such conjunctions as *quotiens*¹ in the middle Lives, contrasted with a number of clauses of the same form from the earlier period,² including three from those chapters of *Caligula* which fall in the lifetime of Augustus, and two from Suetonius' own manhood,³ all clearly describing genuine habits.

Taking these features of the Lives from Tiberius to Vespasian in isolation, it would be possible to argue that they simply reflect a shortcoming of the sources available for that period, which obliged Suetonius to generalize if he was to come to any conclusions about the subjects of his biographies. But there is no sign of such a deficiency in Tacitus; and Tacitus, of course, was not hampered in his search for materials. When we compare the growth of generalization and vagueness with the disappearance of documents for the same Lives, it can only be inferred that the deficiency in Suetonius' materials, and his inept attempt to disguise it, is similarly the result of his loss of many sources of information which were still available to Tacitus. Whether Suetonius was actually banished from the city for a time, or was simply not *persona grata* in the palace archives and the public libraries, it is apparent that he was restricted to the main literary authorities and to personal recollections,⁴ including his own,⁵ and had no chance to continue the systematic exploitation of records which made *Augustus* so rich a work. He cannot have been altogether satisfied with the falling-off of his standards.

Now despite the extremely impersonal manner in which Suetonius composes his biographies, there are a few indications of his attitude to contemporary events. He refers specifically to Hadrian (possibly to Trajan) in *Aug.* 7. 1, concerning his gift of a statuette to the emperor; and perhaps by implication in *Dom.* 23. 2 *abstinentia et moderatione insequentium principum*, which ostensibly refers to Nerva and Trajan. So far as subtler references to contemporary issues are concerned, the search is made harder by our comparative ignorance of Hadrian's reign. But we do know of three matters which must have been considered delicate during the early years of the reign: (1) the adoption of Hadrian on the death of Trajan; (2) the execution of the four consulars; (3) the abandonment of Trajan's conquests beyond the Euphrates.

1. Syme argues⁶ that Tacitus' account of the death of Augustus and its sequel 'may seem to hint and foreshadow the accession of Hadrian'. Taken seriously, this suggestion involves the view that *Annals* 1 was radically revised after its original completion; for even Syme's most special pleading cannot establish a date for this later than Trajan's death, and the weight of evidence still supports a considerably earlier date. It also involves the view that Dio's extremely invidious account of Tiberius' accession⁷ is largely based on Tacitus, whom for the most part, as Syme himself sees,⁸ he does not know at all. An impartial reader cannot doubt that what Tacitus and Dio have in common, they take from a common source: that is, one which published the rumours of

¹ *Tib.* 19, *Cal.* 33, 35. 2, 36. 2, 55. 1, *Cl.* 8, 22, 42, *Nero* 15. 1, 27. 3, 28. 2.

² *Iul.* 26. 3, *Aug.* 41. 1, 45. 1, 56. 1, 77, 82. 2, 88, *Cal.* 3. 2, 4, 7.

³ *Dom.* 2. 1, 21.

⁴ *Cal.* 19. 3, *Nero* 29, *Tit.* 3. 2, *Dom.* 17. 2.

⁵ *Nero* 57. 2, *Dom.* 12. 2.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 481-8.

⁷ 56. 30 ff.

⁸ pp. 688-92.

poisoning by Livia, etc., long before they could be inspired by the death of Trajan. The most important feature in this common account is the double tradition concerning Tiberius' presence at Augustus' death-bed. Tacitus says:¹ *neque satis compertum est spirantem Augustum apud urbem Nolam an exanimem repperit. acribus namque custodiis domum et vias saepserat Livia, laetique interdum nuntii vulgabantur donec provisus quae tempus monebat simul excessisse Augustum et rerum potiri Neronem fama eadem tulit.* Dio² has: ἡ γὰρ Λιβία . . . συνέκρυψεν αὐτὸν (his death) μέχρι οὐ ἐκεῖνος ἀφίκετο. ταῦτα γὰρ οὕτω τοῖς τε πλείοσι καὶ τοῖς ἀξιopiστοτέροις γέγραπται· εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ καὶ παραγενέσθαι τὸν Τιβερίον τῇ νόσῳ καὶ ἐπισκήψαι τινὰς παρ' αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν ἔφασαν. Some elements in Tacitus' version are certainly coloured by accounts of the death of Claudius, especially the use of *Neronem* for Tiberius;³ and it requires excessive subtlety to suppose that the writer also intended a reference to the death of Trajan. But the important point is that both stories were already in the common source.

What is remarkable, then, in Suetonius' accounts of Augustus' death, is that he gives no sign that he was aware of the version accusing Livia of dissimulating the death. In *Aug.* 98. 5 he asserts flatly that Tiberius was recalled from his journey (not yet from Illyricum, as Tacitus states) and closeted with Augustus *diu secreto sermone*. In *Tib.* 21. 1 he gives virtually the same words as Tacitus: *spirantem adhuc Augustum repperit fuitque una secreto per totum diem*. He is prepared, in the long section which follows, to quote variant authorities, including Augustus' letters, concerning the relationship between Augustus and his successor—one of the most satisfactory fruits of his research during the period when the archives and libraries were fully available—yet there is not a word of the tradition which might be held to recall the dubious circumstances of Hadrian's succession. And this is exactly what one would expect. No imperial servant would venture to refer to such a dangerous topic during the first years of the reign; although to Tacitus, writing several years earlier from more or less the same sources, it had been open to give both stories, and to improve the latter with a cross-reference to the universally accepted crime of Agrippina. Since 117 tact has become compulsory.

But this is not the last doubtful death-bed that Suetonius describes. By the time he comes to describe the death of Tiberius,⁴ he quotes conflicting rumours considerably more freely than Tacitus⁵ or Dio;⁶ and on the death of Claudius,⁷ where again an empress is deeply concerned in the succession and commonly accused of complicity in her husband's death, he not only admits (as Tacitus and Dio do not) the possibility of an imperial death remaining an unsolved mystery, but so expresses what followed (*mors eius celata est, donec circa successorem omnia ordinarentur*) as to recall very closely the prevalent gossip in circulation about Trajan's death, as Dio⁸ had it from his father: ὁ θάνατος τοῦ Τραϊανοῦ ἡμέρας τινὰς συνεκρύφθη ὥς ἡ ποίσις συνεκφοιτήσοι. This cannot be accidental; and although it is very far from being an attack on Hadrian, it is a striking decline from the tactfulness which marked the earlier work. It is no longer the language of a loyal court official anxious not to offend a captious master.

2. The next passage goes farther. In *Tit.* 6. 1 Suetonius describes the early savagery of Titus: *siquidem suspectissimum quemque sibi . . . haud cunctanter*

¹ *Ann.* 1. 5. 5.

² 56. 31. 1.

³ Martin, in *C.Q.* xlviii (1955), 123-8.

⁴ *Tib.* 73, 2, *Cal.* 12. 2-3.

⁵ *Ann.* 6. 50.

⁶ 58. 28.

⁷ *Cl.* 44. 2.

⁸ 59. 1. 3; cf. *S.H.A.Hadr.* 4. 10.

oppressit. in his A. Caecinam consularem, vocatum ad cenam ac vixdum triclinio egressum, confodi iussit; sane urgente discrimine, cum etiam chirographum eius praeparatae apud milites contionis deprehendisset. This is all straightforward, except the habitual exaggeration, since only Epirus Marcellus appears to have suffered besides Caecina;¹ and it is noteworthy that the *Epitome* of Victor,² while quoting the same source as Suetonius for the words *adhibitum cenae, vixdum triclinio egressum*, gives quite a different charge, of adultery with Berenice, as if that were originally the sequel in the source in question. But Suetonius' following words are more remarkable: *quibus rebus sicut in posterum securitati satis cavet, ita ad praesens plurimum contraxit invidiae, ut non temere quis tam adverso rumore magisque invitis omnibus transierit ad principatum.* In the first place, on his own account the execution was not a precaution against future dangers, but a measure to put down an immediate threat to his father, apparently with every justification. But more significant is the comparison implied with other unpopular accessions. There is no indication in Suetonius that any other of his Caesars was faced with unpopularity at the beginning of his reign, even Tiberius. Yet he does not say simply *nemo*: the phrase *non temere quis* implies quite clearly that one such emperor might be found if the reader thought carefully. At any time during the first ten years or so of Hadrian's reign, when the execution of the four consulars had aroused deep disquiet about the emperor,³ the biographer's words could hardly have been more unfortunately chosen.

3. Thirdly, in *Nero* 18 Suetonius uses language which cannot be accounted for simply by its own context: *augendi propagandique imperii neque voluntate ulla neque spe motus unquam, etiam ex Britannia deducere exercitum cogitavit, nec nisi verecundia, ne obtrectare parentis gloriae videretur, destitit.* Syme⁴ observes that this is peculiar, and remarks shrewdly that 'the passage has more relevance for Hadrian than for Nero'. He does not mention just how odd the language is. Suetonius appears to speak of extending the empire as a regular imperial obligation—an idea which he suggests nowhere else, and which is not particularly appropriate in criticism of Nero, however little in fact came of his projects for expansion in the East. He suggests that Nero was concerned for Claudius' *gloria*, in complete opposition to his assertions in *Nero* 33, which evidently cover Nero's attitude from very early in the reign; and the only moment when a withdrawal could have been contemplated was on the news of the disaster in 61,⁵ long after any pretence of *pietas* had been abandoned. Indeed, if Nero then wished to abandon Britain, the accepted *μωπία* of Claudius would have been a welcome pretext. Finally, the use of *parentis*, not *Claudii* or *patris*, deliberately leaves the door open for interpretation in terms of another adoptive father.⁶ There need be no reference to Hadrian's supposed withdrawal from part of Britain;⁷ but at a time when the emperor had declared his intention to turn his back on territorial expansion and to concentrate on preserving peace, this suggestion that an emperor had a self-evident obligation to extend the empire and to respect the military prowess of a *parens* is certainly not without relevance to a policy on which Hadrian was particularly touchy.

¹ Dio. 65. 16. 3.

² 10. 4.

³ S.H.A.Hadr. 7. 3, Dio 69. 2. 5, Syme, pp. 244-5, 485-8.

⁴ Op. cit., p. 490, n. 6.

⁵ *Nero* 39. 1; cf. Syme, l.c., for Stevens's

argument for 58 and Birley's answer.

⁶ For Suetonius' use of *parens* cf. *Iul.* 7. 2, *Vit.* 14. 5, *Tit.* 8. 3, *Gram.* 16, never simply as a synonym for *pater*.

⁷ Syme, p. 490.

These three points appear to exhaust the sum of indiscretions which Suetonius allows himself. References to Nero's philhellenism,¹ love of music and poetry,² and pederasty³ can hardly be read in this connexion. At all events, there is no need so to explain them, as there is in the case of the two latter passages considered above; and they are shared by all our sources. If Syme⁴ is right in arguing that Suetonius' words in *Tit.* 10. 2 *Domitia iurabat* show that he wrote them after this lady was dead, perhaps as late as 130, then imperial pederasty in particular will indeed have become a delicate point. But the tense of Suetonius' verb more probably refers to the period before 122 when he was in a position to hear gossip about the old dowager,⁵ or perhaps to a time when she was still to be seen about in court society. Nothing in the *Lives* can be held to constitute a positive criticism of Hadrian, apart from the remarks in *Aug.* 86 on Augustus' dislike of obscurity and archaism in style, both of which were typical of Hadrian,⁶ as of many of his contemporaries, always excepting Suetonius himself.⁷ Henderson⁸ goes too far in speaking of 'a very notable revenge on Autocracy, if not on Hadrian himself'. There are signs merely of a petty vindictiveness, such as are to be expected of the disgruntled polymath in retirement.

All the clues thus combine to the same conclusion: the cessation of documentary evidence, the affectation of vagueness over details, the decline of discretion in connexion with contemporary issues. Suetonius' dismissal can be placed after the publication of *Iulius* and *Augustus* and the assembly of some of the material for the early part of *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, and *Claudius*. Whether these *Lives* were completed immediately afterwards or laid aside in despair, to be resumed after an interval, we do not know. But there can be no doubt that these and their successors would have been more on a level with the first two *Lives* if the author had not proved deficient in *reverentia domus aulicae*.

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¹ *Nero* 12. 3, etc.

² *Ibid.* 20-21.

³ *Ibid.* 28.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 780.

⁵ For this use of the imperfect cf. *Dom.*

17. 2, of a witness to Domitian's murder.

⁶ S.H.A. *Hadr.* 16. 2-5.

⁷ Macé, pp. 56-57, D'Anna, *Le Idee letterarie di Suetonio* (1954), pp. 94 ff.

⁸ *Life and Principate of Hadrian*, p. 23, n. 5.

THALES

THE Greeks attributed to Thales a great many discoveries and achievements. Few, if any, of these can be said to rest on thoroughly reliable testimony, most of them being the ascriptions of commentators and compilers who lived anything from 700 to 1,000 years after his death—a period of time equivalent to that between William the Conqueror and the present day. Inevitably there also accumulated round the name of Thales, as round that of Pythagoras (the two being often confused¹), a number of anecdotes of varying degrees of plausibility and of no historical worth whatsoever. These and the achievements credited to Thales have, of course, been painstakingly brought together by Hermann Diels in *Der Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*.² Useful and necessary (though not entirely comprehensive³) as this work undoubtedly is, it nevertheless has probably contributed as much as any other book to the exaggerated and false view of Thales which we meet in so many modern histories of science or philosophy, and which it is the purpose of this article to combat. In Diels, quotations from sources such as Proclus, Aëtius, Eusebius, Plutarch, Josephus, Iamblichus, Diogenes Laërtius, Theon Smyrnaeus, Apuleius, Clemens Alexandrinus, and Pliny, of different dates and varying reliability, are listed indiscriminately side by side with a few from Herodotus, Plato, and Aristotle, in order to provide material for a biography of Thales; but so uncertain is this material that there is no agreement among the 'authorities' even on the most fundamental facts of his life—e.g. whether he was a Milesian or a Phoenician, whether he left any writings or not, whether he was married or single—much less on the actual ideas and achievements with which he is credited. The critical evaluation of the worth of these citations is left entirely to the reader. Future historians of classical antiquity who (in the not improbable event of a general cataclysm) may have to rely entirely on secondary sources such as Diels are likely to form an extremely erroneous idea of the validity and completeness of our knowledge of Thales.

It is worth while examining the material in Diels a little more closely. Very broadly, the sources may be classified in two main divisions, namely, writers before 320 B.C. (Thales' *floruit* is usually and probably correctly given as the first quarter of the 6th century B.C.) and those after this date—some being nearly a millennium after it, e.g. Proclus (5th century A.D.) and Simplicius (6th century A.D.). In the first division there are only three writers in Diels's list who mention Thales, viz. Herodotus (Diels 4, 5, and 6—the references are to the numbered quotations in Diels's section on Thales, which are discussed here in numerical order), Plato (Diels 9; also *Rep.* 10. 600a—cf. Diels 3), and Aristotle (Diels 10, 12, and 14). What do they tell us about him? Herodotus, who calls him a Milesian of Phoenician descent, mentions with approval his

¹ e.g. the well-known story of the sacrifice of an ox on the occasion of the discovery that the angle on a diameter of a circle is a right angle is told about both Thales and Pythagoras (Diog. Laert. 1. 24–25); cf. Schwartz in *P.W.* s.v. 'Diogenes Laërtius', col. 741; Pfeiffer, *Callimachus*, 1949, i. 168.

² 8th ed. 1956, edited by W. Kranz.

³ There are in classical literature at least three mentions of Thales not included by Diels, viz. Aristophanes, *Clouds* 180; *Birds* 1009; Plautus, *Captivi* 274; and there are probably more. Cf. O. Gigon, *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie*, 1945, p. 11, for a plea for a really complete collection of notices regarding the Pre-Socratics.

recommendation to the Ionians to form a federation with one paramount assembly in Teos (1. 170 = Diels 4). Relying on this notice and the inclusion of Thales among the Seven Wise Men, Gigon¹ suggests that Thales' 'book' (if he ever wrote one—see below) contained political material. Then comes the much discussed passage (1. 74 = Diels 5) about Thales' prediction of a solar eclipse—Herodotus' actual words are: τὴν δὲ μεταλλαγὴν ταύτην τῆς ἡμέρας Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος τοῖσι Ἰωσὶ προηγόρευσε ἔσεσθαι, οὐρον προθέμενος ἐναντὶν τοῦτον, ἐν τῷ δὴ καὶ ἐγένετο ἡ μεταβολή. The eclipse is generally regarded as being that of 28 May 585 B.C.,² and Thales is supposed to have predicted it by means of the old lunar cycle of 18 years and 11 days, i.e. 223 lunar months, in which both solar and lunar eclipses may repeat themselves in roughly the same positions. Much has been made of this cycle, often (but quite erroneously³) called the 'Saros', which Thales is supposed to have borrowed from the Babylonians;⁴ modern historians of science have eagerly seized on it as evidence for the traditional picture of Thales as the intermediary between the wisdom of the East and Greece, so that now it figures prominently in practically every account of Thales. The Babylonians, however, did not use cycles to predict solar eclipses, but computed them from observations of the latitude of the moon made shortly before the expected syzygy.⁵ Moreover, as Neugebauer says: 'There exists no cycle for solar eclipses visible at a given place; all modern cycles concern the earth as a whole. No Babylonian theory for predicting a solar eclipse existed at 600 B.C., as one can see from the very unsatisfactory situation 400 years later; nor did the Babylonians ever develop any theory which took the influence of geographical latitude into account.'⁶ Yet the manner in which Herodotus reports the prediction, οὐρον προθέμενος ἐναντὶν τοῦτον,⁷ would lead one to suppose that Thales did make use of a cycle. It is perhaps just possible that he may have heard of the 18-year cycle for lunar phenomena, and may have connected it with the solar eclipse of 585 in such a way as to give rise to the story that he predicted it; if so, the fulfilment of the 'prediction' was a stroke of pure luck and not science, since he had no conception of geographical latitude and no means of knowing whether a solar eclipse would be visible in a particular locality. It is difficult to see what the remark, allegedly quoted from Eudemus by Dercyllides,⁸ to the effect that 'Thales was the first to discover an eclipse of the sun' (... εὗρε πρῶτος ... ἡλίου ἐκλειψιν),

¹ O. Gigon, *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie*, 1945, p. 42.

² Cf. Boll in *P.W. s.v.* 'Finsternisse', col. 2353; Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos*, 1913, pp. 13–16; Fotheringham in *J.H.S.* xxxix [1919], 180 ff., and in *M.N.R.A.S.* lxxxii [1920], 108.

³ Cf. O. Neugebauer, *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity*, 2nd ed. 1957, pp. 141–2.

⁴ Ptolemy mentions it (*Synt. math.*, ed. Heiberg, i. 269. 18 f.) and also the ἐξελγμός, a similar cycle obtained by multiplying the former by 3, making 669 lunar months or 19,756 days, but attributes both to οἱ ἐνταῖς παλαιότεροι μαθηματικοί, which refers to Greek astronomers earlier than Hipparchus and not to the Babylonian astronomers, whom Ptolemy always calls οἱ Χαλδαῖοι.

⁵ F. X. Kugler, *Sternkunde und Sterndienst in Babel*, ii (1909), 58 f.; O. Neugebauer, *Astronomical Cuneiform Texts*, i (1956), 68–69, 115, 160 f.

⁶ *Ex. Sci.*, p. 142. As regards the use of the 18-year cycle he says (*ibid.*), 'there are certain indications that the periodic recurrence of lunar eclipses was utilised in the preceding period [i.e. before 311 B.C.] by means of a crude 18-year cycle which was also used for other lunar phenomena' (my italics).

⁷ Diels's suggestion (*Antike Technik*, 3rd ed. 1924, p. 3, n. 1) that ἐναντός here means 'solstice' has nothing to recommend it.

⁸ *Ap. Theon. Smyrn.*, p. 198. 14, ed. Hiller = Diels 17.

actually means. It can hardly mean that he was the first to notice a solar eclipse; but if it means that he was the first to discover the cause of one, then it is certainly wrong, for he could not possibly have possessed this knowledge which neither the Egyptians nor the Babylonians nor his immediate successors possessed.¹ In fact the report is an obvious amplification of Herodotus' story with a further discovery attributed to Thales (that he also found the cycle of the sun with relation to the solstices) thrown in for good measure, merely because it seemed plausible to Eudemus or Dercyllides. After Herodotus,² the doxographical writers and Latin authors like Cicero and Pliny (cf. Diels 5) go on repeating the story with or without further embellishment, but it is perhaps significant that no other writer in the first group of sources (i.e. those before 320 B.C.) mentions it. Of modern commentators, Martin³ long ago rejected the entire story, Dreyer⁴ is extremely sceptical, and Neugebauer,⁵ the most recent authority, also refuses to credit it.

Next in Diels's collection is Herodotus' story (1. 75 = Diels 6) of Thales' reputed diversion of the river Halys to enable King Croesus to invade Cappadocia—a story, be it noted, which Herodotus reports as being generally believed among the Greeks, but which he himself explicitly refuses to accept.⁶ Then Plato (*Rep.* 10. 600a), in a discussion of the desirability of tolerating Homer in the ideal state, takes Thales as an example of the clever technician, ἀλλ' οἷα δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς πολλὰ ἐπινόαι καὶ εὐμήχανοι εἰς τέχνας ἢ τινας ἄλλας πράξεις λέγονται, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς Θαλῆς τε περὶ τοῦ Μιλήσιου καὶ Ἀναχάρσιος τοῦ Σκύθου.⁷ Elsewhere (*Theat.* 174a = Diels 9) he is cited as an example of the absent-minded star-gazer who is so intent on the heavens that he does not see what is at his feet and falls into a well.⁸ Aristotle (*Pol.* A, 1259^a5 = Diels 10) tells the story of Thales' foresight and business acumen in buying up all the olive-presses in Miletus and Chios during one winter, in anticipation of a bumper olive crop later; when this duly materialized he was able to hire them out at great profit to himself.

Finally, in this first group of sources, Thales' philosophical speculations are limited to two main propositions only, each accompanied by a more or less fanciful corollary, viz. (1) that water is the primary substance of the universe (Diels 12), and that the world rests on water (Diels 14), and (2) that everything is full of gods πάντα πλήρη θεῶν (Diels 22), and that the lodestone has a soul (ibid.). It is worth noting the manner in which Aristotle reports these speculations; as regards (1), which seems to be the most definite, Aristotle

¹ Cf. G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 1957, p. 78—Kirk's reference to 'the undoubted fact of Thales' prediction' is a considerable overstatement.

² Gigon (op. cit., p. 52) thinks that Herodotus may have taken the story from a poem of Xenophanes, who perhaps expressed incredulity at the report; but it seems much more probable that Herodotus is relating the generally accepted hearsay of his time.

³ *Revue Archéologique*, ix [1864], 170–99.

⁴ J. L. E. Dreyer, *A History of Astronomy* (originally entitled *A History of the Planetary Systems*), repr. 1953 (Dover Publications, New York), p. 12.

⁵ *Ex. Sci.*, p. 142. Neugebauer complains

of the vagueness of Herodotus' report, but this is somewhat unjust; obviously, what impressed Herodotus was the sudden change from bright daylight to comparative darkness—hence the choice of the words μεταλαγή and μεταβολή.

⁶ ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ λέγω, κατὰ τὰς εἰσὺς γεφύρας διεβίβασε τὸν στρατὸν, ὡς δὲ ὁ πολλὸς λόγος τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Θαλῆς οἱ ὁ Μιλήσιος διεβίβασε. Kirk and Raven (op. cit., p. 76) cite this as 'convincing evidence' for Thales' reputation as an engineer—the adjective seems hardly appropriate.

⁷ On this and the scholion (= Diels 3), see below.

⁸ This earliest example of a perennially

says, *Θαλῆς μὲν ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας ὕδωρ φησὶν εἶναι* (διὸ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐφ' ὕδατος ἀπεφάνητο εἶναι), λαβὼν ἴσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ κ.τ.λ., and in another place (*de caelo* B 13. 294^a28) τοῦτον γὰρ [τὴν γῆν ἐφ' ὕδατος κείσθαι] ἀρχαιότατον παρελήφμεν τὸν λόγον, ὃν φασιν εἰπεῖν Θαλῆν τὸν Μιλήσιον: as regards (2) Aristotle's words are (*de anima* A, 411^a8), ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾤηθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι, while elsewhere he is even more hesitant (*de an.* A, 405^a19), εἴκοι δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητικὸν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὴν λίθον ἐφ' ἡ ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ. Snell, in an article which examines critically the process of transmission of Thales' philosophical opinions,¹ notes that the first quotation (*Metaph.* 1. 3. 983^b21 = Diels 12) gives a false impression of definiteness on Aristotle's part, because the passage continues (984^a1) εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀρχαία τις αὕτη καὶ παλαιὰ τετύχηκεν οὕσα περὶ τῆς φύσεως ἢ δόξα, τάχ' ἂν ἀδελον εἴη, Θαλῆς μὲντοι λέγεται οὕτως ἀποφάνασθαι περὶ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας, and Diels ought certainly to have continued the quotation as far as this.² In several other instances Snell corrects what appear in Diels as philosophical speculations attributed by Aëtius to Thales, and shows that in reality these stem directly from Aristotle's own interpretations which then became incorporated in the doxographical tradition as erroneous ascriptions to Thales³—and, one might add, are duly perpetuated by Diels-Kranz.

So much, then, for what may be termed the primary authorities for our knowledge of Thales' life and opinions, e.g. writers before 320 B.C. What is the general impression we obtain from them? Surely, that he had a reputation chiefly as a *practical* man of affairs, who was capable of giving sensible political advice (his recommendation to the Ionians to unite), was astute in business matters (the transaction with the olive-presses), and had an inquiring turn of mind with a bent towards natural science and the ability to put to practical use whatever knowledge he possessed (the stories of the eclipse prediction and the diversion of the river Halys). This picture of Thales is amply substantiated by the other references to him in classical writers not listed in Diels, e.g. Aristophanes, *Clouds* 180; *Birds* 1009; Plautus, *Captivi* 274—in each of these passages he is cited as the typical example of the clever man (perhaps not always scrupulous in his methods? *Clouds* 180—cf. the story of the olive-presses) noted as much for his resourcefulness as for his sagacity. The single discordant note is Plato's story of his falling into a well, but then this is the kind of anecdote which might be told about anyone interested in astronomy, and is by no means an indication of habitual absent-mindedness on Thales' part. It is not surprising that a man endowed with the qualities enumerated above should in due course be numbered among the Seven Wise Men of Greece. There was

popular genre of comic story has been subjected to a solemn discussion and analysis by M. Landmann and J. O. Fleckenstein, 'Tagesbeobachtung von Sterner in Altertum', *Vierteljahrsschr. d. Naturf. Gesch. in Zürich*, lxxviii [1943], 98 f., in the course of which it is suggested that the story is not 'echt oder unecht', but contains a germ of historical truth in that Thales probably observed stars in daylight from the bottom of a well! The article contains an entirely uncritical account of Thales' alleged achievements and discoveries, with the usual

imaginary picture of him as the transmitter of Egyptian and Babylonian wisdom.

¹ B. Snell, 'Die Nachrichten über die Lehren des Thales und die Anfänge der griechischen Philosophie- und Literaturgeschichte', *Philologus* xcvi (1944), 170-82.

² Id., op. cit., p. 172.

³ Op. cit. pp. 170 and 171 with footnote (1). Thales, of course, was not the only early thinker to be thus treated by Aristotle; Anaxagoras was another—cf. F. M. Cornford, 'Anaxagoras' Theory of Matter—II', *C.Q.* xxiv [1930], 83-95.

never complete agreement among the ancient writers on the names of the Seven or even on the number itself,¹ but four names occur regularly in the various lists given—Thales, Solon, Bias, and Pittacus; and these, be it noted, were all essentially *practical* men who played leading roles in the affairs of their respective states, and were far better known to the earlier Greeks as lawgivers and statesmen than as profound thinkers and philosophers.² As we shall see, it is only from the second group of sources, i.e. writers after 320 B.C., that we obtain the picture of Thales as the pioneer in Greek scientific thinking, particularly in regard to mathematics and astronomy which he is supposed to have learnt about in Babylonia and Egypt. In the earlier tradition he is a favourite example of the intelligent man who possesses some technical 'know-how'.³

One very important point that can be established from consideration of this first group of sources is that no written work by Thales was available for consultation to either Herodotus, Plato, or Aristotle—the tradition about him, even as early as the fifth century B.C., was evidently based entirely on hearsay. This seems quite certain; for all mentions of him are introduced by words such as *φασί*, *λέγεται*, *ᾠήθη*, *εἶκε*, and the like, and never⁴ is a citation given that reads as though taken directly from a work by Thales himself. This fact has obvious implications for our judgement of the trustworthiness of the information that later writers give us about him. It is even doubtful whether he ever produced any written work at all;⁵ certainly there was a persistent tradition in later antiquity that he left none.⁶ It would seem that already by Aristotle's time the early Ionians were largely names only⁷ to which popular tradition attached various ideas or achievements with greater or less plausibility;

¹ See Diog. Laert., 1. 40 f.

² Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 2nd ed. 1948 (translated into English by R. Robinson), Appendix II, 'On the Origin and Cycle of the Philosophic Life', p. 454, is surely wrong in saying that the reports emphasizing the practical and political activities of the Seven Wise Men were first introduced into the tradition by Dicaearchus in the latter half of the fourth century. In the case of Thales, at any rate, it is the *early* tradition as exemplified by Herodotus that makes him a practical statesman, while the later doxographers foist on to him any number of discoveries and achievements, in order to build him up as a figure of superhuman wisdom. Jaeger is also wrong in asserting that Plato had made Thales 'a pure representative of the theoretical life' (op. cit., p. 453)—he apparently overlooks *Rep.* 10. 600a, where this is far from being the case, and he takes the well story too seriously. On the other hand, he is undoubtedly right to emphasize the comparatively late origin of the traditional picture of Pre-Socratic philosophy, 'the whole picture that has come down to us of the history of early philosophy was fashioned during the two or three generations from Plato to the immediate pupils of Aristotle' (429).

³ See especially Plato, *Rep.* 10. 600a (and Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 47 n. 1) where Thales is coupled with Anacharsis, who is said to have invented the potter's wheel and the anchor.

⁴ The single apparent exception (*Met.* 1. 3. 983^b21 = Diels 12), where Aristotle seems to be more definite, has already been shown to be illusory, in that if the quotation were carried to its proper end we should find the familiar *Θαλῆς λέγεται* again. Kirk and Raven (op. cit., p. 85) also remark on the cautious manner in which Aristotle cites Thales; cf. Snell, op. cit., pp. 172 and 177—but Snell's insistence that Aristotle is not relying merely on oral tradition but must be using a pre-Platonic written source (which Snell identifies as Hippias) is hardly convincing on the evidence available.

⁵ What Diels (pp. 80–81) prints as 'Angebliche Fragmente' of Thales' works are, of course, completely spurious, as Diels himself points out.

⁶ Diog. Laert. 1. 23, *καὶ κατὰ τινὰς μὲν σύγγραμμα κατέλιπον οὐδέν*: cf. Joseph. *c. Ap.* 1. 2; Simplicius, *Phys.* 23. 29.

⁷ Cf. Kirk and Raven, p. 218—Aristotle, Plato, and Pythagoras.

naturally this process gave rise to numerous permutations and combinations of the names and the attributes among the later writers of our second group of sources. Even the works of men like Anaximander and Xenophanes, the existence of whose writings in the sixth century B.C. anyway is unquestioned, by the fourth century B.C. either had disappeared completely or were extant in one or two scattered copies distinguished by their rarity;¹ and if this was the situation in the time of Aristotle, it can confidently be said that the chances that the original works of the earlier Pre-Socratics were still readily available to his pupils, such as Theophrastus and Eudemos, much less to their excerptors and imitators in succeeding centuries, are extremely small. Nearly always when a later commentator attributes some idea to Thales or any other early Ionian the ascription is based not on the original work, nor even on some other writer's citation of the original, but on some 'authority' two, three, four, five, or more stages removed from the original (see below).

It is when we come to the second main group of sources, i.e. writers after 320 B.C., that Thales' stature begins to take on heroic proportions and he appears as the figure so dear to modern historians of science and philosophy—the founder of Greek mathematics and astronomy, the transmitter of ancient Egyptian and Babylonian wisdom, the first man to subject the empirical knowledge of the orient to the rigorously analytic Greek method of reasoning; and, of course, the later the 'authority' the more freely does he ascribe all sorts of knowledge to Thales.² It is again to Hermann Diels that we are indebted for a detailed examination of these later sources. His large volume, *Doxographi Graeci*, which first appeared in 1879 and achieved a second edition in 1929, remains the standard work on the subject. Diels's results are by now well known.³ In 263 pages of Prolegomena he gives a detailed, critical discussion of the doxographical writers from Theophrastus (4th–3rd centuries B.C.) to Tzetzes (12th century A.D.), analyses the probable sources of each writer's information, and traces with patient ingenuity the interconnexions and ramifications of these sources among the host of epitomators, excerptors, and compilers who flourished in later antiquity. Briefly, one of the main results of Diels's work is the re-emergence of Aëtius, an eclectic of the first or second centuries A.D.,⁴ whose lost *Συναγωγή τῶν ἀρεσκόντων* is shown to be largely preserved in the pseudo-Plutarchean *Placita Philosophorum* and in the *Ἐκλογαί* of Stobaeus.⁵ All such collections of *ἀρέσκοντα* or *placita* are derived ultimately from the *Φυσικῶν δόξαι* of Theophrastus who, following the example initiated by Aristotle (e.g. at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*), set out to record the opinions of the early thinkers on various problems of philosophy and natural science; but Diels shows that our extant sources, far from taking their material directly from Theophrastus' work, preferred to use one or more intermediaries, so that what we actually read in them comes to us not even at second, but at third or fourth or fifth hand. Thus Aëtius did not use Theophrastus directly, but (with additions from other sources) an epitome of him which Diels calls

¹ Cf. Diels, *Dox.* p. 219; p. 112.

² Oddly enough, this tendency can also be seen in modern times. Earlier writers, like Tannery, are far less prone to exaggerate Thales' achievements than more recent ones, such as van der Waerden—on whom see further below.

³ There are summaries in Zeller, *Outlines*

of the *History of Greek Philosophy*, 13th ed. repr. 1948, pp. 4–8; Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed. repr. 1952, pp. 33–38; Kirk and Raven, op. cit., pp. 1–7; cf. P.-H. Michel, *De Pythagore à Euclide*, 1950, pp. 72–167—a useful reference section for all the sources relevant to Greek mathematics.

⁴ *Dox.*, p. 101.

⁵ *Dox.*, pp. 45 f.

the *Vetusta Placita*¹ and which seems to have appeared towards the end of the second century B.C., possibly in the school of Posidonius. Obviously this use of intermediate sources, copied and recopied from century to century, with each writer adding additional pieces of information of greater or less plausibility from his own knowledge, provided a fertile field for errors in transmission, wrong ascriptions, and fictitious attributions—as can be seen, for example, in the scrap-book of Diogenes Laertius.² Aëtius himself is by no means always a reliable source; Snell³ has shown how two passages, which in Diels-Kranz are accepted as genuine opinions of Thales, are in fact merely Aëtius' interpretations of remarks by Aristotle which have nothing to do with Thales. Similarly, Aëtius' coupling of Thales and Pythagoras (!) in connexion with the division of the celestial sphere into five zones is entirely erroneous, as the theory of zones (i.e. the bands of the globe bounded by the 'arctic', 'antarctic', equator, and tropics) can hardly have been formulated before the time of Eudoxus.⁴

Now if Theophrastus himself was in error on any point either through misinterpretation or lack of reliable information (which we have not the slightest reason to doubt was frequently the case as regards the Pre-Socratics⁵), it is perfectly obvious that there is no chance at all that his later copyists and excerptors would either recognize or be in a position to correct the error. We have seen already that even if Thales did write a book it was no longer extant in Aristotle's time. This being the case, it can be taken for granted that no copy was available to Theophrastus either. Hence all that he knew about Thales was what he could gather from Aristotle's previous mentions of him, supplemented perhaps by a few more scraps of information gained from hearsay.⁶ We have seen the type of information that Aristotle possessed, and this, it should be remembered, was the direct, authentic line of the tradition. Yet modern commentators persist in ascribing as much, if not more, weight to the exaggerated stories of Thales' achievements given by post-Theophrastean writers who had to rely on their own imaginations to bolster the meagre account that was all that Aristotle or Theophrastus could give. It needs to be borne in mind that the preservation of old texts and the careful referring back to the *ipsissima verba* of the author are comparatively modern innovations of scholarship, which, though seeming to us of fundamental importance, were by no means so regarded by the ancients. Cicero makes a revealing remark in this connexion: talking about Aristotle's work on the early handbooks of rhetoric, he says 'ac tantum inventoribus ipsis suavitate et brevitate dicendi praestitit ut nemo illorum praecepta ex ipsorum [i.e. veterum scriptorum] libris cognoscat, sed omnes qui quod illi praecipiant velint intellegere ad hunc quasi ad quendam multo commodiorem explicatorem revertantur'.⁷ Exactly the same holds true for the early philosophers; if one wanted to know their opinions, one consulted Theophrastus or Eudemus (on whom see more below) or

¹ *Dox.*, pp. 179 f.

² Cf. Schwartz in *P.W.* s.v. 'Diogenes Laertios'; *Dox.*, pp. 161 f.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 170-1, 176.

⁴ Cf. J. O. Thomson, *History of Ancient Geography*, 1948, pp. 112 and 116.

⁵ Cf. G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: the Cosmic Fragments*, 1954, pp. 20-25.

⁶ What Gigon (*op. cit.*, pp. 43-44) calls the 'anekdotische und apophthegmatische Überlieferung'.

⁷ *De invent.* 2. 2. 6. Further on he mentions Isocrates whose book Cicero knows to exist but which he has not himself found, although he has come across numerous writings by Isocrates' pupils.

Menon¹—one would not bother to go back to the original works even in the unlikely event of their being still available.² There is, therefore, no justification whatsoever for supposing that very late commentators, such as Proclus (5th century A.D.) and Simplicius (6th century A.D.), can possibly possess more authentic information about the Pre-Socratics than the earlier epitomators and excerptors who took their accounts from the above disciples of the Peripatetic School, who in turn depended mainly on Aristotle himself and perhaps to a small extent on an oral tradition such as obviously forms the basis of Herodotus' stories about Thales.

Diels,³ in a comparative examination of four later works which depend ultimately on Theophrastus, viz. Hippolytus' *Philosophoumena*, pseudo-Plutarch's *Stromata*, Diogenes Laertius, and Aëtius (the 'biographical doxographers' as Burnet calls them⁴), shows that in each case two primary sources can be traced, (a) a 'futilissimum Vitarum compendium', a very inferior compilation based on biographical material of dubious authenticity gleaned from the same sources as were presumably used by Aristoxenus and the later writers of 'Successions' (*Διαδοχαί*) such as Sotion—this must represent the pre-literary oral tradition of popular hearsay; and (b) a good epitome of Theophrastus by some unknown writer. It is particularly noteworthy that the notices regarding Thales, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles are entirely derived from the first inferior source—yet another indication of the paucity of genuine knowledge about these early figures. One result of this lack of information was that very soon certain doctrines that later commentators invented for Thales, and that became fixed in the doxographical tradition, were then accepted into the biographical tradition, and thus, because they may be repeated by different authors relying on different sources, may produce an illusory impression of genuineness. This can be shown to have happened in the case of the dogma *ὁ κόσμος ἑμψυχος*, which in reality stemmed from Aristotle and not from Thales, but which reappears in the biographical tradition that underlies both the scholion on Plato, *Rep.* 10. 600a and Diogenes Laertius 1. 27.⁵

I must now discuss the source on which modern scholars⁶ rely most of all to substantiate their exaggerated views of Thales' knowledge and achievements—namely, Eudemus, who to some extent bridges the gap between what I have called the primary and secondary sources for our knowledge of Thales. It is generally considered that it is from Eudemus' *Γεωμετρικὴ ἱστορία*, *Ἀριθμητικὴ ἱστορία*, and *Ἀστρολογικὴ ἱστορία*⁷ that all later writers derive their information

¹ Cf. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, p. 335; in the work of compiling a comprehensive history of human knowledge Menon was allotted the field of medicine, Eudemus that of mathematics and astronomy and perhaps theology, and Theophrastus that of physics and metaphysics.

² Cf. Diels, *Dox.*, p. 128.

³ *Dox.*, pp. 145 f.

⁴ *Early Greek Philos.*, p. 36.

⁵ Snell, *op. cit.*, pp. 175–6.

⁶ Such as, F. Cajori, *A History of Mathematics*, 1919, pp. 15 f.; D. E. Smith, *History of Mathematics*, i (1923), 64 f.; G. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, repr. 1950, i. 72; W. Capelle, *Die Vorsokratiker*, 4th ed.

1953, pp. 67 f.; B. L. van der Waerden, *Science Awakening*, 1954, pp. 86 f.; G. Hauser, *Geometrie der Griechen von Thales bis Euklid*, 1955, pp. 43–49; Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, repr. 1955, i. 46–48; O. Becker, *Das mathematische Denken der Antike*, 1957, pp. 37 f.—to name but a few. Even T. L. Heath, who was aware of the flimsiness of the evidence on which our knowledge of Thales is based, is inclined to over-estimate his achievements—cf. *History of Greek Mathematics*, 1921, i. 128 f.; *Manual of Greek Mathematics*, 1931, pp. 81 f.

⁷ All three now only extant in meagre fragments, recently edited with a commentary by F. Wehrli, *Eudemos von Rhodos* (*Die Schule des Aristoteles*, Heft viii), 1955.

about Greek science before Euclid,¹ and there may well be a good deal of truth in this view. Unfortunately it does not help us at all in assessing the trustworthiness of Eudemos' statements about such an early figure as Thales, for two reasons. In the first place, if, as has already been shown, neither Aristotle nor Theophrastus possessed any written work by Thales, what reason is there to suppose that Eudemos had access to such? If he did not, then he knew no more about Thales than the other two did since he had to rely on the same inadequate sources; and therefore any achievement which later writers credit to Thales on the authority of Eudemos alone is likely to be a mere invention of his own or (as we shall see below) a rationalization of a presumed state of affairs in Thales' time. Secondly, there is some reason to suppose that Eudemos' works were lost quite soon after the fourth century B.C.² and that the same fate befell them as overtook Theophrastus' *Φυσικῶν δόξαι*, i.e. they were excerpted and rearranged by the epitomators, and then later writers took their quotations from these intermediate sources rather than from the original works. Proclus, from whose *Commentary on the First Book of Euclid* come most of the extant fragments of Eudemos' *Γεωμετρικὴ ἱστορία*,³ although he usually quotes as though directly from the original (*ὡς φησιν Εὐδήμος*), twice gives the impression that in fact he may be using intermediaries, when he mentions *οἱ τὰς ἱστορίας ἀναγράφοντες*⁴ and *οἱ περὶ τὸν Εὐδήμον*.⁵ Even Simplicius, who purports to quote verbatim from Eudemos,⁶ may have taken his quotation from a secondary source, for he says on one occasion, *ὡς Εὐδήμος τε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς ἀστρολογικῆς ἱστορίας ἀπεμνημόνευσε καὶ Σωσιγένης παρὰ Εὐδήμου τοῦτο λαβών*.⁷

The authority of Eudemos is especially invoked to support the view of Thales as the founder of Greek geometry. The following propositions are commonly attributed to him:⁸

- (1) that a circle is bisected by its diameter;
- (2) that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal (the word actually used is *ὅμοιος* 'similar', instead of *ἴσος*);
- (3) that when two straight lines intersect, the vertically opposite angles are equal;
- (4) that if two triangles have two angles and one side equal, the triangles are equal in all respects.

For the first two of these, Eudemos is not specifically cited by Proclus as his authority, but it is generally assumed that they are derived from Eudemos⁹—how far this assumption is justified may be inferred from the following con-

¹ Cf. Martini in *P.W.* s.v. 'Eudemos'; Wehrli, op. cit., p. 114.

² Cf. Michel, op. cit., pp. 82–83, quoting Tannery.

³ Wehrli, op. cit., pp. 54–67.

⁴ Id. frag. 133 ad fin.

⁵ Id., frag. 137.

⁶ Id., frag. 140, p. 59, l. 24, *ἐκθήσομαι δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Εὐδήμου κατὰ λέξιν λεγόμενα*.

⁷ Id., frag. 148. Heath, however, sees no reason to doubt that these late commentators of the fifth and sixth centuries A.D., such as Proclus, Simplicius, and Eutocius, consulted Eudemos at first hand (*Hist. of Gk. Maths.* ii. 530 f.; cf. *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's*

Elements, 2nd ed. repr. 1956 (Dover Publications, New York), i. 29–38. Heath contradicts Tannery's view (cf. also Martini in *P.W.* s.v. 'Eudemos'; Heiberg, *Philol.* xliii. 330 f.), but offers no explanation of the passages I have cited above; he does agree that in the case of Oenopodes, for example, Proclus gives a quotation which cannot have been at first hand.

⁸ Heath, *H.G.M.* i. 130 (cf. *Man.*, p. 83), v. d. Waerden, p. 87, Hauser, p. 45, and Becker, p. 38, give less well-authenticated lists.

⁹ Cf. Heath, *Euclid*, p. 36.

siderations. As regards (1) it should be observed that Thales is said to have 'proved' (ἀποδείξει) this, a statement which itself arouses suspicion since even Euclid did not claim to do this, but was content to state it as a 'definition' (ὅρος);¹ on the other hand, we are told that Thales only 'noted and stated' (ἐπιστήσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν) (2) and 'discovered' (εὗρεῖν) without scientifically proving (3).² Most revealing, however, is the manner in which (4) is reported; here Proclus' actual words are,³ Εὐδήμος δὲ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρικαῖς ἱστορίαις εἰς Θαλὴν τοῦτο ἀνάγει τὸ θεωρήμα. τὴν γὰρ τῶν ἐν θαλάττῃ πλοίων ἀπόστασιν δι' οὗ τρόπου φασὶν δεικνύναι, τοῦτω προσχρησθῆναι φησιν ἀναγκαῖον, 'Eudemus in his "History of Geometry" attributes this theorem to Thales; for he says that Thales must have made use of it for the method by which, *they say*, he showed the distance of ships at sea' (my italics). This, as Burnet remarks,⁴ is a clear indication of the real basis for all the statements about Thales' geometrical knowledge. Because his was the most notable name in early Greek history about whom various traditional stories were told (as in Herodotus), because he also had a reputation for putting his technical knowledge to practical use (hence the report—which was nothing more than hearsay, as φασί proves—of his measuring the distance of ships from the shore), and because it soon became firmly fixed in the tradition that he had learnt geometry in Egypt (on this see further below), then it seemed obvious to later generations brought up on Euclid and the logical, analytical method of expressing geometrical proofs, that Thales must certainly have known the simpler theorems in the *Elements*, which it was supposed he formulated in the terms familiar to post-Euclidean mathematicians. From this it was only a short and inevitable step to ascribing the actual discoveries of these geometrical propositions to the great man.⁵ In fact, however, the formal, rigorous method of proof by a process of step-by-step deduction from certain fixed definitions and postulates was not developed until the time of Eudoxus in the first half of the fourth century B.C., and there is not the slightest likelihood that it was known to Thales.⁶ He may have possessed some mathematical knowledge of the empirical type of Egyptian or Babylonian mathematics, but that this took the form which Proclus-Eudemus would have us suppose is quite out of the question.

Also regarded as stemming from Eudemus, although admittedly not his in its

¹ Euclid, *Elements* i, Def. 17.

² Cf. Heath, *H.G.M.* i. 131.

³ Wehrli, frag. 134.

⁴ *E.G.P.*, p. 45; cf. Gigon, op. cit., p. 55.

⁵ There is an excellent modern example of this type of rationalization in the oft-repeated statement that the Egyptians of the second millennium B.C. knew that a triangle with sides of 3, 4, and 5 units was right-angled, and used this fact in marking out with ropes the base angles of their monuments; hence, it is said, they knew empirically this special case of the general 'theorem of Pythagoras'. In actual fact, there is no truth in this at all, and the whole story originated in a piece of typical guesswork by M. Cantor (whose *Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Mathematik*, 4 vols., 1880-1908, is probably responsible for more erroneous beliefs in this

field than any other book—cf. O. Neugebauer, *Isis*, xlvii [1956], 58, for a just appraisal of it). Because Cantor thought that ropes representing a triangle with sides of 3, 4, and 5 were the simplest means for constructing a right-angle, he assumed that this was the method used by the Egyptians. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that they knew that such a triangle was right-angled; cf. Heath, *Math.*, p. 96; v. d. Waerden, p. 6.

⁶ Cf. Neugebauer, *Ex. Sci.*, pp. 147-8. Its beginnings may be dated back to Hippocrates in the last half of the fifth century B.C., if he was really the first to compose a book of 'Elements' (στοιχεῖα) as Proclus says (in the 'Eudemian Summary'—see below—Wehrli, frag. 133, p. 55, l. 7): cf. v. d. Waerden, pp. 135-6.

present form,¹ is the so-called *Eudemian Summary*, a brief, 'potted' history of geometry which Proclus prefixes to his *Commentary on the First Book of Euclid*.² It is here that we find for the first time the explicit statement that Thales went to Egypt and thence introduced geometry into Greece: *Θαλῆς δὲ πρῶτον εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐλθὼν μετρήσας εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὴν θεωρίαν ταύτην [γεωμετρίαν] καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς εὗρεν, πολλῶν δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν ὑφηγήσατο* (Wehrli, p. 54, ll. 18–20). Nowhere in the primary group of sources do we find Thales' name linked directly with either the beginnings of geometry or Egypt (or, for that matter, Babylonia); it is only in the secondary sources, and apparently first in Eudemus (if we assume that he is the authority for Proclus' account), that these connexions are made. This is worth emphasizing and is in itself very suggestive. It seems highly probable that the whole picture painted for us by later writers of Thales as the founder of Greek geometry on the basis of knowledge he had acquired in Egypt is nothing more than the amplification and linking together of separate notices in Herodotus.³ The process seems to have been as follows: Thales was a prominent figure in early Greek history about whom practically nothing certain was known except that he lived in Miletus; Milesians were in a position to be able to travel widely; the two most interesting 'barbarian' civilizations known to the Greeks were the Egyptian and the Mesopotamian; therefore Thales (it was assumed) must have visited Egypt and Babylonia; but Herodotus⁴ says that geometry originated in Egypt and thence came into Greece; therefore (it was assumed) Thales must have learnt it there and introduced it to the Greeks. It was left to modern commentators to add yet another stage to the myth by envisaging Thales (because of his alleged prediction of an eclipse) as the transmitter of Babylonian astronomical lore.⁵ Once granted that Thales visited Egypt, then, of course, a number of other stories followed automatically. For example, it would naturally be assumed that he saw the most striking phenomenon of life in Egypt, the annual flooding of the Nile; Herodotus⁶ reports three theories about this and in each case omits to name the originator; what more natural, therefore, than to appropriate the first of these for Thales?⁷ Similarly it would be assumed that he saw the pyramids; therefore, the story followed that he measured their heights (Diels 21). The only surprising thing about these stories (apart from the seriousness with which modern scholars treat them⁸) is that there are not more of them.

¹ Cf. Heath, *H.G.M.* i. 118 f.; *Euclid*, pp. 37–38.

² Proclus *Diadochus*, In *primum Euclidis Elementorum librum comment.*, Prologus II, pp. 64 f. ed. Friedlein; Wehrli, frag. 133, pp. 54–56.

³ Wehrli (op. cit., 115) points out that Eudemus follows Herodotus' view even in the face of a different opinion expressed by Aristotle.

⁴ 2. 109; cf. Diod. Sic. 1. 81. 2; Strabo 757 and 787.

⁵ In fact, a visit of Thales to Babylonia is even less well authenticated than a visit to Egypt—Josephus (*c. Ap.* 1. 2) seems to be the only writer to mention the former; but since Egyptian astronomy never evolved beyond a

very elementary level and did not concern itself with eclipses (cf. Neug., *Ex. Sci.*, pp. 80–91; 95 ad fin.), some connexion between Thales and Babylonia had to be manufactured. This was made the more plausible by reference to Herodotus' statement (2. 109) that the Greeks learnt about the 'polos', the gnomon, and the division of the day into 12 parts (but on this see below) from the Babylonians. ⁶ 2. 20 f.

⁷ Aëtius 4. 1. 1 = Diels 16; cf. Diod. Sic. 1. 38.

⁸ e.g. Gomperz, Gigon, Hölscher, and Hauser accept them all apparently without a qualm; Gigon (op. cit., p. 87) even accepts Cicero's story (*de div.* 1. 50. 112) about Anaximander's foretelling an earthquake.

Thus the Proclus-Eudemos invention of a visit to Egypt by Thales had an enormous effect on the later view of him and his achievements. The Egyptian civilization, whether because of the massive nature of its monuments or simply because of its antiquity, seems to have made a profound and ineradicable impression on the Greeks. This manifested itself in several ways; sometimes by a readiness to attribute to the Egyptians an immemorial knowledge of certain subjects, e.g. geometry; sometimes by a desire to give a respectable antiquity to a body of doctrine by inventing for it an Egyptian origin, e.g. the 'Hermetic' literature of the Alexandrian period;¹ and sometimes by a tendency to suppose that no life of a great man was complete without a visit to Egypt, e.g. Thales, and compare also the apocryphal stories about Pythagoras² and Plato's travels.³ Once the travels became an integral part of the Thales tradition, then it was easy to draw a picture of him as the first Greek philosopher and scientist and the first to become acquainted with the knowledge of the Egyptian and Babylonian priests—a picture which suited well the preconceived ideas that later generations had of what must have happened in those early centuries, but which, it must be emphasized, is entirely hypothetical and unsubstantiated by any really trustworthy evidence. Modern commentators, by using every scrap of information gleaned from late sources, regardless of its genuineness but mindful of its plausibility, have enlarged the picture and even added to its colours so as to harmonize it with our greater knowledge of pre-Greek mathematics and astronomy. It still, however, remains a hypothetical picture, because it is not based on reliable evidence but on imaginary suppositions.³

The evidence we have points clearly to the fact that it was Eudemos, about 250 years after Thales, when already the famous names of early Greek history were dim figures of a remote antiquity about whom little definite was known, who was primarily responsible for using Thales as a convenient peg on which to hang an account of the beginnings of Greek mathematics. Thales' name was well known, there were already stories about his cleverness in Herodotus and Aristotle, and no written work of his remained to contradict whatever doctrine might be assigned to him; he was, in fact, an ideal choice. Once the connexion had been made between him and Egypt, then everything else fitted nicely into place. There is nothing surprising in such a process. The distortion of historical fact in later tradition and the ease with which purely imaginary accounts,

¹ This was represented as part of the divine teaching of the ancient Egyptian god Thoth (Greek, Hermes) and his interpreters, Nechepso and Petosiris; cf. A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, 4 tom. (1944–54)—especially tom. i, pp. 70 f.

² Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 88; G. C. Field, *Plato and His Contemporaries*, 2nd ed. 1948, p. 13.

³ There is a curious dualism evident in most of the modern accounts of Thales. Even those scholars who profess to recognize the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence on which our knowledge of him depends continue to discuss his alleged achievements as though they are undoubtedly real. Despite the occasional qualifying phrase (e.g. 'Thales is said to . . .', 'tradition has it that Thales

. . .', and so on), the desire to believe is so strong that his travels, for example, are now treated as an established fact. One result of this is that the notices about Thales in classical dictionaries and encyclopedias are for the most part uniformly bad; especially misleading are those in *P.W.*, *O.C.D.*, and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*—Chambers's is slightly better, while Tannery's in *La Grande Encyclopédie*, tom. 30 is eminently sensible. It is noteworthy that some American scholars in recent years are at last realizing how little is really known about Thales: cf. D. Fleming in *Isis*, xlvii [1956], reviewing *Essays on the Social History of Science* (Centaurus 1953); M. Clagett, *Greek Science in Antiquity*, 1957, p. 56.

buttressed by one or two circumstantial details, can be rendered entirely plausible could be demonstrated by numerous examples; one thinks of the mighty epic of Roland and its slender basis of fact in an unimportant border skirmish,¹ and the famous story of the First World War about the Russians marching through England with 'snow on their boots'. The legend of Thales built up by the later commentators is simply another more prosaic example of a similar type. Admittedly the lateness of a source does not in itself entirely destroy its worth as a trustworthy authority, but it should at least make us look more closely into the antecedents and origin of the information provided. When, as Diels has clearly shown, this information is based on intermediaries copying and recopying from each other at third, fourth, and fifth hand, then the value of the late source is, I submit, negligible, and the data it provides likely to be unauthentic and misleading. This is especially true of the early Ionian thinkers who, as we have already seen, even to Aristotle's generation tended to be mere names attached to various traditional stories. Anything new, however plausible, that Proclus tells us about Thales must be taken with more than the proverbial grain of salt.

What view, then, based on reliable evidence, are we to take of Thales, having rejected the testimony of the secondary group of sources? We may accept it as a fact that he was a man of outstanding intelligence, for this is implicit in all the references to him in the primary sources; we may also take it that he speculated on the origin and composition of the universe and came to the conclusion that the primary substance was water—this is well attested, but the original statement was soon embellished by later writers and these embellishments were likewise attributed to Thales.² Finally, we may, on the evidence of Herodotus' story of the prediction of the eclipse and (but much more dubiously) the alleged diversion of the river Halys, regard it as highly probable that Thales interested himself in mathematics and astronomy and possessed for his time a more than average knowledge of both. If we wish to know what this knowledge consisted in, there is (owing to the lack of an original source and the scarcity of reliable evidence) only one legitimate means by which we can find out, namely, by a comparative examination of the mathematics and astronomy of Thales' time, and this means in effect Egyptian and Babylonian mathematics and astronomy, for these were the only highly developed civilizations with which the early Greeks came into close contact. This is most definitely not to assert that Thales visited either Egypt or Babylonia; the evidence that he did is, as we have seen, late and unreliable, and we are not entitled on the strength of it to build up elaborate theories about his travels and the knowledge he is supposed to have acquired on them. He *may* have made a tour of the whole Aegean coastline, he *may* have been conducted up and down the Nile and the Euphrates to the accompaniment of a continuous stream of information supplied by priestly guides, and he *may* have crossed the Mediterranean from east to west and north to south sailing entirely at night; there is just as much or just as little evidence for all this as there is for the traditional picture of him as the transmitter of Egyptian and Babylonian wisdom. If, however, we are prepared to believe that he was conversant with the mathematical knowledge of his time, then this must have been of the type of Egyptian and Babylonian mathematics—regardless of whether he actually visited the countries—because there

¹ Rhys Carpenter, *Folk Tale, Fiction and Saga in the Homeric Epics*, repr. 1956, pp. 39-40.

² See the article by Snell, already quoted.

existed no other to which he had access. It is, therefore, only by examining the contents of pre-Greek¹ mathematics that we can estimate what Thales could have known as distinguished from what later commentators supposed he knew. It is useless to try to reason backwards and reconstruct, as Eudemus apparently did, what Thales 'must' have known from the standpoint of Eudemus' own period, for by that time the formal, Euclidean type of mathematics (which is the characteristically Greek contribution in this field) had been firmly established, and if there is one thing that is quite certain it is that this type of treatment was completely foreign to Egyptian and Babylonian mathematics.

This is not the place for a detailed description of them,² but a few salient points may be noted. Both the Egyptian and the Babylonian mathematicians knew the correct formulae for determining the areas and volumes of simple geometrical figures such as triangles, rectangles, trapezoids, etc.; the Egyptians could also calculate correctly the volume of the frustum of a pyramid with a square base (the Babylonians used an incorrect formula for this), and used a formula for the area of a circle, $A(\text{area}) = (\frac{1}{2}d)^2$ where d is the diameter, which gives a value for π of 3.1605—a good approximation.³ These determinations of area and volume were closely connected with practical problems such as the storage of grain in barns of various shapes, the amount of earth needed in the construction of ramps, and so forth. It is especially noteworthy that in both Egyptian and Babylonian geometry the treatment is essentially arithmetical; in the texts the problem is stated with actual numbers and the procedure is then described with explicit instructions as to what to do with these numbers.⁴ There is little indication of how the rules of procedure were discovered in the first place and no trace at all of the existence of a logically arranged corpus of generalized geometrical knowledge with analytical 'proofs' such as we find in the works of Euclid, Archimedes, and Apollonius. Hence even if we wish to assume that Thales visited Egypt (for which—let it be repeated—there is no reliable evidence) all he could have learnt there (and even in this he would probably have had considerable difficulty, for there is no evidence that any Greek of Thales' time could read Egyptian hieroglyphics)⁵ was some empirical data about the simpler geometrical figures, not theorems of the type that Eudemus attributes to him. Egyptian mathematics is essentially additive in character (multiplication and division are reduced to a cumbersome process of successive duplication, the sums of the factors being then added to give the required answer),⁶ and also operates entirely with fractions having 1 as the denominator, with the single exception of $\frac{2}{3}$; it is obviously unsuited to extensive calculations such as are necessary in astronomical problems, and has

¹ Both Egyptian and Babylonian mathematics were already highly developed by the beginning of the second millennium B.C., and both remained largely static until Hellenistic times.

² Excellent accounts are given by O. Neugebauer, *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity*, 2nd ed. 1957 (with full references to the relevant literature), and by B. L. van der Waerden, *Science Awakening*, 1954 (despite an exaggerated and misleading treatment of Thales).

³ The Babylonians commonly used the

rough figure $\pi = 3$, but one text implies the more accurate value $\pi = 3\frac{1}{4}$; cf. Neugebauer, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁴ Cf. v. d. Waerden, pp. 63 f.

⁵ Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 17. The passage in Herodotus (2. 154) about 'interpreters' significantly mentions only Egyptians sent to the Greek settlements in Egypt to learn the language, and says nothing of Greeks learning Egyptian; nor is there any mention of writing.

⁶ Cf. Neug. p. 73.

been described as having 'a retarding force upon numerical procedures'¹—very unlike the extremely flexible Babylonian system of numeration. There is not the slightest evidence or likelihood that the Greeks of Thales' time, or for several centuries afterwards, understood the Egyptian methods.² Only in the late Hellenistic period do we begin to find traces in Greek writers of the existence of a type of mathematics which is very different from the classical Greek mathematics of Euclid and Archimedes, and which has its origins in the Egyptian and Babylonian procedures and forms 'part of this oriental tradition which can be followed into the Middle Ages both in the Arabic and in the western world'.³ Similarly, there is not the slightest justification for supposing that Thales was conversant with the sexagesimal system with its place-value notation which was the invaluable contribution of the Babylonians to later Greek mathematical astronomy. There is evidence to show that neither the sexagesimal system nor the general division of the circle into 360° (also a Babylonian invention) was known to the Greeks before the second century B.C., and that probably Hipparchus (c. 194–120 B.C.) was responsible for at least the introduction of the latter into Greek mathematics.⁴

Detailed knowledge of things Babylonian seems only to have reached the Greeks at a comparatively late period; Herodotus tells us practically nothing about their literature or their science and displays only a limited knowledge of their history.⁵ It is generally considered that the source from which the Greeks obtained most of their knowledge about Babylonian culture was Berossus, a Babylonian priest who is supposed to have set up a school in Cos about 270 B.C. and to have produced works on Babylonian history;⁶ certainly, in the second century B.C. Hipparchus was familiar with the results of Babylonian astronomy. There is, however, no evidence that the Greeks before the third century B.C. knew much more about the Babylonian civilization than Herodotus did. Thus the modern myth-makers' determined efforts to manufacture a connexion between Thales and Babylonia are as fruitless as they are without foundation; even had he visited that country there is again no evidence and no likelihood that he could read the cuneiform script.

To sum up—there is no reliable evidence at all for the extensive travels that Thales is supposed to have undertaken; his mathematical knowledge could hardly have comprised more than some empirical rules for the determination of elementary areas and volumes; his astronomical knowledge must have been

¹ Id., p. 80.

² Van der Waerden (p. 36) is very misleading here. The difference between the classical Greek and the Egyptian methods of multiplication and division is clearly shown by Heath, *Manual*, pp. 29 f.

³ Neug., p. 80.

⁴ The arguments and the evidence cannot conveniently be presented here, but I hope to discuss them in a further article. Meanwhile it should be noted that A. Wasserstein's curious paper 'Thales' Determination of the Diameters of the Sun and Moon' (as remarkable for its disregard of recent modern work in this field as for its inconclusiveness) in *J.H.S.* lxxv (1955), 114–16, contains little but unwarrantable assumptions based on

unreliable evidence.

⁵ Cf. W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, repr. 1950, i. 379–80. The only Greek borrowings from the Babylonians that Herodotus mentions are of the 'polos' (a portable, hemi-spherical sun-dial), the gnomon, and the division of the day into 12 parts (in this he is only partly correct, as it was the day-and-night period that was divided into 12 parts).

⁶ Cf. P. Schnabel, *Berossus und die babylonische-hellenistische Literatur*, 1923. It must, however, be said that Schnabel's conclusions regarding Babylonian astronomy are now untenable, and his arguments in support of the great influence of Berossus' writings are very speculative and far from conclusive.

similarly elementary (probably comprising nothing more scientific than the recognition of some constellations),¹ since there is not the slightest likelihood that he was familiar with the complicated linear methods of Babylonian astronomy, and Egyptian astronomy was of a very primitive character; on the other hand, he might possibly have heard of the 18-year cycle for lunar phenomena and might somehow have connected this with a solar eclipse so as to give rise to the story that he predicted it; there is no reason to disbelieve the early stories of his political and commercial sagacity, or the fact that he considered the primary matter of the universe to be water; everything else that is attributed to him by later writers in the secondary group of sources (including Eudemus) can be disregarded.

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¹ Kirk and Raven's description (op. cit., pp. 81-82) of Thales' astronomical activities is far too optimistic. Some idea of the primitiveness of the astronomical ideas then current may be gained from the peculiar notions of his successors such as Anaximander,

Anaximenes, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus, which Heiberg (*Gesch. d. Math. und Naturwiss. im Altert.*, 1925, p. 50) rightly characterizes as 'diese Mischung von genialer Intuition und kindlichen Analogien'.

SOME PASSAGES OF THE *AGAMEMNON*

In this article I deal with difficulties, textual and exegetical, in ten passages of the *Agamemnon*. In some passages there is wide agreement on the sense required, but not on the remedies proposed for a corrupt reading: here I venture to put forward fresh proposals that seem to possess a reasonable¹ degree of palaeographical probability (1347, 1659). In another passage I argue for a new interpretation with its appropriate emendation (1339). In some cases where the sense is hardly in doubt and the text not certainly corrupt, I propose what seems on linguistic or other grounds a preferable reading (496, 966, 1409, 1630), or I argue in favour of some other scholar's proposal (319). Finally, where there can be little, if any, likelihood of successful restoration, I offer a tentative suggestion which may give at least an approximation to the original text (1657).

In one passage (1346 ff.) I hope that the transpositions proposed will be considered a great improvement.

319 λόγους δ' ἀκούσαι τούσδε κάποθανμάσαι
διηγεκῶς θέλοιμ' ἄν, ὡς λέγεις πάλιν.

ὡς λέγεις is, I think, wholly unsatisfactory (see Denniston-Page). Sidgwick's defence of ὡς λέγεις is conceivably right, 'according as thou would'st tell it again', but, as Fraenkel says, 'unnatural'. On the other hand, εἰ λέγεις (Blomfield) is excellent, 'if you would be so good as to tell the story again'. For the polite conditional clause cf. *πείθοι' ἄν, εἰ πείθοι'* (1049), *χαίροιτ' ἄν εἰ χαίροιτ'* (1394), *εἰ βοῦλει*, 'please', after an imperative.

494-7 μαρτυρεῖ δέ μοι κάσις
πηλοῦ ξύνουρος θυβία κόνις τάδε,
ὡς οὔτ' ἀναυδος οὔτε σοι δαίων φλόγα
ῦλης ὀρείας σσημανεῖ καπνῷ πυρός.

I believe there is corruption in 496, but I am concerned here only with 497.

Throughout Clytemnestra's speech (281-316) we are impressed by the brilliance of the beacons: *λαμπρὸν σέλας* (281), *τὸ χρυσοφεγγές ὥς τις ἥλιος σέλας* (288-9), *δίκην φαιδρᾶς σελήνης* (298), *φάος* (300, 302, 311), *φλογὸς μέγαν πύργωνα* (306); cf. *φασσφόρων* (489), *φῶς* (492). It is therefore somewhat surprising to find in 497 the expression *καπνῷ πυρός*. Where there is smoke there must be fire, but we may have fire without any appreciable smoke, and this is obviously the kind of fire Clytemnestra has described. In 497 the mention of smoke is quite unsuitable, and I suggest that Aeschylus wrote *πανῶ* (cf. 284). If *πανῶ* had been written *απνῶ*, this would naturally become *καπνῶ*.

965 δόμοισι προυνεχθέντος ἐν χρηστηρίοις
ψυχῆς κόμιστρα τῆσδε μηχανωμένης.

We should, with many modern editors, read *μηχανωμένη* (Abresch), and take both *δόμοισι* and *μηχανωμένη* to be dependent on *προυνεχθέντος* (schema

¹ After all the labour expended on the text of the *Agamemnon* it is unlikely that absolutely convincing emendations will be forthcoming.

Ionicum: 'the Queen is in the absence of the master the representative of the δόμοι'—Fraenkel). It is highly desirable, however, that a pronoun (going with the participle) should be expressed, and I suggest τῇδε = γυναικὶ τῇδε = ἐμοί: cf. γυναικὸς τῇδε = ἐμοῦ in 1438 (spoken by Clytemnestra); so τῇδε = ἐμοῦ in *S. Tr.* 305. This alteration disposes of the difficulty of making Agamemnon to be referred to as ψυχῆς τῇδε (see Fraenkel and Denniston—Page). ψυχῆς is the life of Agamemnon, but instead of saying 'your life' Clytemnestra makes the reference indirect: 'of a (man's) life'.

1338 ff.

νῦν δ' εἰ προτέρων αἶμ' ἀποτείσῃ
καὶ τοῖσι θανοῦσι θανῶν † ἄλλων
ποινὰς θανάτων ἐπικράνῃ,
τίς κἄν εὖξαιτο βροτῶν ἀσινεῖ
δαίμονι φῦναι τὰδ' ἀκούων;

Men can never have enough prosperity. Consider Agamemnon, conqueror of Troy, honoured of Heaven (1331–7): should one not with good reason expect him to continue to enjoy prosperity? But, if Cassandra is right, he will not: he must by his own death pay for the blood shed by his father Atreus. If such is the fate of Agamemnon, who can be assured of unbroken good fortune? This summary paraphrase gives what I believe to be the correct interpretation of the passage 1331–42.

In view of the repeated references¹ in the preceding scene to the murder of Thyestes' children, we should naturally suppose that they alone are referred to in προτέρων (1338), τοῖσι θανοῦσι (1339), and θανάτων (1340). In this anapaestic passage the Chorus are drawing their pessimistic conclusion from Cassandra's prophecy, of which alone their minds for the time being are full. The fact that the language in itself could refer to Iphigenia's death (cf. *Μῆνις τεκνόποινος* in 155, θανάτῳ τέισας ἄπερ ἔρξεν in 1529, i.e. having paid by his death for the sacrifice of Iphigenia) is no guarantee that in this particular context it does, and context is decisive. Compare the utterances of the Queen, who recognizes two good reasons for her deed, but which reason she puts forward at any moment depends on circumstances, on the ideas or emotions that are immediately dominant.²

I think, then, that the context is all in favour of the interpretation of ποιנὰς θανάτων as 'punishment for the deaths of Thyestes' children'. If this is correct, ἄλλων must be corrupt. It would be absurd, as Fraenkel shows (p. 631), to make ἄλλων refer to τοῖς θανοῦσι, and there are several reasons why it should not refer to Clytemnestra and Aegisthus: (i) the whole context is against it: cf. what was said above about the supposed reference to Iphigenia; (ii) a reference to Clytemnestra and Aegisthus is quite irrelevant to the question τίς . . . φῦναι, which is asked from the standpoint of one considering what may happen in the near future, not with what may come after Agamemnon's death; (iii) a reference to the vengeance to be taken on Clytemnestra and

¹ 1096, 1217, 1242. Atreus' sin is referred to twice: τῶν πάλαι πεπραγμένων (1185), παλαιὰς ἀμαρτίας δόμων (1197), and in 1223 the punishment for it is foretold. It is probable that in 1340 ποιנὰς is an echo of ποιנὰς in 1223. In both passages I believe the punishment is said to fall on Agamemnon.

² In 1500 ff. the murder of Agamemnon is

regarded as punishment for Atreus' crime, and naturally so, since from 1468 the theme has been the δαίμων βαρύμηνις γένεης. Earlier in the scene Clytemnestra thinks of Agamemnon's murder as justice realized for her child (1432), whose sacrifice (1417) called for another sacrifice (that of Agamemnon, 1509).

Aegisthus would have a 'disastrously weakening effect here' (Fraenkel, loc. cit.); (iv) *ποινὰς θανάτων* would naturally mean 'punishment for deaths', not 'punishment consisting in deaths', though the explanatory gen. might stand if the interpretation were otherwise acceptable. The cumulative effect of all these objections seems to me overwhelming.

If in place of *ἄλλων* we had some descriptive adj. such as 'unholy' (*ἄνακτον*, *ἀνίερον* are used of Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice Iphigenia, 220), 'impious' (*ἀσεβεί* is applied to *θανάτω* in 1493, of Agamemnon's death), the gen. phrase would be unexceptionable: if Agamemnon by his death brings to pass for the dead retribution for their impious deaths. I suggest *ἀνόμων θανάτων*: cf. *Or.* 1455, *φονίων παθὲν ἀνόμων τε κακῶν*. The first four letters of *ἀνόμων* may have dropped out by haplography (*ANΩN* and *ANOM* are almost identical) and *ἄλλων* may be a stop-gap—a stupid one; alternatively, *αν* may have dropped out after *ων* and *OMΩN* could be read as *ΑΛΛΩN*.

1346 ff.

Χο.	τοῦργον εἰργάσθαι δοκεῖ μοι βασιλέως οἰμώγμασιν· ἀλλὰ κοινωσώμεθ' *ἔμπας ἀσφαλῆ βουλευόμενα.	1346
1	ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην λέγω, πρὸς δῶμα δεῦρ' ἀστοῖσι κηρύσσειν βοήν.	
2	ἐμοὶ δ' ὅπως τάχιστα γ' ἐμπεσεῖν δοκεῖ καὶ πρᾶγμ' ἐλέγχειν σὺν νεορρῦτῳ ξίφει.	1350
3	κἀγὼ τοιούτου γνώματος κοινωὸς ὢν ψηφίζομαι τὸ δρᾶν τι μὴ μέλλειν δ' ἀκμή.	1353
5	χρονίζομεν γάρ· οἱ δὲ τῆς μελλοῦς κλέος πέδον πατοῦντες οὐ καθεύδουσιν χερί.	1356 1357
4	ὁρᾶν πάρεστι· φροιμάζονται γὰρ ὡς τυραννίδος σημεῖα πράσσοντες πόλει.	1354 1355
8	ἦ καὶ βίον τείνοντες ὧδ' ὑπέξομεν δόμων κατασχυντήρσι τοῖσδ' ἡγουμένοις;	1362 1363
9	ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεκτόν, ἀλλὰ καθναεῖν κρατεῖ· πεπαιτέρα γὰρ μοῖρα τῆς τυραννίδος.	1364 1365
6	οὐκ οἶδα βουλῆς ἥστινος τυχὼν λέγω· τοῦ δρωντός ἐστι καὶ τὸ βουλευῆσαι πέρι.	1358 1359
7	κἀγὼ τοιοῦτός εἰμ', ἐπεὶ δυσμηχανῶ λόγοισι τὸν θανόντ' ἀνιστάμαι πάλιν.	1360 1361
10	ἦ γὰρ τεκμηρίουσιν ἐξ οἰμωγμάτων μαντευσόμεσθα τάνδρος ὡς ὀλωλός;	1366 1367
11	σάφ' εἰδότας χρὴ τῶνδε μυθεῖσθαι πέρι· τὸ γὰρ τοπάζειν τοῦ σάφ' εἰδέναι δίχα.	
12	ταύτην ἐπαινεῖν πάντοθεν πληθύνομαι, τραπῶς Ἀτρεΐδην εἰδέναι κυροῦνθ' ὅπως.	1370

The Coryphaeus begins by stating what is obvious to all: 'I gather from the King's groans that the deed has been done.' Nothing they can do will alter that melancholy fact. 'Nevertheless,' he adds, 'let us share safe counsels with one

* For *ἀν πως* of the MSS. I think we should read *ἔμπας* (ἀλλ' *ἔμπας* in P.V. 187).

another.' In the face of a *fait accompli* what sort of counsels can be given? What is the point of giving them? It may be replied: some interval must elapse between the King's cries from behind the stage and the appearance of Clytemnestra, if only to allow time for the bodies to be displayed in the doorway (whether by *ἐκκύκλημα* or in some other way). This interval is emotionally appropriate as well: it increases the tension; instead of rushing to the rescue, or, if it is too late for that, of finding out whether the King is alive or dead, the Elders, by making no move, keep the audience in suspense. Further, the manner in which the interval is used serves to reveal the Elders' state of mind. It was clearly the poet's intention to depict their bewilderment, their irresolution, and the hopelessness of the situation. This intention, it must be agreed, he has carried out with conspicuous success! It must not, of course, be supposed that the inaction of the Chorus betrays lack of devotion to their King—on this point see Fraenkel, p. 643.

Of the twelve speakers only two (1 and 2) make really concrete proposals:¹ summon help from the citizens, dash in and surprise the murderers red-handed. Speaker 3 agrees with 2 that something must be done and that right quickly, but contributes nothing original. Speakers 11 and 12 stress the importance of *finding out* whether Agamemnon is dead or alive, but say nothing about *how* the information is to be obtained. Speaker 6 confesses he does not know what to suggest, but recognizes the necessity for a *plan of action*. Speaker 7 agrees with him: words get you nowhere. The remaining speakers (4, 5, 8, 9, 10) do not propose any course of action, but *make comments* on what some one else has said, or else give their reflections on future prospects, or wonder whether Agamemnon is to be presumed dead.

From this summary of what the speakers say we see how little substance there is in their *βουλευματα* (1347), but the fact to which I wish to draw special attention is this: *with only three exceptions* (as the text stands) *each couplet is directly related to the preceding one*. Thus, *ἐμοὶ δ'* (1350) answers *ἐγὼ μὲν* (1348); *καὶ γὰρ* (1352) ranges the speaker alongside no. 2 (so does his *τοιούτου*); 4 and 5 comment on what precedes in each case; 7 (*τοιούτός*) follows on 6, 9 on 8, 11 on 10, 12 on 11. That there should be this close connexion in thought between most of the couplets is only to be expected. The number of possible *ἀσφαλῆ βουλευματα* was very limited: summon help (1), discover the murderer or murderers (2), find out the truth about Agamemnon (11, 12)—what else could there be in the way of immediate action or some plan leading to action? With twelve speakers to provide with a couplet each it is obvious that comment is all that is possible for the majority and I hope to show that the comment extends even further than the traditional order of lines allows us to believe. In fact, I think 1358-9 is the only couplet that was originally completely independent of its predecessor. As if in recognition that the discussion is wandering rather far from the exhortation of the Coryphaeus no. 6 gets back to the idea of putting forward some plan of action (*βουλή* recalls the *βουλευματα* of 1347); even if he has to confess he is nonplussed, he does see that action demands planning.

As they stand in the manuscripts lines 1362, 1366 are quite unconnected with what immediately precedes. Such lack of connexion is not in itself sus-

¹ Fraenkel exaggerates the number of those 'in favour of immediate action' (p. 644). Speakers 8 and 9 should not be counted in, and, as will be seen later, I would exclude also 4 and 5.

picious: we may suppose that speakers 8 and 10 express their thoughts without any reference to what others have said (so no. 6); but (a) in ordinary usage interrogative sentences beginning with *ἦ γάρ* or *ἦ καί* are related to what immediately precedes. Something the preceding speaker has just said prompts the question. (b) By a transposition the questions will follow naturally upon something already said. Thus, the content of 1362-5 and the repetition of the keyword *τυραννίδος* surely link these lines to 1355. Speaker 4 says in so many words, 'It looks as if we are in for a tyranny'; on which the speaker of 1362-3 remarks, 'What? Are we to drag out our lives in submission to these *κατασχυντήρες δόμων*?' To which the answer is, 'No; death were a milder lot than tyranny.' For similar reasons (idiomatic usage and connexion of thought) I believe 1366-7 should follow 1361. Speaker 7 refers to Agamemnon as *τὸν θανόντα*; but is he justified in so doing? Is he not jumping to a conclusion on insufficient evidence? This is the doubt expressed by the 10th speaker's question: note that *ὁλωλότος* takes up the previous speaker's *θανόντα*.

Attention to sequence of thought enables us to render highly probable another transposition: 1356 should follow 1353. 'Tis no time to delay' says no. 3. 'You are right: we are delaying while *they* lose no time.' Note the sequence *μέλλειν*, *χρονίζομεν*, *μελλοῦς* and the propriety of putting *οἱ δὲ . . . οὐ καθεύδουσιν χερί* before *φροιμάζονται γάρ . . .* 'True' (*χρονίζομεν γάρ*): 'and their first act savours of tyranny'—the general statement *οὐ καθεύδουσιν χερί* is followed by the more specific *φροιμάζονται . . . πόλει*. Also the subject of *φροιμάζονται* has not to be inferred (there being no reference to the murderers so far), and *οἱ δὲ* is the suitable way of introducing them. Lastly, *ὅρᾱν πάρεσιν* now refers to *καθεύδουσιν χερί*, to what the murderers have achieved, and the following clause is explanatory, describing the same act as betokening tyranny. With the traditional order of lines we have to 'supply' some object for *ὅρᾱν πάρεσιν*, and it is significant that scholars are by no means agreed about what should be supplied. If with Bothe we understand the object to be *ἀκμὴν εἶναι μὴ μέλλειν* we get sense, but a rather poor sense; to see what *they* have been up to is much more pertinent than to be conscious of their own procrastination. Schütz's note is, *imo uero tempus instat uidendi*; scil. rem gestam gerendamue cognoscendi—a palpable misinterpretation. Mazon's 'on peut attendre et voir' makes an arbitrary addition to the Greek and misconceives the situation. Fraenkel makes no comment: his version 'It is clear: their prelude is that of people whose doings betoken tyranny against the city' takes the *γάρ* clause to be the real object of *ὅρᾱν*; but *ὅρᾱν πάρεσιν* would naturally look backwards, not forwards. Denniston-Page understand the object of *ὅρᾱν* to be 'their intentions', *ἃ θέλουσι* (Paley), which gives good sense, but which I find it difficult to supply.

It cannot, I think, be denied that the transpositions given above greatly improve the sequence of thought and are therefore not only possible, but probable. Only two mistakes are assumed: (i) the transposition of two couplets, 1354-5 and 1356-7; (ii) the transposition of 1358-61 (which hang together) and 1362-5 (which also hang together). The mistakes once made were not readily to be noticed, since the utterances nevertheless did make sense. That some of them were consequently isolated utterances, having no connexion with what immediately precedes, would not trouble the scribe who would probably think, if he thought at all about the matter, that when a series of opinions is invited there is no logical necessity that would prevent their being delivered

in isolation; indeed the contrary would appear to be the case. That in our passage most of the utterances are not isolated is due to the fact that the number of possible suggestions is exceedingly limited, so that mere comment also was needed to give every choreutes an opportunity of speaking.

1407 ff. τί κακόν, ὦ γύναι, . . . πασαμένα . . . τόδ' ἐπέθου θύος. . .

θύος, if sound, must surely mean 'sacrifice', a substitute for 'murderous killing' (Denniston-Page). The word is taken up by Clytemnestra in 1417, ἔθυσεν αὐτοῦ παῖδα. 'What drove you to this "sacrifice"', asks the Chorus, 'that will bring to you curses, hatred, banishment?' To which Cl. retorts: 'You condemn *my* sacrifice, but you said not a word against *his* sacrifice: did *he* not deserve banishment for his foul deed?'

Instead of τόδ' ἐπέθου θύος, which presupposes an unexampled meaning for ἐπέθου, 'bring, take upon yourself', should we not read τῷδ' ἐπέθου θύει, 'set yourself to', a well-established meaning (see L. and S.)?

1442-3 πιστῇ ξύνεννος, ναυτίλων δὲ σελμάτων
†ισοτορίβης.

ισοτορίβης is here meaningless. Perhaps ιστ has come from the initial word of the preceding line. ὁμοτορίβης is exactly what is wanted: it is an unexceptionable compound, whereas ισοτορίβης (Pauw) is unexampled (see Fraenkel). Aeschylus is rather partial to ὁμο- compounds: see in this play 158, 1004, 1108, 1509.

1630 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἦγε πάντ' ἀπὸ φθογγῆς χαρᾶ.

'He by his voice led all things after him in delight' (Fraenkel). I find the conjunction of ἀπὸ φθογγῆς and χαρᾶ very awkward, since the former refers to the subject of ἦγε, the latter to πάντα: 'he led them by *his* voice through the joy *they* felt'. ἦγε πάντ' ἀπὸ φθογγῆς is unexceptionable, but, if we add χαρᾶ it would naturally mean the joy felt by Orpheus, especially as the preceding phrase refers to *Orpheus'* voice. This stylistic difficulty could be overcome if it were possible to take φθογγῆς χαρᾶ together: 'he led them because of the joy they felt in his voice', a sense that some scholars obtained by construing χαρᾶ ἀπὸ φθογγῆς (against this see Fraenkel p. 774), Margoliouth by reading ὑπό for ἀπό (but the purely instrumental ὑπό with dat. 'by means of' is only used with passive verbs or their equivalents, while the meaning 'to the accompaniment of' is here not suitable). Everything is satisfactory if we read ἀπὸ φθογγῆς χαρᾶς, 'through their delight in his voice', διότι τῇ φθογγῇ αὐτοῦ ἔχαιρον, as a scholiast might have explained. With φθογγῆς χαρά compare μελέων χαρά in *Alc.* 579.

1657-8 στείχετε δ' οἱ γέροντες πρὸς δόμους †πεπρωμένους τοῦδε†
πρὶν παθεῖν ἔρξαντες †καιρὸν χρὴν τάδ' ὥς ἐπράξαμεν.

It seems most unlikely that these lines can be convincingly emended, but I hope that the following discussion may help towards a tentative restoration.

The general sense is doubtless 'Depart, ye Elders, before you do something that will cause you harm. You must accept the situation that we have brought about.' If the Elders are to depart, it is presumably to their homes, certainly not into the Palace, so that if we keep πρὸς δόμους we must delete τοῦδε

(quite apart from considerations of metre); cf. *πρὸς δόμους δ' ἴθι*, a command addressed to the Chorus in *Persae* 1038. The next difficulty is *πεπρωμένους*, which gives no suitable sense if taken with *δόμους*. Madvig's clever suggestion *πεπρωμένοις* . . . *εἰζάντες* does away with what seems essential, the contrast between *παθεῖν* and *ἔρξαντες* (cf. the familiar *δράσαντι παθεῖν* and *δράσωμεν* in 1654). I think *πεπρωμένους* must be a corruption of a quite different word: if it is, we must allow for the possibility that the demonstrative was in the original text. The commonly held view, that *τούσδε* is a gloss on *δόμους*, seems to me very unlikely. Would any scribe be so fatuous as to imagine that Clytemnestra is commanding the Elders to enter the Palace? I admit that scribes are often very stupid, but this seems *folie à outrance*. May not the Queen have said something like this, 'Depart, ye Elders, and be favourably disposed to this house', *τούσδε πρευμενεῖς¹ δόμοις*? She wants no more bloodshed and warns the Chorus that continued hostility can only do them harm. For the meaning of *πρευμενεῖς* cf. *Suppl.* 207, where the Chorus pray that Zeus may look down upon them with favouring eye, *πρευμενοῦς ἀπ' ὀμματος*.

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H. D. BROADHEAD

Christchurch, New Zealand

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